Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 20, 2024. Petitioner: Corner Post, Inc.Respondent: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Advocates: Bryan K. Weir (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The case concerns the interchange fees associated with debit card transactions, which generate billions of dollars in revenue for issuing banks. The regulatory agency, the Board of the Federal Reserve System, promulgated a rule (“Regulation II”) to govern these fees. Regulation II caps the fees that banks can charge for each debit card transaction. Petitioners in the case include Corner Post, a convenience store, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA), and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA), all of whom accept debit card payments and are thus affected by interchange fees. On April 29, 2021, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA) and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA) challenged Regulation II as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the Board moved to dismiss the case based on the statute of limitations, NDRA and NDPMA amended their complaint to add Corner Post, Inc. as an additional plaintiff. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the 2015 clarification to Regulation II did not reset the statute of limitations, that Corner Post's statute of limitations began in 2011 with the original publication of Regulation II, and that none of the plaintiffs’ claims warranted equitable tolling. The Merchants appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a plaintiff’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act “first accrue” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule, or when the rule first causes harm to the plaintiff?

Trump v. Anderson Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 8, 2024. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.Respondent: Norma Anderson, et al. Advocates: Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Petitioner) Jason C. Murray (for Respondents Anderson, et al.) Shannon W. Stevenson (for Respondent Griswold) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Donald Trump was elected as the 45th President, serving for four years. In the 2020 election, Joe Biden was elected as the 46th President, despite Trump's refusal to accept the results. The Electoral College confirmed Biden's victory with 306 votes to Trump's 232. Trump continued to challenge the outcome in court and media. On January 6, 2021, during a Congressional session to certify the election, Trump held a rally, claiming victory and urging supporters to protest at the Capitol. The next day, Vice President Pence certified Biden's win. Trump is currently seeking the Colorado Republican Party’s nomination for the 2024 presidential election. A group of Colorado electors, consisting of both registered Republicans and unaffiliated voters, filed a petition in the Denver District Court to prevent Trump from appearing on the Colorado Republican presidential primary ballot. Citing Colorado’s Uniform Election Code, they requested the court to direct Secretary of State Jena Griswold to exclude Trump’s name. Their argument centered on Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, claiming Trump was disqualified due to his involvement in the January 6, 2021, insurrection, violating his presidential oath to support the U.S. Constitution. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that Trump engaged in insurrection as those terms are used in Section Three but that Section Three does not apply to the president. Thus, the court denied the petition. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that Section Three disqualifies Trump from holding the office of President of the United States and thus that it would be unlawful under Colorado law to list him on the ballot. Question Does Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment disqualify Donald Trump from holding the office of President of the United States and thus from appearing on Colorado’s 2024 presidential primary ballot?

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 17, 2024. Petitioner: Loper Bright Enterprises, et al.Respondent: Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A group of commercial fishermen who regularly participate in the Atlantic herring fishery sued the National Marine Fisheries Service after the Service promulgated a rule that required industry to fund at-sea monitoring programs at an estimated cost of $710 per day. The fisherman argued that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 did not authorize the Service to create industry-funded monitoring requirements and that the Service failed to follow proper rulemaking procedure. The district court granted summary judgment for the government based on its reasonable interpretation of its authority and its adoption of the rule through the required notice-and-comment procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Question 1. Does the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorize the National Marine Fisheries Service to promulgate a rule that would require industry to pay for at-sea monitoring programs? 2. Should the Court overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council or at least clarify whether statutory silence on controversial powers creates an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?

Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 17, 2024. Petitioner: Relentless, Inc., et al.Respondent: Department of Commerce, et al. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Atlantic herring fishery is regulated by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), aimed at preventing overfishing and promoting conservation. The MSA sets up regional councils, including the New England Fishery Management Council, which oversees the Atlantic herring fishery. These councils create fishery management plans (FMPs) to set conservation measures, which must align with ten National Standards and other laws. The Secretary of Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), reviews and publishes these plans for public comment. In 2000, the New England Council established an FMP for Atlantic herring, updated with an industry-funded monitoring program in 2020. The program partially shifts the cost of at-sea monitoring to vessel owners but aims for a 50% target of monitored herring trips, which will cause reduced profits for the fishing industry and communities. Owners of two fishing vessels, Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet LLC, challenged the Rule, arguing that the monitoring requirement disproportionately burdens them because of their longer trips and inability to qualify for exemptions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Agency, ruling that the MSA’s ambiguity on industry-paid monitors allows for agency interpretation under Chevron deference, that the Rule complies with the MSA’s National Standards and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and does not violate the Commerce Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question 1. Should Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council be overruled? 2. Does statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?

Devillier v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 16, 2024. Petitioner: Richard Devillier.Respondent: State of Texas. Advocates: Robert J. McNamara (for the Petitioners) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Devillier and others own property in Texas along Interstate Highway 10 (IH-10). The State of Texas, through the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), elevated IH-10 and installed a solid concrete median barrier, which acted as a “weir” to obstruct natural water flow and led to the flooding of the petitioners’ properties. Despite being aware of the potential for flooding, the State proceeded with the construction and even extended the barrier, causing extensive damage to the petitioners’ properties. The petitioners sued the state, directly invoking the Taking Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which they argued applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied Texas’s motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated, finding the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a right of action for takings claims against the state. Question May a party sue a state directly under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 16, 2024. Petitioner: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp., et al.Respondent: Moab Partners, L.P., et al. Advocates: Linda T. Coberly (for the Petitioners) David C. Frederick (for the Respondent) Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) For years, Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. had been lauded as a “total return opportunity” thanks to its strong dividend history, diversified business operations, and favorable growth rates. One of its most significant assets, International-Matex Tank Terminals (“IMTT”), was a substantial driver of its profit, with a major focus on storing No. 6 fuel oil. However, Macquarie and its leadership allegedly hid crucial information from investors, specifically about IMTT’s heavy reliance on No. 6 fuel oil, a commodity facing stringent upcoming regulations and declining demand. Even after international regulations on sulfur levels in fuel were confirmed to drastically affect the market for No. 6 fuel oil, the company continued to misrepresent its exposure, allegedly misleading investors about IMTT's flexibility and downplaying the impending effects on revenue. On February 21, 2018, Macquarie first announced a sharp decline in IMTT utilization, earnings falling short of analysts’ expectations, and a 31% cut to the company’s dividend. The company admitted for the first time that it would need to spend hundreds of millions to repurpose IMTT's storage tanks due to the declining demand for No. 6 fuel oil. As a result, the stock price plummeted, and Macquarie’s management faced a credibility crisis. Questions arose about the company’s transparency and honesty, harming investor trust and the company’s overall reputation. On behalf of a class of plaintiffs, Moab Partners, L.P., sued Macquarie, alleging that it made material omissions and false and misleading statements about IMTT in violation of various provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that while many of the alleged misstatements are not actionable, the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded material omissions and facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter. Question May a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K support a private claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even in the absence of an otherwise misleading statement?

Smith v. Arizona Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2024. Petitioner: Jason Smith.Respondent: State of Arizona. Advocates: Hari Santhanam (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Alexander W. Samuels (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In December 2019, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Jason Smith's father's property, which had multiple structures. They detected a strong odor of marijuana from a shed, where they found Smith and later discovered various drugs and paraphernalia. Smith was charged with multiple felonies related to drug possession. During the trial, a forensic scientist testified that the seized substances were indeed illegal drugs. Smith's defense argued he was merely at the property to care for his ill father and was not involved in any illegal activities. Smith was found guilty on several counts, including possession of marijuana for sale, and was sentenced to four years in prison. Smith appealed the decision, claiming, among other things, that the admission of drug-analysis testimony violated his confrontation rights because the testifying expert relied on data generated by a non-testifying expert. The appellate court affirmed. Question Does the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permit the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst?

Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 9, 2024. Petitioner: George Sheetz.Respondent: County of El Dorado, California. Advocates: Paul J. Beard II (for the Petitioner) Aileen M. McGrath (for the Respondent) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The County of El Dorado, California, has a Traffic Impact Mitigation (TIM) Fee Program that imposes a traffic-impact fee on any property owner applying for a building permit. The fee consists of two components: the “Highway 50 Component” and the “Local Road Component,” and is determined by the geographic zone in which the project is located and the type of construction proposed. The fee is mandatory regardless of the actual impact the project may have on existing or future roads. The TIM Fee Program stipulates that new developments bear the full cost of road construction and widening, even though these roads are used and benefitted from by existing residents and non-residents alike. In 2012, the County Board passed a resolution establishing new TIM Fee rates, which were subsequently applied to George Sheetz’s project. Sheetz applied for a building permit in July 2016 to construct a 1,854-square-foot manufactured house for his family. The County required him to pay $23,420 in traffic-mitigation fees based on the type and location of his project, even though no individualized assessment was made to correlate the fee with the project’s actual impact on local or state roads. Sheetz paid the fee under protest and later filed a legal action against the County, alleging the fee was an unconstitutional condition under the Nollan and Dolan standards and seeking a refund of the fee paid. Under the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, “the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional right.” The U.S. Supreme Court in Nollan (1987) and Dolan (1994) recognized that land-use permit applicants “are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits.” Under those cases, the government may condition approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s dedication of property to public use if the government can prove that an “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” exist between the demanded property and the impacts of the owner’s project. The superior court ruled against Sheetz, concluding that legislative exactions are exempt from Nollan/Dolan review. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. Question Is a monetary exaction imposed by a local government as a condition for a building permit exempt from the “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” requirements established in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, simply because the exaction is authorized by local legislation?

Office of the United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 9, 2024. Petitioner: Office of the United States Trustee.Respondent: John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC, et al. Advocates: Masha G. Hansford (for the Petitioner) Daniel L. Geyser (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the U.S., bankruptcy proceedings are administered through two systems: the Trustee Program managed by the Department of Justice for 88 judicial districts, and the Bankruptcy Administrator Program for six districts in Alabama and North Carolina, overseen directly by the courts. This dual system originated in 1978, with Alabama and North Carolina eventually gaining a permanent exemption from the Trustee Program in 2000. Both programs have different funding models, with the Trustee Program financed primarily through debtor fees and the Administrator Program funded through the general judicial budget. Over the years, Congress has enacted various amendments to balance the fee structures between the two systems, but disparities have remained, most notably with the 2017 Amendment which significantly raised fees in Trustee districts. Seventy-six Chapter 11 debtors associated with John Q. Hammons Hotels & Resorts (Debtors) filed for bankruptcy in the District of Kansas, a Trustee district, in June 2016. Their cases were still pending when a 2017 Amendment took effect in January 2018, which significantly increased their quarterly Chapter 11 disbursement fees. By the end of December 2019, they had paid over $2.5 million more in fees than they would have if they had filed in a Bankruptcy Administrator district, such as those in North Carolina and Alabama. The Debtors challenged the fee increase in bankruptcy court, arguing it was unequally applied and retroactive without clear congressional intent. The bankruptcy court rejected these arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. Question Must the U.S. Trustee issue refunds for the extra fees paid by debtors in certain districts to address the lack of uniformity identified in Siegel v. Fitzgerald?

Campos-Chaves v. Garland Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 8, 2024. Petitioner: Moris Esmelis Campos-Chaves.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Charles L. McCloud (for the United States) Easha Anand (for the Petitioner in 22-674 and the Respondent in 22-884) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Moris Campos-Chaves, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States illegally on January 24, 2005, and was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) on February 10, 2005. He was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). When Campos-Chaves did not appear for his hearing, he was ordered removed in absentia. Years later, on September 18, 2018, Campos-Chaves moved to reopen his case, arguing that the NTA he had initially received was defective. The immigration judge concluded that the NTA was not defective, and Campos-Chaves had actually received both the NTA and the Notice of Hearing. Thus, the immigration judge denied his petition for review and also denied all pending motions. The Board of Immigration Appeals issued a final order of removal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied his petition for rehearing. Question Does the government provides adequate notice under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) when it serves an initial notice document that does not include the “time and place” of proceedings followed by an additional document containing that information?

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 8, 2024. Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al.Respondent: Yonas Fikre. Advocates: Sopan Joshi (for the Petitioners) Gadeir Abbas (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010, Yonas Fikre, a U.S. citizen of Eritrean descent, was placed on the FBI’s No Fly List while he was traveling to Sudan. FBI agents questioned him about his ties to a mosque in Portland, Oregon, and informed him he was a flight risk. Fikre was offered removal from the list in exchange for becoming an FBI informant, an offer he declined. Subsequently, Fikre was imprisoned and tortured in the United Arab Emirates, allegedly at the request of the FBI. Unable to return to the U.S., Fikre sought asylum in Sweden, but was ultimately denied and returned to Portland via private jet after his petition to be removed from the No Fly List was also denied. While still in Sweden, Fikre filed a lawsuit against the FBI, claiming violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process. While the lawsuit was pending, the FBI removed him from the No Fly List. A federal district court in Oregon dismissed Fikre's case as moot, given that he had been removed from the No Fly List. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reinstated the lawsuit, stating that under the voluntary cessation doctrine, it was not “absolutely clear” that Fikre would not be placed back on the list for the same reasons. The case returned to the district court where an FBI official filed a declaration that Fikre would not be put back on the list based on current information. Despite this declaration, the court once again dismissed the case. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit again reversed, reasoning that the FBI’s declaration did not indicate a change in the policies or procedures that put Fikre on the list in the first place. Question Are respondent’s claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List moot, given that he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he “will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information”?

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2023. Petitioner: Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow.Respondent: City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al. Advocates: Brian Wolfman (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sergeant Muldrow, initially assigned to the Intelligence Division where she worked on various high-profile cases and was deputized by the FBI, was transferred to the Fifth District by Interim Police Commissioner Lawrence O'Toole's appointee, Captain Deeba. This change led to a different work schedule, responsibilities, and loss of special FBI-related privileges including a potential $17,500 in annual overtime pay. After her transfer, Sergeant Muldrow was asked to return FBI-issued equipment, which she did, and her Task Force Officer status was revoked. She filed a discrimination charge with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights against the City of St. Louis and Captain Deeba, later filing an action in Missouri state court alleging Title VII violations. The case was removed to federal court, where the district court granted summary judgment against her Title VII claims and dismissed her state law claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the employment decisions she alleged did not constitute “adverse employment action” and thus did not establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination under Title VII, nor were they “materially adverse action” as required for a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. Question Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a signification disadvantage?

Moore v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 5, 2023. Petitioner: Charles G. Moore and Kathleen F. Moore.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Andrew M. Grossman (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2005, the Moores invested $40,000 in KisanKraft, an Indian company that supplies tools to small farmers, in exchange for 11% of the common shares. KisanKraft is a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC), meaning it is majority-owned by U.S. persons but operates abroad. Prior to 2017, U.S. shareholders of CFCs were typically taxed on foreign earnings only when those earnings were repatriated to the United States, according to a provision called Subpart F. However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 significantly changed this, introducing a one-time Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT) that retroactively taxed CFC earnings after 1986, regardless of repatriation. This increased the Moores’ 2017 tax liability by approximately $15,000 based on their share of KisanKraft’s retained earnings. The Moores challenged the constitutionality of this tax, but the district court dismissed their suit, holding that the MRT taxed income and, although it was retroactive, did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the 16th Amendment authorize Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states?

Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2023. Petitioner: William K. Harrington, United States Trustee, Region 2.Respondent: Purdue Pharma L.P., et al. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner) Gregory G. Garre (for Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.) Pratik A. Shah (for Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Sackler family, who purchased Purdue Pharma in the 1950s, heavily influenced the company’s direction and was instrumental in the development and marketing of OxyContin. Despite initial claims of low addiction risk, growing evidence of widespread abuse led to legal battles across the United States, with multiple stakeholders including individuals, state governments, and federal agencies suing Purdue. In 2004, the board of Purdue entered into an expansive Indemnity Agreement to protect its directors and officers from financial liability related to lawsuits. This protection was especially broad, extending even after their official tenure at Purdue, but contained a bad faith carveout. From 2007 onwards, the Sacklers began shielding assets, anticipating litigation against them personally. By 2019, Purdue faced weakened financial prospects, and the Sacklers had stepped down from the board. In the same year, the DOJ brought criminal and civil charges against Purdue, resulting in a plea agreement in 2020 that prioritized the DOJ’s claims in Purdue’s bankruptcy proceedings. The plea stipulated a $2 billion forfeiture judgment but allowed for the release of $1.775 billion if certain conditions were met. Although Purdue declared bankruptcy in 2019, the Sacklers did not, and litigation against both parties was temporarily halted. The estate of Purdue is estimated to be around $1.8 billion, while claims against both Purdue and the Sacklers are estimated to exceed $40 trillion. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed a proposed bankruptcy plan on September 17, 2021. This plan included a “shareholder release” that, in effect, permanently enjoined certain third-party claims against the Sacklers. Several parties objected to the plan, but the bankruptcy court rejected their claims. On appeal to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the district court overturned the bankruptcy court's confirmation, holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for the forced release of direct claims against non-debtors. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s order holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit nonconsensual third-party releases of direct claims, and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s approval of the plan. Question Does the Bankruptcy Code authorize a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by non-debtors against non-debtor third parties, without the claimants’ consent?

