Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Viking River Cruises, Inc..Respondent: Angie Moriana. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Scott L. Nelson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Angie Moriana worked as a sales representative for Viking River Cruises, Inc., and agreed to submit any dispute arising out of her employment to binding arbitration. Notwithstanding that agreement, Moriana sued Viking on behalf of herself and similarly situated workers under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Moriana relied on a 2014 decision by the California Supreme Court, Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, which held arbitration agreements that waive the right to bring PAGA representative actions in any forum (such as the one between Moriana and Viking) are unenforceable. Viking moved to compel Moriana’s claims to arbitration, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis overruled Iskanian. The trial court denied Viking’s motion. The appellate court affirmed. Question Does the Federal Arbitration Act require enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims? Conclusion The Federal Arbitration Act preempts a California law that invalidates contractual waivers of the right to bring representative claims. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion holding that the FAA preempts the rule in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles to the extent that Iskanian precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate. The California Supreme Court’s holding in Iskanian, holding unenforceable any arbitration agreement that waives the right to bring a PAGA representative action, presents parties with an impermissible choice: either arbitrate disputes using a form of class procedures, or do not arbitrate at all. The FAA protects bilateral arbitration from undue state interference. To the extent that Iskanian precludes bilateral arbitration, it is preempted by federal law. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the FAA does not apply to state-court proceedings.

Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 29, 2022.Decided on Jun 29, 2022. Petitioner: Le Roy Torres.Respondent: Texas Department of Public Safety. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Leroy Torres enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1989. In 1998, he was employed by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) as a trooper, where he served until his deployment to Iraq in 2007. In 2008, he was honorably discharged and sought reemployment by DPS. However, due to a lung condition he acquired in Iraq, Torres requested employment with DPS in a position different from the one he held before. Instead, DPS offered Torres only a “temporary duty offer,” which he declined. Torres sued DPS in 2017, alleging that the agency’s failure to offer him a job that would accommodate his disability violated the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which prohibits adverse employment actions against an employee based on the employee’s military service. The trial court ruled in favor of Torres, finding that USERRA properly abrogated DPS’s sovereign immunity under Congress’s constitutional war powers. The appellate court reversed. Question Did Congress properly abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims arising under the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)? Conclusion Congress properly exercised its power to raise and support the Armed Forces when it authorized private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. In PennEast, the Court held that Congress could, pursuant to its eminent domain power, authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting States because, upon entering the federal system, the States implicitly agreed that their “eminent domain power would yield to that of the Federal Government.” Under PennEast, the test for structural waiver is whether the federal power is “complete in itself, and the States consented to the exercise of that power—in its entirety—in the plan of the Convention.” Congress’s power to build and maintain the Armed Forces fits PennEast’s test. Thus, in joining together to form a Union, the States agreed to sacrifice their sovereign immunity for the good of the common defense. Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined.

LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2022.Decided on Apr 28, 2022. Petitioner: Bradley LeDure.Respondent: Union Pacific Railroad Company. Advocates: David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) J. Scott Ballenger (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Bradley LeDure is a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In August 2016, LeDure reported for work at a rail yard in Salem, Illinois, to assemble a train for a trip to Dexter, Missouri. Three locomotives were coupled together on a sidetrack, and LeDure decided only one locomotive would be powered on. On an exterior walkway on his way to shut down one of the locomotives, LeDure slipped and fell down the steps. Upon investigation, LeDure noticed a “slick” substance, which Union Pacific later reported to be a “small amount of oil” on the walkway. LeDure sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Locomotive Inspection Act and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, arguing that Union Pacific failed to maintain the walkway free of hazards. The district court dismissed LeDure’s claims, finding the locomotive was not “in use” and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, and LeDure’s injuries were not reasonably foreseeable because they resulted from a small “slick spot” unknown to Union Pacific. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Is a train that makes a temporary stop in a railyard as part of its unitary journey in interstate commerce “in use” and therefore subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act? Conclusion The judgment of the Seventh Circuit, affirming that the train was not "in use" and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2022.Decided on Jun 6, 2022. Petitioner: Southwest Airlines Co..Respondent: Latrice Saxon. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner) Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Latrice Saxon is a ramp supervisor, which entails managing and assisting workers to load and unload airplane cargo for Southwest Airlines. Unlike ramp agents, supervisors like Saxon are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and instead are required to arbitrate wage disputes, in accordance with their employment contract. Notwithstanding the arbitration requirement, Saxon, on behalf of herself and other ramp supervisors, sued Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failing to pay overtime work. Southwest moved to stay the suit pending arbitration, or to dismiss it altogether in light of the arbitration agreement. Saxon argued that the Arbitration Act did not apply to her lawsuit because she and other ramp supervisors were “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and therefore exempt under Section 1 of the Act. The district court ruled for Southwest, finding that a transportation worker must actually transport goods, not merely handle them at one end or the other of a network. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, and thus Saxon and the class of workers she represents are exempt from the Act. Question Is an airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor a “transportation worker” under Section 1 of the Arbitration Act and therefore exempt from the Act’s arbitration requirement? Conclusion An airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor, frequently loading and unloading airplane cargo, belongs to the “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and is therefore exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act’s arbitration requirement. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous 8-0 opinion of the Court. The “class of workers” language of Section 1 refers not to what Southwest does generally, but what Saxon, as a worker, does specifically: physically loading and unloading cargo on and off airplanes. This work qualifies as being “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” as these workers are directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders. Thus, Saxon falls within Section 1’s exception. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: ZS Automotive US, Inc., et al..Respondent: Luxshare, Ltd.. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners in 21-401) Joseph T. Baio (for the Petitioners in 21-518) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Andrew R. Davies (for the Respondent in 21-401) Alexander A. Yanos (for the Respondent in 21-518) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2017, Luxshare entered into a large-scale business deal with ZF Automotive US, and the deal closed in April 2018. Luxshare allegedly discovered that ZF fraudulently concealed certain material facts, inflating the purchase price. The parties’ purchase agreement required that all disputes be settled by three arbitrators in Germany, and Luxshare intended to bring claims for the losses as a result of ZF’s allegedly wrongful conduct. However, it first sought to obtain discovery from ZF and its senior officers and asked a federal district court to compel discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a). Question Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), which gives federal district courts authority to order litigants subject to their jurisdiction to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a foreign or international tribunal,” apply to private commercial arbitral tribunals? Conclusion Although 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) permits a district court to order discovery “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,” only a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body may qualify as such a tribunal, and the arbitration panels in these cases are not such adjudicative bodies. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The word “tribunal” in the context of § 1782, with modifiers “foreign or international” is best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority. The statute’s history confirms this understanding, as does analogy to the Federal Arbitration Act. The adjudicative bodies in these cases are not governmental or intergovernmental and thus are not subject to § 1782(a).

Golan v. Saada Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 22, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Narkis Aliza Golan.Respondent: Isacco Jacky Saada. Advocates: Karen R. King (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Richard Min (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Isacco Saada and Narkis Golan married in Italy in 2015 and had a son. From the very start of their relationship, Saada was violently abusive toward Golan, including in front of their son (though allegedly not toward the son). In 2018, Golan and their son traveled to the United States and remained there. Saada asked a court to return their son under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court found that Italy was the child’s country of habitual residence for the purposes of the Hague Convention. However, it also found that returning the child to Italy would subject him to a grave risk of psychological harm based on Saada’s abuse of Golan. Under binding precedent, the district court was also required to determine whether there were any ameliorative undertakings it could impose on Saada that would mitigate the risk of harm in returning the child to Italy. The district court ordered Saada to stay away from Golan, to pay her $30,000, and to visit their son only with Golan’s consent. After the district court coordinated with an Italian court to enforce the orders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, musts courts consider all measures that might mitigate the grave risk of harm if the child were to return to their country of habitual residence? Conclusion A court is not required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention gives a court the discretion to grant or deny return of a child to a foreign country if it finds that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm. Nothing in the Convention’s text either forbids or requires consideration of ameliorative measures in exercising this discretion.

Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2022.Decided on Jun 23, 2022. Petitioner: Philip E. Berger.Respondent: North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al.. Advocates: David H. Thompson (for the Petitioners) Elisabeth S. Theodore (for the NAACP Respondents) Sarah Boyce (for the State Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP challenged a North Carolina voter-ID law, arguing that it violates the Constitution and the federal Voting Rights Act. Although the state attorney general, a Democrat, is already is representing the State's interest in the validity of that law, defending its constitutionality in both state and federal court, Republicans Phil Berger, president pro tempore of the state senate, and Tim Moore, speaker of the state house representatives, sought to intervene to also represent the interests of the State. The district court twice rejected their requests to intervene, and the full (en banc) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also rejected their request. Question Do the two North Carolina legislators have a right to intervene in this case to defend a state voter-ID law? Conclusion North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that one has a right to intervene in litigation if they have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and are “so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede” their ability to protect their interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. When a State chooses to divide its sovereign authority among different officials and authorize their participation in a suit challenging state law, full consideration of the state’s interests may require the involvement of various officials. Intervention by the legislators neither violates the North Carolina Constitution nor gives them authority beyond what the law already provides them. The existing parties do not adequately represent the legislators’ interest, as the presumption of adequate representation applies only in cases where interests fully overlap, which is not the case here. Thus, the legislators have a right to intervene in the litigation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court erroneously presumed that a State is inadequately represented in federal court unless whomever state law designates as a State’s representative is allowed to intervene and incorrectly implied that the attorney general’s defense of the constitutionality of the voting law at issue here fell below a minimal standard of adequacy.

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2022.Decided on May 23, 2022. Petitioner: Robyn Morgan.Respondent: Sundance, Inc.. Advocates: Karla A. Gilbride (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In September 2018, Robyn Morgan sued Sundance, Inc. for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that Sundance failed to pay her for overtime work. The district court denied Sundance’s motion to dismiss. Sundance then answered Morgan's complaint but did not assert its right to arbitrate Morgan's claims. After filing its answer, Morgan participated in a settlement mediation with plaintiffs in another similar lawsuit in Michigan. The Michigan case settled, but Morgan's case moved forward. Nearly eight months after the filing of Morgan's complaint, Sundance moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding Sundance's participation in the litigation waived its right to arbitration. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Question Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate the Supreme Court’s instruction that lower courts must “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts”? Conclusion Federal courts may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Outside of the arbitration context, a federal court assessing whether a party has waived a right does not generally ask about prejudice. Rather, waiver is “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” It focuses on the actions of the person who held the right, not the effects on the opposing party. Although the FAA may express policy favoring arbitration, that policy does not authorize federal courts to invent special arbitration-preferring procedural rules. Federal courts thus may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule requiring that a party show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim of waiver.

