Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Bowe v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 14, 2025. Petitioner: Michael Bowe.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Kasdin M. Mitchell (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below as to Question 1) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2008, Michael Bowe was charged with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using a firearm during a crime of violence. He pleaded guilty in 2009 and received a 288-month sentence, which included a mandatory consecutive 120-month term for the firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Starting in 2016, Bowe made multiple attempts to challenge his § 924(c) conviction through a series of motions and applications, arguing that changes in Supreme Court precedent (particularly Johnson v. United States and United States v. Davis) meant that his underlying crimes no longer qualified as “crimes of violence” that could support the firearm conviction. The district court initially denied Bowe’s first § 2255 motion in 2016, finding that attempted Hobbs Act robbery still qualified as a crime of violence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit then denied several subsequent applications from Bowe to file additional challenges, ultimately concluding in that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his latest application because he was attempting to raise the same claim he had already presented in previous applications. Question 1. Does a rule requiring dismissal of repeat claims in state prisoner habeas petitions also apply to repeat claims in federal prisoner motions to vacate their sentences? 2. Does the Court have jurisdiction to review lower court decisions allowing or denying federal prisoners permission to file repeat challenges to their sentences?

Ellingburg v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 14, 2025. Petitioner: Holsey Ellingburg, Jr.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Amy M. Saharia (for the Petitioner) Ashley Robertson (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur) John F. Bash (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In December 1995, Holsey Ellingburg, Jr. robbed a bank and was indicted in April 1996. He was convicted in August 1996 and sentenced to prison, along with an order to pay over $7,500 in restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA). Following his release from prison in June 2022, having paid only about one-quarter of the original restitution amount, Mr. Ellingburg filed a motion arguing that enforcement of his restitution order was unlawful. He claimed that the applicable 20-year payment period under the VWPA had expired and that applying a longer restitution term and mandatory interest provision under the later-enacted Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court rejected Mr. Ellingburg’s arguments and upheld the restitution order. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Question Is criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause?

Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2025. Petitioner: Michael J. Bost.Respondent: Illinois State Board of Elections. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Michael Talent (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Jane E. Notz (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael Bost, a multi-term U.S. Representative from Illinois’s 12th District, along with Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney, political activists who served as presidential electors in 2020, challenged Illinois’s mail-in ballot receipt procedure. Under Illinois law, election officials can receive and count mail-in ballots for up to fourteen days after Election Day if the ballots are postmarked or certified by Election Day. Plaintiffs argued this procedure violates federal election statutes by impermissibly extending Election Day beyond the federally mandated date. They claimed the counting of these “untimely” ballots dilutes their votes and forces them to expend additional campaign resources to monitor ballot counting for two weeks after Election Day. Plaintiffs filed suit in May 2022 against the Illinois State Board of Elections and its Executive Director. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the case, finding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court also rejected their claims on the merits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. Question Do federal candidates have Article III standing to challenge state laws that allow mail-in ballots to be received and counted for two weeks after Election Day based on claims that such laws dilute their votes and force them to incur additional campaign expenses for extended ballot monitoring?

United States Postal Service v. Konan Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 8, 2025. Petitioner: United States Postal Service.Respondent: Lebene Konan. Advocates: Frederick Liu (for the Petitioners) Easha Anand (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Lebene Konan, a Black property owner, leased two rental residences in Euless, Texas, and retrieved business and tenant mail from a central mailbox daily. In May 2020, United States Postal Service (USPS) employee Jason Rojas changed the lock on the mailbox at one of Konan's properties without her approval, halted mail delivery, and demanded ownership verification. Even after USPS’s Inspector General confirmed Konan’s ownership, Rojas and another USPS employee, Raymond Drake, allegedly continued marking mail addressed to Konan and her tenants as undeliverable. Konan claims this refusal of service extended to her second property and was racially motivated, causing loss of rental income and disruption of essential communications. Konan sued USPS, Rojas, Drake, and the United States, raising claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and alleging violations of the equal protection guarantees of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985. The district court dismissed her FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the postal-matter exception, and her equal protection claims for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the equal protection claims but reversed on the FTCA claim, holding that sovereign immunity did not bar claims based on intentional acts of mail non-delivery. Question Does a claim that Postal Service employees intentionally refused to deliver mail to a designated address arise out of “the loss” or “miscarriage” of postal matter under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s postal-matter exception?

Barrett v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Dwayne Barrett.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Matthew B. Larsen (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the Respondent, in support of the Petitioner) Charles L. McCloud (Court-appointed amicus curiae, in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Between August 2011 and January 2012, Dwayne Barrett and several co-conspirators carried out a string of armed robberies in New York, often using guns, knives, and threats of violence. On December 12, 2011, Barrett and two associates followed a minivan carrying the proceeds from a sale of untaxed cigarettes. While Barrett waited in the car, his accomplices held two men at gunpoint and stole the vehicle, which also contained $10,000 and a third victim, Gamar Dafalla. As he tried to discard some of the money during the getaway, Dafalla was fatally shot by one of the robbers. Later that day, Barrett took part in another robbery, threatening a victim’s life. He also helped dispose of the murder weapon and clean their vehicle with latex gloves and cleaning fluid to eliminate evidence. Barrett was indicted on multiple counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, two substantive counts of Hobbs Act robbery (one involving Dafalla’s murder), and separate firearms offenses, including a murder charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). He was convicted in 2014 and originally sentenced to 90 years in prison. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated one firearms conviction under the Supreme Court’s then-new decision in United States v. Davis. Barrett was resentenced to 50 years in 2021. After further appellate proceedings, the Second Circuit affirmed most of his convictions and sentence but vacated and remanded for resentencing in light of the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Lora v. United States, which held that § 924(j) does not require consecutive sentencing under § 924(c). Question Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment permit two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and (j)?

Chiles v. Salazar Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2025. Petitioner: Kaley Chiles.Respondent: Patty Salazar. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioner) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Shannon W. Stevenson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kaley Chiles is a licensed professional counselor practicing in Colorado Springs. She holds a master's degree in clinical mental health and provides talk therapy, specializing in clients dealing with addiction, trauma, sexuality, gender dysphoria, and other mental health concerns. Chiles identifies as a Christian and serves clients who often seek religiously informed care that aligns with traditional biblical understandings of sexuality and gender. Prior to the enactment of a 2019 Colorado law banning conversion therapy for minors, Chiles counseled clients, including minors, in accordance with their self-identified goals, which sometimes included diminishing same-sex attractions or aligning gender identity with biological sex. Since the law’s passage, Chiles has refrained from engaging in discussions with minors that she believes could be interpreted as conversion therapy and alleges that this has hampered her ability to provide full counseling services in line with her and her clients’ religious convictions. In September 2022, Chiles brought a pre-enforcement lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Colorado officials responsible for enforcing the statute. She alleged that the ban on conversion therapy for minors violates her rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Seeking a preliminary injunction, she asked the district court to block enforcement of the law against her. The court denied the motion but found she had standing to proceed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in full, holding that Colorado’s law regulates professional conduct that incidentally involves speech and survived rational basis review. Question Does a Colorado law banning “conversion therapy”—i.e., attempts to “convert” someone’s sexual orientation or gender identity—violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Villarreal v. Texas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2025. Petitioner: David Asa Villarreal.Respondent: State of Texas. Advocates: Stuart Banner (for the Petitioner) Andrew N. Warthen (for the Respondent) Kevin J. Barber (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Asa Villarreal was charged with murder in Bexar County, Texas. During his trial, Villarreal took the stand in his own defense shortly before a planned midday recess. Because Villarreal was still in the middle of his direct examination when the court adjourned for an overnight recess, the trial judge instructed his attorneys not to confer with him regarding his ongoing testimony but permitted them to discuss other trial-related matters. Villarreal’s lead counsel objected to this limitation under the Sixth Amendment but otherwise indicated understanding of the court's directive. The next day, Villarreal resumed his testimony, and no further objections about the limitation were raised. Villarreal was ultimately convicted and sentenced to sixty years in prison. Following his conviction, Villarreal appealed, arguing that the trial court’s restriction violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. A divided appeals court affirmed his conviction, and Villarreal petitioned for discretionary review, and the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas held that the trial judge’s limited no-conferral order did not violate Villarreal’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Question Does a trial court violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by preventing the defendant and his lawyer from discussing the defendant’s testimony during an overnight break in the trial?