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 29, 2023. Petitioner: Securities and Exchange Commission.Respondent: George R. Jarkesy, Jr., et al. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner) S. Michael McColloch (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) George Jarkesy established two hedge funds, with Patriot28 as the investment adviser, managing $24 million in assets from over 100 investors. The SEC initiated an investigation in 2011, eventually bringing an in-house action alleging fraud under multiple acts. Jarkesy challenged the SEC’s proceedings in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, citing constitutional infringements, but both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the injunction, finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction. After an evidentiary hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), Jarkesy was found guilty of securities fraud. Jarkesy sought review by the Commission, and while that petition was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, holding that SEC ALJs were improperly appointed. Jarkesy, however, waived his right to a new hearing. The Commission affirmed the fraud findings, imposed penalties, and rejected several constitutional arguments. He then filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed and remanded, finding multiple constitutional violations. Question Does the statutory scheme that empowers the Securities and Exchange Commission violate the Seventh Amendment, the nondelegation doctrine, or Article II of the U.S. Constitution?

McElrath v. Georgia Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2023. Petitioner: Damian McElrath.Respondent: Georgia. Advocates: Richard A. Simpson (for the Petitioner) Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2017, a Georgia jury found Damien McElrath guilty but mentally ill as to felony murder but not guilty by reason of insanity as to malice murder after an encounter between McElrath and his mother. The trial court did not recognize the verdicts as repugnant and accepted them, but the Georgia Supreme Court held that the verdicts were repugnant and vacated the verdicts, remanding McElrath’s case for retrial. On remand, McElrath alleged that retrial was precluded on double jeopardy grounds, but the trial court denied his motion. On a second appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, McElrath argued that the court should have reversed rather than vacated his felony murder conviction in his previous appeal. He also challenges the trial court’s ruling on his double jeopardy claim, arguing that retrial on all of the counts is barred because the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity on the malice murder count. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. Question Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?

Wilkinson v. Garland Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2023. Petitioner: Situ Kamu Wilkinson.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Jaime A. Santos (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Situ Wilkinson, originally from Trinidad and Tobago, overstayed his tourist visa in the U.S., built a life, and fathered a U.S.-citizen son. In 2019, after being arrested for selling crack cocaine, he faced deportation proceedings. Wilkinson conceded his deportability but sought either cancellation or withholding of removal based on the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” it would cause his son and the threat to his own life or freedom if he returned to Trinidad due to his “membership in a particular social group,” specifically people who have filed complaints against Trinidadian police. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected both of Wilkinson's claims. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the hardship claim because was discretionary. The Third Circuit also concluded that Wilkinson’s claim of belonging to a “particular social group” did not meet the requirements for withholding of removal, as it was not socially distinct within Trinidadian society. Therefore, the Third Circuit dismissed in part and denied in part Wilkinson’s petition for review. Question Is an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), or instead a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)?

Brown v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 27, 2023. Petitioner: Justin Rashaad Brown.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner Justin Rashaad Brown) Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner Eugene Jackson) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Justin Rashaad Brown was indicted in York County, Pennsylvania, for multiple counts, including being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Brown pleaded guilty to one charge of drug possession and distribution as well as the § 922(g) offense. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania sentenced him to concurrent terms of 180 months’ imprisonment due to prior convictions triggering the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence prescribed in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Brown appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that his prior state marijuana convictions should not serve as predicates under the ACCA because those crimes are no longer a categorical match to their federal counterpart. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Question Does the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act incorporate the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense?

Rudisill v. McDonough Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2023. Petitioner: James R. Rudisill.Respondent: Denis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Misha Tseytlin (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The case involves the interpretation of education benefits under two different programs for veterans: the Montgomery GI Bill enacted in 1984 and the Post-9/11 GI Bill enacted in 2008. Both programs offer a maximum of 36 months of education benefits. Congress has implemented various provisions to limit the benefits under these two programs, including a 48-month cap for benefits generally and the prohibition against receiving benefits from both programs concurrently. James Rudisill, who served three periods of active-duty service, initially used the Montgomery benefits for his undergraduate education. Later, he applied for Post-9/11 benefits to attend Yale Divinity School. The VA granted him only the remaining Montgomery benefits, and he appealed that decision to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The Board denied the appeal, so Rudisill appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, where a split panel held that § 3327(d)(2) does not apply to veterans with multiple periods of service. ruled in his favor, finding the statute ambiguous. The Secretary of Veterans Affairs appealed the Veterans’ Court decision to the Federal Circuit, where a split panel affirmed, but then the court sitting en banc reversed, holding that the plain language of § 3327(d)(2) applies to veterans with multiple periods of service. Question Is a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill and the Post-9/11 GI Bill entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit?

United States v. Rahimi Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 7, 2023. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Zackey Rahimi. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) J. Matthew Wright (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between December 2020 and January 2021, Zackey Rahimi was involved in a series of violent incidents in Arlington, Texas, including multiple shootings and a hit-and-run. Rahimi was under a civil protective order for alleged assault against his ex-girlfriend, which explicitly prohibited him from possessing firearms. Police searched his home and found a rifle and a pistol, leading to Rahimi’s indictment for violating federal law 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it unlawful for someone under a domestic violence restraining order to possess firearms. Rahimi moved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds but was denied, as his argument was foreclosed by United States v. McGinnis, 956 F.3d 747 (5th Cir. 2020). Rahimi pleaded guilty but continued his constitutional challenge on appeal. As the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 579 U.S. __ (2022). Rahimi argued that Bruen overruled McGinnis and thus that § 922(g)(8) was unconstitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violate the Second Amendment?

Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 6, 2023. Petitioner: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service.Respondent: Reginald Kirtz. Advocates: Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Petitioner) Nandan M. Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1970, Congress enacted the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) to regulate credit reporting and protect consumer privacy. The Act was amended in 1996 to impose additional obligations on entities like creditors and lenders that furnish information to credit reporting agencies. These amendments allowed consumers to dispute inaccuracies in their credit files and mandated furnishers to investigate and correct such inaccuracies. Reginald Kirtz filed a lawsuit in 2020 against Trans Union, AES, and the USDA, alleging both negligent and willful violations of the FCRA. Kirtz claimed that despite his loans being closed with a zero balance, both AES and the USDA continued to report him as “120 Days Past Due,” damaging his credit score. While Trans Union and AES responded to the lawsuit, the USDA sought dismissal, citing sovereign immunity. The district court granted the USDA’s motion, reasoning that the FCRA did not clearly express Congress’s intent to waive sovereign immunity, despite the Act’s language stating that it applies to “any person,” including government agencies. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, concluding that when Congress has clearly expressed its intent, as through the FCRA, even when the meaning is implausible, courts may neither second-guess its choices nor decline to apply the law as written. Question Do the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States?

Vidal v. Elster Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2023. Petitioner: Katherine K. Vidal, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office.Respondent: Steve Elster. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2018, Steve Elster attempted to register the phrase “TRUMP TOO SMALL” for use on various types of shirts, intending the mark to serve as political commentary on President Donald Trump and his policies. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) examiner rejected the application, citing two sections of the Lanham Act: Section 2(c), which prohibits registering a mark that identifies a living individual without their consent, and Section 2(a), which bars marks that falsely suggest a connection with living or dead persons. Elster appealed, arguing that the provisions infringed on his First Amendment rights and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Board upheld the examiner's decision based solely on Section 2(c), asserting that the statute is constitutional and serves compelling government interests, including the protection of individual rights and consumer protection. Elster appealed the decision, and the Federal Circuit reversed. Question Does the refusal to register a trademark under 15 U.S.C. § 1052(c) when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2023. Petitioner: Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff, et al.Respondent: Christopher Garnier, et ux. Advocates: Hashim M. Mooppan (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Pamela S. Karlan (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Christopher and Kimberly Garnier are parents of children in the Poway Unified School District in the city of Poway, California, just north of San Diego. The Garniers frequently posted comments critical of the District’s Board of Trustees on the social media pages of the Trustees, including Respondents Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T.J. Zane. For their school-board campaigns, O’Connor-Ratcliff and Zane created personal Facebook and Twitter pages, which they updated with their official titles once elected and continued to use to post about school-district business and news. The Trustees began to hide or delete the critical and often repetitive comments by the Garniers, and then around October 2017, they blocked the Garniers from their social media pages. After the Trustees blocked the Garniers, the Garniers sued them, arguing that their social media pages constitute public fora and that by blocking them, the Trustees violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the Garniers but found that the Trustees’ had qualified immunity from the damages claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a public official engage in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official’s personal social media account, which the official uses to communicate about job-related matters with the public?