Egbert v. Boule Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2022.Decided on Jun 8, 2022. Petitioner: Erik Egbert.Respondent: Robert Boule. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Huston (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Felicia H. Ellsworth (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Erik Egbert, a Customs and Border Patrol Agent, went to the Smugglers Inn, which sits at the U.S.-Canada border, and approached a car carrying a guest from Turkey. The inn’s owner, Robert Boule, asked Egbert to leave, and when Egbert refused to do so, Egbert pushed Boule to the ground. After Boule complained to Egbert’s supervisors, Egbert suggested to the IRS that it investigate Boule. Boule filed a Bivens lawsuit (so called because of the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which first recognized the right of plaintiffs to sue federal officials for damages arising from violations of their constitutional rights) against Egbert arguing that the agent had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court ruled against Boule, finding his claims beyond the scope of those permitted under Bivens. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the full (en banc) Ninth Circuit denied Egbert’s petition for rehearing. Question Does a plaintiff have a right to sue federal officers for First Amendment retaliation claims or for allegedly violating the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights while engaging in immigration-related functions? Conclusion A plaintiff does not have a right to sue Border Patrol officers engaged in immigration-related functions for First Amendment retaliation claims or for alleged excessive force. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court. Although Bivens permits suits against federal officials for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, its application to Border Patrol officers raises national security concerns. Thus, “judicial intrusion” would be harmful or inappropriate in this arena. As to the First Amendment, Boule’s claim is a novel concept and no factors weigh in favor of judicial extension of Bivens to that claim. Moreover, for both claims, Congress is better suited to authorize a damages remedy. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch would overrule Bivens entirely. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, concurring in the judgment as to the First Amendment claim but dissenting as to the Fourth Amendment claim. Justice Sotomayor argued that Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim was squarely within the scope of Bivens and only his First Amendment claim was in a new context.

Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 1, 2022.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan, et al..Respondent: DaVita, Inc., et al.. Advocates: John J. Kulewicz (for the Petitioners) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal) Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) DaVita is the leading provider of dialysis treatment in the United States. Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan is a self-funded plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Patient A is an anonymous individual with end-stage renal disease who is a member of the plan and has been receiving treatment by DaVita since April 15, 2017. The Plan defines three tiers of reimbursement, and dialysis providers are categorically in the lowest tier and are considered out of network, entitling them to the lowest level of reimbursement relative to all other providers. DaVita challenged the Plan as violating the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which prohibits health plans from treating individuals with kidney failure differently in eligibility or access to benefits. The district court dismissed all of DaVita’s claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that DaVita had plausibly alleged that the Plan engaged in unlawful discrimination. Question Did the Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan violate the Medicare Secondary Payer Act’s non-discrimination provisions through its reimbursement structure for dialysis providers? Conclusion The Marietta Plan’s coverage terms for outpatient dialysis do not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(C) because those terms apply uniformly to all covered individuals, and the Medicare Secondary Payer statute does not authorize disparate-impact liability. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. Section 1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii) prohibits a plan from differentiating in benefits between individuals with and without end-stage renal disease. The language of the provision cannot fairly be read to authorize liability for disparate-impact claims. Because the Marietta Plan provides the same outpatient dialysis benefits to all Plan participants, whether or not they are eligible for Medicare, it does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(C). Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that because outpatient dialysis is an almost perfect proxy for end-stage renal disease, differentiation on the basis of one is equivalent to differentiation on the basis of the other.

Ruan v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 1, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2022. Petitioner: Xiulu Ruan.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lawrence S. Robbins (for the Petitioner in 20-1410) Beau B. Brindley (for the Petitioner in 21-5261) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A federal jury in Alabama convicted Xiulu Ruan and several other pain management physicians of running a medical practice constituting a racketeering enterprise in violation of several federal statutes, including provisions of the Controlled Substances Act. Ruan allegedly prescribed medicines, including Schedule II drugs (many of which are opioids), outside the standard of care for his practice. At trial, prosecutors showed that Ruan and other physicians in his practice prescribed medications for their own financial gain rather than for the benefit of their patients. Ruan and other defendants challenged their convictions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question May a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) regardless of whether he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice? Conclusion The crime of prescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, requires that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. In general, criminal law seeks to punish conscious wrongdoing. Thus, when a criminal statute is silent as to the mental state required, courts infer a requirement of knowledge or intent. When it is not silent, the general mental state provision applies to each term of the provision. Thus, the “knowingly or intentionally” requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841 applies to the phrase “except as authorized.” As such, once the defendant proves their conduct was “authorized,” the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Alito looked to the Harrison Act, which preceded the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Regarding the Harrison Act, the Court held that a registered physician acts “in the course of his professional practice” when the physician writes prescriptions “in good faith.” Justice Alito would thus hold that this rule applies under the CSA and vacate the judgments below and remand for further proceedings.

West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 28, 2022.Decided on Jun 30, 2022. Petitioner: West Virginia, et al..Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al.. Advocates: Lindsay S. See (for the state Petitioners) Jacob M. Roth (for the private Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Respondents) Beth S. Brinkmann (for the power company Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Trump administration repealed the 2015 Clean Power Plan, which established guidelines for states to limit carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, and issued in its place the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, which eliminated or deferred the guidelines. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the ACE Rule as arbitrary and capricious. One of the challengers, North American Coal Corporation, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to so broadly regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Question Does the Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in virtually any industry, so long as it considers cost, non-air impacts, and energy requirements? Conclusion Congress did not grant the Environmental Protection Agency in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act the authority to devise emissions caps based on the generation shifting approach the Agency took in the Clean Power Plan. Under the “major questions doctrine,” there are “extraordinary cases” in which the “history and the breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted,” and the “economic and political significance” of that assertion, provide a “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress” meant to confer such authority. This is one such case, so the EPA must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the authority it claims. It cannot do so. The EPA has admitted that issues of electricity transmission, distribution, and storage are not within its traditional expertise, yet it claims that Congress implicitly tasked it with the regulation of how Americans get their energy. Without “clear congressional authorization” for the EPA to regulate in such a manner, the agency lacks authority to implement the Clean Power Plan under the Clean Air Act. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined.

Arizona v. City and County of San Francisco Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Arizona, et al..Respondent: City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.. Advocates: Mark Brnovich (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the federal Respondents) Helen H. Hong (for the state Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Although federal immigration law uses the term “public charge,” referring generally to recipients of federal benefits, it lacks a precise and clear definition. Under the Clinton administration, it referred only to a noncitizen who received cash benefits (as opposed to other types of benefits). In 2019, the Trump administration issued a final rule defining “public charge” as a noncitizen who would likely need cash benefits and/or government-provided housing, food assistance, or medical insurance for more than twelve months. The rule was subject to legal challenges, and the Biden administration stopped defending the rule and dismissed all the cases challenging the rule. The federal government also took additional steps to revert the definition to that of the Clinton administration. Several states sought to intervene in the litigation and take up the defense of the rule where the federal government left off. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the states’ motion to intervene. Question Can states with interests intervene to defend a rule when the United States ceases to defend it? Conclusion Dismissed as improvidently granted.

Denezpi v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 22, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Merle Denezpi.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Michael B. Kimberly (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Merle Denezpi, a member of the Navajo tribe, pleaded guilty to an assault charge in the Court of Indian Offenses. That court is a trial court that exercises jurisdiction over Native Americans where there are no tribal courts to do so. Six months later, a federal grand jury indicted Denezpi on a charge of aggravated sexual assault based on the same underlying events. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Denezpi challenged his prosecution in federal court, arguing that it violated the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause because the Court of Indian Offenses is a federal agency. The district court ruled against Denezpi, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a prosecution in the Court of Indian Offenses trigger the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause? Conclusion The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit prosecuting a person twice “for the same conduct or actions,” but for the same “offence.” Under the dual-sovereignty principle, two offenses arising from the same act can therefore be separately prosecuted without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause, even if they have identical elements and could not be separately prosecuted if enacted by a single sovereign. Denezpi’s single act constituted assault and battery under the Ute Mountain Ute Code and aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country under the U.S. Code. His prosecution for both crimes does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined in part, arguing that the same prosecuting authority charged the same defendant twice for the same crime—the very definition of double jeopardy proscribed by the U.S. Constitution.

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 22, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, et al..Respondent: State of Texas. Advocates: Brant C. Martin (for the Petitioners) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Lanora C. Pettit (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Ysleta del Sur Pueblo is a federally recognized tribe with a reservation near El Paso, Texas. Under the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, passed by Congress in 1987, the Pueblo agreed that its gaming activities would comply with Texas law. Another law, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, also regulates tribal gaming operations. The Pueblo engaged in gaming activity that violated state law but not the IGRA, and Texas filed a lawsuit to enjoin the tribe’s gaming operations. The district court ruled in favor of the State of Texas, finding that the more restrictive Restoration Act controlled and prohibited the gaming operations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Which federal law governs the legality of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s gaming operations, the Restoration Act or the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act? Conclusion The Ysleta del Sur and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act applies to the case at hand and bans on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court Section 107 of the Restoration Act directly addresses gaming on the lands of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, providing that “gaming activities which are prohibited by [Texas law] are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.” Activities that Texas law merely regulates and does not prohibit are outside the scope of the Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh joined.