Berk v. Choy Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2025. Petitioner: Harold R. Berk.Respondent: Wilson C. Choy. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Frederick R. Yarger (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Harold R. Berk injured his ankle and allegedly received negligent medical care from three healthcare providers: Dr. Wilson C. Choy, Beebe Medical Center, Inc., and Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Middletown, LLC. Believing he suffered harm due to their malpractice, Berk filed a lawsuit against them under Delaware law. Like many states, Delaware requires plaintiffs in medical negligence cases to submit an affidavit of merit (AOM)—a statement from a qualified expert certifying that the lawsuit has a reasonable basis—either with the complaint or within a short time after filing. Berk failed to submit an AOM with his complaint and did not request an extension before the deadline passed. Because the Delaware statute treats the AOM requirement as mandatory, the district court dismissed his case. Berk appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the Delaware AOM statute is substantive and therefore must be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity. Question Must a Delaware law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit be enforced by a federal court sitting in diversity?

Trump v. CASA Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on May 15, 2025. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.Respondent: CASA, Inc., et al. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Applicants) Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for the State and City Respondents) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Private Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Question

Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 30, 2025. Petitioner: Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board.Respondent: Gentner Drummond, Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma. Advocates: James A. Campbell (for the Petitioners in No. 24-394) Michael H. McGinley (for the Petitioner in No. 24-396) D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Gregory G. Garre (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gentner Drummond, the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, filed an action against the Oklahoma Statewide Virtual Charter School Board and its members seeking to invalidate their contract with St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School. St. Isidore, supported by the Archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the Diocese of Tulsa, aims to operate as a Catholic virtual charter school. In creating this contract, the Charter School Board recognized religious rights and entitlements for St. Isidore, which deviated from the standard expectation that charter schools remain nonsectarian under Oklahoma law. On June 5 and October 9, 2023, the Charter School Board approvingly voted for St. Isidore's application and contract, both by a 3-2 margin. The contract omitted standard provisions prohibiting religious affiliation while affirming St. Isidore’s religious mission, which the State contends violates the Oklahoma Constitution, the Oklahoma Charter Schools Act, and the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. Consequently, the State requested a writ of mandamus to rescind the contract, arguing that the use of public funds for a sectarian institution contravenes legal and constitutional prohibitions. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction and granted belated relief to the State, holding that the contract violated state and federal law, including constitutional provisions prohibiting government establishment of religion. Question 1. Are a privately owned and operated school’s educational decisions considered state action simply because the school has a contract with the state to provide free education to students? 2. Does the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause prohibit, or the Establishment Clause require, a state to exclude religious schools from its charter-school program?

Martin v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Curtrina Martin.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the Petitioners) Frederick Liu (for the Respondents) Christopher E. Mills (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below on Question 1) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2017, six FBI agents, led by Special Agent Lawrence Guerra, mistakenly executed a no-knock search warrant at the home of Curtrina Martin and her family in Atlanta, Georgia. The intended target was a nearby home suspected to contain violent gang member Joseph Riley. Due to similarities between the two properties and issues with navigating to the correct address, the agents entered Martin’s home instead. The SWAT team, in full tactical gear, entered the house, causing fear and distress to its occupants. They later realized the mistake and promptly left the scene, later apologizing and assuring the family that the FBI would handle any damages. Martin and her family sued the U.S. government and the agents, claiming violations of their Fourth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Georgia state law. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision, ruling that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity and that the Federal Tort Claims Act claims were barred by the Supremacy Clause and the discretionary function exception. Question 1. Does the Supremacy Clause prevent individuals from suing the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act when federal employees’ actions, even if negligent or wrongful, are related to carrying out federal policy and can be interpreted as following federal laws? 2. Is the discretionary-function exception, which usually protects the government from being sued for certain decisions made by its employees, always inapplicable when dealing with claims related to law enforcement officers’ actions that fall under the intentional torts category?

Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 29, 2025. Petitioner: Luke Davis.Respondent: Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Deepak Gupta (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Julian Vargas, who is blind, encountered inaccessible check-in kiosks at LabCorp facilities. Vargas attempted to use these kiosks but was unable due to their lack of accessibility for visually impaired individuals. As a result, he had to wait for assistance from a staff member, which delayed his check-in and denied him equal access to services such as maintaining his spot in the queue or updating personal information privately. Vargas claimed that this lack of accessibility infringed on his rights under disability laws, leading to the lawsuit. The district court certified two classes: a California class for Unruh Civil Rights Act claims and a nationwide class for claims under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable Care Act. LabCorp appealed the class certification, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Question May a federal court certify a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) when some members of the proposed class lack any Article III injury?

A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279 Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: A.J.T.Respondent: Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A.J.T., a student with epilepsy, experiences seizures so severe in the morning that she cannot attend school until noon. Her parents repeatedly requested evening instruction from Osseo Area Schools to give her a school day length more comparable to her peers. Despite the District providing some accommodations, including one-on-one instruction, a slightly extended school day, and summer home instruction sessions, they denied the requests for evening instruction. The District’s Director of Student Services, responsible for Section 504 compliance, was unaware of the parents’ complaints and did not know that District policies allowed at-home schooling as an accommodation. A.J.T., through her parents, sued the District for disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question Do the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require children with disabilities to satisfy a “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard when seeking relief for discrimination relating to their education?

Soto v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2025. Petitioner: Simon A. Soto.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Tacy F. Flint (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran with a combat-related disability, was medically retired in 2006 with less than 20 years of service. Although he became eligible for Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) in 2009 when he received his disability rating, he did not apply until 2016. The Navy used the Barring Act’s six-year limitation period to calculate his retroactive payments, giving him payments dating back only to 2010 instead of to 2008 when Congress had expanded CRSC eligibility to veterans with less than 20 years of service. Soto filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated veterans who received only six years of back payments, arguing that the CRSC statute’s own procedures should apply instead of the Barring Act’s six-year limit. The district court granted summary judgment to Soto’s class, holding that the CRSC statute was more specific and therefore superseded the Barring Act. The court also applied the pro-veteran canon of statutory interpretation, resolving any doubt in favor of the veterans. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed. Question When disabled combat veterans claim past-due compensation, should the military use the CRSC statute's rules to calculate how far back they can be paid, or should it use the Barring Act's six-year limit?