Lindke v. Freed Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2023. Petitioner: Kevin Lindke.Respondent: James R. Freed. Advocates: Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner) Victoria R. Ferres (for the Respondent) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) James Freed created a private Facebook profile that was originally intended to connect with family and friends. Eventually, he grew too popular for Facebook's 5,000-friend limit on profiles. So Freed converted his profile to a "page," which has unlimited "followers" instead of friends and is public so that anyone may "follow" it. Freed designated the page category as "public figure." In 2014, Freed was appointed city manager for Port Huron, Michigan, so he updated his Facebook page to reflect that new title. On his page, he shared both personal updates about himself and his family and professional updates, including directives and policies he initiated in his official capacity. Kevin Lindke came across Freed’s page and did not approve of how Freed was handling the pandemic. He posted criticism of Freed in response to Freed’s Facebook page, and Freed deleted the comments and ultimately “blocked” Lindke. Lindke sued Freed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his First Amendment rights by deleting his comments and blocking him. The district court granted summary judgment to Freed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question When does a public official’s social media activity constitute state action subject to the First Amendment?

Culley v. Marshall Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 30, 2023. Petitioner: Halima Tariffa Culley, et al.Respondent: Steven T. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, et al. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners) Edmund G. LaCour, Jr. (for the Respondents) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On February 17, 2019, Halima Tariffa Culley’s son was pulled over by police while driving a car registered to his mother. Police arrested him, charged him with possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and seized the vehicle. Culley unsuccessfully tried to retrieve the vehicle, and on February 27, 2019, the State of Alabama filed a civil asset forfeiture action in state court. After 20 months, the state court granted Culley summary judgment, finding that she was entitled to the return of her vehicle under Alabama’s innocent-owner defense. Culley filed a class-action lawsuit in federal court claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the failure of the state and local officials to provide a prompt post-deprivation hearing violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court ruled for the defendants, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed as to those claims that were not moot. Question What test must a district court apply when determining whether and when a post-deprivation hearing is required under the Due Process Clause?

Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 11, 2023. Appellant: Thomas C. Alexander, in His Official Capacity as President of the South Carolina Senate, et al..Appellee: The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al.. Advocates: John M. Gore (for the Appellants) Leah C. Aden (for the Appellees) Caroline A. Flynn (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) After the 2020 Census, South Carolina’s Republican-controlled legislature adopted a new congressional map that moved tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, effectively making the district a safe seat for Republicans. The South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP sued, and a three-judge panel concluded that the district was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. The legislators appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the map was actually a political gerrymander (which is permissible) that merely had a racial effect. Question Does the South Carolina legislature’s redistricting map, which has the effect of moving tens of thousands of Black voters to a different district, constitute an impermissible racial gerrymander, even if the legislators’ purported intent was merely a political gerrymander?

Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 10, 2023. Petitioner: Trevor Murray.Respondent: UBS Securities, LLC, et al.. Advocates: Easha Anand (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Eugene Scalia (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2011, UBS hired Trevor Murray as a strategist in its commercial mortgage-backed securities business. Under Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, Murray was required to certify that his reports were produced independently and that they accurately reflected his own views. According to Murray, two leaders at UBS improperly pressured him to skew his research. Murray repeatedly reported this conduct to his supervisor, who declined to take action. UBS terminated Murray in 2012. Murray sued UBS in 2014 alleging that his former employer terminated him in response to his complaints about fraud on shareholders in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's antiretaliation provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The district court ruled for Murray, and UBS appealed, arguing that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that Murray had to prove UBS's retaliatory intent to prevail on his section 1514A claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with UBS and vacated the judgment of the district court. Question Under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief?

Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 10, 2023. Petitioner: Great Lakes Insurance SE.Respondent: Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for the Petitioner) Howard J. Bashman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Raiders Retreat Realty Co., a Pennsylvania company, insured a yacht for up to $550,000 with Great Lakes Insurance (GLI), a company headquartered in the United Kingdom. In June 2019, the yacht ran aground, incurring at least $300,000 in damage. Raiders submitted a claim to GLI for loss of the vessel, but GLI rejected it, claiming that, although none of the damage was due to fire, the entire policy was void because Raider had failed to timely recertify or inspect the yacht's fire-extinguishing equipment. GLI asked the district court for a declaratory judgment that Raiders’ omission voided the policy, and Raiders raised five counterclaims based on Pennsylvania law. The district court dismissed those counterclaims, finding that ​​the policy’s choice-of-law provision required the application of New York law. The court also rejected Raiders’ argument that the choice-of-law provision was unenforceable under the Supreme Court’s decision in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), which held that under federal admiralty law, a forum-selection provision is unenforceable “if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding The Bremen controlled the outcome in this case. Question Is a choice-of-law clause in a maritime contract unenforceable if enforcement would conflict with the “strong public policy” of the state whose law is displaced?

Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 4, 2023. Petitioner: Acheson Hotels, LLC.Respondent: Deborah Laufer. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Deborah Laufer, a prolific litigant with physical disabilities and vision impairments, sued Acheson Hotels for failing to publish information about their accessibility on their website, which is required under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the lawsuit, finding that Laufer lacked standing to sue because had no plans to visit the hotel and thus suffered no injury as a result of the lack of information on the website. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, concluding that Laufer’s lack of intent to book a room at the hotel operated by Acheson does not negate the fact of injury. Question Does an ADA “tester” have Article III standing to challenge a hotel’s failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she has no plans to visit the hotel?

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2023. Petitioner: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, et al..Respondent: Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, et al.. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners) Noel J. Francisco (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In response to the financial crisis around 2007, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which, among other things, authorized the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve. The CFPB was tasked with writing and enforcing rules for financial institutions, examining financial institutions, monitoring and reporting on markets, and tracking consumer complaints. In 2017, the CFPB adopted a rule that prohibited lenders from further attempting to withdraw funds from borrowers’ bank accounts after two consecutive attempts failed for lack of funds. A group of lenders sued the CFPB over that rule, arguing that the agency’s funding scheme was unconstitutional. Instead of receiving money allocated to it each year by Congress, as most agencies do, the CFPB receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, which collects fees from member banks. The district court concluded the funding scheme was not unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Question Does the funding scheme for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which receives funding directly from the Federal Reserve, violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution?

Pulsifer v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 2, 2023. Petitioner: Mark E. Pulsifer.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Mark Pulsifer pleaded guilty to distributing at least fifty grams of methamphetamine. Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), Pulsifer asked the district court for a sentence lower than the otherwise applicable statutory minimum term of imprisonment. That provision, permits a district court to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum upon finding that the defendant does not have: “(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines.” It was undisputed that Pulsifer had a criminal history that meets the criteria in subsections (A) and (B), due to having more than four criminal history points and a prior three-point offense. The district court concluded that this history alone made him ineligible for sentencing under § 3553(f), notwithstanding that he did not also have a prior two-point violent offense that would meet the condition in subsection (C). It therefore denied his request under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Pulsifer appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding the statutory word “and” means a defendant must not have any of the criteria, not that he must not have all of them. Question Must a defendant show he does not meet any of the criteria listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) to qualify for a sentence lower than the statutory minimum?

Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2023.Decided on May 25, 2023. Petitioner: Geraldine Tyler.Respondent: Hennepin County, Minnesota, et al.. Advocates: Christina M. Martin (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Geraldine Tyler owned a condominium in Minneapolis. She stopped paying her property taxes and accrued a tax debt of $15,000. To satisfy the debt, Hennepin County foreclosed on Tyler’s property and sold it for $40,000, retaining the net proceeds from the sale. Tyler sued the County, arguing that its actions violated her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Tyler’s case for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question 1. Does taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violate the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause? 2. Is the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment? Conclusion Taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that Tyler plausibly alleged that Hennepin County’s actions violated the Takings Clause and thus that her claim can go forward. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property without “just compensation.” This does not prevent the government from collecting taxes, or from taking action to enforce the collection of taxes. However, the government may not, as Minnesota purported to do by statute in 1935, extinguish a property owner’s interest in property when she falls behind on her property taxes. English law, from which the U.S. Constitution derives much meaning, has long proscribed the taking of more from a taxpayer than she owes. Moreover, Supreme Court precedents and Minnesota law itself, in other contexts, recognize the principle that a taxpayer is entitled to the surplus in excess of the debt owed. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, addressing the second question presented, which the majority declined to address. In Justice Gorsuch’s view, Hennepin County’s actions likely also violate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.