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 19, 2022.Decided on May 16, 2022. Petitioner: Federal Election Commission.Respondent: Ted Cruz for Senate, et al.. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Appellant) Charles J. Cooper (for the Appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The day before Election Day in 2018, Senator Ted Cruz loaned Ted Cruz for Senate (“Cruz Committee”) two campaign finance loans totaling $260,000. After Election Day, the Cruz Committee used the funds it had on hand to pay vendors and meet other obligations instead of repaying the loans to Senator Cruz. Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations place a $250,000 limit on the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to pay back a candidate's pre-election loans more than 20 days after Election Day. After 20 days had elapsed, the balance of those loans that exceeded BCRA's $250,000 statutory cap on post-election contributions ($10,000)—converted into a campaign contribution. The Cruz Committee filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations as violating constitutional and administrative laws. A three-judge court ruled for Cruz, finding that the restrictions place a burden on political speech without adequate justification. Question Do appellees have standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(j), and does the limit unconstitutionally burden political speech without justification? Conclusion Appellees have standing to challenge Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and that section—which limits the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to repay a candidate who lends money to his own campaign—violates the First Amendment rights of candidates and their campaigns to engage in political speech. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. As to standing, appellee’s injuries are directly inflicted by the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC’s) threatened enforcement of the provisions at issue. That appellees intentionally triggered the application of the provisions does not undermine their standing to challenge them. Additionally, although the jurisdiction of a three-judge district court is limited to actions challenging the enforcement of a statute (as opposed to a regulation), the enforcement is traceable to the operation of the statute itself. Thus, the appellees may challenge the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the loan-repayment limitation through its implementing regulation. As to the merits, the loan-repayment limitation burdens candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. By seeking to deter candidates from loaning money to their campaigns, Section 304 raises a barrier to entry thus abridging political speech. The Government fails to describe how the limitation furthers a permissible interest—namely, the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. Although the Government argues that the types of contributions at issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because they are used to repay a candidate’s personal loans, it does not identify a single case of quid pro quo corruption as a result of these types of contributions. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan argued that the majority overstates the the First Amendment burdens Section 304 imposes and understates the anticorruption values Section 304 serves. Because the regulated transactions personally enrich those already elected to office, they threaten both corruption and the appearance of corruption, “bring[ing] this country’s political system into further disrepute.”

Concepcion v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 19, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2022. Petitioner: Carlos Concepcion.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Charles L. McCloud (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2008, Carlos Concepcion pleaded guilty to crack cocaine charges, and in 2009 he was sentenced to 228 months in prison. While he was serving his sentence, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the statutory penalties for most federal crimes involving crack cocaine. In 2018, Congress made these changes retroactive, and Concepcion moved for resentencing. The district court denied his motion, and Concepcion appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the district court was not obligated to update and reevaluate the sentencing factors. Question Must or may a district court consider intervening legal and factual developments when deciding whether to “impose a reduced sentence” on an individual under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018? Conclusion The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. District courts enjoy substantial discretion to consider all relevant information at a sentencing hearing. That discretion extends to subsequent hearings modifying sentencing, as well. The First Step Act preserves this discretion, allowing the district court to reduce sentences based not only on the changes to sentencing ranges, but also on other legal or factual changes that have occurred since the original sentencing. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the text of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to reduce sentences based only on changes to the crack-cocaine sentencing ranges, not on other unrelated changes that have occurred since the original sentencing.

Shurtleff v. Boston Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 18, 2022.Decided on May 2, 2022. Petitioner: Harold Shurtleff, et al..Respondent: City of Boston, Massachusetts, et al.. Advocates: Mathew D. Staver (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal) Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The City of Boston owns and manages three flagpoles in front of City Hall, the seat of Boston’s municipal government. Ordinarily, the City raises the United States flag and the POW/MIA flag on one flagpole, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts flag on the second flagpole, and its own flag on the third flagpole. Upon request and after approval, the City will occasionally fly another flag for a limited period of time instead of its own flag. Gregory T. Rooney, Commissioner of Boston’s Property Management Department, reviews applications for flag-raising events to ensure the flag is consistent with the City’s message, policies, and practices. The City has approved 284 flag-raising events over a 12-year period, and Rooney had never denied a flag-raising application. Camp Constitution is an organization that seeks “to enhance the understanding of the country’s Judeo-Christian moral heritage” and applied to fly a “Christian flag” for its event. Rooney denied Camp Constitution’s flag-raising request, finding it was the first time any entity or organization had requested to fly a religious flag. Camp Constitution sued, and the district court found for the City. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question Does Boston’s refusal to fly a private religious organization’s flag depicting a cross on a city flagpole violate the organization’s First Amendment rights? Conclusion Boston’s flag-raising program does not constitute government speech, so its refusal to fly the private religious organization’s flag violates the organization’s First Amendment rights. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Court first considered whether Boston’s flag-raising program is government speech. The test for government speech is a holistic inquiry that considers, among other things, the history of the expression at issue, the public’s perception as to who is speaking, and the extent to which the government has controlled the expression. Although the history of flag displays favors Boston, the other two factors outweigh the first factor. The public would not necessarily associate a flag’s message with the City, and, most importantly, the City has exercised almost no control over flag content. In fact, the City has no record of denying a request until the Petitioner’s in this case. Thus, on balance, the flag-raising program is not government speech. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment disallows the government from engaging in “impermissible viewpoint discrimination.” When it is not speaking for itself, the government may not exclude speech based on “religious viewpoint.” Thus, Boston’s refusal to allow Shurtleff and Camp Constitution to raise their flag based on “religious viewpoint” violated the First Amendment. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion to reiterate that the government does not violate the Establishment Clause when it treats religious persons or organizations equally with secular persons or organizations, but it does violate the Free Speech Clause when it excludes religious persons or organizations. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, disclaiming the three-factor test used by the majority. Rather, when faced with a question whether speech constitutes government speech, Justice Alito would ask “whether the government is actually expressing its own views or the real speaker is a private party and the government is surreptitiously engaged in the ‘regulation of private speech.’” Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined, criticizing the so-called Lemon test the Court adopted for resolving Establishment Clause disputes. Justice Gorsuch argued that Boston erroneously relied on the now-abandoned Lemon test, leading it to believe that flying the flag would violate the Establisment Clause.

Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 18, 2022.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: David Cassirer.Respondent: Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation. Advocates: David Boies (for the Petitioners) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Thaddeus J. Stauber (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Cassirer and others filed a lawsuit to recover a painting by French Impressionist painter Camille Pissarro, which was stolen from their ancestors by the Nazi regime in 1939. The district court originally granted summary judgment in favor of Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC), but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the court needed to determine, as a threshold matter, whether TBC had actual knowledge the painting was stolen. If it had such knowledge, then it could be an accessory after the fact under Spanish Civil Code Article 1956. On remand, the district court determined that TBC did not have actual knowledge that the painting was stolen when it purchased the painting in 1993. Cassirer again appealed, arguing among other things the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision erred in holding that Spanish law governs the substantive claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding no factual or legal developments that would justify revisiting its original holding. Question Should a federal court hearing state law claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules or federal common law to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue? Conclusion A federal court hearing state-law claims under the FSIA should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion holding that, in this case, that means applying the forum state’s choice-of-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. Although the FSIA generally recognizes foreign sovereign immunity absent a statutory exception, it does not affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state when the entity is not immune from suit. Rather, in that situation, the foreign state is subject to the same substantive law as a private party. In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-of-law rule.

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 12, 2022.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: Boechler, P.C..Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Advocates: Melissa Arbus Sherry (On behalf of the Petitioner) Jonathan C. Bond (On behalf of the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On June 5, 2015, the Internal Revenue Service sent Boechler, P.C., a letter noting a discrepancy between prior tax document submissions. After not receiving a response, the IRS imposed a 10% intentional disregard penalty, which Boechler did not pay. The IRS mailed Boechler a notice of intent to levy. Boechler timely responded but failed to establish grounds for relief. On July 28, 2017, the Office of Appeals mailed a determination sustaining the levy to Boechler's last known address in Fargo, North Dakota. The notice of determination, delivered on July 31, stated that Boechler had 30 days from the date of determination, i.e. until August 28, 2017, to submit a petition for review. Boechler mailed a petition for a CDP hearing on August 29, 2017, one day after the 30-day filing deadline had expired. The Tax Court received Boechler's untimely petition, and the IRS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Boechler argued that the 30-day time limit in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, the time limit should be equitably tolled, and calculating the time limit from issuance rather than receipt violates due process. The tax court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and Boechler appealed. Question Is the 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the commissioner of internal revenue in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling? Conclusion The 30-day time limit of 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. A procedural requirement is jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” it is. Section 6330(d)(1) provides that a “person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” Thus, the meaning of this provision turns on the meaning of “such matter.” Because the phrase “such matter” in that sentence lacks a clear antecedent, the text does not “clearly” mandate a jurisdictional reading. Nonjurisdictional limitations periods are presumptively subject to equitable tolling, and nothing in the facts of this case rebuts that presumption.

Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 11, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al..Respondent: Antonio Arteaga-Martinez. Advocates: Austin L. Raynor (for the Petitioners) Pratik A. Shah (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Antonio Arteaga-Martinez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection. In May 2018, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested and detained him and initiated removal proceedings. Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding and deferral of removal based on fear of violence in Mexico. Six months after the start of his detention, he requested a bond hearing and challenged his continued detention without one. Question Is a noncitizen who has spent more than six months in immigration detention awaiting resolution of their deportation withholding claim entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they can be released on bond? Conclusion The Government is not required to provide noncitizens detained for six months with bond hearings in which the Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community. No plausible construction of the text of 9 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) requires the Government to provide bond hearings with the procedures mandated by the Third Circuit. It says nothing about bond hearings before immigration judges or burdens of proof. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurrring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, arguing that while the majority reached the correct conclusion, he would hold that the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause does not apply to removal of noncitizens, and Zadvydas v. Davis should be overruled. Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that Zadvydas control the outcome in this case.

Garland v. Gonzalez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 11, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al..Respondent: Esteban Aleman Gonzalez, et al.. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners) Matthew H. Adams (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Gutierrez Sanchez are natives and citizens of Mexico who reside in the United States. The federal government had initiated removal proceedings against them, but asylum officers determined that each had a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico. Gonzalez and Sanchez both requested a bond hearing before an immigration judge after they had been detained for 180 days, but both requests were denied. Question Is a noncitizen who has spent more than six months in immigration detention awaiting resolution of their deportation withholding claim entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they can be released on bond? Conclusion District courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion reversing the judgment of the lower court. Section 1252(f)(1) generally strips lower courts of “jurisdiction or authority” to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Although that section includes one exception, to “enjoin or restrain the operation of” the relevant statutory provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated,” that exception does not apply to claims on behalf of an entire class. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, dissenting from the Court’s holding as to the interpretation of Section 1252(f)(1) but concurring in the judgment insofar as it concludes the government prevails on the merits.

