Supreme Court Oral Arguments

United States v. Skrmetti Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2024. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter for Tennessee. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) Chase B. Strangio (for the Respondents L.W., et al., supporting the Petitioner) J. Matthew Rice (for the Respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2023, Tennessee and Kentucky passed laws restricting certain medical treatments for transgender minors. These laws prohibited healthcare providers from administering puberty blockers, hormone therapy, and sex-transition surgeries to minors for the purpose of altering their appearance or validating their gender identity when inconsistent with their biological sex. Both laws included exceptions for certain medical conditions and provided mechanisms for enforcement, including professional discipline for healthcare providers and extended statutes of limitations for lawsuits. In response, groups of transgender minors, their parents, and healthcare providers challenged these laws in federal court. The plaintiffs argued that the laws violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. They sought preliminary injunctions to prevent the laws from taking effect. In both cases, district courts initially granted injunctions, finding that the laws likely infringed on parents’ fundamental rights to direct their children's medical care and discriminated based on sex. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stayed these injunctions, allowing the laws to go into effect pending further legal proceedings. Question Does a Tennessee law restricting certain medical treatments for transgender minors violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment?

Republic of Hungary v. Simon Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2024. Petitioner: Republic of Hungary.Respondent: Rosalie Simon. Advocates: Joshua S. Glasgow (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case arises from the Hungarian government’s confiscation of Jewish-owned property during the Holocaust. In 1944, Hungary rapidly exterminated over half a million Jews and seized their property. Fourteen Holocaust survivors sued Hungary and its agency, Magyar Államvasutak Zrt., seeking compensation for this seized property. To overcome Hungary’s sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs invoked the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s expropriation exception, asserting they were either stateless or Czechoslovakian nationals at the time of the takings, not Hungarian nationals. This claim was made in response to the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Fed. Republic of Germany v. Philipp that a country’s taking of property from its own nationals is generally excluded from the FSIA’s expropriation exception. The case has a complex litigation history, with multiple appeals focusing on the plaintiffs’ nationality status and FSIA jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to shift the burden of proof to Hungary to disprove, contrasting with the Second Circuit’s decision that plaintiffs must demonstrate a link between the expropriated property’s funds and U.S. commercial activity. Question 1. Does historical commingling of assets suffice to establish that proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act? 2. Must a plaintiff make out a valid claim that an exception to the FSIA applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference? 3. Does a sovereign defendant bear the burden of producing evidence to affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the FSIA?

United States v. Miller Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2024. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: David L. Miller. Advocates: Yaira Dubin (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, All Resorts Group, Inc. paid $145,138.78 to the Internal Revenue Service to cover personal tax debts of two of its principals. The company filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2017. Subsequently, the United States Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against the United States to avoid these transfers, relying on Section 544(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and Utah's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The United States did not contest the substantive elements required to establish a voidable transfer but argued that sovereign immunity would bar an actual creditor from avoiding the tax payments outside of bankruptcy. This prevented the Trustee from satisfying the "actual creditor requirement" of Section 544(b)(1). The Trustee countered that the sovereign immunity waiver in Section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code applied not only to the adversary proceeding but also to the underlying state law cause of action. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the Trustee, and both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question May a bankruptcy trustee avoid a debtor’s tax payment to the United States under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy?

FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C. Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2024. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration.Respondent: Wages and White Lion Investments, L.L.C. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner) Eric N. Heyer (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2009, Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, requiring FDA approval for new tobacco products, including e-cigarettes. FDA issued guidance on the application process, stating that long-term studies were not necessary and emphasizing the importance of marketing plans to prevent youth access. Manufacturers were encouraged to use existing data and observational studies. In January 2020, FDA announced it would prioritize enforcement against flavored, cartridge-based e-cigarette products due to their popularity among youth. Wages and White Lion Investments (Triton Distribution) and Vapetasia, manufacturers of flavored nicotine liquids for refillable e-cigarette systems, submitted applications in September 2020. Their applications included existing studies on e-cigarettes generally and detailed marketing plans to restrict youth access. However, in August 2021, FDA unexpectedly announced a new requirement for randomized controlled trials or longitudinal cohort studies specific to flavored products. Shortly after, FDA denied the applications of Triton and Vapetasia, citing a lack of evidence that their flavored products would benefit adult users enough to outweigh risks to youth. The manufacturers challenged this decision, arguing that FDA had changed its requirements without notice and refused to consider their marketing plans. Question Was the Food and Drug Administration’s orders denying respondents’ applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act?

NVIDIA Corporation v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 13, 2024. Petitioner: NVIDIA Corporation.Respondent: E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioners) Deepak Gupta (for the Respondents) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) NVIDIA, a major producer of graphics processing units (GPUs), experienced a surge in demand for its gaming GPUs due to cryptocurrency mining, particularly for Ethereum, during 2017-2018. This mirrored a previous crypto-driven boom and bust cycle experienced by NVIDIA’s rival, AMD. Despite introducing specialized crypto mining GPUs (Crypto SKUs) and reporting their sales separately, NVIDIA continued to see substantial crypto-related purchases of its gaming GPUs. However, the company’s executives, particularly CEO Jensen Huang and CFO Colette Kress, repeatedly downplayed the impact of crypto mining on their gaming segment revenues when questioned by analysts and investors. As cryptocurrency prices began to decline in 2018, NVIDIA’s GPU sales dropped. On August 16, 2018, the company lowered its revenue guidance, which was followed by a more significant miss in November. On November 15, 2018, NVIDIA disclosed that post-crypto channel inventory was taking longer than expected to sell through, with Huang referring to it as a “crypto hangover.” This revelation led to a sharp decline in NVIDIA's stock price, dropping 28.5% in two trading days. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that during the class period (May 10, 2017, to November 14, 2018), NVIDIA's executives knowingly or recklessly misled investors about the company's exposure to crypto volatility by understating the impact of crypto-related purchases on their gaming segment revenues. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged that, during the Class Period, Huang made false or misleading statements and did so knowingly or recklessly. Question What is the proper pleading standard to show knowledge or intent for Private Securities Litigation Reform Act claims that rely on internal company documents?

Velazquez v. Garland Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2024. Petitioner: Hugo Abisai Monsalvo Velazquez.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Gerard J. Cedrone (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Mr. Velázquez, a Mexican citizen, entered the U.S. without authorization in 2005. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him and served a deficient Notice to Appear that lacked time and place details. In 2013, Velázquez admitted to unlawful entry and sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. In March 2019, an Immigration Judge denied these requests but granted voluntary departure within 60 days. Velázquez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal in October 2021 and reinstated the 60-day voluntary departure period. On December 13, 2021, Velázquez filed a motion to reopen his case to apply for cancellation of removal, arguing he had accrued 10 years of continuous presence due to his deficient Notice to Appear. The BIA denied this motion, finding Velázquez had not asserted “new facts” and that the motion was untimely, filed after the 60-day voluntary departure period. Velázquez then filed a motion to reconsider, challenging only the timeliness determination, which the BIA also denied. Velázquez filed a petition for review in federal court, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied review, concluding that Mr. Velázquez failed to voluntarily depart or file an administrative motion within 60 calendar days, the maximum period provided by statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(2). Question When a noncitizen’s voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)?