Yegiazaryan v. Smagin Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2023.Decided on Jun 22, 2023. Petitioner: Ashot Yegiazaryan.Respondent: Vitaly I. Smagin, et al. . Advocates: Vincent Levy (for the Petitioners) Nicholas O. Kennedy (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Vitaly Smagin, a Russian citizen who resides in Russia, sued Ashot Yegiazaryan, a Russian citizen who resides in California, and eleven other defendants, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Smagin alleged that Yegiazaryan and the other defendants illegally attempted to avoid paying a judgment Smagin won against them in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for engaging in a series of fraudulent transactions between 2003 and 2009 in to steal Smagin’s shares in a joint real estate investment in Moscow, Russia. The district court dismissed Smagin’s RICO claim, finding he did not suffer a domestic injury, which is a requirement for a RICO claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that Smagin did allege a domestic injury. Question Does a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States state a cognizable claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act when it suffers an injury to an intangible property? Conclusion A plaintiff alleges a “domestic injury” for purposes of filing a private civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate it arose in the United States. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The “domestic injury” requirement for private civil RICO suits comes from the Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community. However, the RJR Nabisco Court did not explicitly define a “domestic injury,” so the Court adopted a context-specific approach that considers the injury's circumstances—an approach consistent with that case. Applying this approach to Smagin’s case, the Court found his injury to be domestic. The majority of the alleged racketeering activities that prevented Smagin from collecting his judgment occurred in the U.S., targeting a California judgment. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the writ of certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.

Dupree v. Younger Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2023.Decided on May 25, 2023. Petitioner: Neil Dupree.Respondent: Kevin Younger. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Amy M. Saharia (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kevin Younger was a pretrial detainee at a state prison in Baltimore, Maryland. One morning, three guards attacked Younger and other inmates at the direction of Neil Dupree, an intelligence lieutenant at the prison. Younger sued Dupree under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Dupree violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court rejected Dupree’s argument that Younger’s suit was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Dupree appealed that conclusion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that Dupree was precluded from challenging the district court’s decision because Dupree raised the claim in a pretrial motion for summary judgment but did not raise it again in a post-trial motion. Question To preserve the issue for appellate review, must a party reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment? Conclusion A post-trial motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 is not required to preserve for appellate review a purely legal issue resolved at summary judgment. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. In Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011), the Court held that a party whose sufficiency-of-the evidence challenge was rejected at the summary judgment stage must reassert the claim in a post-trial motion to preserve it for appeal. That decision was based on the reasoning that the factual record developed at trial supersedes the record existing at the time of summary judgment. When the motion for summary judgment is based on a purely legal question—rather than on the factual record—no subsequent proceedings in the trial court supersede conclusions of law. Thus, when a pure question of law is resolved in an order denying summary judgment, the party need not reassert the claim in a post-trial motion to preserve it on appeal. The Court did not decide whether the issue Dupree raised on appeal is purely legal, so it remanded the case for the Fourth Circuit to answer that question.

Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2023.Decided on Jun 15, 2023. Petitioner: Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, et al..Respondent: Brian W. Coughlin. Advocates: Pratik A. Shah (for the Petitioners) Gregory G. Rapawy (for the Respondent) Austin L. Raynor (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In July 2019, Brian W. Coughlin took out a $1,100 payday loan from Lendgreen, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (“Band”). Later that year, he filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the District of Massachusetts and listed his debt to Lendgreen as a nonpriority unsecured claim. When he filed his petition, the Bankruptcy Code imposed an automatic stay enjoining “debt-collection efforts outside the umbrella of the bankruptcy case.” Despite the stay, Lendgreen repeatedly contacted Coughlin seeking repayment of his debt. Coughlin moved to enforce the automatic stay against Lendgreen, and in response, the Band asserted tribal sovereign immunity and moved to dismiss the enforcement proceeding. The bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed. Question Does the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogate tribal sovereign immunity? Conclusion The Bankruptcy Code unequivocally abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governments, including federally recognized Indian tribes. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opinion of the Court. To abrogate sovereign immunity, Congress must make its intent to abrogate “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” The statute at issue here contains such unmistakably clear language. First, 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) expressly abrogates the sovereign immunity of “governmental unit[s]” for certain enumerated purposes. Section 101(27), defines “governmental unit” as “United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States . . . , a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic government.” This definition “exudes comprehensiveness from beginning to end,” and other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code support this understanding as well. Federally recognized tribes are “indisputably” governments, so the § 106(a) unequivocally abrogates their sovereign immunity. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas reiterated an argument he has made before that to the extent that tribes possess sovereign immunity at all, that immunity does not extend to “suits arising out of a tribe’s commercial activities conducted beyond its territory.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court’s clear-statement rule requires the statute to expressly mention Indian tribes in order to abrogate their sovereign immunity. Because the Bankruptcy Code does not, he would hold that it does not abrogate federally recognized Indian tribes’ sovereign immunity.

Counterman v. Colorado Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2023.Decided on Jun 27, 2023. Petitioner: Billy Raymond Counterman.Respondent: The People of the State of Colorado. Advocates: John P. Elwood (for the Petitioner) Philip J. Weiser (for the Respondent) Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Billy Raymond Counterman repeatedly contacted a person over Facebook in 2014, sending her “creepy” messages from numerous different accounts even after she repeatedly blocked him. Some of the messages implied that Counterman was watching her and saying that he wanted her to die or be killed. She reported Counterman to law enforcement, who arrested him in 2016. He was charged with one count of stalking (credible threat), one count of stalking (serious emotional distress, and one count of harassment; before trial, the prosecution dismissed the count of stalking (credible threat). Counterman claimed that the remaining charges, as applied to his Facebook messages, would violate his right to free speech under the First Amendment because they were not “true threats.” The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, and a jury found him guilty of stalking (serious emotional distress). The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Question To establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, must the government show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement? Conclusion To establish that a statement is a “true threat” unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must prove that the defendant had some subjective understanding of the statements’ threatening nature, based on a showing no more demanding than recklessness. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court. While the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, it allows for restrictions of so-called “true threats.” A true threat is determined by the recipient’s perception, not the speaker’s intent. However, to prevent chilling protected speech, there must be a subjective mental-state requirement. This means that the speaker’s understanding of the threat is crucial. A recklessness standard—where a person consciously disregards a significant risk that their words might harm another—is the appropriate measure for true threats because it strikes a balance between safeguarding free speech and addressing genuine threats. In Counterman’s case, the government used only an objective standard, without considering Counterman’s understanding of his statements as threatening, in violation of the requirements of the First Amendment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part. Justice Sotomayor would not reach the question whether recklessness is sufficient for true-threats prosecutions generally. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority for relying on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan instead of applying the First Amendment as it was understood at the time of the Founding. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that true threats do not enjoy First Amendment protection, and nearly every other category of unprotected speech may be restricted using an objective standard.

Groff v. DeJoy Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 18, 2023.Decided on Jun 29, 2023. Petitioner: Gerald E. Groff.Respondent: Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General. Advocates: Aaron M. Streett (for the Petitioner) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gerald Groff is a Christian and U.S. Postal Service worker. He refused to work on Sundays due to his religious beliefs. USPS offered to find employees to swap shifts with him, but on numerous occasions, no co-worker would swap, and Groff did not work. USPS subsequently fired him. Groff sued USPS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming USPS failed to reasonably accommodate his religion because the shift swaps did not fully eliminate the conflict. The district court concluded the requested accommodation would pose an undue hardship on USPS and granted summary judgment for USPS. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Question Is inconvenience to coworkers an “undue burden” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 such that it excuses an employer from providing an accommodation requested for religious exercise? Conclusion Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for the unanimous Court. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on religion, and subsequent regulations issued by the EEOC required employers to make reasonable accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs unless doing so would cause “undue hardship” to the employer. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not require an employer who uses a seniority system to assign shifts to deprive senior employees of their seniority rights in order to accommodate a junior employee’s religious practices. The Hardison decision also inadvertently established a “more than de minimis” test for hardship; courts interpreted that decision to mean that any cost or hardship “more than de minimis” justifies denying a religious accommodation. Revisiting that interpretation, the Court rejected the “de minimis cost” standard and adopted instead a “substantial increased costs” standard consistent with the spirit and language of Title VII. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined.