Gallardo v. Marstiller Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2022.Decided on Jun 6, 2022. Petitioner: Gianinna Gallardo, an Incapacitated Person, By and Through her Parents and Co-Guardians Pilar Vassallo and Walter Gallardo.Respondent: Simone Marstiller, In Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. Advocates: Bryan S. Gowdy (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Henry C. Whitaker (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gianinna Gallardo suffered catastrophic injuries when she was hit by a truck after getting off her school bus, and she remains in a persistent vegetative state. She eventually recovered $800,000 in a court-approved settlement, which applied to her past medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages, and other damages. However, the settlement amount covered only a fraction of each type of damages. Medicaid had paid $862,688.77 toward her past medical expenses, so in an attempt to recover reimbursement for its payments, pursuant to Florida law, the State of Florida asserted a lien over the compensation for past medical expenses, which Medicaid had paid, as well as the compensation for future medical expenses. Gallardo’s counsel filed a lawsuit asking the court to enjoin the state from asserting its lien over the portion of her tort recovery compensating for future medical expenses and to declare that Florida’s reimbursement statute violates the Medicaid Act. The district court ruled for Gallardo, finding that the Medicaid Act preempted the Florida law to the extent that the law allows the State to satisfy its lien for past medical expenses from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. Question Does the federal Medicaid Act provide for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid’s payment of a beneficiary’s past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses? Conclusion The Medicaid Act permits a state to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion. Section 1396p(a)(1) of the Medicaid Act prohibits states from recovering medical payments from a beneficiary’s “property,” that is, from settlement amounts other than those allocated for past medical care paid for by Medicaid. But that provision does not apply to state laws expressly authorized under the Act. Florida’s Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act falls squarely within this exception to Section 1396p(a)(1). The plain text of the provision, as well as the statutory context, support this interpretation. The language granting rights to payment of “any medical care” includes both past medical payments and future medical payments. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority “read[s] one statutory provision in isolation while giving short shrift to the statutory context, the relationships between the provisions at issue, and the framework set forth in precedent. As such, Justice Sotomayor argued, its holding “is inconsistent with the structure of the” Medicaid program and will cause needless unfairness and disruption.

Biden v. Missouri Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 7, 2022.Decided on Jan 13, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden.Respondent: Missouri, et al.. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (On behalf of the Applicants) Jesus A. Osete (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A240) Elizabeth Murrill (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A241) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question Does the Department of Health and Human Services have the authority to enforce a rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption? Conclusion The Department of Health and Human Services has the authority to enforce its rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the applications to stay the two injunctions barring the Secretary of Health and Human Services from enforcing the regulation. The Court reasoned that a core function of HHS is to ensure that the healthcare providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients protect their patients’ health and safety, and the interim rule at issue here seeks to do precisely that. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. The dissenters found no statutory support for such an exercise of authority.

National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 7, 2022.Decided on Jan 13, 2022. Petitioner: National Federation of Independent Business, et al..Respondent: Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Advocates: Scott A. Keller (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A244) Benjamin M. Flowers (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A247) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (On behalf of the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question Did the Occupational Safety & Health Administration exceed its authority in promulgating a rule mandating that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing? Conclusion The challengers to the OSHA rule requiring that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing are likely to succeed on the merits. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the application to stay the OSHA rule. Congress created OSHA to set workplace safety standards. The challenged rule goes well beyond that and is effectively a broad public health measure. Even the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic do not justify such an expansion in the agency's authority. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, reiterating that the States and Congress—not OSHA—have the authority to decide how to respond to the pandemic. Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan filed a joint dissent, arguing that the pandemic directly affects the safety of workplaces and thus that OSHA has the authority to issue regulations to curb the effects of the pandemic in workplaces. The dissenters argue that by granting the stay, the Court acted outside of its competence and without legal basis, displacing the judgments of officials who have the responsibility and expertise to respond to workplace health emergencies.

Carson v. Makin Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: David Carson, as Parent and Next Friend of O. C., et al..Respondent: A. Pender Makin. Advocates: Michael Bindas (for the Petitioner) Christopher C. Taub (for the Respondent) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The State of Maine relies on local school administrative units (SAUs) to ensure that every school-age child in the state has access to a free education. Not every SAU operates its own public secondary school. To meet the state requirements, an SAU without its own public secondary school may either (1) contract with a secondary school to provide school privileges or (2) pay the tuition of a secondary school at which a particular student is accepted. In either circumstance, the secondary school must be either a public school or an “approved” private school. To be an “approved” school, a private school must meet the state’s compulsory attendance requirements (which can be demonstrated by accreditation by a New England association of schools and colleges or by approval by the Maine Department of Education), and it must be “nonsectarian in accordance with the First Amendment.” The Carsons, Gillises, and Nelsons live in SAUs that do not operate a public secondary school of their own but instead provide tuition assistance to parents who send their children to an “approved” private school. The three families opted to send their children to private schools that are accredited but do not meet the nonsectarian requirement because they are religiously affiliated. Because the schools are not “approved,” they do not qualify for tuition assistance. The families filed a lawsuit in federal court arguing that the “nonsectarian” requirement violates the Constitution on its face and as applied. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment to the State and denied judgment to the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, noting that it had twice before rejected similar challenges, and even though the U.S. Supreme Court had decided two relevant cases in the interim, those cases do not produce a different outcome here. Question Does a state law prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or “sectarian,” instruction violate the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments to parents who live in school districts that do not operate a secondary school of their own violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice Jonh Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. Two cases resolve the dispute in this case. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not permit Missouri to discriminate against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character. And in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, the Court held that a provision of the Montana Constitution barring government aid to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination” violated the Free Exercise Clause because it prohibited families from using otherwise available scholarship funds at religious schools. Applying those precedents to this case, Maine may not choose to subsidize some private schools but not others on the basis of religious character. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the majority gives “almost exclusive” attention to the Free Exercise Clause while paying “almost no attention” to the Establishment Clause. In Justice Breyer’s view, Maine’s nonsectarian requirement strikes the correct balance between the two clauses. Justice Sotomayor dissented separately, as well, to highlight the Court’s “increasingly expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause” that “risks swallowing the space between the Religion Clauses.”

Shinn v. Ramirez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2021.Decided on May 23, 2022. Petitioner: David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry.Respondent: David Martinez Ramirez. Advocates: Brunn W. Roysden III (for the Petitioner) Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Ramirez was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death by a judge for the 1989 murders of his girlfriend and her daughter. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, including the trial court’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and imposition of the death sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Ramirez filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court, alleging various claims, but did not claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state court denied his petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Ramirez then filed a petition for habeas relief in federal district court. The court substituted his counsel “due to concerns regarding the quality of representation” and allowed Ramirez to amend his petition to add the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, the court ultimately found the claim procedurally defaulted because Ramirez had not raised it earlier. In 2012, while Ramirez’s appeal was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Martinez v. Ryan that a federal court cannot consider evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney failed to diligently develop the claim’s factual basis in state court, but “a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” In light of Martinez, the Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration of whether post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness was cause to overcome the procedural default of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court again determined that Ramirez’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally barred and denied Ramirez’s request for more evidence. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Ramirez demonstrated cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Question Does the Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan render the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act inapplicable to a federal court’s merits review of a claim for habeas relief? Conclusion Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. Federal habeas relief is narrowly available because it overrides a state’s power to enforce criminal law and incurs certain costs. For example, a federal order to retry or release a state prisoner overrides the state’s power to enforce “societal norms through criminal law,” and federal intervention imposes significant costs on state criminal justice systems. Thus, federal habeas relief is an “extraordinary remedy” that guards only against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires state prisoners to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. The doctrine of procedural default generally prevents federal courts from hearing any federal claim not presented in state court according to the state’s own procedural rules. A federal court may excuse procedural default only in narrow circumstances: the prisoner must demonstrate cause for the default and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Attorney error cannot generally serve as such “cause.” Specifically, state postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance in developing the record is attributed to the prisoner, as there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court “guts” the reasoning of two key precedents establishing that a habeas petitioner is not at fault for any failure to bring a trial-ineffectiveness claim in state court and “arrogates power from Congress” by “reconfigur[ing] the balance Congress struck [in AEDPA] between state interests and individual constitutional rights.”

United States v. Taylor Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 7, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Justin Eugene Taylor. Advocates: Rebecca Taibleson (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Justin Eugene Taylor and a co-conspirator intended to rob a drug dealer, who ended up being shot during the transaction. The Government’s indictment charged Taylor on seven counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The indictment also alleged two predicate crimes of violence: the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and the attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” and the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Taylor was convicted of using a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). On habeas review, Taylor asked the court to vacate his conviction and remand for resentencing based on the argument that the two predicate offenses are not “crimes of violence” under § 924(c). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor’s § 924(c) conviction, finding that because the elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery do not invariably require “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” the offense does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). Question Does the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) exclude attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which may be completed through an attempted threat alone? Conclusion Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-2 majority opinion. To convict a defendant of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the prosecution must prove that the defendant intended to complete the offense and that the defendant completed a “substantial step” toward that end. Neither element requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force (even though, in many cases, force is present). As such, attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot constitute a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that under the facts of this case, Taylor did in fact threaten violence, so his attempted Hobbs Act robbery was a “crime of violence” even if that incomplete crime might not be a crime of violence in some other hypothetical situation. Justice Samuel Alito also dissented, rejecting the majority’s categorical approach as disregarding the real world.