Delligatti v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 12, 2024. Petitioner: Salvatore Delligatti.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Salvatore Delligatti, an associate of the Genovese Crime Family, was convicted of various charges, including attempted murder in aid of racketeering (under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5)), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)). Delligatti had organized a plot to murder Joseph Bonelli, a neighborhood bully who had been stealing from a local gas station owner and was suspected of cooperating against bookies associated with the Genovese Crime Family. Delligatti paid another man to coordinate the murder with gang members, providing them with a gun and a car. The murder attempts were ultimately unsuccessful due to the presence of potential witnesses and the arrest of the would-be murderers by law enforcement. On appeal, Delligatti argued that his firearms conviction should be vacated because the predicate offenses, including the attempted murder charge, were not “crimes of violence” under the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that attempted murder in aid of racketeering qualifies as a crime of violence, as it necessarily involves the attempted use of physical force, and therefore upheld Delligatti's firearms conviction. Question Does a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but which can be committed by failing to take action, have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force?

Facebook v. Amalgamated Bank Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 6, 2024. Petitioner: Facebook, Inc., et al.Respondent: Amalgamated Bank, et al. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Kevin K. Russell (for the Respondents) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Facebook, the world’s largest social media platform, faced scrutiny in 2018 when news broke that Cambridge Analytica, a British political consulting firm, had improperly harvested personal data from millions of unwitting Facebook users. The data originated from a personality quiz integrated on Facebook by Aleksandr Kogan, who gained access to users’ data and their Facebook friends’ data without consent. Although only about 270,000 users took the quiz, Kogan harvested data from over 30 million users. Cambridge Analytica used this data to create personality profiles of American voters, which were allegedly used to benefit political campaigns, including Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Facebook learned of Cambridge Analytica’s misconduct in 2015 but failed to inform affected users. The company continued to investigate the data usage and negotiated a confidential settlement with Kogan in 2016. Despite assurances that the data had been deleted, Facebook discovered in 2016 that Cambridge Analytica was still using the data. The scandal became public in March 2018, leading to significant drops in Facebook's stock price. Shortly after, it was revealed that Facebook had been sharing user data with dozens of whitelisted third parties without express user consent, contradicting previous statements about data control and privacy. These revelations, along with subsequent privacy concerns and regulatory actions, led to further stock price declines and reduced revenue growth for Facebook. Shareholders filed a securities fraud action against Facebook and its executives, alleging violations of Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act's implementing regulations. The district court dismissed the shareholders’ claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that under the heightened standard of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, the shareholders adequately pleaded falsity as to some of the challenged risk statements. Question Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm?

E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2024. Petitioner: E.M.D. Sales, Inc.Respondent: Faustino Sanchez Carrera. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Lauren E. Bateman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) E.M.D. Sales Inc. (EMD) is a distributor of Latin American, Caribbean, and Asian food products to grocery stores in the Washington, D.C. area. Three of EMD’s sales representatives—Faustino Sanchez Carrera, Magdaleno Gervacio, and Jesus David Muro—sued EMD and its CEO, Elda Devarie, in 2017 for allegedly violating the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by denying them overtime wages. The plaintiffs claimed they worked about 60 hours per week, paid on commission without overtime compensation. The sales representatives were assigned routes of stores, spending most of their time servicing chain stores and some independent groceries. Their duties included restocking shelves, managing inventory, and submitting orders for EMD products. While they could make some sales to independent stores, their ability to make sales at chain stores was limited, as high-level negotiations between EMD management and corporate buyers typically determined product placement. EMD argued that the sales representatives were exempt from overtime pay under the FLSA’s “outside sales” exemption. The case went to a bench trial, where the court had to determine whether the plaintiffs’ primary duty was making sales, qualifying them for the exemption, or if their work was primarily incidental to sales made by others. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that EMD failed to prove the outside sales exemption applied, awarded both unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages, but limited the damages to a two-year period after concluding that EMD's violation was not willful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Is the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption a mere preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence?

Advocate Christ Medical Center v. Becerra Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 5, 2024. Petitioner: Advocate Christ Medical Center, et al.Respondent: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services. Advocates: Melissa Arbus Sherry (for the Petitioners) Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves the calculation of Medicare reimbursements to hospitals under the “disproportionate share hospital” (DSH) adjustment, which provides additional compensation to hospitals serving a high percentage of low-income patients. The adjustment is based on two formulas: the Medicare fraction and the Medicaid fraction. The Medicare fraction, which is at the center of this dispute, represents the percentage of a hospital's Medicare patients who are also entitled to Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. Over 200 hospitals are challenging the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) interpretation of who counts as “entitled to supplementary security income benefits” for the Medicare fraction calculation. HHS considers only patients who qualify for the monthly SSI cash payment during their hospital stay, while the hospitals argue that all patients enrolled in the SSI program should be included, even if they don't receive a payment that month. The hospitals also dispute HHS’s matching process and seek access to detailed SSI payment codes for their patients. After being denied relief by HHS’s internal review board and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the hospitals sought judicial review, but the district court granted summary judgment to HHS. The U.S. Circuit Court for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Question Does the phrase “entitled… to benefits” include all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received?

Wisconsin Bell, Inc. cv. United States, ex rel. Heath Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2024. Petitioner: Wisconsin Bell, Inc.Respondent: United States, ex rel. Todd Heath. Advocates: Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner) Tejinder Singh (for the Respondent) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1996, Congress created the E-rate program to help schools and libraries afford telecommunications services. The program provides federal subsidies on a sliding scale, and service providers must follow the “lowest-corresponding-price” rule, offering schools and libraries the lowest price charged to similarly situated non-residential customers. Wisconsin Bell, aware of this rule since its inception, provided services to hundreds of eligible schools and libraries under the E-rate program. Despite knowing about the rule, Wisconsin Bell did not train its sales representatives or implement compliance mechanisms until 2009. The company admitted to treating pricing contracts for schools and libraries the same as other customers, often instructing sales representatives to offer the highest prices possible. In 2009, following a settlement by its parent company with the Department of Justice and FCC, Wisconsin Bell developed a compliance plan. In 2008, Todd Heath filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act, alleging that Wisconsin Bell submitted false claims and certifications related to the E-rate program. After initial dismissal and subsequent appeal, the case proceeded to discovery, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wisconsin Bell. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Heath identified enough specific evidence of discriminatory pricing to allow a reasonable jury to find that Wisconsin Bell, acting with the required scienter, charged specific schools and libraries more than it charged similarly situated customers. Question Do reimbursement requests submitted to the Federal Communications Commission's E-rate program qualify as “claims” under the False Claims Act?

City and County of San Francisco v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2024. Petitioner: City and County of San Francisco, California.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency. Advocates: Tara M. Steeley (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The city of San Francisco operates a combined sewer system that collects both sewage and stormwater runoff. During heavy rains, the system can exceed its capacity, resulting in combined sewer overflows (CSOs) that discharge pollutants into the Pacific Ocean. The Clean Water Act requires cities like San Francisco to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for such discharges. San Francisco has been implementing a CSO control plan since the late 1960s and completed construction of its current CSO control facilities in 1997. In 2019, the EPA and the California Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a new NPDES permit for San Francisco's Oceanside treatment facility. San Francisco is challenging two provisions in this permit: (1) narrative prohibitions against violating water quality standards, and (2) a requirement that San Francisco update its long-term CSO control plan. San Francisco argues that these provisions are inconsistent with the Clean Water Act and EPA regulations. The EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board denied San Francisco's administrative appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied San Francisco’s petition for review, holding that the Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to include in the Oceanside NPDES permit the challenged provisions, and that EPA's decision to do so was rationally connected to evidence in the administrative record. Question Does the Clean Water Act allow the Environmental Protection Agency (or an authorized state) to impose generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits that subject permit-holders to enforcement for violating water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their discharges must conform?

Bufkin v. McDonough Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 16, 2024. Petitioner: Joshua E. Bufkin.Respondent: Denis R. McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: Melanie L. Bostwick (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Veterans Joshua Bufkin and Norman Thornton were each denied benefits despite evidence that appeared to be in “approximate balance.” The benefit-of-the-doubt rule, codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b), provides that, “[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant.” However, in reviewing the Veterans Court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Section 7261(b)(1), which requires the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to “take due account of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ application of that rule “does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond” performing the usual review of the underlying factual findings for clear error—a basic procedural requirement that was already in place before enactment of the Veterans Benefits Act. Question Must the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule in 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1)?