U.S. ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 18, 2023.Decided on Jun 1, 2023. Petitioner: Unites States of America, Ex. Rel. Schutte, et al..Respondent: SuperValu Inc., et al.. Advocates: Tejinder Singh (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) SuperValu owned or operated approximately 2,500 grocery stories with over 800 in-store pharmacies between 2006 and 2016. To compete with other pharmacies, SuperValu stores implemented a prescription price-matching program, under which it would match lower prescription prices of competitors. However, SuperValu did not report its price-match program prices as its usual and customary price, in violation of Medicaid regulations. Tracy Schutte and Michael Yarberry (the “Relators”) sued SuperValu under the False Claims Act on behalf of the federal government and several states. They alleged that SuperValu knowingly caused false payment claims to be submitted to government healthcare programs between 2006 and 2016 by incorrectly reporting their drug prices. The federal government did not intervene in the case. The district court concluded that the Relators had failed to prove the “scienter” element of their FCA claim—that is, they failed to show SuperValu that SuperValu’s interpretation of the reporting requirement was objectively unreasonable at the time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Is a defendant’s contemporaneous subjective understanding about the lawfulness of its conduct relevant to whether it “knowingly” violated the False Claims Act? Conclusion The False Claims Act’s scienter element refers to a defendant’s knowledge and subjective beliefs, not to what an objectively reasonable person may have known or believed. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. Both the text and common-law origins of the False Claims Act support an understanding of the scienter as focusing on the subjective knowledge of the defendant. It describes a three-part definition of the word “knowingly” that largely tracks the common-law concept of scienter for fraud: actual knowledge, deliberate indifference, or recklessness. Each of these concepts pertains to the defendant’s lack of an honest belief in the statement’s truth when making the claim, not what a defendant might have thought afterward.

Pugin v. Garland Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2023.Decided on Jun 22, 2023. Petitioner: Jean Francois Pugin.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General) Martha Hutton (for the Petitioner in 22-23 (Pugin)) Mark C. Fleming (for the Respondent in 22-331 (Cordero-Garcia)) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jean Francois Pugin is a citizen of Mauritius who has lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident for nearly 40 years. The government began deportation proceedings against Pugin after he was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact to a felony. The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes removal upon conviction for an “aggravated felony,” including felonies relating to obstruction of justice. Despite Pugin’s argument to the contrary, the Board of Immigration appeals concluded that Virginia’s accessory after the fact to a felony constituted an offense relating to obstruction of justice, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Is Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” under the Immigration and Nationality Act? Conclusion Virginia’s offense of accessory after the fact to a felony is an offense “relating to” obstruction of justice under the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of an “aggravated felony.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. An offense can be categorized as “relating to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) without a requirement for an ongoing investigation or proceeding. This understanding is supported by dictionary definitions, federal and state laws, and the Model Penal Code. Obstruction of justice can occur even if no formal investigation or proceeding is active. The phrase “relating to” in the statute further broadens its applicability, ensuring it encompasses offenses connected to obstruction of justice, irrespective of a pending investigation. Even if certain provisions might require a pending investigation or proceeding, §1101(a)(43)(S) has a more expansive definition. Historical interpretations do not mandate a pending investigation for obstruction of justice. The rule of lenity, which favors defendants in ambiguous criminal laws, does not apply because traditional interpretation tools clearly defined the statute’s intent. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined the majority opinion in full but concurred separately to note that when Congress inserted the phrase “offense relating to obstruction of justice” into §1101(a)(43)(S), it might well have been referencing a specific and previously designated category of offenses of obstruction, many of which do not have a pending-proceeding requirement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the Court “subverts” the commonly understood meaning of “obstruction of justice.”

Slack Technologies v. Pirani Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2023.Decided on Jun 1, 2023. Petitioner: Slack Technologies, LLC, fka Slack Technologies, Inc., et al..Respondent: Fiyyaz Pirani. Advocates: Thomas G. Hungar (for the Petitioners) Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On June 20, 2019, tech company Slack went public through a direct listing, which, unlike an initial public offering (IPO), does not involve the company issuing new shares and instead involves only filing a registration statement to allow existing shareholders to sell their shares on the exchange. Shares made available by a direct listing are sold directly to the public and not through a bank. Fiyyaz Pirani purchased 30,000 Slack shares at $38.50 per share on the day it went public and went on to purchase another 220,000 over several months. Subsequently, the share price dropped below $25. On September 19, 2019, Pirani brought a class action lawsuit against Slack, alleging that Slack’s registration statement was inaccurate and misleading because it did not disclose information about its service disruptions and how it compensated customers for those disruptions. The district court held that Pirani had standing to sue Slack even though he could not prove that his shares were issued under the registration statement he said was inaccurate. On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed over one dissenting vote. Question Do Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading? Conclusion To state a claim under §11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, a plaintiff must allege the purchase of “such security” issued pursuant to a materially misleading registration statement. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 authorizes an individual to sue for a material misstatement or omission in a registration statement when the individual has acquired “such security.” Normally, the word “such” refers to something that has already been described, but because there is no clear referent in Section 11, the Court looked for clues from the statutory context. First, the statute refers to “the” registration statement in imposing liability for false statements or misleading omissions. The definite article “the” suggests that the plaintiff must acquire the security. Second, the statute repeatedly uses the word “such” to narrow the law’s focus, suggesting “such security” refers to a specific security registered under the particular statement that allegedly has a falsehood or misleading omission. Still other provisions further support the understanding that “such security” means a security issued pursuant to the allegedly misleading security statement.

Samia v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 29, 2023.Decided on Jun 23, 2023. Petitioner: Adam Samia, aka Sal, aka Adam Samic.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Defendants Joseph Manuel Hunter, Carl David Stillwell, and Adam Samia were tried jointly and convicted on five counts: conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire, murder-for-hire, conspiracy to murder and kidnap in a foreign country, causing death with a firearm during and relation to a crime of violence, and conspiracy to launder money. All three defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment. One piece of evidence used to convict the defendants was Stillwell’s redacted confession. Samia challenged the admission of that evidence, arguing that the redactions were insufficient because jurors would immediately infer that the confession’s references to “another person” referred to Samia himself. As such, Samia argued, his inability to cross-examine Stillwell violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s evidentiary ruling on that issue. Question Does admitting a codefendant’s redacted out-of-court confession that immediately inculpates a defendant based on context violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment? Conclusion The admission of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause where the confession as modified did not directly inculpate the defendant but used the descriptor “other person” and the jury was instructed to consider the confession only as to the codefendant. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court. Historically, a non-testifying codefendant’s confession was permissible if the jury was instructed not to consider it against the nonconfessing defendant. The Court in Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, recognized an exception to that general rule, holding “that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a non-testifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial,” even with a proper instruction. However, the Court established certain outer limits on the Bruton rule. For example, in Richardson v. Marsh, the Court did not extend the rule to confessions that do not name the defendant, although, in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, the Court clarified that some redacted confessions might still be directly accusatory if the redaction is evident. Here, the confession was redacted to avoid naming the defendant, aligning with the Bruton rule and differing from the confession in Gray. The Court declined to further extend the Bruton rule, reasoning that its extension would disrupt historical practices and necessitate extensive pretrial hearings, potentially leading to mandatory severance in joint trials when introducing a non-testifying codefendant's confession. This would undermine the role of joint trials and the significance of confessions in the legal system. Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined the majority opinion except the historical discussion, which, in her separate concurrence, she argues is beside the point. She would limit consideration to the meaning of the Confrontation Clause at the time of the founding and reach the same conclusion. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, arguing that the non-testifying codefendant’s confession in this case inculpated the defendant in the same way that the Court recognized it would in other cases. Justice Kagan criticized the majority for “permit[ting] an end-run around [the Court’s] precedent and undermin[ing] a vital constitutional protection for the accused.”