Diamond Alternative Energy LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 23, 2025. Petitioner: Diamond Alternative Energy LLC.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for the Petitioners) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Federal Respondents) Joshua A. Klein (for the State Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, California applied for a waiver from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to implement its Advanced Clean Car Program, which included two key components: a Low Emission Vehicle Program to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 34% for new cars in Model Years 2017-2025, and a Zero Emission Vehicle Program requiring about 15% of manufacturers’ fleets to be electric cars by 2025. The EPA granted this waiver in 2013, and automobile manufacturers began investing to meet these requirements. However, in 2019, under a different administration, the EPA withdrew the 2013 waiver, arguing that state greenhouse gas regulations were preempted by federal fuel economy standards, that California’s standards weren’t necessary to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions,” and that California could not show a direct connection between greenhouse gas emissions and its air pollution problems. After this withdrawal, several automakers like Honda, Ford, and BMW voluntarily agreed to continue meeting California’s standards due to their existing investments and growing consumer demand for electric vehicles. In 2022, under yet another administration, the EPA reversed course again and reinstated the 2013 waiver, prompting challenges from various states and fuel industry groups who argued that California should not receive special treatment and that climate change is not a “compelling and extraordinary condition” justifying state-specific standards. California, environmental organizations, and automobile manufacturers intervened to defend the EPA’s decision. The D.C. Circuit dismissed most of the claims for lack of standing, finding that challengers had not shown that their injuries were redressable by a favorable decision. Question May a party establish the redressability component of Article III standing by pointing to the coercive and predictable effects of regulation on third parties?

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2025. Petitioner: Commissioner of Internal Revenue.Respondent: Jennifer Zuch. Advocates: Erica L. Ross (for the Petitioner) Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010 and 2011, while still married, Jennifer Zuch and Patrick Gennardo made two estimated tax payments totaling $50,000 for their 2010 taxes, without specifying how to allocate the payments between them. In September 2012, after filing separate tax returns, Gennardo reported owing $385,393 while Zuch reported an overpayment. The IRS applied the entire $50,000 in estimated payments to Gennardo’s liability. When Zuch later filed an amended return reporting additional income and claiming her share of the $50,000, the IRS assessed the additional tax but did not credit her for any portion of the estimated payments, even after Gennardo filed his own amended return indicating the payments should be allocated to Zuch. In August 2013, the IRS notified Zuch of its intent to levy her property to collect approximately $36,000 in unpaid 2010 taxes. During the ensuing Collection Due Process hearing, Zuch challenged her underlying tax liability, arguing she was entitled to credit for the estimated payments. Meanwhile, over several years while Zuch was disputing her 2010 liability, the IRS repeatedly took her tax refunds from other years and applied them to what it calculated as her 2010 liability, eventually reducing the balance to zero by April 2019. The case went through the Tax Court, which initially denied summary judgment and remanded to the IRS Office of Appeals. When the balance was reduced to zero through the IRS’s seizure of Zuch's later tax refunds, the Tax Court dismissed the case as moot. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the IRS cannot eliminate Tax Court jurisdiction over a disputed tax liability simply by seizing a taxpayer’s refunds to cover the contested debt. Question Does a proceeding under 26 U.S.C. § 6330 for a pre-deprivation determination about a levy proposed by the Internal Revenue Service to collect unpaid taxes become moot when there is no longer a live dispute over the proposed levy that gave rise to the proceeding?

Mahmoud v. Taylor Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 22, 2025. Petitioner: Tamer Mahmoud.Respondent: Thomas W. Taylor. Advocates: Eric S. Baxter (for the Petitioners) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Alan E. Schoenfeld (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In October 2022, Montgomery County Public Schools in Maryland approved LGBTQ-inclusive books for its English Language Arts curriculum. These “Storybooks” featured characters and themes related to sexual orientation and gender identity, including books like “Pride Puppy!” for pre-K students and “Born Ready: The True Story of a Boy Named Penelope” for K-5 students. Initially, the school board allowed parents to receive notice and opt their children out of lessons involving these books, in line with the district’s guidelines for religious accommodations. However, in March 2023, the Board abruptly reversed this policy, eliminating all notice and opt-out options without explanation, though they later cited concerns about high student absenteeism, classroom disruption, administrative burden, and potential stigmatization of individuals represented in the books. Several parents of different religious backgrounds (Muslim, Roman Catholic, and Ukrainian Orthodox) sued the Board, arguing that the denial of notice and opt-out options violated their religious freedom and parental rights. The parents did not seek to ban the books or challenge their adoption into the curriculum; rather, they sought to maintain control over how and when their children would be exposed to content they believed conflicted with their religious duties to train their children according to their faiths on matters of gender, marriage, and sexuality. The district court denied the parents’ motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the parents failed to demonstrate a cognizable burden to their religious freedom, and the parents filed an interlocutory appeal, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. Question Do public schools burden parents’ religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents’ religious convictions and without notice or opportunity to opt out?

Parrish v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2025. Petitioner: Donte Parrish.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Amanda Rice (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Michael R. Huston (Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) While serving a 15-year federal prison sentence in 2017, Donte Parrish sued the United States for $5 million, claiming prison officials unlawfully held him in administrative segregation for three years. After the district court dismissed his case in March 2020, Parrish did not receive notice of the dismissal until June 2020 due to his transfer to state custody. He promptly filed a notice of appeal, which the appeals court treated as a request to reopen his appeal time. The district court granted this request in January 2021, giving him 14 days to file a new appeal, but Parrish missed this deadline and instead sent a supplemental brief to the appeals court a few days late. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Question Must a party who files a notice of appeal during the period between when their original appeal deadline expired and when the court reopens their time to appeal file a second notice after the reopening is granted?

Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2025. Petitioner: Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Secretary of Health and Human Services.Respondent: Braidwood Management, Inc. Advocates: Hashim M. Mooppan (for the Petitioners) Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which requires private insurers to cover certain preventive-care services without cost sharing. Rather than defining these services directly, the ACA empowers three agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services to determine required services: the United States Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), and the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). The Task Force consists of sixteen volunteer experts serving four-year terms, ACIP has fifteen members selected by the HHS Secretary, and HRSA operates through offices and bureaus reporting to the HHS Secretary. Over the years, these agencies issued various preventive care recommendations, including ACIP’s 2007 recommendation for HPV vaccines, HRSA’s 2011 guidelines for contraceptive coverage, and the Task Force’s 2019 recommendation for HIV prevention drugs (PrEP). Four individuals and two Christian-based businesses in Texas challenged these requirements, arguing that mandatory coverage of these services violated their religious beliefs by making them “complicit in facilitating homosexual behavior, drug use, and sexual activity outside of marriage between one man and one woman.” The plaintiffs filed suit in 2020 against the federal government and various department secretaries, primarily arguing that the structure of these agencies violated the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The district court ruled in their favor regarding the Task Force but rejected their challenges to ACIP and HRSA, and both parties appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Task Force’s structure violated the Appointments Clause and upheld the injunction against enforcing its recommendations, but reversed the district court’s universal remedies and remanded for further consideration of whether HHS properly ratified ACIP and HRSA’s recommendations. Question Does the structure of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force violate the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, and if so, is the provision that insulates the task force from the Health & Human Services secretary’s supervision severable from the rest of the statute?

Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 2, 2025. Petitioner: Eunice Medina, Interim Director, South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services.Respondent: Planned Parenthood South Atlantic. Advocates: John J. Bursch (for the Petitioner) Kyle D. Hawkins (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Nicole A. Saharsky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Medicaid, established in 1965, is a cooperative federal-state program that provides medical assistance to needy individuals. The program offers federal funding to states that agree to comply with certain conditions, including the “free-choice-of-provider” provision added in 1967, which ensures Medicaid beneficiaries can obtain medical assistance from any qualified provider. States must submit their medical assistance plans to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval, and the Secretary can withhold funds if states fail to comply with federal requirements. In South Carolina, Planned Parenthood South Atlantic operates two health centers providing various medical services, including contraception, cancer screenings, and STI treatment. Julie Edwards, a Medicaid beneficiary, received care at Planned Parenthood and planned to continue her gynecological care there. However, in July 2018, South Carolina’s Governor issued an executive order directing the Department of Health and Human Services to terminate abortion clinics from the Medicaid program. As a result, DHHS informed Planned Parenthood that it was no longer qualified to provide services to Medicaid beneficiaries and terminated its enrollment agreements immediately. Planned Parenthood and Edwards then sued the Director of DHHS in federal court, seeking to block enforcement of the executive order. The district court initially granted a preliminary injunction blocking South Carolina from terminating Planned Parenthood’s Medicaid enrollment, and after multiple appeals to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and one previous remand from the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit again held that Medicaid beneficiaries can sue to enforce their right to choose their provider. Question Does the Medicaid Act’s “any qualified provider” provision unambiguously confer a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider?

Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 1, 2025. Petitioner: Miriam Fuld.Respondent: Palestine Liberation Organization. Advocates: Kent A. Yalowitz (for the Petitioners in No. 24-20) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioner in No. 24-151) Mitchell R. Berger (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A group of United States citizens who were injured in terror attacks in Israel, along with the estates and survivors of U.S. citizens killed in such attacks, filed a lawsuit in 2004 against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The PLO, founded in 1964, conducts Palestine’s foreign affairs and serves as a Permanent Observer to the United Nations, while the PA was established under the 1993 Oslo Accords to serve as the interim governing body for parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The plaintiffs sought damages under the Anti-Terrorism Act for the defendants’ alleged involvement in these attacks. At trial, a jury found the defendants liable for six terror attacks and awarded $218.5 million in damages (automatically trebled to $655.5 million under the Anti-Terrorism Act), but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated this judgment in 2016, finding that U.S. courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the PLO and PA. In 2019, Congress enacted the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act. This law deemed the PLO and PA to have consented to personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts if they engaged in certain conduct after the law’s enactment: either making payments to families of deceased terrorists or designees of imprisoned terrorists who harmed U.S. nationals, or conducting various activities within the United States (with some exceptions for UN-related activities). After the district court found that the defendants had made qualifying payments following the Act’s enactment, the Second Circuit ultimately concluded that this consent provision violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Question Does the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment?

Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2025. Petitioner: Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc.Respondent: Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission. Advocates: Eric C. Rassbach (for the Petitioners) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Colin T. Roth (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Catholic Charities Bureau (CCB) is the social ministry arm of the Diocese of Superior in Wisconsin, operating since 1917 to provide services to the poor and disadvantaged as an expression of the Catholic Church's social ministry. The organization is controlled by the bishop of the Diocese, who serves as CCB’s president and appoints its membership. CCB’s mission is to provide service to people in need and advocate for justice, with a philosophy rooted in being “an effective sign of the charity of Christ.” The organization makes no distinctions based on race, sex, or religion in its services, employment, or board appointments. Under CCB’s umbrella are four sub-entities involved in this case: Barron County Developmental Services, Black River Industries, Diversified Services, and Headwaters. These entities provide various social services, including job placement and coaching for people with disabilities, community-based training, daily living services, and support programs. While CCB oversees these sub-entities and provides management services, the sub-entities themselves are primarily funded through government contracts and do not receive direct funding from the Diocese. Neither employees nor service recipients are required to be of any particular religious faith, and the programs do not provide religious training or attempt to promote the Catholic faith. CCB and its sub-entities sought an exemption from state unemployment insurance contributions in 2016, but the Department of Workforce Development denied the exemption. An administrative law judge reversed that decision, but then the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) reversed again, finding the organizations were not operated primarily for religious purposes. Then, the circuit court sided with CCB, and then the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated LIRC’s decision. Ultimately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the organizations did not qualify for the religious purposes exemption under state law. Question Does a state violate the First Amendment’s religion clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state’s criteria for religious behavior?

Rivers v. Guerrero Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2025. Petitioner: Danny Richard Rivers.Respondent: Eric Guerrero, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division. Advocates: Peter A. Bruland (for the Petitioner) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, Danny Rivers was convicted in Texas state court of multiple charges related to sexual abuse of a child and possession of child pornography. He filed his first federal habeas petition in August 2017 challenging these convictions, which was denied by the district court in September 2018. While his appeal of that denial was pending, Rivers filed a second habeas petition in February 2021 raising new claims after obtaining his attorney-client file through a state bar grievance in October 2019. The district court deemed this second petition “successive” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and transferred it to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for authorization, but Rivers failed to file the required motion for authorization. After the Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed the denial of his first petition in May 2022, Rivers appealed the transfer order of his second petition, arguing that it should have been treated as a motion to amend his first petition rather than as a successive petition since his first petition was still pending when he filed the second one. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Rivers’s second-in-time petition for lack of jurisdiction. Question Does 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) apply to all second habeas petitions, or only specific types of second petitions?

Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 26, 2025. Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al.Respondent: Consumers' Research, et al. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioners in No. 24-354) Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners in No. 24-422) R. Trent McCotter (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was established in 1934 to regulate interstate communications and ensure widespread access to telecommunications services. To further this mission, Congress in 1996 instructed the FCC to establish and maintain a universal service fund, requiring telecommunications carriers to contribute quarterly based on their revenues. The FCC partners with the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), a private entity, to manage this process—USAC calculates projected demand and contribution factors using FCC formulas, submits these proposals to the FCC for approval, and then uses the approved figures to determine individual contribution amounts. Consumers’ Research challenged the constitutionality of the 1996 Telecommunications Act’s universal service requirements and the FCC’s implementation of those requirements. Their primary arguments were twofold: first, that Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power to the FCC through the universal service provisions, and second, that the FCC improperly delegated its authority to a private entity (USAC) to manage the universal service fund. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied the petition, finding no constitutional violations in either delegation. The Court determined that Congress provided sufficient guidance (an “intelligible principle”) to the FCC in the statute, and that the FCC maintained adequate control and oversight over USAC’s activities in managing the universal service fund, preventing any improper delegation of government authority to a private entity. Question Did Congress violate the Constitution in the way it delegated power to the FCC to collect Universal Service Fund money, and did the FCC violate the Constitution by letting a private, industry-controlled company make those collection decisions?

Environmental Protection Agency v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2025. Petitioner: Environmental Protection Agency.Respondent: Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Seth P. Waxman (for Respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of the Petitioner) Michael R. Huston (for Respondents Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress amended the Clean Air Act to establish the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program, which requires refiners and importers of transportation fuel to blend increasing amounts of renewable fuels into their products each year. To comply, these companies must either blend renewable fuels themselves or purchase credits called Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) from other companies that do the blending. Recognizing that this might create hardship for small refineries (those processing less than 75,000 barrels of crude oil daily), Congress created three exemptions: an initial blanket exemption through 2011, extensions based on a Department of Energy study, and case-by-case exemptions that small refineries could petition for based on “disproportionate economic hardship.” In 2022, the EPA issued two decisions denying multiple small refinery exemption petitions. The April 2022 decision denied 36 petitions for the 2018 compliance year (including some that had previously been granted in 2019), and the June 2022 decision denied 69 petitions covering the years 2016 through 2021. These denials were based on EPA’s new interpretation that required hardship to be caused solely by RFS compliance costs and its “RIN passthrough” economic theory. The affected refineries challenged these denials as impermissibly retroactive, contrary to law, and arbitrary and capricious. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the EPA’s adjudications, denied a change of venue to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and remanded, based on its conclusion that the denial was (1) impermissibly retroactive; (2) contrary to law; and (3) counter to the record evidence. Question Should challenges by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act’s Renewable Fuel Standard program be heard exclusively in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit because the agency’s denial actions are “nationally applicable” or “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect”?