Hughes v. Northwestern University Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2021.Decided on Jan 24, 2022. Petitioner: April Hughes, et al..Respondent: Northwestern University, et al.. Advocates: David C. Frederick (for the Petitioners) Michael R. Huston (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Gregory G. Garre (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Northwestern University offers two employee investment plans that are at issue in this case, a Retirement Plan in which Northwestern makes a matching contribution and a Voluntary Savings plan in which the University does not match. Laura Divane and other plaintiffs are beneficiaries of one or both of the employee investment plans. The plaintiffs sued Northwestern University for allegedly breaching its fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. The plaintiffs alleged that Northwestern breached its fiduciary duty by offering a stock account option with excessive fees and a history of underperformance. The district court found no breach, noting that participants could have avoided any problems with the undesirable funds by simply choosing other options. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Are allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for alternative available investment products or services sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)? Conclusion An allegation that fiduciaries breached their duty of prudence requires a context-specific inquiry involves assessing the fiduciaries’ duty to monitor all plan investments and remove any imprudent ones, which the Seventh Circuit below failed to do. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion for the unanimous (8-0) Court. ERISA imposes a duty of prudence on fiduciaries that includes, among other things, a duty to monitor investments and remove imprudent ones. The mere fact that participants could have chosen lower-priced investments neither refutes nor supports whether fiduciaries fulfilled their duty of prudence. The court of appeals’ reliance on investor choice in reaching its conclusion for the University failed to make the proper inquiry. Justice Amy Cony Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Patel v. Garland Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2021.Decided on May 16, 2022. Petitioner: Pankajkumar S. Patel, et al..Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Mark C. Fleming (for the Petitioners) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent supporting reversal) Taylor A.R. Meehan (for the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Pankajkumar Patel is a citizen of India who entered the United States without inspection. In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security charged Patel as removable for being present without inspection. At a hearing, Patel conceded that he was removable but sought discretionary relief from removal on the grounds that he had an approved I-140 employment authorization document. To be eligible for discretionary relief from removal, a noncitizen must show, among other things, “clearly and beyond doubt” that he is not inadmissible. However, Patel’s admissibility is in doubt because, when he applied for a Georgia driver’s license in 2008, he falsely represented himself when he checked a box indicating he is a U.S. citizen. At his removal hearing, Patel argued that it was simply a mistake and was immaterial since citizenship was not required to obtain the driver’s license. The immigration judge (IJ) rejected Patel’s arguments and denied his application for adjustment of status. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding no clear error in the factual findings. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the factual findings of the IJ, based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), which provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” for certain enumerated categories of discretionary relief, including the relief for which Patel applied. Question Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) preserve the jurisdiction of federal courts to review a nondiscretionary determination that a noncitizen is ineligible for certain types of discretionary relief? Conclusion Federal courts lack jurisdiction to review facts found as part of any judgment relating to the granting of discretionary-relief in immigration proceedings enumerated under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) strips courts of jurisdiction to review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief” under § 1255. Best understood, the word “judgment” in that phrase refers to any authoritative decision relating to the granting or denying of discretionary relief. Although this interpretation prohibits review of some factual determinations made in the discretionary-relief context that would be reviewable if made elsewhere in removal proceedings, that distinction reflects Congress’s choice to provide reduced procedural protection for discretionary relief. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the majority’s opinion permits a bureaucratic factual mistake to have life-changing consequences for an immigrant applying for legal residency and is an assertion of “raw administrative power” that neither the agency nor the Executive Branch endorses.

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2021.Decided on Jun 24, 2022. Petitioner: Thomas E. Dobbs, State Health Officer of the Mississippi Department of Health, et al..Respondent: Jackson Women's Health Organization, et al.. Advocates: Scott G. Stewart (for the Petitioners) Julie Rikelman (for the Respondents) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2018, Mississippi passed a law called the “Gestational Age Act,” which prohibits all abortions, with few exceptions, after 15 weeks’ gestational age. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the only licensed abortion facility in Mississippi, and one of its doctors filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the law and requesting an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO). After a hearing, the district court granted the TRO while the litigation proceeded to discovery. After discovery, the district court granted the clinic’s motion for summary judgment and enjoined Mississippi from enforcing the law, finding that the state had not provided evidence that a fetus would be viable at 15 weeks, and Supreme Court precedent prohibits states from banning abortions prior to viability. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Is Mississippi’s law banning nearly all abortions after 15 weeks’ gestational age unconstitutional? Conclusion The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, are overruled. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Constitution does not mention abortion. The right is neither deeply rooted in the nation’s history nor an essential component of “ordered liberty.” The five factors that should be considered in deciding whether a precedent should be overruled support overruling Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey: (1) they “short-circuited the democratic process,” (2) both lacked grounding in constitutional text, history, or precedent, (3) the tests they established were not “workable,” (4) they caused distortion of law in other areas, and (5) overruling them would not upend concrete reliance interests. Justices Clarence Thomas and Brett Kavanaugh concurred. Chief Justice John Roberts concurred in the judgment. Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan dissented.

Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2021.Decided on Apr 28, 2022. Petitioner: Jane Cummings.Respondent: Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C.. Advocates: Andrew Rozynski (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Jane Cummings has been deaf since birth and is legally blind. In 2016, she contacted Premier Rehab Keller to treat her chronic back pain and requested that Premier provide an ASL interpreter. Premier refused and told her she could communicate with her therapist using written notes, lipreading, gesturing, or provide her own ASL interpreter. Cummings ultimately went to another physical therapy provider but found the alternate provider “unsatisfactory.” Cummings sued Premier for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, and the Texas Human Resources Code § 121.003. In her complaint, she sought injunctive relief and damages. The district court granted Premier’s motion to dismiss, finding that “[t]he only compensable injuries that Cummings alleged Premier caused were ‘humiliation, frustration, and emotional distress,’" and emotional distress damages are unavailable under the statutes Cummings relied on. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Do the compensatory damages available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the statutes that incorporate its remedies for victims of discrimination, such as the Rehabilitation Act and the Affordable Care Act, include compensation for emotional distress? Conclusion Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. Pursuant to its power under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, Congress enacted statutes—including the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Affordable Care Act—prohibiting recipients of federal funds from discriminating on the basis of certain protected characteristics. The Supreme Court has recognized implied rights of action for private individuals seeking enforcement of those statutes, but because the rights of action are implied, the remedies available under the statutes are unclear. The Supreme Court uses the analogy of contract law to decide whether a remedy is available in these situations. Under this approach, a particular remedy is available “only if the funding recipient is on notice that, by accepting federal funding, it exposes itself to liability of that nature.” Because damages for emotional distress are not usually available under contract law and serious emotional disturbance is not a particularly likely result of violation of these statutes, federal funding recipients have not consented to be subject to such damages. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, suggesting that the separation of powers principle, rather than contract law, is better suited for determining remedies for this implied cause of action. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the contracts most analogous to these anti-discrimination statutes did allow for recovery of emotional distress damages, as emotional disturbance is the likely result of invidious discrimination.

American Hospital Association v. Becerra Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2021.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: American Hospital Association, et al..Respondent: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.. Advocates: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the Petitioners) Christopher G. Michel (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The federal government reimburses hospitals for providing outpatient care to patients insured by Medicare Part B. Until recently, the government reimbursed all hospitals at a uniform rate for providing covered drugs. In 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) reduced the reimbursement rates for certain types of hospitals (known as “340B hospitals”) because those hospitals can obtain the covered drugs far more cheaply than other hospitals can. HHS reasoned that it should not reimburse hospitals more than they paid to acquire the drugs. Several 340B hospitals and hospital associations affected by the decision filed a lawsuit challenging HHS’s decision to lower reimbursement rates. The district court ruled that HHS had exceeded its statutory authority by reducing drug reimbursement rates for 340B hospitals, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed, finding that HHS’s decision is based on a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Question 1. Is the Department of Health and Human Services’ decision to lower drug reimbursement rates for certain hospitals based on a reasonable interpretation of the Medicare statute? 2. Does 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12) preclude the petitioners’ challenge to HHS’s adjustments? Conclusion The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 does not preclude judicial review of the reimbursement rates set by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for certain outpatient prescription drugs that hospitals provide to Medicare patients. Here, because HHS did not conduct a survey of hospitals’ acquisition costs in 2018 and 2019, its decision to vary reimbursement rates only for 340B hospitals in those years was unlawful. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. There is a general presumption that judicial review is available, and the relevant provision of the Medicare act contains nothing precluding judicial review. HHS may not vary the reimbursement rates only for certain hospitals and not others without a survey. Permitting it to do so is contrary to the text and structure of the statute. Thus, its decision to change reimbursement rates only for 340B hospitals without conducting a survey was unlawful.

Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 29, 2021.Decided on Jun 24, 2022. Petitioner: Xavier Becerra, Secretary of Health and Human Services.Respondent: Empire Health Foundation, for Valley Hospital Medical Center. Advocates: Jonathan C. Bond (for the Petitioner) Daniel J. Hettich (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2005, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services promulgated a rule eliminating the word “covered” from 42 C.F.R. § 412.106(b)(2)(i), effectively amending HHS’s interpretation of the phrase “entitled to [Medicare]” in a subsection of the Medicare Act. This amendment affects the way HHS calculates its reimbursement to certain hospitals that serve low-income patients. Plaintiff Empire Health Foundation challenged the 2005 Rule as part of a larger challenge to HHS’s calculation of its 2008 reimbursement. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Empire based on a finding that HHS did not follow correct procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because of numerous mistakes that occurred during the notice-and-comment process. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, concluding that HHS did follow the correct procedures under the APA, but the rule is substantively invalid because it directly conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent holding that the phrase “entitled to [Medicare] is unambiguous.” Question Did the Department of Health and Human Services follow the correct procedures when it promulgated a rule changing the way it calculates Medicare reimbursement rates for hospitals? Conclusion HHS followed the correct procedures; in calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to [Medicare Part A] benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The phrase “entitled to benefits” means the same thing as “qualifying for benefits.” By counting everyone who qualifies for Medicare benefits in the Medicare fraction—and no one who qualifies for those benefits in the Medicaid fraction—HHS is following the statutory procedures that seek to capture two different segments of a hospital’s low-income patient population. Thus, HHS is correct in counting everyone regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Kavanaugh focused on the text of the statute, arguing that a patient who, by statute, cannot have payment made by Medicare that day is not “entitled to” have payment made by Medicare for that day.

City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2021.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: City of Austin, Texas.Respondent: Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc., et al.. Advocates: Michael R. Dreeben (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Reagan National Advertising of Austin and Lamar Advantage Outdoor Company own and operate signs and billboards that display commercial and non-commercial messages. They filed applications with the City of Austin to digitize existing billboards, but the City denied the applications because its sign code does not allow the digitization of off-premises signs. Reagan and Lamar sued, arguing that the code’s distinction between on-premise signs and off-premise signs violates the First Amendment. The district court held that the sign code was content-neutral and thus that it need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny—it must further an important government interest through means that are substantially related to that interest. The court found the code satisfied this test and entered judgment for the City. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the code’s distinction is content-based, therefore subject to scrutiny, and that it cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Question Does the Austin city code’s distinction between on-premise signs, which may be digitized, and off-premise signs, which may not, constitute facially unconstitutional content-based regulation? Conclusion The City of Austin’s on-/off-premises distinction is facially content-neutral under the First Amendment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. When the government regulates speech based on its content, the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the government show the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. A regulation of speech is content based if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” The City’s off-premises distinction is agnostic as to content. It does not single out any topic or subject matter for differential treatment, and its focus on location is akin to ordinary time, place, or manner restrictions, which are also not subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, it is facially content neutral. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a concurrring opinion arguing that while Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) is binding precedent that determines the outcome in this case (as the majority acknowledges), he disagrees with the Court’s reasoning in that decision. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He would reverse the lower court’s holding that the signs are facially unconstitutional but disagrees with the majority that the provisions defining on- and off- premises signs do not discriminate on the basis of content, at least as applied in some situations. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the majority misinterprets Reed’s rule for content-based restrictions and replaces it with “an incoherent and malleable standard.”

Ramirez v. Collier Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2021.Decided on Mar 24, 2022. Petitioner: John H. Ramirez.Respondent: Bryan Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al.. Advocates: Seth Kretzer (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) State laws differ and have vacillated as to whether and to what extent spiritual advisers may be present in the execution chamber. In 2019, the Court upheld Alabama’s refusal to allow an imam present at the execution of a Muslim man, even though the state at the time permitted a Christian chaplain to be present. A month later, the Court prohibited Texas from executing a Buddhist inmate unless he was allowed to have a Buddhist priest present. As a result, Texas passed a law prohibiting all spiritual advisers from the execution chamber but then after another legal challenge reversed course to allow their presence. The Court subsequently prohibited another Alabama death-row inmate’s execution without his pastor present, so the state executed him eight months later with his pastor at his side, praying with him and touching his leg. John Ramirez, a Texas death-row inmate, brought a lawsuit asking that he be permitted to have his pastor present at his execution and that his pastor be allowed to pray audibly and touch him while he is being executed. Question Does Texas’s decision to allow Ramirez’s pastor to enter the execution chamber but not to lay hands on the parishioner as he dies, sing, pray, or read scripture violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act? Conclusion Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) because they burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s compelling interests. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 8-1 majority opinion holding that Ramirez satisfied the test for a preliminary injunction and reversing the court below. As a threshold matter, Ramirez properly exhausted his administrative remedies before seeking a judicial remedy. As to the merits, Ramirez satisfied all of the requirements of a preliminary injunction—likelihood of success on the merits, risk of irreparable harm, and balance of equities and public interest. First, Ramirez demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. RLUIPA prohibits the state from imposing a substantial burden on an inmate unless imposition of that burden is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. Texas’s ban on audible prayer and touch imposed a substantial burden on Ramirez because the laying on of hands and prayer are significant parts of his religious exercise. Although the state has compelling interests in monitoring an inmate’s condition during the lethal injection process and in preventing disruptions in the execution chamber, the State failed to show that its refusal to grant Ramirez’s request is the least restrictive means of achieving those interests. Further, even though the State has compelling interests in security in the execution chamber, preventing unnecessary suffering of the prisoner, and avoiding further emotional trauma to the victim’s family members, it failed to show that a categorical ban on touch is the least restrictive means of accomplishing any of these goals. Second, Ramirez is likely to suffer irreparable harm because without injunctive relief, he would be prohibited from engaging in protected religious exercise in the final moments of his life. Finally, the balance of equities and public interest tilt in Ramirez’s favor because it is possible to accommodate Ramirez’s sincere religious beliefs without delaying or impeding his execution. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurring opinion to underscore the importance of the legal obligation of prison officials to set clear grievance processes. Justice Brett Kavanaugh also joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurring opinion to point out the need for states to treat all religions equally; to highlight how difficult it is under RLUIPA to determine whether a state interest is “compelling” and whether a particular rule is the “least restrictive means”; and to call upon states to clarify their processes to ensure efficient executions in the future. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that Ramirez was simply seeking to further delay his execution and that his claims either do not warrant equitable relief or are procedurally barred.

United States v. Vaello-Madero Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2021.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Jose Luis Vaello-Madero. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner) Hermann Ferré (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress established the Supplemental Security Income program in 1972 to provide cash benefits to low-income people who are 65 or older and have disabilities. The program extends to residents of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the unincorporated territory of the Northern Mariana Islands, but not to those living in Puerto Rico. Jose Luis Vaello-Madero was born in Puerto Rico in 1954 and moved to New York in 1985. In 2012, he started receiving SSI payments after he experienced severe health problems, and in 2013, he moved back to Puerto Rico to help care for his wife. In 2016, the Social Security Administration (SSA) informed Vaello-Madero that because he had moved back to Puerto Rico, it was terminating his SSI benefits. Moreover, the federal government filed a lawsuit in federal court in Puerto Rico to recover over $28,000 in benefits it had paid Vaello-Madero between 2013 and 2016 when he was living in Puerto Rico. The district court ruled for Vaello-Madero, finding, among other things, that the exclusion of Puerto Rico violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question Did Congress violate the Fifth Amendment by establishing the Supplemental Security Income program in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands, but not in Puerto Rico? Conclusion The Constitution does not require Congress to make Supplemental Security Income benefits available to the residents of Puerto Rico. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court reversing the lower court. Two precedents dictate the answer to the question presented in this case. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978), the Court held that Congress’s decision not to extend Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to Puerto Rico did not violate the constitutional right to interstate travel because Congress had a rational basis for that decision (that residents of Puerto Rico were exempt from paying federal taxes). And in Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980), the Court held that Congress’s differential treatment of Puerto Rico did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it had the same rational basis for doing so. Applying these two precedents to the present case, the Court concluded that because Congress had a rational basis for the differential treatment, it was not required to extend SSI benefits to the residents of Puerto Rico. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is a better basis for prohibiting the federal government from discriminating on the basis of race than the so-called equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion noting that although no party asked the Court to overrule the Insular Cases, in which the Court held that the federal government could rule Puerto Rico and other territories without regard to the Constitution, those cases are based on racial stereotypes and “deserve no place in our law.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that there is no rational basis for treating needy citizens living within a territory of the United States so differently from others.

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2021.Decided on Mar 4, 2022. Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al..Respondent: Yassir Fazaga, et al.. Advocates: Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioners) Catherine M.A. Carroll (for the Agent Respondents) Ahilan T. Arulanantham (for Respondents Fazaga, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Respondents Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, Ali Uddin Malik, and Yasser AbdelRahim are three Muslim residents of Southern California who regularly attended religious services at the Islamic Center of Irvine. They filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the FBI had used a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program for at least fourteen months to gather information at the Islamic Center based solely on their Muslim religious identity. Their claims included violations of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Fourth Amendment; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1810; and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346. The U.S. Attorney General asserted the state secrets privilege with respect to evidence in the case and moved to dismiss the discrimination claims based on that privilege. It did not move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment or FISA claims based on privilege, but on other grounds. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims on the basis of the state secrets privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence in camera to determine whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful under FISA. The appellate court then denied a petition for a rehearing en banc. Question Does Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 displace the state-secrets privilege and authorize a district court to resolve the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of government surveillance by considering the privileged evidence? Conclusion Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) does not displace the state secrets privilege. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. First, the text of FISA lacks any reference to the state secrets privilege, suggesting that its passage did not alter the privilege at all. Regardless of whether the privilege arises from common law or the Constitution, Congress could not have abrogated it without clear statutory language. Second, § 1806(f), which provides a procedure under which a trial-level court may consider the legality of electronic surveillance conducted under FISA, is not incompatible with the state secrets privilege. They involve different inquiries, award different forms of relief, and different procedures.

Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2021.Decided on Feb 24, 2022. Petitioner: Unicolors, Inc..Respondent: H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P.. Advocates: E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Petitioner) Melissa N. Patterson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Peter K. Stris (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Unicolors, Inc., a company that creates art designs for use on fabrics, created and copyrighted as part of a collection of designs a two-dimensional artwork called EH101 in 2011. In 2015, retail clothing store H&M began selling a jacket and skirt with an art design called “Xue Xu.” Unicolors sued H&M for copyright infringement, alleging that the Xue Xu design is identical to its EH101 design. The district court rejected H&M’s argument that Unicolors’ copyright was invalid because it had improperly used a single copyright registration to register 31 separate works. The court noted that invalidation of a copyright requires an intent to defraud, and no such evidence was presented in this case. Further, it concluded that the application contained no inaccuracies because the separate designs in the single registration were published on the same day. A jury returned a verdict for Unicolors, finding that it owned a valid copyright in EH101, that H&M had infringed on that copyright, and that the infringement was willful. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that there is no intent-to-defraud requirement for registration invalidation, and the district court failed to refer the matter to the Copyright Office, as required under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2), when it was informed of inaccuracies in the copyright registration. Question Does 17 U.S.C. § 411 require a district court to request advice from the Copyright Office when there are questions about the validity of a copyright registration but no evidence of fraud or material error? Conclusion Lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A)’s safe harbor. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 6-3 majority opinion. The Copyright Act safe harbor, 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A) says that a certificate of registration is valid regardless of whether it contains inaccurate information unless the inaccurate information was included “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” The statutory language makes no distinction between lack of legal knowledge or lack of factual knowledge. The U.S. Court of Appeals thus erred in holding that a copyright holder cannot benefit from the safe harbor if its lack of knowledge stems from a failure to understand the law. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part. Justice Thomas would dismiss the case as improvidently granted because the Court granted certiorari on a question of fraud but Unicolors put forth a different argument that the court below did not meaningfully consider.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2021.Decided on Jun 23, 2022. Petitioner: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., et al..Respondent: Kevin P. Bruen, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of New York State Police, et al.. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Barbara D. Underwood (for the Respondents) Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The state of New York requires a person to show a special need for self-protection to receive an unrestricted license to carry a concealed firearm outside the home. Robert Nash and Brandon Koch challenged the law after New York rejected their concealed-carry applications based on failure to show “proper cause.” A district court dismissed their claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Does New York's law requiring that applicants for unrestricted concealed-carry licenses demonstrate a special need for self-defense violate the Second Amendment? Conclusion New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense. The right to carry a firearm in public for self-defense is deeply rooted in history, and no other constitutional right requires a showing of “special need” to exercise it. While some “sensitive places” restrictions might be appropriate, Manhattan is not a “sensitive place.” Gun restrictions are constitutional only if there is a tradition of such regulation in U.S. history. Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion arguing that the effect of guns on American society is irrelevant to the issue. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, noting that many state restrictions requiring background checks, firearms training, a check of mental health records, and fingerprinting, are still permissible because they are objective, in contrast to the discretionary nature of New York’s law. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion noting two methodological points the Court did not resolve. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that states should be able to pass restrictions in an effort to curb the number of deaths caused by gun violence, and the Court’s decision “severely burdens the States’ efforts to do so.”

Badgerow v. Walters Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2021.Decided on Mar 31, 2022. Petitioner: Denise A. Badgerow.Respondent: Greg Walters, et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Denise Badgerow was employed as an associate financial advisor with REJ Properties, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, from January 2014 until July 2016, when she was terminated. During her employment with REJ, Badgerow signed an agreement to arbitrate any disputes that may arise between her and the three principals of the corporation. After her termination, Badgerow initiated an arbitration proceeding against the three principals before an arbitration panel of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), seeking damages for tortious interference of contract and for violation of Louisiana’s whistleblower law. The panel dismissed all of her claims with prejudice. Badgerow then brought a new action in Louisiana state court, asking the court to vacate the dismissal because the whistleblower claim was obtained by fraud. The principals removed the action to federal court, and Badgerow filed a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition to vacate and denied remand. On the merits, the court found no fraud and denied vacatur of the FINRA arbitration panel’s dismissal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Circuit affirmed. Question Do federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question? Conclusion Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award because the “look-through” approach recognized in the context of Section 4 does not apply in the context of Sections 9 and 10. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), the Court recognized that in the context of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a federal court may “look through” the petition for arbitration to the “underlying substantive controversy” to decide whether it has jurisdiction. Its decision in that case relied on “distinctive” language in Section 4 that directed the “look through” approach. Sections 9 and 10, at issue in this case, do not contain that same language, so the “look through” approach does not apply. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority’s narrow focus on the statute’s literal words “creates unnecessary complexity and confusion,” while consideration of the statute’s purposes would lead to a better and clearer outcome.

Houston Community College System v. Wilson Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2021.Decided on Mar 24, 2022. Petitioner: Houston Community College System.Respondent: David Buren Wilson. Advocates: Richard A. Morris (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Michael B. Kimberly (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Houston Community College (HCC) System operates community colleges throughout the greater Houston area. HCC is run by a Board of nine trustees, each of which is elected by the public to serve a six-year term without remuneration. David Wilson was elected to the Board as a trustee on November 5, 2013. Starting in 2017, Wilson criticized the other trustees, alleging that they had violated the Board’s bylaws, and made various other criticisms of the Board. As a result, the Board censured Wilson and barred him from holding officer positions on the Board or from receiving travel reimbursements. Wilson sued HCC, alleging that the censure violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled against him, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In holding for Wilson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment precludes community college boards from censuring members for their speech. Question Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member’s speech? Conclusion A purely verbal censure does not give rise to an actionable First Amendment claim. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that Wilson lacked an actionable First Amendment claim against the Houston Community College System. The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech,” which includes a prohibition on “retaliatory actions” for engaging in protected speech. However, elected bodies have long exercised the power to censure their members, and the Court’s precedents affirm that mere censure does not afoul of the First Amendment. That Wilson was an elected official and that the censure itself was mere speech by other members within the same elected body support the conclusion that the censure was not a materially adverse action and thus did not give rise to a First Amendment claim.

Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2021.Decided on Dec 10, 2021. Petitioner: Whole Woman's Health, et al..Respondent: Austin Reeve Jackson, Judge, District Court of Texas, 114th District, et al.. Advocates: Marc A. Hearron (for the Petitioners) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Texas legislature passed a law, SB 8, that prohibits abortions after about six weeks of pregnancy. Additionally, the law criminalizes any person who "aids or abets" any such abortion and permits any private citizen (as opposed to the state itself), to file a lawsuit for damages against such persons. Abortion providers challenged the law, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the providers’ initial request to block enforcement of the law. After the law went into effect, the providers filed another legal challenge. Question Can the petitioners in this case pursue a pre-enforcement challenge to Texas Senate Bill 8 (SB 8), which prohibits providers from performing or inducing an abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected and which allows for direct enforcement of the law through private civil actions? Conclusion The petitioners in this case may proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage only as to the defendants who are state medical licensing officials. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court. Writing for himself and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the petitioners cannot sue defendants Penny Clarkston and Austin Jackson (a state-court clerk and state-court judge, respectively) because states are generally immune from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment, and even the limited exception recognized in Ex Parte Young does not permit an ex-ante injunction preventing state courts from hearing cases. Additionally, state-court clerks and judges are not “adverse litigants” and thus a pre-enforcement challenge against those parties does not constitute a “case or controversy” as required under the Constitution. The same five Justices also concluded that the petitioners cannot sue Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton because the attorney general lacks authority to enforce the challenged law. All nine Justices agreed that the petitioners cannot sue the individual private defendant Mark Lee Dickson because they cannot establish an injury “fairly traceable” to his unlawful conduct, as required by the Constitution. All but Justice Clarence Thomas agreed that the petitioners may proceed in their lawsuit against the state licensing officials because each may or must take enforcement actions against the abortion providers if the providers violate SB 8. In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Roberts noted that SB 8 has the purpose and effect of “nullify[ing]” the Court’s rulings and thus threatens the entire constitutional system. Writing on behalf of herself and Justices Breyer and Kagan, Justice Sotomayor extended the Chief Justice’s concerns, pointing out that the Court’s narrow ruling “effectively invites” other states to follow Texas’s example in nullifying constitutional rights.

United States v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2021.Decided on Dec 10, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Texas, et al.. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) Judd E. Stone, II (for the state Respondent) Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the private Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Texas legislature passed a law, SB 8, that prohibits abortions after about six weeks of pregnancy. Additionally, the law criminalizes any person who "aids or abets" any such abortion and permits any private citizen (as opposed to the state itself), to file a lawsuit for damages against such persons. Abortion providers challenged the law, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the providers’ initial request to block enforcement of the law. After the law went into effect, the providers filed another legal challenge, as did the federal government. A federal district court temporarily enjoined enforcement of the law, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the lower court's injunction. The Department of Justice asked the Court to reinstate the district court's judgment. Question Can the United States sue the State of Texas in federal court to prohibit enforcement of an unconstitutional abortion law? Conclusion The court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and denied the application to vacate the stay.

United States v. Tsarnaev Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 13, 2021.Decided on Mar 4, 2022. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev. Advocates: Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner) Ginger D. Anders (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2013, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother detonated two homemade pressure cooker bombs near the finish line of the race, killing three and injuring hundreds. He was sentenced to death for his role in the bombings, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit threw out his death sentences on the grounds that the district court should have asked potential jurors what media coverage they had seen about Tsarnaev’s case, and the district court should not have excluded from the sentencing phase evidence that Tsarnaev’s brother was involved in a separate triple murder. Question Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit err in vacating the death sentence for the district court’s failure to ask prospective jurors for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage they had seen, heard, or read, and for its exclusion of evidence at the sentencing phase of trial that Tsarnaev’s brother had been involved in different crimes two years before the bombing? Conclusion The First Circuit improperly vacated Tsarnaev’s capital sentences. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The district court did not abuse its discretion during jury selection when it declined to ask every prospective juror what they learned from the media about the case. The district court has substantial discretion during jury selection, and it was reasonable for the court to conclude that the proposed question wrongly emphasized what a juror knew before coming to court rather than revealing potential bias. The “supervisory authority” of federal courts does not allow them to “create prophylactic supervisory rules that circumvent or supplement legal standards” established by the Supreme Court. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded from sentencing the evidence that Tsarnaev’s brother was possibly involved in an unsolved triple homicide. A district court has the discretion to exclude evidence “when its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.” The bare inclusion of this evidence risked producing a “confusing mini-trial” about an unsolved crime in which all witnesses were dead. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, noting her skepticism about the “supervisory authority” of federal courts of appeals. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the evidence of the brother’s involvement in the unsolved triple homicide because, in his view, the record does not adequately support the court’s conclusions that the evidence lacks probative value, is insufficient to corroborate the brother’s role in the murders, is a waste of time, and would confuse the jury.

Babcock v. Kijakazi Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 13, 2021.Decided on Jan 13, 2022. Petitioner: David Bryon Babcock.Respondent: Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Babcock enlisted in the Michigan National Guard in 1970 and served for 3.5 years. After his service, Babcock went to flight school and received his pilot’s license, then returned to work as a National Guard dual-status technician, where he worked for over 33 years, including an active-duty tour in Iraq between 2004 and 2005. (Under 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1), a National Guard dual-status technician “is a Federal civilian employee” who “is assigned to a civilian position as a technician” while a member of the National Guard.) Babcock retired from his position in 2009, at which time he began receiving Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) payments and, separately, military retirement pay from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. He fully retired in 2014 and at that point, applied for Social Security retirement benefits. On his application, he confirmed that he was receiving monthly CSRS payments. The Social Security Administration (SSA) granted his application but reduced his benefits because of his CSRS pension. Babcock asked the SSA to reconsider the reduction, noting that members of a uniformed service were not generally subject to the reduction in benefits (under the Windfall Elimination Provision, or WEP), and that as a dual-status technician, he qualified for that exception. SSA refused to change its initial determination, an administrative law judge (ALJ) upheld the determination, and then the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision. A federal district court entered judgment against Babcock, and the appellate court affirmed. Question Is a civil service pension received for federal civilian employment as a “military technician (dual status)” considered “a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” for the purposes of the Social Security Act’s windfall elimination provision? Conclusion Civil-service pension payments based on employment as a dual-status military technician are not payments based on “service as a member of a uniformed service” for the purposes of the windfall elimination provision. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. While the National Guard of the United States is a uniformed service, prior to 1984, it hired technicians (including Babcock) as civil servants. These technicians possess characteristically civilian rights and were properly considered civilians rather than service members. Although Babcock did serve at other times as a member of the National Guard, his civil-service pension payments were not based on that service. Therefore, those payments are not payments based on “service as a member of” the National Guard and are thus not subject to the exception Social Security Act’s uniformed-services exception. Justice Neil Gorsuch dissented, arguing that National Guard technicians hold a unique position in federal employment because they must maintain membership in the National Guard and wear a Guard uniform, they should be considered “members.”

Thompson v. Clark Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 12, 2021.Decided on Apr 4, 2022. Petitioner: Larry Thompson.Respondent: Pagiel Clark, et al.. Advocates: Amir H. Ali (for the Petitioner) Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) John D. Moore (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Camille Watson was staying with her sister and her sister’s husband, Larry Thompson, when she dialed 911 after seeing a diaper rash on the couple’s infant daughter and mistaking the rash for signs of abuse. In response, two Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) arrived at Thompson’s apartment building to investigate. The EMTs saw nothing amiss, and, unaware of Camille’s 911 call, Thompson told the EMTs that no one in his home had called 911. He asked the EMTs to leave, and they did. Four police officers followed up to investigate the alleged child abuse and insisted on seeing Thompson’s daughter. Thompson asked to speak to the officers’ sergeant, and after being denied that request, asked whether the officers had a warrant (which they did not). Nevertheless, they physically tried to enter Thompson’s home, and when Thompson attempted to block the doorway, the officers tackled and handcuffed him. He was arrested and taken to jail, where he spent two days. He was charged with resisting arrest and obstructing governmental administration, and about three months later, the prosecution dropped the charges against him, stating that “People are dismissing the case in the interest of justice.” Thompson filed a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the police officers involved. A federal district court granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants on Thompson’s malicious prosecution claim due to his failure to establish favorable termination of his criminal case, which is required under binding Second Circuit precedent. The appellate court affirmed. Question Must a plaintiff who seeks to bring a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process show that the criminal proceeding against him “formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence,” or that the proceeding “ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence”? Conclusion A plaintiff wishing to bring a Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that Thompson satisfied that requirement and reversing the judgment of the lower court. To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) the suit or proceeding was instituted without probable cause, (2) the motive in instituting the suit was malicious—that is, for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice, and (3) the prosecution terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the accused. The purposes of this third element—favorable termination of the underlying criminal case—are: (a) to avoid parallel civil and criminal litigation, (b) to prevent inconsistent civil and criminal judgments, and (c) to prevent civil suits from being improperly used as collateral attacks on criminal proceedings. Most American courts have considered a favorable termination to mean simply a prosecution that ends without conviction and cannot be revived. Thus, if the prosecutor abandons the case or the court dismisses the case without stating a reason, these satisfy the third element of a malicious prosecution claim. Acquittal of the defendant is not required. Respondents’ claims to the contrary are not persuasive. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito argued that the majority’s analysis is cursory and erroneously relies on lower court cases “heavily influenced by a mistaken reading of the plurality opinion in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994).”

Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 12, 2021.Decided on Mar 3, 2022. Petitioner: Daniel Cameron, Attorney General of Kentucky.Respondent: EMW Women's Surgical Center, P.S.C., et al.. Advocates: Matthew F. Kuhn (for the Petitioner) Alexa Kolbi-Molinas (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dilation and extraction (D&E) is the standard method of abortion used in the second trimester of pregnancy, accounting for 95% of second-trimester abortions nationwide. Kentucky House Bill 454 requires patients to undergo a procedure to end potential fetal life before they may receive an abortion using the D&E method. Kentucky’s only abortion clinic and two of its doctors filed a lawsuit challenging the law, arguing that it violates patients’ constitutional right to abortion prior to fetal viability. All defendants except then-Secretary of Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Adam Meier, and Commonwealth Attorney Thomas B. Wine, were voluntarily dismissed prior to trial. After a five-day bench trial, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction. In the meantime, governor Matt Bevin was replaced by Andy Beshear and Meier was replaced by Eric Friedlander. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, and the new Health Secretary declined to continue defending the law. Daniel Cameron, the Kentucky attorney general, asked the Sixth Circuit for permission to intervene to defend the law, but the court declined. Question Should a state attorney general vested with the power to defend state law be permitted to intervene after a federal court of appeals invalidates a state statute when no other state actor will defend the law? Conclusion The Kentucky attorney general should have been permitted to intervene on the Commonwealth’s behalf in litigation concerning Kentucky House Bill 454. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the opinion on behalf of the 6-3 majority. Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer concurred in the judgment but did not join the majority opinion. No provision of law limits the jurisdiction of federal appellate courts to allow intervention by a party who was not part of the litigation—the state attorney general in this case. Nor is there a mandatory claims-processing rule that precludes the attorney general’s intervention. Contrary to the conclusion of the court below, the attorney general’s motion to intervene was not “untimely,” as he filed as soon as the secretary for Health and Family Services decided not to defend the law. Finally, allowing the attorney general to intervene would not cause unfair prejudice to the parties, so the appellate court erred in denying the attorney general’s motion to intervene. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion making the additional point that the attorney general was not a “party” to the district court’s final judgment thus negating a premise of the respondents’ jurisdictional argument. Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment because, in their view, granting the attorney general’s motion to intervene would not be an “end-run around the timely-appeal rule” but a product of the timing of the litigation and a new need for the attorney general to enter the suit. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that while the majority acknowledges that courts have “sound discretion” to permit or disallow intervention, it “nonetheless bends over backward to accommodate the attorney general’s reentry into the case.” Justice Sotomayor expressed concern that the decision would broadly allow government officials to “evade the consequences of litigation decisions made by their predecessors of different political parties.”

United States v. Zubaydah Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2021.Decided on Mar 3, 2022. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, aka Abu Zubaydah, et al.. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (for the Petitioner) David F. Klein (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Zayn Husayn, also known as Abu Zubaydah, is a former associate of Osama bin Laden. U.S. military forces captured him in Pakistan and detained him abroad before moving him to the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, where he is currently being held. Zubaydah alleged that, before being transferred to Guantanamo, he was held at a CIA “dark site” in Poland, where two former CIA contractors used “enhanced interrogation techniques” against him. Zubaydah intervened in a Polish criminal investigation into the CIA’s conduct in that country, and he sought to compel the U.S. government to disclose evidence connected with that investigation. The government has declassified some information about Zubaydah’s treatment in CIA custody, but it has asserted the state-secrets privilege to protect other information. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s assertion of state-secrets privilege based on its own assessment of potential harms to national security and allowed discovery in the case to proceed. Question Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit err in rejecting the federal government’s assertion of the state-secrets privilege based on its own assessment of the potential harms to national security that would result from disclosure of information pertaining to clandestine CIA activities? Conclusion The Ninth Circuit erred in holding, based on its own assessment, that the state secrets privilege did not apply to information that could confirm or deny the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion. To invoke the state secrets privilege, the government must show a reasonable danger of harm to national security. In a declaration supporting its claim of privilege, the Government submitted a declaration from the Director of the CIA stating that a response to the discovery requests would significantly harm our national security interests by confirming or denying the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland. Although some publicly available sources claim that such a site exists, the CIA has made no official statement. The specific language of Zubaydah’s discovery requests would elicit information that tends to confirm or deny the existence of such a site, so the government is entitled to invoke the state secrets privilege in response to those requests. Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of himself, Chief Justice John Roberts, and four other Justices, would dismiss the application for discovery. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Thomas argued that Zubaydah’s “dubious” need for discovery requires dismissal of his discovery application regardless of the government’s reasons for invoking the state secrets privilege. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh clarified the process by which a court assesses invocation of the state secrets privilege, with great deference to the Executive Branch. Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that even when the government meets its burden of showing a “reasonable danger” of harm to national security (as she agreed it did in this case), that does not require dismissal of the case. Rather, it is possible to segregate the classified location information from the unclassified treatment information and allow discovery of the latter. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the events took place two decades ago and have since been declassified and the subject of numerous books, movies, and official reports. As such, while dismissing the suit might save the government “embarrassment,” doing so will not “safeguard any secret.”

Brown v. Davenport Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 5, 2021.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: Mike Brown, Acting Warden.Respondent: Ervine Davenport. Advocates: Fadwa A. Hammoud (for the Petitioner) Tasha Bahal (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A Michigan jury convicted Ervine Lee Davenport of first-degree murder in 2008. He challenged his conviction in a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because at trial he was restrained at the waist, wrist, and ankles, although there was a privacy curtain around the defense table. The State admitted that the visible restraints were unconstitutional but argued that the error was harmless. The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed, finding that while it was error for the trial court to order the defendant to be restrained without justification, Davenport had not shown that his restraints were visible to the jury and thus failed to show prejudice. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded, and on remand, five jurors testified that they saw the shackles and two others had heard comments about the shackles. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that although some jurors saw the shackles, the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling did not affect the jury’s verdict. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. Davenport challenged the conviction in federal court, and the district court denied the petition and certificate of appealability. Davenport petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for a certificate of appealability, which the court granted. Noting that “shackling is inherently prejudicial,” the Sixth Circuit concluded that the State had not met its burden to show that the restraints did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” and reversed. Question What is the appropriate standard of review for a federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief? Conclusion A federal court deciding whether to grant habeas relief must apply both the test the Supreme Court outlined in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, and the one Congress prescribed in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that the Sixth Circuit erred in granting relief based solely on its application of the Brecht standard. Since the founding, Congress has authorized (but not required) federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus “as law and justice require.” In response to an evolving use of the writ, the Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson held that a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must show that the constitutional error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence on the verdict.” Congress subsequently further reformed the writ in passing AEDPA, which is a constitutionally valid rule of decision. AEDPA instructs that federal courts shall not grant relief for a claim adjudicated in state court unless the state court’s decision was (1) contrary to clearly established law or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Notably, Congress left intact the tradition whereby federal courts have discretion to grant relief if “law and justice require.” The test outlined in Brecht is different from the requirements of AEDPA; proof of prejudice under Brecht does not satisfy AEDPA. Moreover, the materials a court may consult when considering each test are different. As such, a court must apply both tests when reviewing a habeas claim. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan argued that the Court twice, in 2007 and again in 2015, stated that the Brecht standard “obviously subsumes” the “more liberal” AEDPA standard and that if a defendant meets the former, he will “necessarily” meet the latter, too. Justice Kagan pointed out that every Justice has subscribed to that position in prior decisions and that requiring courts to apply both tests is unnecessarily burdensome and “will never lead to a different result” from application of the Brecht test alone.