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2024. Petitioner: Amina Bouarfa.Respondent: Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security. Advocates: Samir Deger-Sen (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, Amina Bouarfa, a U.S. citizen, submitted Form I-130 to petition for her husband, Ala’a Hamayel, to be classified as her immediate relative under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Secretary approved the petition in 2015 but later notified Bouarfa of an intent to revoke the approval, stating that Hamayel had entered into a previous marriage solely to evade immigration laws. Despite Bouarfa’s response, the Secretary revoked the approval, and Bouarfa’s appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals was unsuccessful. Bouarfa sued in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, challenging the officials’ actions as arbitrary and capricious. The Secretary and Director moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the revocation decision was unreviewable because it was a discretionary action. The district court granted the motion, concluding that while the action was based on nondiscretionary criteria, the action itself was discretionary and thus that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the decision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question May a visa petitioner obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria?

Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 15, 2024. Petitioner: Medical Marijuana, Inc.Respondent: Douglas J. Horn. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioners) Easha Anand (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2012, Douglas J. Horn was involved in a car accident that caused injuries to his hip and right shoulder. While seeking alternative natural remedies, he discovered an advertisement for Dixie X CBD Dew Drops Tincture, which claimed to contain 0% THC and be compliant with federal law. As a commercial truck driver subject to random drug testing, Horn carefully investigated these claims before purchasing and consuming the product in October 2012. However, he subsequently failed a drug test and lost his job, wages, and benefits. Independent lab tests confirmed that Dixie X contained THC, contrary to the advertisement's claims. On August 6, 2015, Horn sued the companies who allegedly falsely marketed the product—Medical Marijuana, Inc., Dixie Holdings, LLC, and Red Dice Holdings, LLC—in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York, which included a civil RICO claim and eight state law claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Horn lacked RICO standing because he sued for the loss of earnings, which was derivative of an antecedent personal injury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated, concluding that nothing in the text of RICO’s civil-action provision, or in its structure or history, supports a rule that bars plaintiffs from suing simply because their otherwise recoverable economic losses happen to have been connected to a non-recoverable personal injury. Question Are economic harms resulting from personal injuries properly considered injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act?

Glossip v. Oklahoma Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 9, 2024. Petitioner: Richard Eugene Glossip.Respondent: Oklahoma. Advocates: Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent in support of the Petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Richard Glossip was sentenced to death for the 1997 murder of Barry Van Treese, the owner of the Oklahoma City motel where Glossip worked as a manager. Critical to Glossip’s conviction was testimony from Justin Sneed, a handyman at the hotel, who told jurors that Glossip paid him $10,000 to kill Van Treese. After Glossip’s conviction, he received information that Sneed had testified falsely about his mental health and whether he had seen a psychiatrist. Glossip asked the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to set aside his conviction, but the court rejected that request, and the state’s Pardon and Parole Board turned down Glossip’s request for clemency. All told, Glossip has spent 26 years behind bars, faced nine execution dates, and had multiple independent investigations that raised serious doubts about his conviction. Ahead of his execution date of May 18, 2023, Glossip asked the Supreme Court to stay his execution and consider whether Oklahoma violated Glossip’s constitutional rights when prosecutors suppressed evidence that their key witness was under a psychiatrist’s care; the Court granted his motion to stay and granted his petition, as well. Question May Oklahoma carry out the execution of Richard Glossip in light of the prosecutorial misconduct and other errors that affected his conviction and sentencing?

Garland v. VanDerStok Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2024. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland.Respondent: Jennifer VanDerStok. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners) Peter A. Patterson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) ATF, created in 1972, is responsible for regulating firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA). The GCA requires federal firearms licensees (FFLs) to conduct background checks, record firearm transfers, and serialize firearms when selling or transferring them. The GCA’s regulation of firearms is based on the definition of “firearm,” which includes the “frame or receiver.” However, ATF’s 1978 definition of “frame or receiver” became outdated due to changes in modern firearm design, such as the AR-15 and Glock pistols. Furthermore, the rise of privately made firearms (PMFs) or “ghost guns” posed challenges to law enforcement because they were not regulated under the GCA and did not require serialization. In response, ATF issued a Final Rule in 2022, updating the definitions of “frame,” “receiver,” and “firearm” to better capture modern firearm designs and regulate PMFs. The Final Rule took effect on August 24, 2022. The respondents in this case challenged the Final Rule’s redefinition of “frame or receiver” and “firearm,” arguing that it exceeded ATF’s congressionally mandated authority. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and vacated the Final Rule in its entirety. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination that the two provisions exceeded ATF’s statutory authority. Question Did the ATF exceed its statutory authority in promulgating its Final Rule purporting to regulate so-called “ghost guns”?

Lackey v. Stinnie Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2024. Petitioner: Gerald F. Lackey.Respondent: Damian Stinnie. Advocates: Erika L. Maley (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Brian D. Schmalzbach (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Under the so-called “American Rule,” each litigant pays their own attorney’s fees, regardless of whether they win or lose. However, certain statutes permit the payment of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to “the prevailing party” in litigation; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 is one such statute, permitting the payment of attorney’s fees to parties that prevail in civil rights litigation. Several indigent Virginia residents challenged in federal court a state statute that required automatic suspension of the driver’s licenses of those who failed to pay certain court fines and fees. Finding the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their case, the district court granted a preliminary injunction ordering the state to remove the plaintiffs’ suspensions. The state did not appeal the injunction, so the plaintiffs were able to drive again. Before the case could go to trial, the Virginia legislature repealed the statute. The plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under Section 1988, but the district court rejected that request, citing a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit holding that a grant of a preliminary injunction does not render a plaintiff a “prevailing party.” The plaintiffs appealed. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but, on rehearing, the en banc 4th Circuit reversed. Question Is a party who obtains a preliminary injunction a “prevailing party” for purposes of being entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C § 1988?

Royal Canin U.S.A. v. Wullschleger Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2024. Petitioner: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc.Respondent: Anastasia Wullschleger. Advocates: Katherine B. Wellington (for the Petitioners) Ashley C. Keller (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Anastasia Wullschleger filed a class-action complaint in Missouri state court against Royal Canin and Nestle Purina, alleging that their requirement for a prescription for specialized dog food was misleading and led to higher prices. The defendants removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court, and then they appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which determined that the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims raised substantial federal issues and belonged in federal court. Upon returning to the district court, Wullschleger amended her complaint to remove references to federal law, dropped the antitrust and unjust-enrichment claims, and added a civil-conspiracy claim. Despite these changes, the district court exercised federal-question jurisdiction and ultimately granted the manufacturers’ motion to dismiss, leading to a second appeal. Reviewing the case de novo, the Eighth Circuit concluded that amending a complaint to eliminate the only federal questions destroys subject-matter jurisdiction and thus returned the case to state court. Question Can a plaintiff whose state-court lawsuit has been removed by the defendants to federal court seek to have the case sent back to state court by amending the complaint to omit all references to federal law?

Williams v. Washington Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2024. Petitioner: Nancy Williams, et al.Respondent: Fitzgerald Washington, Alabama Secretary of Labor. Advocates: Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Petitioners) Edmund G. LaCour, Jr. (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dissatisfied with the Alabama Department of Labor’s handling of their unemployment benefits applications, 26 plaintiffs filed a complaint and motion for injunctive relief against Secretary Fitzgerald Washington and the Department. The plaintiffs, each having filed applications for benefits, alleged various grievances against the Department’s processing methods. Subsequently, Secretary Washington and the Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. In response, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, which resulted in the omission of several initial claims and the exclusion of the Department as a defendant. The remaining allegations in the suit were federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, accusing Secretary Washington of implementing policies and procedures that violated both the Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought various forms of relief, including multiple permanent and preliminary injunctions to expedite the handling of unemployment compensation applications and improve communication clarity, as well as attorney fees. Secretary Washington again moved to dismiss the case, citing reasons such as lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, absence of a private cause of action, and the substantive meritlessness of the claims. The court granted the dismissal without stating the basis for it. The plaintiffs moved to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, but the court denied their motion. They then appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the suit because the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted mandatory administrative remedies. Question Does a Section 1983 claim brought in state court require the plaintiffs to first exhaust state administrative remedies?

Trump v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2024. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Former President Donald Trump was indicted in August 2023 on four counts arising from Special Counsel Jack Smith’s investigation into the January 6, 2021, attacks on the U.S. Capitol. Trump claimed that he cannot be prosecuted for his official acts as president and that a former president cannot be prosecuted unless he has first been impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate. U.S. District Judge Tanya Chutkan initially set Trump’s trial for March 4, 2024, but later vacated this date pending resolution of Trump’s immunity claims. Judge Chutkan denied Trump’s motion to dismiss on immunity grounds, and Smith asked the Supreme Court directly to expedite review and bypass a decision by the D.C. Circuit. The Court declined, deferring instead to the D.C. Circuit’s judgment. On February 6, the D.C. Circuit upheld Chutkan’s decision, and Trump requested a stay of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided to expedite the case. Question Does a former president enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office, and if so, to what extent?

Moyle v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 24, 2024. Petitioner: Mike Moyle, et al.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Joshua N. Turner (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2022, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to an abortion, the Biden administration brought a legal challenge to a restrictive Idaho abortion law. The Biden administration argued that the state law, which criminalizes providing an abortion except in a few narrow circumstances, including to save the life of the mother, is preempted by a federal law, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA requires hospitals receiving Medicare funding to offer “necessary stabilizing treatment” to pregnant women in emergencies. The district court ruled in favor of the Biden administration and barred Idaho from enforcing its law to the extent that it conflicted with EMTALA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to stay the district court's ruling while the state appealed. Question Does the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act preempt an Idaho law that criminalizes most abortions in that state?

Department of State v. Munoz Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2024. Petitioner: Department of State, et al.Respondent: Sandra Munoz, et al. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners) Eric T. Lee (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sandra Muñoz, a U.S. citizen, married Luis Asencio-Cordero, an El Salvadoran citizen, in 2010. They have a U.S. citizen child. Asencio-Cordero, who arrived in the U.S. in 2005 and has multiple tattoos, applied for an immigrant visa after Muñoz filed an approved immigrant-relative petition and waiver for his inadmissibility. In 2015, he returned to El Salvador for his visa interview, denying any gang affiliations. However, in December 2015, the U.S. Consulate denied his visa under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), suggesting his potential involvement in unlawful activities. Muñoz sought intervention from Congresswoman Judy Chu, but the State Department upheld the decision. A declaration from a gang expert, Humberto Guizar, stated that Asencio-Cordero’s tattoos were not gang-related. Despite this and further appeals, including to the State Department's Office of Inspector General, the decision remained unchanged, with authorities confirming the inadmissibility and indicating no grounds for appeal. Following the government’s denial of Asencio-Cordero’s immigrant visa application, the plaintiffs sought judicial review, arguing that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, invoking the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to prevent judicial scrutiny of the visa decision. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the government failed to provide the constitutionally required notice within a reasonable time after the visa application was denied. As a result, the appellate court determined that the government was not entitled to summary judgment based on the doctrine of consular nonreviewability and vacated the district court's decision. Question Does the denial of a visa to the non-citizen spouse of a U.S. citizen infringe on a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen and, if so, did the government properly justify that decision in this case?

Starbucks Corporation v. McKinney Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2024. Petitioner: Starbucks Corporation.Respondent: M. Kathleen McKinney. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In early January 2022, Nikki Taylor, a supervisor at a Memphis Starbucks, initiated union-organizing efforts, contacting Buffalo, New York, Starbucks employees and the Union for guidance. Conversations with colleagues about unionizing led to managerial scrutiny and disciplinary actions against Taylor for alleged insubordination and a dress code violation. Despite this, Taylor and coworkers held a meeting with Union representatives and drafted a letter to Starbucks's CEO announcing their intent to unionize. On January 18, following the public release of the unionization letter, the Memphis store was closed early by management under the pretext of understaffing, coinciding with a media event covering the unionization efforts. Subsequent investigations by Starbucks led to the February 8 firing of seven employees, including key organizing committee members, for policy violations during the media event. These terminations led to a reduced display of union support among the remaining staff and increased anxiety about unionizing in other Starbucks locations. However, the Memphis store voted to join the Union in June. The Union filed charges against Starbucks for unfair labor practices. Following an investigation, a district court ordered a temporary injunction, demanding the reinstatement of the terminated employees. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the NLRB satisfied its burden of showing “‘reasonable cause’ to believe that employers engaged in unfair labor practices and that an injunction protects the Board’s remedial power.” Question What test must courts use to evaluate requests for injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act?

City of Grants Pass v. Johnson Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2024. Petitioner: City of Grants Pass, Oregon.Respondent: Gloria Johnson, et al. Advocates: Theane D. Evangelis (for the Petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The city of Grants Pass in southern Oregon has a population of approximately 38,000, and of that population, somewhere between 50 and 600 persons are unhoused. Whatever the exact number of unhoused persons, however, it exceeds the number of available shelter beds, requiring that at least some of them sleep on the streets or in parks. However, several provisions of the Grants Pass Municipal Code prohibit them from doing so, including an “anti-sleeping” ordinance, two “anti-camping” ordinances, a “park exclusion” ordinance, and a “park exclusion appeals” ordinance. In September 2018, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Martin v. City of Boise, holding that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting, sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless individuals who cannot obtain shelter.” While the Grants Pass Municipal Code provisions impose only civil penalties, they still can mature into criminal penalties. A district court certified a class of plaintiffs of involuntarily unhoused persons living in Grants Pass and concluded that, based on the unavailability of shelter beds, the City’s enforcement of its anti-camping and anti-sleeping ordinances violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc. Question Does a city’s enforcement of public camping against involuntarily homeless people violate the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual punishment?

Smith v. Spizzirri Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2024. Petitioner: Wendy Smith, et al.Respondent: Keith Spizzirri, et al. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioners) E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Plaintiffs Smith and others were current and former delivery drivers for Intelliserve. They sued Intelliserve in Arizona state court alleging that “Intelliserve violated federal and state employment laws by misclassifying them as independent contractors, failing to pay them required minimum and overtime wages, and failing to provide paid sick leave.” Intelliserve removed the case to federal court, then moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss the case. While both parties agreed that, under the FAA, all claims were subject to mandatory arbitration, they disagreed on how the district court was supposed to handle the lawsuit. Intelliserve argued that Section 3 of the FAA permitted the district court to dismiss the action, while the plaintiffs argued that the FAA required the district court to stay the action pending arbitration. The district court dismissed the action without prejudice, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act give district courts discretion to dismiss a lawsuit when all claims are subject to arbitration?

Thornell v. Jones Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 17, 2024. Petitioner: Ryan Thornell, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections.Respondent: Danny Lee Jones. Advocates: Jason D. Lewis (for the Petitioner) Jean-Claude Andre (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In Bullhead City, Arizona, on March 26, 1992, Danny Lee Jones and Robert Weaver engaged in a day of drinking and using crystal methamphetamine. A violent altercation ensued, resulting in Jones fatally striking Weaver with a baseball bat. Jones also attacked Weaver’s grandmother, Katherine Gumina, and his seven-year-old daughter, Tisha, the latter of whom he also strangled or suffocated. Jones fled to Las Vegas but was arrested and indicted in Arizona on two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder. His public defender, inexperienced in capital cases, received limited funding for expert witnesses. Jones was convicted on all counts, and a sentencing hearing was scheduled. At sentencing, testimony revealed Jones’s troubled childhood, including substance abuse, head injuries, and abuse by his first stepfather. Dr. Jack Potts, a forensic psychiatrist, assessed Jones, citing a history of substance abuse, possible mood disorders, and susceptibility to aggression due to drug use. Potts’s report, submitted late due to delayed receipt of the Presentence Information Report, suggested Jones’s impaired capacity to conform to the law at the time of the offenses. Despite a request for a continuance for further psychological testing, the judge found multiple aggravating factors for the murders and sentenced Jones to death for both murders and an additional twenty-five years for the attempted murder. The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence, and Jones filed a federal petition for habeas relief. After protracted litigation and appeals, the district court dismissed Jones’s habeas petition. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that application of the appropriate standards pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") meant that Jones was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Question What is the proper methodology for assessing prejudice, for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim?

Fischer v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 16, 2024. Petitioner: Joseph W. Fischer.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey T. Green (for the Petitioner) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On January 6, 2021, while Congress was convening to certify the results of the 2020 presidential election in favor of Joe Biden, thousands of supporters of the losing candidate, Donald Trump, converged on the United States Capitol to disrupt the proceedings. The Trump supporters swarmed the building, overwhelming law enforcement officers who attempted to stop them. The chaos wrought by the mob forced members of Congress to stop the certification and flee for safety. Congress was not able to resume its work for six hours. Joseph Fischer, Edward Lang, and Garret Miller were indicted for various offenses related to their involvement in the Capitol riot on January 6. All three were charged with felony offenses of assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers, and misdemeanor offenses of disorderly conduct in a Capitol building and in restricted grounds, involving the intent to disrupt congressional sessions and government functions. Additionally, each faced a count of obstruction of an official proceeding. The defendants challenged this obstruction charge, claiming that the statute does not prohibit their alleged conduct on that day. The district court agreed, holding that the statute does not apply to assaultive conduct, committed in furtherance of an attempt to stop Congress from performing a constitutionally required duty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, concluding that the natural, broad reading of that provision is that it applies to forms of obstructive conduct, not just those related to investigations and evidence. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations, include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2024. Petitioner: Jascha Chiaverini, et al.Respondent: City of Napoleon, Ohio, et al. Advocates: Easha Anand (for the Petitioners) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Megan M. Wold (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jascha Chiaverini, manager of the Diamond and Gold Outlet in Napoleon, Ohio, bought a men's ring and diamond earring from Brent Burns for $45. He recorded the transaction, including copying Burns' ID and photographing the items. Subsequently, David and Christina Hill contacted Chiaverini, claiming the jewelry was stolen from them. Chiaverini advised them to report to the police but denied buying their described items. After multiple calls, Chiaverini ended the conversation. Both parties contacted the police. Chiaverini expressed his suspicion about holding stolen property and requested police, not the Hills, to visit. When the police arrived, Chiaverini cooperated, providing information and photographs of the jewelry. The situation escalated when Chiaverini received a conflicting "hold letter" from the police, instructing him to keep the items as evidence but also to release them to the Hills. Chiaverini refused to release the items, citing legal concerns and advice from his counsel. His confrontation with Police Chief Weitzel revealed Chiaverini's lack of a precious-metal-dealer license, prompting a new investigation angle. Officer Steward updated the police report to include Chiaverini's suspicion about the stolen nature of the items, which Chiaverini disputed. Based on these developments, warrants were issued for Chiaverini's arrest and the search of his store, leading to his temporary detention. Although a court later dismissed the criminal case against Chiaverini, he filed a complaint against the officers and the city, alleging various legal violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, citing probable cause for Chiaverini's arrest and dismissing his claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question May a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim proceed as to a baseless criminal charge so long as other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause?

Snyder v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 15, 2024. Petitioner: James E. Snyder.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) James Snyder formerly served as mayor of Portage, Indiana. He was convicted of federal funds bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for soliciting and accepting $13,000 in connection with the city’s purchases of garbage trucks, among other federal crimes. Before, during, and after trial, Snyder argued that the evidence did not support a finding that there was an agreement to exchange money for the truck contracts before they were awarded. Without a prior quid pro quo agreement, he argued, § 666 cannot apply. Interpreting the plain language of the statute and Sixth Circuit precedent, the district court rejected his interpretation of that provision. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) criminalize gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions a state or local official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions?

Erlinger v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2024. Petitioner: Paul Erlinger.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting the Petitioner) D. Nick Harper (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Paul Erlinger received a 15-year prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), for illegally possessing a firearm. This sentence was based on his three prior convictions for violent felonies, all being Indiana burglaries. Erlinger challenged his sentence on two grounds. First, he argued that Indiana’s definition of burglary extends beyond the federal statute, making it non-applicable as a predicate offense under ACCA. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted that Indiana's definition of burglary is “[a] person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it.” Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1 (1990) is no broader than the federal definition of general burglary, which is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Secondly, Erlinger argued that these burglaries did not occur on separate occasions, and claimed that the determination of this fact should be made by a jury, not a judge, as per the Sixth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in Wooden v. United States (2022). The Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding that under binding circuit precedent, the government was not required to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Erlinger committed the Indiana burglaries on separate occasions, only to the sentencing judge by a preponderance of the evidence. Question Does the Constitution require a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant’s prior convictions were “committed on occasions different from one another,” as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act?

Connelly v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 27, 2024. Petitioner: Thomas A. Connelly, as Executor of the Estate of Michael P. Connelly, Sr.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner) Yaira Dubin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Brothers Michael and Thomas Connelly were the sole shareholders of a corporation. The corporation obtained life insurance on each brother so that if one died, the corporation could use the proceeds to redeem his shares. When Michael died, the Internal Revenue Service assessed taxes on his estate, which included his stock interest in the corporation. According to the IRS, the corporation’s fair market value included the life insurance proceeds intended for the stock redemption. Michael’s estate argued otherwise and sued for a tax refund. The district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding that the stock-purchase agreement did not affect the valuation and furthermore, that a proper valuation of the corporation must include the life insurance proceeds used for redemption because they were a significant asset of the company. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Should the proceeds of a life insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax?

Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 26, 2024. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration, et al.Respondent: Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, et al. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Petitioners) Jessica L. Ellsworth (for Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C) Erin M. Hawley (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Medication abortion in the U.S. is commonly conducted using a combination of mifepristone and misoprostol. Mifepristone was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in September 2000 and is used in over half of all U.S. abortions. Initially, its distribution was limited to hospitals and medical facilities under FDA regulations. The 2007 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act introduced Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), reinforcing FDA's control over drug approvals. Despite REMS review in 2011, mifepristone's distribution remained restricted. In March 2016, the FDA expanded access, allowing medical practitioners to prescribe it and extending the usage period in pregnancy. In April 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the FDA permitted mail distribution from certified sources, and in January 2023, approved pharmacies also began distributing it. However, following the Supreme Court's June 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, which eliminated the constitutional right to abortion, several states sought to restrict mifepristone’s sale. The Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other anti-abortion groups challenged the FDA’s approval, claiming inadequate consideration of evidence in 2000. In April 2023, a federal district court judge sided with the plaintiffs, suspending the FDA’s approval. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit partially stayed this decision, maintaining the original 2000 approval but striking down the 2016 REMS changes that eased access. After a hearing on the merits, in August 2023, the Fifth Circuit upheld the ban on changes made in 2016. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review and stayed the lower court’s injunction. Question 1. Do respondents have Article III standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration’s 2016 and 2021 actions with respect to mifepristone’s approved conditions of use? 2. Were the FDA’s 2016 and 2021 approvals of mifepristone arbitrary and capricious? 3. Did the district court properly grant preliminary relief?