Oklahoma v. Environmental Protection Agency Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2025. Petitioner: Oklahoma, et al.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al. Advocates: Mithun Mansinghani (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1067) Misha Tseytlin (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1068) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) strengthened its national air quality standards for ozone, requiring states to submit implementation plans that would prevent their emissions from significantly impacting other states’ air quality. In February 2023, the EPA issued a final rule disapproving the plans submitted by 21 states, including Oklahoma and Utah, after evaluating them using a four-step framework designed to address interstate pollution. Oklahoma and Utah, along with various industry groups, challenged the EPA’s disapproval of their plans in their respective regional circuit courts. The EPA responded by moving to transfer these cases to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, arguing that because the disapprovals were published together in a single Federal Register notice and used a consistent analytical approach, they must be reviewed by the D.C. Circuit rather than regional courts. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed with the EPA that the challenged rule is nationally applicable, so it granted the EPA’s motions to transfer the petitions to the D.C. Circuit. Question Does the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have exclusive jurisdiction to review an Environmental Protection Agency action that affects only one state or region, simply because the EPA published that action alongside actions affecting other states in a single Federal Register notice?

Louisiana v. Callais Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2025. Appellant: Louisiana.Appellee: Phillip Callais, et al. Advocates: J. Benjamin Aguinaga (for the Appellant in No. 24-109) Stuart C. Naifeh (for the Appellants in No. 24-110) Edward D. Greim (for the Appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves a challenge to Louisiana’s congressional redistricting map, specifically focusing on District 6, alleging that the map is an impermissible racial gerrymander. The map was created in response to a previous lawsuit, Robinson v. Ardoin, where plaintiffs argued that the prior map violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting minority votes. To address these issues, the Louisiana Legislature adopted a new map (Senate Bill 8) that included a second majority-Black district. However, the plaintiffs in this case claimed that this new map violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by prioritizing race in its creation. A three-judge panel concluded that District 6 of the new map did indeed violate the Equal Protection Clause, leading the court to issue an injunction against using this map in future elections. Question Does Louisiana’s creation of a second majority-Black congressional district constitute unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, even when drawn in response to a federal court finding that the state’s prior single majority-Black district likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?

Riley v. Bondi Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2025. Petitioner: Pierre Yassue Nashun Riley.Respondent: Pamela Bondi, Attorney General. Advocates: Keith Bradley (for the Petitioner) Ephraim McDowell (for the Respondent in support of the Petitioner) Stephen J. Hammer (court-appointed amicus curiae in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Riley entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in 1995. In 2006, he was indicted and later convicted of marijuana distribution and firearm charges, receiving a 25-year sentence. After being granted compassionate release in January 2021, immigration authorities took him into custody and ordered his removal due to his aggravated felony conviction. Though Riley expressed fear of returning to Jamaica, leading to various proceedings regarding potential persecution and torture claims, he ultimately was only eligible for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). While an immigration judge initially granted this relief, the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the decision in May 2022 and ordered Riley’s removal to Jamaica. Riley petitioned for review, and his case was temporarily held pending the resolution of Martinez v. Garland. In Martinez, the U.S. Court Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an order denying CAT relief is not a final order of removal for purposes of § 1252(a)(1). Relying on Martinez, the Fourth Circuit dismissed Riley’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Question 1. Is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims-processing rule that can be waived or forfeited? 2. Can a person obtain review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in a withholding-only proceeding by filing a petition within 30 days of that decision?

Nuclear Regulatory Commission v. Texas Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 5, 2025. Petitioner: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.Respondent: Texas. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1300) Brad Fagg (for the Petitioner in No. 23-1312) David C. Frederick (for Respondent Fasken Land and Minerals, Ltd.) Aaron L. Nielson (for Respondents Texas, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The United States has grappled with nuclear waste storage since the 1940s, initially from weapons development and later from commercial nuclear power. While spent nuclear fuel was originally intended to be reprocessed, this proved impractical, leading Congress to pass the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982. The Act designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the nation’s permanent underground repository and required the Department of Energy to begin accepting waste from states by 1998. However, amid strong opposition and delays, the Obama administration halted work on Yucca Mountain and established a Blue Ribbon Commission, which recommended a consent-based approach to siting storage facilities. Following that shift in policy, Waste Control Specialists (as Interim Storage Partners) applied to build a nuclear waste storage facility in Andrews County, Texas. Despite opposition from Texas's governor and legislature, which passed a law prohibiting such storage, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a license in September 2021. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the license, holding that neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the Nuclear Waste Policy Act authorized the Commission to license private interim storage facilities. Question 1. Can a nonparty challenge a federal agency’s “final order” under the Hobbs Act’s judicial review provision? 2. Do federal nuclear laws allow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to license private companies to store spent nuclear fuel at off-reactor sites?

Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 4, 2025. Petitioner: Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc.Respondent: Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioners) Catherine E. Stetson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Mexican government sued several U.S. gun manufacturers in federal court, alleging their practices facilitated illegal gun trafficking to Mexican drug cartels, causing harm to Mexico. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the lawsuit was barred by the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which prohibits certain lawsuits against gun manufacturers. The district court dismissed the case, holding that the PLCAA applied and barred Mexico's claims. Mexico appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed, holding that while the PLCAA does apply to lawsuits by foreign governments for harm suffered abroad, Mexico’s lawsuit falls within the statute’s “predicate exception” for claims alleging knowing violations of laws applicable to gun sales. The court found Mexico adequately alleged that the defendants aided and abetted illegal gun trafficking in violation of U.S. laws, and that this proximately caused harm to Mexico. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments that the causal chain was too attenuated, finding Mexico plausibly alleged direct harm from having to combat well-armed cartels. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing Mexico's lawsuit to move forward. Question Can U.S. gun manufacturers be held liable for violence in Mexico under theories of proximate causation and aiding and abetting, based on their domestic production and sale of firearms that are later trafficked to Mexican cartels?

BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2025. Petitioner: BLOM Bank SAL.Respondent: Michal Honickman. Advocates: Michael H. McGinley (for the Petitioner) Michael J. Radine (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves victims and family members of HAMAS terrorist attacks who sued BLOM Bank SAL for allegedly aiding HAMAS by providing financial services to customers affiliated with the terrorist organization. The plaintiffs brought their case under the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), claiming BLOM Bank was liable for aiding and abetting terrorism through these financial services. The plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in January 2019, which the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal but clarified that the district court had applied the wrong legal standard for aiding-and-abetting liability under JASTA. The plaintiffs then returned to the district court and moved to vacate the dismissal and amend their complaint. The district court denied their motion, and the Second Circuit concluded that the district court had erred by not properly balancing the competing principles of judgment finality (Rule 60(b)) and liberal pleading standards (Rule 15(a)). Question Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)’s stringent standard apply to a post-judgment request to vacate for the purpose of filing an amended complaint?

CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2025. Petitioner: CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited.Respondent: Antrix Corp. Ltd. Advocates: Aaron M. Streett (for the Petitioner in No. 24-17) Matthew D. McGill (for the Petitioners in No. 23-1201) Sarah M. Harris (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves an agreement between two Indian corporations, Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. and Antrix Corp. Ltd. After a dispute arose, Devas obtained an arbitration award from the International Chamber of Commerce against Antrix. Devas then sought to confirm this award in a U.S. district court. Antrix challenged the court’s personal jurisdiction, but the district court confirmed the award, concluding that a minimum contacts analysis was unnecessary under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Antrix appealed the confirmation order, arguing that the district court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction without conducting a minimum contacts analysis. Meanwhile, a group of intervenors, including CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. and others, moved to register the judgment in the Eastern District of Virginia. Both Antrix and Devas challenged this registration order. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plaintiff must prove minimum contacts, and its failure to do so meant it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Antrix. Question Must plaintiffs prove minimum contacts before federal courts may assert personal jurisdiction over foreign states sued under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 26, 2025. Petitioner: Marlean A. Ames.Respondent: Ohio Department of Youth Services. Advocates: Xiao Wang (for the Petitioner) Ashley Robertson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) T. Elliot Gaiser (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Ohio Department of Youth Services hired Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, in 2004 and promoted her to Administrator of the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) in 2014. In 2017, Ames was assigned a new supervisor, Ginine Trim, who is gay. Trim reported to Assistant Director Julie Walburn, and in 2019, Ryan Gies was appointed as the Department's Director. Both Walburn and Gies are heterosexual. In December 2018, Trim gave Ames a generally positive performance evaluation. In April 2019, Ames applied for the position of Bureau Chief of Quality but was not selected. Shortly after, Trim suggested that Ames consider retirement. On May 10, 2019, Ames was demoted from her PREA Administrator position, resulting in a significant pay cut. The Department then promoted Alexander Stojsavljevic, a 25-year-old gay man, to the PREA Administrator position. Later that year, Yolanda Frierson, a gay woman, was chosen as Bureau Chief of Quality. Following these events, Ames filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and then sued the Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asserting claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation and sex. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, holding that Ames lacked evidence of “background circumstances” necessary to establishing her prima facie case for her claim based on sexual orientation, and that Ames lacked evidence of pretext for purposes of her sex-discrimination claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a plaintiff who belongs to a majority group need to demonstrate “background circumstances suggesting that the defendant is the unusual employer who discriminates against the majority” in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Perttu v. Richards Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2025. Petitioner: Thomas Perttu.Respondent: Kyle Brandon Richards. Advocates: Ann M. Sherman (for the Petitioner) Lori Alvino McGill (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Richards, an inmate at Michigan’s Baraga Correctional Facility, sued Resident Unit Manager Thomas Perttu for sexual harassment and retaliation. Richards alleged that Perttu destroyed multiple grievances he attempted to file regarding Perttu's sexual abuse. Additionally, Richards claimed Perttu threatened to kill him if he continued trying to file grievances and wrongfully placed him in administrative segregation. After Perttu moved for summary judgment arguing the inmates failed to exhaust administrative remedies, and Richards cross-moved raising constitutional claims, the district court denied both motions due to factual disputes. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and recommended finding that Perttu proved the inmates failed to exhaust remedies. The district court adopted this recommendation and dismissed the case. Richards appealed, and after requesting supplemental briefing on whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury for exhaustion disputes intertwined with case merits, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that it does and reversed the judgment of the district court. Question In cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, do prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim?

Esteras v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2025. Petitioner: Edgardo Esteras.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Christian J. Grostic (for the Petitioner) Masha G. Hansford (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In January 2020, Edgardo Esteras began a six-year term of supervised release following imprisonment for drug trafficking offenses. Three years into his supervised release, in January 2023, his probation officer reported violations including domestic violence and firearm possession, though the related criminal charges were dismissed at the victim's request. At a violation hearing, Judge Pearson found that Esteras had possessed a firearm while on supervised release. Concerned that previous sentences had failed to deter him, she imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release with special conditions including anger management and location monitoring. Though Esteras objected to the court’s consideration of certain statutory factors related to punishment, Judge Pearson maintained that she also weighed deterrence and public safety, while acknowledging that some supervision conditions had both punitive and rehabilitative aspects. On appeal, Esteras challenged his sentence on the ground that the district court relied on prohibited factors in sentencing him, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question When revoking supervised release and imposing a prison sentence, may a district court consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—namely, “the seriousness of the offense,” “promot[ing] respect for the law,” and “just punishment”—even though these factors are not explicitly referenced in the supervised release statute?

Gutierrez v. Saenz Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2025. Petitioner: Ruben Gutierrez.Respondent: Luis Saenz. Advocates: Anne E. Fisher (for the Petitioner) William F. Cole (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1998, Ruben Gutierrez was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the robbery and killing of Escolastica Harrison. After multiple appeals and habeas corpus petitions, Gutierrez sought DNA testing of evidence from the crime scene under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 64. Texas courts repeatedly denied his requests, in part because Chapter 64 does not authorize testing when exculpatory results might only affect punishment or sentencing. In 2019, Gutierrez filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cameron County District Attorney Luis V. Saenz and others challenging the constitutionality of Texas’s postconviction DNA testing procedures. Gutierrez argued that Chapter 64 improperly limited the rights granted in another Texas statute (Article 11.071) governing successive habeas applications for death row inmates. The district court agreed, ruling that the interaction between these laws violated procedural due process by making the right to bring a successive habeas application to claim innocence of the death penalty “illusory.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Gutierrez had no standing to make this claim and vacated the district court’s judgment. Question Does a Texas death-row inmate have standing to sue the state over its refusal to grant access to DNA testing under a law that allows such testing only when the person can demonstrate that exculpatory results would have prevented their conviction?

Barnes v. Felix Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Janice Hughes Barnes.Respondent: Roberto Felix, Jr. Advocates: Nathaniel A.G. Zelinsky (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Charles L. McCloud (for the Respondents) Lanora C. Pettit (for Texas, et al., as amici curiae, supporting Respondent Felix) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix Jr. fatally shot Ashtian Barnes during a traffic stop on the Harris County Tollway. After spotting Barnes’s Toyota Corolla, which had been flagged for toll violations, Felix initiated a stop and Barnes pulled over to the median. When Felix requested documentation, Barnes, who was driving a car rented in his girlfriend’s name, could not produce it and began “digging around” in the car. Claiming he smelled marijuana, Felix questioned Barnes, who then turned off the vehicle and suggested checking the trunk for documentation. Dash cam footage shows that after Barnes opened the trunk and exited the vehicle at Felix’s request, the car’s blinker came back on and the vehicle began to move. Felix, with his weapon drawn, stepped onto the moving car and pressed his gun against Barnes’s head. While holding onto the car frame with his head above the roof—leaving him unable to see inside the vehicle—Felix fired two shots. Barnes’s vehicle stopped, and he was pronounced dead at the scene at 2:57 p.m. Though both the Houston Police Department and Harris County Precinct 5 Constable's Office investigated the incident, a grand jury found no probable cause for an indictment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, focusing exclusively on the two seconds before the shooting when Barnes’s car began moving with Felix holding onto it. The court ruled that because Felix reasonably feared for his life in that moment, his use of deadly force was justified regardless of his previous actions, such as jumping onto the moving vehicle. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Should courts apply the “moment of the threat” doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment?