Polselli v. Internal Revenue Service Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 29, 2023.Decided on May 18, 2023. Petitioner: Hanna Karcho Polselli, et al..Respondent: Internal Revenue Service. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioners) Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Remo Polselli underpaid his federal taxes for over a decade, with an outstanding balance of over $2 million. In pursuit of those unpaid liabilities, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued administrative summonses to the banks of Polselli’s wife and lawyers. The IRS did not notify Polselli’s wife or lawyers of the summonses, relying on the exception in the Internal Revenue Code § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i), which excludes from the notice requirement summonses issued “in aid of the collection” of tax assessments. The district court concluded that the summonses fell within the exception and that Polselli’s wife and lawyers were not entitled to notice. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the exception in I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) to the notice requirements for an Internal Revenue Service summons on third-party recordkeepers apply to a summons for anyone’s records whenever the IRS thinks that person’s records might somehow help it collect a delinquent taxpayer’s liability? Conclusion The exception to the notice requirements described in I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies to a summons for anyone’s records, regardless of whether the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the accounts or records summoned. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The IRS has the power to pursue unpaid taxes and the people who owe them. In exercising that power, the IRS may issue a summons, including to third parties, to determine the liability of a taxpayer. In general, such summons require the IRS to give notice to any person identified in the summons. Anyone who is entitled to notice may bring a motion to quash the summons in federal district court, which ordinarily individuals may not do because of the sovereign immunity of the United States. The statute describes three conditions under which the IRS is exempt from having to provide notice of a summons: (1) the summons must be issued in aid of collection, (2) it must aid the collection of an assessment made or a judgment rendered, and (3) it must aid the collection of assessments or judgments “against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued.” The IRS’s summonses in this case satisfy these three conditions, so the IRS was not required to give notice to Polselli. Because Polselli was not entitled to notice, he also was not entitled to bring a motion to quash the summons. Therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his motion to quash. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, to emphasize that giving notice is the default rule and to caution that reading the exception too broadly would undermine the purpose of the notice-as-default system.

Smith v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2023.Decided on Jun 15, 2023. Petitioner: Timothy J. Smith.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Samir Deger-Sen (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Timothy Smith is a software engineer who lives in Mobile, Alabama, and who is an avid fisherman. He used a web application called Fiddler to obtain the coordinates of private artificial reefs from a website, StrikeLines, that sells such coordinates for between $190 and $199. Smith informed the owners of StrikeLines that he accessed their reef coordinates but refused to tell them how he did it. After negotiations between the owners of StrikeLines and Smith broke down, the owners contacted law enforcement, who executed a search warrant on Smith’s home. A federal grand jury indicted Smith on three counts in the Northern District of Florida. Before trial, Smith moved to dismiss all counts for lack of venue because (1) he was a resident of Mobile, Alabama, which is in the Southern District of Alabama, and (2) StrikeLines’s servers, where the coordinate data is stored, are in Orlando, which is in the Middle District of Florida. Thus, venue in the Northern District of Florida was improper, even though StrikeLines was headquartered in Pensacola, which is within that district. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that venue was improper as to one count but that improper venue for one count does not require vacatur of the conviction for another count. Question Does a criminal trial’s improper venue as to one count require vacatur of the convictions for other counts? Conclusion The Constitution permits the retrial of a defendant following a trial in an improper venue conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. When a defendant obtains a reversal of a prior, unsatisfied conviction, he may normally be retried, unless retrial would be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Neither text nor precedent suggests that if a defendant is tried in the wrong venue (in violation of the Venue Clause), the appropriate remedy is an exception to the retrial rule. The purpose of the Venue Clause is not the convenience for the defendant, as Smith argued, but to be near the location of the alleged crimes. Similarly, a trial conducted before a jury drawn from the wrong district (in violation of the Vicinage Clause) does not preclude retrial. The Court has repeatedly acknowledged that retrials are the appropriate remedy for violations of other jury-trial rights, and nothing about the Vicinage Clause suggests it should be treated differently. Smith’s situation does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause. That Clause prohibits retrial of a criminal defendant when a trial terminates with a finding that the defendant’s “criminal culpability had not been established” but does not affect trials that terminate “on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offence of which [the defendant] is accused.” Reversal of a conviction based on a violation of the Venue or Vicinage Clauses is the latter type because it does not adjudicate the defendant’s culpability.

Lora v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2023.Decided on Jun 16, 2023. Petitioner: Efrain Lora.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Lawrence D. Rosenberg (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Efrain Lora and three co-defendants ran an operation selling cocaine and cocaine base in the Bronx. Lora and the others allegedly conspired to murder a rival drug dealer in retaliation for threats the rival had made over drug territory. A federal grand jury returned an indictment for aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime causing the death of a person. The government obtained a superseding indictment against Lora that added a drug trafficking conspiracy charge and a charge for causing an intentional killing in furtherance of that conspiracy. The jury found Lora guilty of all three counts, and the district court sentenced him to a five-year term of imprisonment for the first count to run consecutively with a 25-year sentence on the second two counts. Lora appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the consecutive sentences. Question Does federal criminal sentencing law require a man who was convicted and sentenced for his role in a drug-trafficking-related murder to serve consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences? Conclusion The bar on imposition of concurrent sentences in 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(D)(ii) does not apply to a sentence for a §924(j) conviction; a §924(j) sentence can run either concurrently with or consecutively to another sentence. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584, a federal court imposing multiple prison sentences typically has the discretion to run the sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, § 924(c) provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment.” Lora was convicted under § 924(j)(1), which penalizes “a person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm,” where “the killing is a murder.” A violation of subsection (c) occurs when a person “uses or carries a firearm” “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,” or “possesses a firearm” “in furtherance of any such crime.” The limitation of subsection (c) applies only to that subsection and not to subsection (j), and Congress could not have intended subsection (j) to incorporate subsection (c)’s penalties in addition to its own. Subsection (j) covers a more serious offense, so the resulting flexibility in sentencing is consistent with the statute’s design. The Court thus vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, which held that subsection (c)’s prohibition on concurrent sentences applies to violations of subsection (j).

Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2023.Decided on May 18, 2023. Petitioner: Amgen, Inc., et al..Respondent: Sanofi, et al.. Advocates: Jeffrey A. Lamken (for the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Amgen owns two patents that describe cholesterol-lowering drugs that share a common written description. In 2014, Amgen filed suit against Sanofi alleging infringement of multiple patents, including the two at issue in this case. Among the jury’s conclusions in that case was that the patents were not invalid for lack of written description and enablement. To satisfy the written description requirement, a patent specification must describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail that a “skilled artisan” can reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. To satisfy the enablement requirement, a patent specification must contain sufficient information that a “skilled artisan” would be enabled to make and use the claimed invention. The U.S. Court for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the jury instructions regarding enablement were erroneous. On remand, the court ruled in favor of Sanofi on the issue of lack of enablement and for Amgen on the issue of lack of written description. Amgen appealed, and the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the asserted claims were invalid for lack of enablement. Question Do Amgen’s two patents satisfy the Patent Act’s enablement clause—that is, describing the invention with sufficient particularity that would enable a “skilled artisan” to “make and use” the claimed invention? Conclusion Amgen’s two patent applications—purporting to cover all antibodies that bind and block the PCSK9 receptor involved in LDL cholesterol metabolism—fail to satisfy the Patent Act’s enablement clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court affirming the judgment below. It is well established that the enablement requirement means that if a patent claims an entire class of process, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, its specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the entire class. While the specification may call for a reasonable amount of experimentation to make and use a claimed invention, it must not be too broad. Amgen’s specification fails to enable all that it has claimed, even allowing for a reasonable degree of experimentation. It described 26 antibodies by their amino acid sequences, but it claims to monopolize an entire class of antibodies not described. Thus, its claim is too broad.

United States v. Hansen Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2023.Decided on Jun 23, 2023. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Helaman Hansen. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner) Esha Bhandari (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Helaman Hansen ran an immigration-advising service charging undocumented immigrants for (incorrect) advice on how to achieve U.S. citizenship. Hansen was convicted and sentenced for, among other federal crimes, two counts of encouraging or inducing illegal immigration for private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i). Two years earlier, in United States v. Sineneng-Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed a Ninth Circuit decision striking down those two statutory provisions. Its reversal was based not on the merits of the constitutional challenge, but on the procedure the Ninth Circuit had used to entertain the challenge. Hansen’s case again raises the constitutional challenge. Question Does the federal prohibition on encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion The federal law criminalizing “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration—forbids only the purposeful solicitation and facilitation of specific acts known to violate federal law and is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it prohibits a significant amount of protected speech compared to its legitimate applications. The federal laws at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) prohibit “encouraging or inducing” illegal immigration, but in this context, they refer to the specialized legal terms of solicitation and facilitation, not their colloquial meanings. Because (A)(iv) targets only the intentional solicitation and facilitation of specific illegal acts, and these acts are generally non-expressive conduct, it is unlikely to stifle protected speech. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority’s opinion in full but wrote separate concurrence to criticize the facial overbreadth doctrine, which he argued “lacks any basis in the text or history of the First Amendment” and “distorts the judicial role.” Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that the majority “departs from ordinary principles of statutory interpretation” to interpret the “encouraging or inducing” as meaning something much narrower than the words plainly mean.

Jack Daniel's Properties v. VIP Products LLC Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 22, 2023.Decided on Jun 8, 2023. Petitioner: Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc..Respondent: VIP Products LLC. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Bennett E. Cooper (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) VIP Products LLC, a company that manufactures dog toys, created a plastic toy that resembles Jack Daniel’s iconic bottle. Instead of “Jack Daniel’s,” the toy’s “label” says “Bad Spaniels”; and instead of “Old No. 7” and “Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey” it says “The Old No. 2 on your Tennessee Carpet.” Jack Daniel’s sued the toy company alleging violation of its trademark. The district court held that the toy is a humorous parody entitled to First Amendment protection, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Is humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead entitled to heightened First Amendment protection? Conclusion The parodic use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s likelihood-of-confusion analysis, not the threshold Rogers test, and is not automatically excluded from a claim of trademark dilution. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Lanham Act creates federal causes of action for trademark infringement and trademark dilution. In a typical infringement case, the question is whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” In a typical dilution case, the question is whether the defendant “harm[ed] the reputation” of a famous trademark. However, even before answering these questions, courts apply a threshold test developed by the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) Under the Rogers test, when a trademark infringement claim targets an expressive work, the claim must be dismissed unless the complainant can show either (1) that the challenged use of a mark “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work” or (2) that it “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” The Rogers test is limited, however. It does not insulate from ordinary trademark scrutiny the use of trademarks as trademarks. A primary purpose of trademark law is to protect against consumer confusion about source, and the risk of consumer confusion is highest when someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark, as VIP did with Jack Daniel’s iconic bottle. The parodic nature of VIP’s use may affect the ultimate determination of the likelihood of consumer confusion, but it does not automatically shield the use from claims of dilution. Thus, dismissal of the infringement and dilution claims under the Rogers test was erroneous. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, to warn courts to view surveys, such as the one provided as evidence of consumer confusion in this case, with caution and as merely one piece of a multifaceted analysis of the likelihood of confusion. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Although the Court’s decision left the Rogers test intact, Justice Gorsuch warned lower courts to view it “with care” and expressed doubt that Rogers is “correct in all its particulars.”

Coinbase v. Bielski Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2023.Decided on Jun 23, 2023. Petitioner: Coinbase, Inc..Respondent: Abraham Bielski. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner) Hassan A. Zavareei (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Coinbase operates an online currency and crypto-currency exchange platform. Abraham Bielski created a Coinbase account in 2021, and shortly after opening it, he alleges that a scammer fraudulently accessed his account and stole more than $30,000 from him. Bielski alleged that Coinbase ignored his attempts at communication until he filed this lawsuit. Bielski alleged in his lawsuit—on behalf of himself and other similarly situated persons—that Coinbase, is a “financial institution” within the meaning of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA), and that it fails to comply with its responsibilities under the EFTA, including conducting a timely and good-faith investigation of fraudulent transfers. Coinbase moved to compel arbitration based on its user agreement, and the district court denied the motion to compel on the grounds that the arbitration clause and delegation clause were unconscionable. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Coinbase’s motion to stay. Question Does a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration oust a district court’s jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal? Conclusion A district court must stay its proceedings while an interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to 9 U. S. C. §16(a) on the question of arbitrability is ongoing. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The Court recognized in Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982) that an appeal, including an interlocutory appeal, “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” The Griggs principle controls the outcome of this case. If district courts could proceed while an appeal on arbitrability is ongoing, the benefits of arbitration, such as efficiency and reduced costs, would be lost and parties could feel pressured to settle to avoid district court proceedings they initially sought to avoid through arbitration. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, and in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined in part. Justice Jackson pointed out that when a federal court of appeals conducts interlocutory review of a trial court order, the rest of the case remains at the trial court level for the trial judge to make particularized determinations at their discretion. Justice Jackson argued that this discretionary decision-making process promotes procedural fairness, and there is no reason to remove that discretion in this case.

Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2023.Decided on Jun 29, 2023. Petitioner: Abitron Austria GmbH, et al..Respondent: Hetronic International, Inc.. Advocates: Lucas M. Walker (for the Petitioners) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Matthew S. Hellman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Hetronic International, Inc., a U.S. company, manufactures radio remote controls heavy-duty construction equipment. By agreement, Abitron, a foreign corporation, distributed Hetronic’s products, mostly in Europe. The relationship deteriorated when Abitron decided that it, not Hetronic, owned the rights to Hetronic’s trademarks and other intellectual property. Abitron began manufacturing products identical to Hetronic’s and selling them under the Hetronic brand, mostly in Europe. Hetronic terminated their contractual relationship, but Abitron continued to manufacture and sell the products, making tens of millions of dollars. Hetronic sued Abitron, and a jury sitting in the Western District of Oklahoma awarded Hetronic over $100 million in damages based on infringement of Hetronic’s trademarks. The district court entered a worldwide injunction barring Abitron from selling the infringing products. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the court’s conclusion that the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially but limited the court’s injunction. Question Does the Lanham Act permit the owner of a U.S.-registered trademark to recover damages for the use of that trademark when the infringement occurred outside the United States and is not likely to cause confusion in the United States? Conclusion The Lanham Act extends trademark protection only to claims where the infringing “use in commerce” is domestic. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court. Unless Congress explicitly states otherwise, U.S. laws are generally presumed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This presumption helps avoid conflicts with other countries and is premised on the idea that Congress typically legislates with domestic matters in mind. To apply the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts apply a two-step framework. First, a court must ask whether Congress has explicitly indicated that the statute should apply to foreign conduct. If not, then the second step is to ask whether the lawsuit seeks a permissible domestic or impermissible foreign application of the law. Applying that two-step framework here, the Court concluded that the Lanham Act applies only to claims where the infringing use is domestic. First, neither § 1114(1)(a) nor § 1125(a)(1) explicitly indicates that the statute should apply to foreign conduct. They prohibit the use “in commerce” of protected marks that are likely to cause confusion. A mere reference to “foreign commerce” does not make a statute extraterritorial. Second, the focus of the statute is on the “use in commerce” that is likely to cause confusion, which is domestic conduct. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson filed a concurring opinion to elaborate on what it means to “use a trademark in commerce.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that while the majority reached the correct conclusion, in her view the Lanham Act extends to activities carried out abroad when there is a likelihood of consumer confusion in the United States.

Arizona v. Navajo Nation Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 20, 2023.Decided on Jun 22, 2023. Petitioner: State of Arizona, et al..Respondent: Navajo Nation, et al.. Advocates: Frederick Liu (On behalf of the Federal parties) Rita P. Maguire (On behalf of the State parties) Shay Dvoretzky (On behalf of the Navajo Nation) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Navajo Reservation is the “permanent home” of the Navajo Nation, under the 1868 Treaty, and subsequent expansions by executive orders and acts of Congress. The Reservation includes parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, and lies almost entirely within the drainage basin of the Colorado River. Due to water scarcity, rights to the Colorado River’s waters are allocated through federal treaties, statutes, regulations, common law rulings, Supreme Court decrees, and interstate compacts—collectively known as the “Law of the River.” In 2003, the Navajo Nation sued the U.S. Department of the Interior and other federal agencies under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and a breach of trust claim for failure to consider their water rights in managing the Colorado River. Arizona, Nevada, and several other entities intervened to protect their interests in the Colorado River waters. The district court dismissed their claim, finding the Supreme Court retained original jurisdiction over allocation of rights to the Colorado River. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Question Does the 1868 Treaty between the Navajo Nation and the United States impose an affirmative duty on the United States to secure water for the tribe? Conclusion The 1868 treaty establishing the Navajo Reservation reserved necessary water to accomplish the purpose of the Navajo Reservation but did not require the United States to take affirmative steps to secure water for the Tribe. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. To succeed on a breach-of-trust claim, as the Tribe asserts here, it must establish, among other things, that the text of a treaty, statute, or regulation imposed certain duties on the United States. The 1868 treaty did not do so. While it did impose a number of specific duties, such as to construct a number of buildings on the reservation and to provide teachers for schools for at least 10 years, the treaty said nothing about any affirmative duty for the United States to secure water for the Tribe. The Court declined to infer such a duty to secure water, particularly when the treaty imposed no such duty with respect to land. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion highlighting the confusion over the definition of a “trust relationship” and calling upon the Court to clarify its meaning in future cases. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch characterized the case as the Navajo Tribe simply asking the United States to identify the water rights it holds for them, and, if the United States has misappropriated the Navajo’s water rights, to formulate a plan to stop doing so prospectively. Under this characterization, the dissenters would allow the Tribe’s case to proceed.