Harrow v. Department of Defense Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2024. Petitioner: Stuart R. Harrow.Respondent: Department of Defense. Advocates: Joshua P. Davis (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Stuart R. Harrow was a federal employee who was furloughed in 2013. He appealed the furlough decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but due to short staffing, the MSPB did not rule on Harrow’s appeal for more than five years, during which Harrow changed his email address. On May 11, 2022, the MSPB affirmed the agency’s furlough action and attempted to inform Harrow that he had 60 days to seek judicial review. However, because he had changed email addresses, Harrow did not learn of the MSPB’s denial until after 60 days had elapsed. On September 8, 2022, Harrow moved the Board for an extension of time to appeal, but the Board denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the timely filing of a petition from the Board's final decision is a jurisdictional requirement and “not subject to equitable tolling.” Question Is the 60-day filing deadline in 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) jurisdictional and thus not subject to equitable tolling?

Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2024. Petitioner: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.Respondent: San Carlos Apache Tribe. Advocates: Caroline A. Flynn (for the Petitioners) Adam G. Unikowsky (for the Respondent in 23-253) Lloyd B. Miller (for the Respondent in 23-250) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Indian Health Service (IHS) manages healthcare for Native tribes, billing Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurance for services and retaining the revenue. To enhance tribal sovereignty, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), allowing tribes to administer their healthcare programs. These programs were funded by the IHS, equivalent to what IHS would spend on tribal healthcare. However, tribes faced financial challenges in running these programs due to the lack of bureaucratic and legal support available to the federal government. To address this, Congress mandated IHS to provide tribes with contract support costs (CSC), ensuring they could offer services at par with IHS. Despite this assistance, tribes still struggled with parity issues with IHS, primarily due to slow billing processes and imperfect remittance of funds by IHS. To remedy this, Congress permitted tribes to bill outside insurers directly and retain the third-party revenue, which the Tribe was required to spend on healthcare. The San Carlos Apache Tribe, exercising its sovereignty in Arizona, managed its healthcare programs and billed outside insurers directly. However, the Tribe encountered difficulties in funding the additional healthcare services from third-party revenue without corresponding CSC from IHS. The Tribe sued the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, IHS, and the United States, for the CSC for the years 2011–2013. The district court dismissed the Tribe’s claim for the third-party-revenue-funded portions of the Tribe’s healthcare program from CSC reimbursement, and the Tribe appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statutory text of 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a) warranted a reversal of the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, highlighting ongoing challenges in achieving true parity and financial sustainability for tribal healthcare programs under the existing legislative framework. Question Must the Indian Health Service pay “contract support costs” not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe’s expenditure of income collected from third parties?

Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 20, 2024. Petitioner: Texas.Respondent: New Mexico and Colorado. Advocates: Frederick Liu (for the United States) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas) Jeffrey J. Wechsler (for New Mexico) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This is a continuation of an action involving a dispute over the waters of the Rio Grande Basin and Elephant Butte. The Supreme Court previously held that the United States may intervene in the action, which it did. When the Special Master filed the Third Interim Report, Colorado, Texas, and New Mexico moved for entry of a proposed "Consent Decree" that would resolve the dispute without the consent of the United States. The United States claims that the Court should deny the motion because (1) a court's approval of a consent decree cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors—i.e., the United States in this case; (2) the consent decree would impose obligations on a party, to wit, the United States, without that party's consent; and (3) the consent decree would be "contrary to the Compact." Question May a court enter a consent decree among Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado regarding the Rio Grande Compact without the consent of the United States, who intervened in the action?

Gonzalez v. Trevino Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 20, 2024. Petitioner: Sylvia Gonzalez.Respondent: Edward Trevino, II, et al. Advocates: Anya A. Bidwell (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Sylvia Gonzalez, a resident of Castle Hills, Texas, was elected to the city council in 2019. During her campaign, she learned of widespread dissatisfaction with the current city manager. After taking office, she organized a nonbinding petition calling for the manager's removal. The petition was presented at a contentious council meeting, after which Mayor Edward Trevino questioned Gonzalez about the petition's location, found in her binder. Two days later, Trevino initiated a criminal complaint against Gonzalez for allegedly stealing the petition. Despite an atypical legal process involving Chief-of-Police John Siemens and special detective Alex Wright, Gonzalez was arrested and spent a night in jail. She is no longer on the council and has refrained from public political activity. Gonzalez sued Trevino, Siemens, Wright, and the city (collectively, the Defendants) for violating her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She argued that the arrest was in retaliation for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment, but she conceded that there was probable cause for the arrest. In support of her retaliation claim, she cited a decade-long review of misdemeanor and felony data in Bexar County that showed no similar cases. The Defendants moved to dismiss her lawsuit on grounds of the independent-intermediary doctrine and qualified immunity, but the district court allowed Gonzalez’s claims to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the outcome was controlled by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Nieves v. Bartlett, holding that, in general, the existence of probable cause will defeat a retaliatory arrest claim. The Fifth Circuit noted that Gonzalez’s facts did not trigger the narrow exception recognized in Nieves, under which a plaintiff need not plead lack of probable cause “where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so.” Question 1. Can the probable-cause exception in Nieves v. Barlett be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened? 2. Is Nieves limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests?

Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 19, 2024. Petitioner: Truck Insurance Exchange.Respondent: Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., et al. Advocates: Allyson N. Ho (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) C. Kevin Marshall (for the debtor respondents) David C. Frederick (for the claimant respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, allows a Chapter 11 debtor with significant asbestos liabilities to channel all current and future asbestos claims into a trust funded by the debtor. This provision aims to treat future claimants equitably, given the long latency period of some asbestos-related illnesses, while also enabling the debtor to exit bankruptcy as a viable economic entity. To obtain relief under this section, the debtor must meet several criteria designed to protect the due process rights of claimants, especially future ones. These criteria include the appointment of a representative for future claimants and court determination that the plan is fair to both current and future claimants. Additionally, 75% of current claimants must vote to approve the plan. In the face of over 38,000 asbestos-related lawsuits since 1978, Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc., and Hanson Permanente Cement, Inc., collectively known as the "Debtors," filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2016. As part of their proposed reorganization Plan, the Debtors negotiated with multiple parties—including insurance companies, creditors, government agencies, and representatives of both current and future asbestos claimants—to establish a § 524(g) trust. This trust aimed to channel both existing and future asbestos-related claims away from the Debtors. The trust's financial viability heavily depended on primary liability insurance policies issued by Truck Insurance Exchange ("Truck") between the 1960s and 1980s, which obligated Truck to investigate and defend each asbestos claim against the Debtors up to a per-claim limit of $500,000. The Debtors would assign their rights under these Truck policies to the § 524(g) trust as part of the Plan's funding. Truck opposed the Plan, arguing it failed to provide anti-fraud measures for insured claims that would be litigated in the tort system, thereby potentially exposing Truck to fraudulent claims. Despite Truck's objections, the bankruptcy court recommended confirmation of the Plan, finding it to be "insurance neutral" and therefore not impacting Truck's rights or obligations under the existing policies. The district court upheld this decision, confirming the Plan and thereby nullifying Truck's objections. Importantly, 100% of the asbestos personal-injury claimants had approved the proposed Plan, making Truck the sole objector. The district court confirmed the Plan over Truck’s objections, finding Truck lacked standing to challenge the Plan because it was not a “party in interest” under § 1109(b). The U.S. Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Is an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim a “party in interest” that may object to a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code?

Diaz v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 19, 2024. Petitioner: Delilah Guadalupe Diaz.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On August 17, 2020, Delilah Guadalupe Diaz was returning to California from Mexico. At the border, a “crunch-like sound” was heard when she rolled down the car window, leading the border agent to call for backup and check the car's door panels using a density measuring device. Inspectors found 27.98 kilos of methamphetamine hidden in these panels. Diaz claimed she was unaware of the drugs in the car, explaining that she had initially traveled to Mexico with her daughter, who returned early. Diaz stayed back to visit her boyfriend, and used his car to return home. She stated her boyfriend had told her he would retrieve the car from her in a few days. The government charged Diaz with importation of methamphetamine in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. One of the elements of that offense is that the defendant knew she was transporting drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)(1). To prove that element, the government called an expert to testify that “narcotic traffickers do not entrust large and valuable quantities of narcotics to unknowing couriers.” Diaz sought to exclude the expert evidence, arguing that it would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) by providing “a direct comment on the ultimate issue—Ms. Diaz’s knowledge.” However, the district court allowed the evidence, the jury found Diaz guilty, and the district court sentenced her to seven years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), may a governmental expert witness testify that couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters to prove that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs?

Murthy v. Missouri Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 18, 2024. Appellant: Vivek H. Murthy, U.S. Surgeon General, et al.Appellee: Missouri, et al. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners) J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Multiple plaintiffs, including epidemiologists, consumer and human rights advocates, academics, and media operators, claimed that various defendants, including numerous federal agencies and officials, have engaged in censorship, targeting conservative-leaning speech on topics such as the 2020 presidential election, COVID-19 origins, mask and vaccine efficacy, and election integrity. The plaintiffs argue that the defendants used public statements and threats of regulatory action, such as reforming Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, to induce social media platforms to suppress content, thereby violating the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. The States of Missouri and Louisiana also alleged harm due to the infringement of the free speech rights of their citizens. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the federal government from meeting with social media companies or otherwise seeking to influence their content-moderation policies. The U.S. Supreme Court granted the government’s motion for an emergency stay and granted certiorari to review the case on the merits. Question Did the federal government’s request that private social media companies take steps to prevent the dissemination of purported misinformation transform those companies’ content-moderation decisions into state action and thus violate users’ First Amendment rights?

National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 18, 2024. Petitioner: National Rifle Association of America.Respondent: Maria T. Vullo. Advocates: David D. Cole (for the Petitioner) Ephraim McDowell (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2017, following a referral from the New York County District Attorney's Office, the New York State Department of Financial Services (DFS), under the leadership of Maria T. Vullo, initiated an investigation into NRA-endorsed insurance programs suspected of violating New York law. This scrutiny resulted in three insurance companies acknowledging their fault through consent decrees in 2018. Concurrently, after the Parkland school shooting, Vullo issued guidance and statements encouraging banks and insurers to assess and potentially end their affiliations with gun promotion organizations like the NRA, citing reputational risks. The fallout led to several firms cutting ties with the NRA, prompting the association to file a lawsuit against Vullo and other state officials, asserting violations of its free speech and equal protection rights. The district court dismissed most of the claims but allowed the First Amendment allegations against Vullo to proceed, citing unresolved factual questions about her qualified immunity. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. The appellate court reasoned that while the First Amendment protects against the abridgment of free speech by government officials, these officials also have the responsibility to address public concerns. Here, the NRA failed to show that Vullo’s conduct sought to coerce, rather than merely to convince. Furthermore, even if her actions were coercive, Vullo’s conduct as a regulator and public official did not infringe upon any clearly established law, as she appeared to act reasonably and in good faith in performing her duties. Question Does a New York regulator’s discouragement of companies from doing business with the National Rifle Association after the Parkland school shooting constitute coercion in violation of the First Amendment?

Garland v. Cargill Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 28, 2024. Petitioner: Michael Cargill.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioners) Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) For over a decade, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) maintained that bump stocks were not machineguns as defined by statute, 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), and issued interpretation letters confirming this position. Following the October 1, 2017 Las Vegas shooting, where a shooter used bump stocks in a massacre, public demand for a ban on bump stocks surged, leading to proposed legislation. Before Congress could act, the ATF, responding to the tragedy and public sentiment, reversed its stance in 2018, reclassifying bump stocks as machineguns and exposing owners to criminal liability. Respondent Michael Cargill surrendered his bump stocks due to this new regulation and filed a lawsuit challenging the ATF regulations, arguing that the ATF exceeded its authority in defining bump stocks as machineguns. The district court for the government, finding that the government’s new interpretation of “machinegun” is the best interpretation of the statute. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but on rehearing, the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed. The en banc court found the definition of "machinegun" as unambiguously not applying to bump stocks, but even if it were ambiguous, the rule of lenity would compel a construction of the statute in Cargill’s favor. Question Is a bump stock device a “machinegun” as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)?

Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 28, 2024. Petitioner: David Suski, et al.Respondent: Coinbase, Inc. Advocates: Jessica L. Ellsworth (for the Petitioner) David J. Harris (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In June 2021, Coinbase, an online cryptocurrency exchange, launched a Dogecoin Sweepstakes that required participants to opt into "Official Rules" with a forum selection clause stipulating exclusive jurisdiction of California courts for related disputes. Respondent David Suski and three other users, who had agreed to the “Coinbase User Agreement” containing an arbitration provision when they created their accounts, entered the sweepstakes. Subsequently, they filed a lawsuit against Coinbase and Marden-Kane, Inc., the company engaged by Coinbase for the sweepstakes management, alleging violations of California’s False Advertising Law, Unfair Competition Law, and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. Coinbase sought to compel arbitration based on the User Agreement, but the district court denied Coinbase’s motion, interpreting the contractual documents to conclude that the Sweepstakes’ Official Rules, with their forum selection clause, took precedence over the User Agreement’s arbitration clause. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the dispute should be resolved within the California court system as per the Official Rules of the Sweepstakes, not through arbitration as Coinbase had sought. Question When parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, does an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?

McIntosh v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 27, 2024. Petitioner: Louis McIntosh.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Steven Y. Yurowitz (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On August 22, 2013, a jury convicted Louis McIntosh of multiple Hobbs Act robbery-related offenses and gun charges, leading to a near-life sentence of 720 months. The district court granted some relief by vacating specific counts but imposed a forfeiture amount inconsistently between oral and written judgments. On appeal, the government belatedly submitted a forfeiture order, which both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld despite its tardiness. The appellate court vacated one of the §924(c) counts but reinstated others, rejecting the petitioner's arguments. After a Supreme Court decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. __ (2022), which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) the Court granted certiorari, leading to a remand. However, the Second Circuit mostly upheld its prior rulings, making only minor changes. Question May a district court enter a criminal forfeiture order when the time limit specified in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has already passed?

Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 27, 2024. Petitioner: Alex Cantero, et al.Respondent: Bank of America, N.A. Advocates: Jonathan E. Taylor (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The National Bank Act of 1864 (NBA) established a dual banking system in the United States, allowing both federal and state governments to charter and regulate banks. National banks are subject to federal authority and have broad powers, including the ability to make real estate loans and provide escrow services. Alongside the NBA, other significant federal statutes regulate national banks: The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) limits the amount banks can require borrowers to deposit into escrow accounts related to home mortgages; the Dodd-Frank Act sets the standards for when state consumer financial laws are preempted by federal law; and it also amends the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) to require the creation of escrow accounts for certain mortgages and mandates interest payment on those accounts if prescribed by state or federal law. The state law in question, New York General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, mandates a minimum interest rate for escrow accounts held by mortgage institutions, which was later adjusted in 2018 to create “parity” between state-chartered and national banks. Alex Cantero purchased a house in Queens Village, New York, with a mortgage from Bank of America (BOA) in August 2010. His mortgage required him to deposit money into an escrow account for property taxes and insurance premiums, and BOA paid no interest on these funds. Cantero’s mortgage specified that it is governed by federal law and the law of the property’s jurisdiction. Cantero alleged that BOA refused to pay interest on escrow funds, contrary to New York State law. The district court determined that New York's General Obligations Law (GOL) § 5-601, was not preempted by the NBA based on its minimal “degree of interference” with national banking powers. Citing Dodd-Frank’s amendment to the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) as supportive of this compatibility, the court denied BOA’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, asserting that both federal and state laws could be read “harmoniously.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the NBA does preempt New York’s GOL because the minimum-interest requirement would exert control over a banking power granted by the federal government, thereby impermissibly interfering with national banks’ exercise of that power. Question Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?

NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2024. Petitioner: NetChoice, LLC, et al.Respondent: Ken Paxton, In His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The State of Texas enacted HB 20 to regulate large social media platforms, such as Facebook, X (formerly known as Twitter), and YouTube. The law purports to prohibit large social media platforms from censoring speech based on the viewpoint of the speaker. NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association filed a lawsuit against the Attorney General of Texas, challenging two provisions of the law as unconstitutional: (1) Section 7, which prohibits viewpoint-based censorship of users’ posts, except for content that incites criminal activity or is unlawful. (2) Section 2, which requires platforms to disclose how they moderate and promote content, publish an "acceptable use policy," and maintain a complaint-and-appeal system for their users. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, holding that Section 7 and Section 2 are facially unconstitutional. The court argued that social media platforms have some level of editorial discretion protected by the First Amendment, and HB 20 interferes with that discretion. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, rejecting the idea that large corporations have a “freewheeling” First Amendment right to censor what people say. It reasoned that HB 20 does not regulate the platforms’ speech but protects other people’s speech and regulates the platforms’ conduct. Question Do Texas HB 20’s provisions prohibiting social media platforms from censoring users’ content and imposing stringent disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment?

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2024. Petitioner: Attorney General, State of Florida, et al.Respondent: NetChoice, LLC, et al. Advocates: Henry C. Whitaker (for the Petitioners) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Social-media platforms collect third-party posts, including text, photos, and videos, and distribute them to other users. Importantly, they are private enterprises, not governmental entities, and thus are not subject to constitutional requirements for free speech. Users have no obligation to consume or contribute to the content on these platforms. And unlike traditional media, social-media platforms primarily host content created by individual users rather than the companies themselves (although they do engage in some speech of their own, such as publishing terms of service and community standards). They are not merely conduits of that content, however; they curate and edit the content that users see, which involves removing posts that violate community standards and prioritizing posts based on various factors. The State of Florida enacted S.B. 7072 to address what it perceives as bias and censorship by large social media platforms against conservative voices. The legislation imposes various restrictions and obligations on social media platforms, such as prohibiting the deplatforming of political candidates and requiring detailed disclosures about content moderation policies. It aims to treat social media platforms like common carriers and focuses on those platforms that either have annual gross revenues exceeding $100 million or at least 100 million monthly individual participants globally. Enforcement mechanisms include substantial fines and the option for civil suits. NetChoice and the Computer & Communications Industry Association (together, “NetChoice”)—are trade associations that represent internet and social-media companies like Facebook, Twitter, Google (which owns YouTube), and TikTok. They sued the Florida officials charged with enforcing S.B. 7072 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the law's provisions (1) violate the social-media companies’ right to free speech under the First Amendment and (2) are preempted by federal law. The district court granted NetChoice’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the provisions of the Act that make platforms liable for removing or deprioritizing content are likely preempted by federal law, specifically 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), and that the Act’s provisions infringe on platforms’ First Amendment rights by restricting their “editorial judgment.” The court applied strict scrutiny due to the Act's viewpoint-based purpose of defending conservative speech from perceived liberal bias in big tech. The court found that the Act does not survive strict scrutiny as it isn't narrowly tailored and doesn't serve a legitimate state interest. The State appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed these conclusions. Question Do Florida S.B. 7072’s content-moderation restrictions comply with the First Amendment, and do the law’s individualized-explanation requirements comply with the First Amendment?

Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 21, 2024. Petitioner: Warner Chappell Music, Inc., et al.Respondent: Sherman Nealy, et al. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Joe Wesley Earnhardt (for the Respondents) Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In the early 1980s, Sherman Nealy and Tony Butler formed Music Specialist, Inc. (MSI), a Florida corporation involved in the music industry. Nealy, a newcomer to the sector, financed the operation while Butler, an experienced disc jockey, authored or co-authored the musical works at the heart of the case. MSI released an album and several singles from 1983 to 1986 before dissolving as a corporation, although its business activities continued until 1989. During Nealy’s subsequent incarceration for drug offenses, Butler formed a new company, 321 Music, LLC, and began licensing rights to MSI’s musical works. This included an agreement in 2008 with Atlantic to interpolate one of MSI’s works into a song by artist Flo Rida. Upon his release, Nealy discovered third-party usage of MSI’s catalog but took no decisive action. He was unaware of ensuing litigation over the works among various entities including Warner Chappell Music, Inc., Artist Publishing Group, LLC, Atlantic Recording Corporation, and Butler's 321 Music. It wasn't until post-release from a second prison term that he learned of the prior litigation and alleged unauthorized transfers of rights. Finally, in December 2018, Nealy and MSI filed a lawsuit alleging copyright infringement by Atlantic, Artist, and Warner for activities dating back to 2008. Following a pre-trial stipulation framing the case as an “ownership dispute,” the defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. On an interlocutory appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that when a copyright plaintiff has a timely claim under the discovery accrual rule for infringement that occurred more than three years before the lawsuit was filed, the plaintiff may recover damages for that infringement. Question Under the discovery accrual rule applied by the circuit courts and the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), may a copyright plaintiff recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit?

Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 21, 2024. Petitioner: Ohio, et al.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al. Advocates: Mathura J. Sridharan (for the State Applicants) Catherine E. Stetson (for the Industry Applicants) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Federal Respondents) Judith N. Vale (for the State Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question None

Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 20, 2024. Petitioner: Corner Post, Inc.Respondent: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Advocates: Bryan K. Weir (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The case concerns the interchange fees associated with debit card transactions, which generate billions of dollars in revenue for issuing banks. The regulatory agency, the Board of the Federal Reserve System, promulgated a rule (“Regulation II”) to govern these fees. Regulation II caps the fees that banks can charge for each debit card transaction. Petitioners in the case include Corner Post, a convenience store, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA), and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA), all of whom accept debit card payments and are thus affected by interchange fees. On April 29, 2021, the North Dakota Retail Association (NDRA) and the North Dakota Petroleum Marketers Association (NDPMA) challenged Regulation II as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the Board moved to dismiss the case based on the statute of limitations, NDRA and NDPMA amended their complaint to add Corner Post, Inc. as an additional plaintiff. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the 2015 clarification to Regulation II did not reset the statute of limitations, that Corner Post's statute of limitations began in 2011 with the original publication of Regulation II, and that none of the plaintiffs’ claims warranted equitable tolling. The Merchants appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a plaintiff’s claim under the Administrative Procedure Act “first accrue” under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) when an agency issues a rule, or when the rule first causes harm to the plaintiff?