Cunningham v. Cornell University Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 22, 2025. Petitioner: Casey Cunningham.Respondent: Cornell University. Advocates: Xiao Wang (for the Petitioners) Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Nicole A. Saharsky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Cornell University administered two retirement plans for its employees: the Retirement Plan and the TDA Plan. As of 2016, these defined-contribution plans had over 30,000 participants and nearly $3.4 billion in combined net assets. Cornell delegated administrative responsibilities to its Vice President for Human Resources and established the Retirement Plan Oversight Committee (RPOC) to oversee the plans. The plans offered approximately 300 investment options and incurred investment management and recordkeeping fees, with TIAA-CREF and Fidelity Investments serving as both investment providers and recordkeepers. Plaintiffs, representing a class of plan beneficiaries, sued Cornell and its appointed fiduciaries in federal district court, alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), including failure to adequately monitor the plans, resulting in the retention of underperforming investment options and excessive fees, as well as engaging in prohibited transactions under 29 U.S.C. § 1106. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment to the defendants on most claims, and the parties reached a settlement on the remaining claim before the court entered final judgment. The plaintiffs challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment on two counts, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court. Question Can a plaintiff state a claim under ERISA’s provision prohibiting a plan fiduciary from knowingly engaging in transactions with barred parties, solely by alleging that such a transaction took place?

McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2025. Petitioner: McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc.Respondent: McKesson Corporation. Advocates: Matthew W.H. Wessler (for the Petitioner) Joseph R. Palmore (for the Respondents) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) True Health Chiropractic, Inc. and McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. filed a class action lawsuit against McKesson Corporation and McKesson Technologies, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by sending unsolicited advertisements via fax. They claimed they neither invited nor gave permission to receive these faxes, and even if there was permission or an established business relationship, the faxes lacked the required opt-out notice. The district court initially granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on McKesson's consent defenses. The court also decertified the proposed class and denied treble damages to the plaintiffs. McKesson appealed the summary judgment decision on their consent defenses. The plaintiffs cross-appealed the class decertification and denial of treble damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo, the decertification order for abuse of discretion, and the denial of treble damages for abuse of discretion, ultimately affirming all of the district court’s decisions. Question Does the Hobbs Act require a federal district court to accept the Federal Communication Commission’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act?

Food and Drug Administration v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2025. Petitioner: Food and Drug Administration.Respondent: R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. Advocates: Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners) Ryan J. Watson (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) These cases arise from the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) denial of R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.’s applications to market various e-cigarettes, including menthol- and berry-flavored “Alto” e-cigarettes. R.J. Reynolds, along with retail entities like Avail Vapor Texas and the Mississippi Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Stores Association, challenged this denial in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The FDA filed a Motion to Dismiss or Transfer, arguing that the petitioners do not meet the venue requirements set forth in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act for filing their petition in the Fifth Circuit. The case was consolidated with previous related cases, and the court had previously ruled that venue was proper in the Fifth Circuit in a related matter. In the present matter, the Fifth Circuit stood by its prior decision that venue was proper. Question May a manufacturer file a petition for review in a circuit where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer’s products that is located within that circuit?

Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 15, 2025. Petitioner: Free Speech Coalition, Inc.Respondent: Ken Paxton, Attorney General of Texas. Advocates: Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Aaron L. Nielson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Texas enacted H.B. 1181, a law regulating commercial entities that publish or distribute material on internet websites, including social media platforms, where more than one-third of the content is sexual material harmful to minors. The law requires these entities to implement age verification methods to limit access to adults and display specific health warnings on their landing pages and advertisements. It defines sexual material harmful to minors using a modified version of the Miller test for obscenity. Shortly after the law was enacted but before it took effect, plaintiffs sued, claiming H.B. 1181 violates their First Amendment rights and, for some plaintiffs, conflicts with Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The district court issued a pre-enforcement preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim and suffer irreparable harm. The court ruled that the age-verification requirement and health warnings fail strict scrutiny—that is, that it is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means to achieve that interest—and that Section 230 preempts H.B. 1181 for certain plaintiffs. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that rational basis review—i.e., rationally related to a legitimate government interest—was the proper standard of review and thus vacated the injunction against the age-verification requirement but affirmed as to the health warnings. Question Is a Texas law that requires any website that publishes content one-third or more of which is “harmful to minors” to verify the age of each of its users before providing access subject to “rational basis” review or “strict scrutiny”?

Thompson v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2025. Petitioner: Patrick D. Thompson.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Chris C. Gair (for the Petitioner) Caroline A. Flynn (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Patrick Thompson took out three loans from Washington Federal Bank for Savings between 2011 and 2014, totaling $219,000. In late 2017, Washington Federal failed, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became its receiver, hiring Planet Home Lending to service the loans. Thompson received an invoice showing a loan balance of $269,120.58, which included interest. In subsequent phone calls with Planet Home and FDIC contractors in February and March 2018, Thompson disputed the higher balance. He acknowledged borrowing money but claimed he had only borrowed $110,000, omitting mention of the two additional loans. When the contractors found out about Thompson’s 2013 and 2014 loans shortly thereafter, they called Thompson back on March 5, 2018, he again expressed doubt over the accuracy of the higher loan balance. Eventually, Thompson and the FDIC agreed to settle his debt for $219,000—the amount Thompson owed without interest in December 2018. In April 2021, a grand jury charged Thompson with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014—a statute that criminalizes making a “false statement . . . for the purpose of influencing in any way the action” of the FDIC or a mortgage lending business. After a six-day trial, a jury convicted Thompson of both counts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Does the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 1014 on making a “false statement” for the purposes of influencing certain financial institutions and federal agencies include making statements that are misleading but not false?

Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 14, 2025. Petitioner: Gary Waetzig.Respondent: Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Advocates: Vincent Levy (for the Petitioner) Matthew D. McGill (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2020, Gary Waetzig sued his former employer Halliburton for age discrimination but voluntarily dismissed his suit without prejudice due to a contractual obligation to arbitrate. After an arbitrator granted summary judgment to Halliburton, Waetzig returned to federal court. Instead of filing a new complaint under the Federal Arbitration Act, he moved to reopen his original case and vacate the arbitration award. The district court agreed to reopen the case using Rule 60(b), citing Mr. Waetzig’s mistaken dismissal and an intervening Supreme Court case that affected his ability to refile. The court then vacated the arbitrator’s order, finding the arbitrator had exceeded her powers, and remanded for further proceedings before a new arbitrator. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Waetzig’s voluntary dismissal without prejudice was not a “final proceeding” within the meaning of Rule 60(b). Question Is a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 a “final judgment, order, or proceeding” under Federal Rule 60(b)?

Hewitt v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2025. Petitioner: Tony R. Hewitt.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Michael B. Kimberly (for the Petitioners) Masha G. Hansford (for the Respondent, supporting the Petitioners) Michael H. McGinley (in support of the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2009, Corey Deyon Duffey, Jarvis Dupree Ross, and Tony R. Hewitt were convicted of multiple counts of conspiracy, attempted bank robbery, bank robbery, and using firearms in furtherance of these crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After appeals and resentencing, they received mandatory minimum sentences of 5 years for their first § 924(c) conviction and 25 years for each subsequent conviction, as per the law at that time which allowed “stacking” of these charges. In 2020, following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, the appellants successfully filed for habeas relief. The district court vacated their § 924(c) conspiracy convictions and ordered resentencing. Before their resentencing in 2022, the appellants argued that § 403 of the First Step Act of 2018, which eliminated sentence stacking for § 924(c) convictions, should apply to their cases. The government initially opposed this view but later changed its position to support the application of § 403. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected their challenges and affirmed the convictions. Question Does the First Step Act’s sentencing reduction provision apply to a defendant whose original sentence was imposed before the Act’s enactment, but was later vacated and resentenced after the Act took effect?

Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2025. Petitioner: Karyn D. Stanley.Respondent: City of Sanford, Florida. Advocates: Deepak Gupta (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jessica C. Conner (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Karyn Stanley, a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, retired due to Parkinson's disease in 2018 after serving for about 19 years. When she joined in 1999, the City's policy provided free health insurance until age 65 for employees retiring due to disability. However, in 2003, the City changed its plan, limiting the health insurance subsidy for disability retirees to 24 months post-retirement. Unaware of this change, Stanley filed suit in April 2020, shortly before her subsidy was set to expire, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Florida Civil Rights Act, Equal Protection Clause, and Florida Statutes section 112.0801. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment on all claims in favor of the City, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, relying on (and reaffirming) binding precedent within that circuit that “a Title I plaintiff must ‘hold[ ] or desire[ ]’ an employment position with the defendant at the time of the defendant's allegedly wrongful act.” Question Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee — who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed — lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?

TikTok, Inc. v. Garland Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2025. Petitioner: TikTok, Inc.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioners TikTok, Inc., et al.) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioners Brian Firebaugh, et al.) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) TikTok is a social media platform with approximately 170 million monthly U.S. users that allows users to create and watch short video clips. The platform’s content is determined by a recommendation engine originally developed by ByteDance, a China-based company that is TikTok’s ultimate parent. While TikTok created a U.S. subsidiary (TTUSDS) and partnered with Oracle to handle U.S. operations and data security, ByteDance retains significant control over the platform's global operations and source code development. In response to national security concerns about Chinese influence over TikTok, both the Trump and Biden administrations attempted various measures to address these risks, including attempted forced divestiture and transaction bans. After lengthy negotiations over TikTok’s proposed National Security Agreement proved unsuccessful, Congress passed a law in 2024 requiring “foreign adversary controlled applications” (specifically including TikTok) to divest from foreign ownership or face effective shutdown through prohibitions on U.S. companies providing hosting and distribution services. The law takes effect on January 19, 2025, though companies can avoid the prohibitions by completing a qualified divestiture that eliminates foreign adversary control and operational relationships. Three sets of petitioners (ByteDance/TikTok, Based Politics, and eight individual TikTok creators) filed constitutional challenges to the Act in May 2024, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Act survived constitutional scrutiny. Question Does the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, as applied to TikTok, violate the First Amendment?

Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 11, 2024. Petitioner: Dewberry Group, Inc.Respondent: Dewberry Engineers Inc. Advocates: Thomas G. Hungar (for the Petitioner) Nicholas S. Crown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Elbert Lin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dewberry Engineers and Dewberry Group are two businesses in the real estate development industry that both use the “Dewberry” name. In 2006, they confronted each other over their competing brands, leading to a lawsuit that was settled in 2007 with a confidential settlement agreement (CSA). The CSA allowed Dewberry Engineers to use its registered marks freely while strictly limiting Dewberry Group’s use of “Dewberry.” It prohibited Dewberry Group from challenging Dewberry Engineers’ federal trademark registrations and required Dewberry Group to abandon pending applications for the “Dewberry Capital” mark. In 2017, Dewberry Group decided to rebrand, changing its name from “Dewberry Capital” to "Dewberry Group” and adopting several subbrands. Despite the CSA, Dewberry Group applied to register new “Dewberry” marks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for real estate-related services. The USPTO rejected these applications due to likelihood of confusion with Dewberry Engineers’ marks. Dewberry Engineers sent cease-and-desist letters to Dewberry Group, claiming trademark infringement and breach of the CSA. Dewberry Group refused to abandon its applications, arguing that the CSA allowed its use of “Dewberry” marks other than “Dewberry Capital” for non-architectural services. The district court ruled in favor of Dewberry Engineers and ordered Dewberry Group to pay almost $43 million in disgorged profits for infringing on Dewberry Engineers’ trademark. The district court also enjoined Dewberry Group from further violating its agreement with Dewberry Engineers and required Dewberry Group to pay Dewberry Engineers’ attorney fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Does an award of the “defendant's profits” under the Lanham Act allow a court to require the defendant to disgorge profits earned by legally separate, non-party corporate affiliates?

Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 10, 2024. Petitioner: Seven County Infrastructure Coalition.Respondent: Eagle County, Colorado. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Federal Respondents) William M. Jay (for Respondents Eagle County, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Surface Transportation Board (STB) granted a petition from the Seven County Infrastructure Coalition to construct and operate an 80-mile railway in Utah’s Uinta Basin. The railway’s primary purpose would be to transport waxy crude oil from the basin to the national rail network. The STB conducted an environmental review process, including the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Board issued a final decision in December 2021, authorizing the construction and operation of the railway subject to environmental mitigation conditions. In its environmental analysis, the STB considered various impacts of the railway’s construction and operation within the project area, including effects on water resources, air quality, special status species, land use, and local economies. However, the Board declined to analyze certain “downline impacts”—effects from increased train traffic on existing rail lines beyond the new railway. The STB also omitted analysis of other potential environmental effects, such as increased crude oil refining impacts on Gulf Coast communities, upline impacts of increased drilling in the Uinta Basin, and downline effects of potential oil spills along the Colorado River. Finally, the Board did not disclose the potential effects of the project on historic sites or structures along the Union Pacific line in Eagle County. The Board justified these omissions by arguing that minimal increases in train traffic on existing lines were unlikely to cause significant impacts, and that some effects were beyond the scope of its regulatory authority. Eagle County asked the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to review the Board’s orders, and the granted the petitions in part, denied them in part, and vacated the underlying order. Question Does the National Environmental Policy Act require an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority?

Feliciano v. Department of Transportation Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2024. Petitioner: Nick Feliciano.Respondent: Department of Transportation. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Nick Feliciano, an air traffic controller for the Federal Aviation Administration and a Coast Guard reserve officer, performed active duty from July to September 2012 under 10 U.S.C. § 12302, receiving differential pay. His service was extended to July 2013 without differential pay. From July 2013 to September 2014, he served again under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) to support various operations, followed by medical treatment until February 2017 under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(h). In 2018, he filed an appeal alleging a hostile work environment and later amended it to include claims about denied differential pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5538. The Board denied his request for differential pay, citing Adams v. Department of Homeland Security, 3 F.4th 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021), which required service in a statutory contingency operation for eligibility. Mr. Feliciano appealed this decision. Question Is a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

Kousisis v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2024. Petitioner: Stamatios Kousisis.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioners) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The U.S. Department of Transportation provides funds to state agencies for transportation projects, requiring recipients to set participation goals for disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs). Kousisis, Frangos, and their companies, Alpha and Liberty Maintenance, were awarded contracts for two Philadelphia projects with DBE requirements. They committed to working with Markias, Inc., a certified DBE, claiming they would obtain millions in paint supplies from the company. However, the defendants submitted false documentation about Markias’s role in the projects. Instead of Markias supplying products or performing a commercially useful function as required, it served merely as a pass-through. The defendants arranged for actual suppliers to send invoices to Markias, which then issued its own invoices with a 2.25% fee added. This scheme allowed the defendants to appear compliant with DBE requirements, a condition for receiving payments and avoiding penalties. The jury convicted Kousisis and Alpha of false statements, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and wire fraud. The district court calculated the loss based on the defendants’ “ill-gotten profits,” determining that this was an appropriate measure of loss when the actual loss to the government was not measurable at the time of sentencing. This calculation led to a 20-point sentencing enhancement corresponding to a loss between $9.5 million and $25 million. Kousisis and Alpha appealed their convictions and the calculation of the loss for sentencing purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the loss calculation. Question Can deception to induce a commercial exchange constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme?