Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Hemphill v. New York Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 5, 2021.Decided on Jan 20, 2022. Petitioner: Darrell Hemphill.Respondent: New York. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner) Gina Mignola (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In April 2006, two men got into a fight with several other people on a street in the Bronx. Shortly thereafter, someone opened fire with a 9 millimeter handgun, killing a child in a passing car. Three eyewitnesses identified Nicholas Morris as the shooter. Police searched Morris’s home and found a 9 millimeter cartridge and ammunition for a .357 revolver. They arrested him the next day. He was indicted for the child’s murder and for possession of a 9 millimeter handgun, but the prosecution ended in a mistrial. Instead of trying him again, the State offered Morris a deal: If Morris pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm at the scene of the shooting, the State would request that the murder charge be dismissed with prejudice. Morris accepted the plea deal. However, the State charged Morris with possessing a .357 revolver at the scene of the shooting, rather than a 9 millimeter established as the murder weapon. The prosecution lacked sufficient evidence to establish possession of the .357 revolver, so Morris supplied the evidence through his own statement. In 2013, the state charged Darrell Hemphill, the petitioner in this case who was also present at the fight in the Bronx, with the murder. At trial, Hemphill elicited testimony that police had recovered the 9 millimeter cartridge on Morris’s nightstand hours after the shooting. In response, the prosecution sought to introduce into evidence Morris’s statement that he possessed a .357 revolver at the scene. Based in part on this evidence, Hemphill was found guilty of second-degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. An appellate court affirmed the conviction, as did New York’s highest court. Question When, if ever, does a criminal defendant who “opens the door” to evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence also forfeit his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause? Conclusion A criminal defendant does not forfeit his confrontation right merely by making an argument in his defense based on a testimonial out-of-court statement like a plea allocution. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. The Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront witnesses against them, and the Court has recognized no open-ended exceptions to this requirement—only those exceptions established at the time of the founding. In People v. Reid, New York’s highest court held that a criminal defendant “opens the door” to evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause if the evidence was “reasonably necessary” to correct a misleading impression made by the defense’s argument. Contrary to the State’s contention, the Reid rule is not merely procedural, but a substantive principle of evidence that dictates what material is relevant and admissible. Such an exception is antithetical to the Confrontation Clause. Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined, to note different circumstances under which a defendant can be deemed to have waived the right to confront adverse witnesses. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that because Hemphill did not raise his Sixth Amendment claim in the New York Court of Appeals, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review its decision.

Wooden v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 4, 2021.Decided on Mar 7, 2022. Petitioner: William Dale Wooden.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Allon Kedem (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1997, William Wooden broke into a mini-storage facility in Georgia and stole from 10 different units, resulting in 10 counts of burglary, to which he pled guilty. Then, in 2014, a plainclothes officer went to Wooden’s home, where he witnessed Wooden in possession of a rifle. Wooden was arrested and charged in state court with being a felon in possession of a firearm, but the case was dismissed when the district attorney noted that there was no probable cause for Wooden’s arrest. Wooden was subsequently charged by federal indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(e). After Wooden was found guilty, the district court found during his sentencing hearing that Wooden qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on his conviction for the 10 counts of burglary, and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment accordingly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Wooden’s prior burglaries were separate from each other, despite occurring as part of a single criminal spree. Question Are offenses committed as part of a single criminal spree but sequentially in time “committed on occasions different from one another” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act? Conclusion Offenses committed as part of a single criminal episode did not occur on different “occasions” and thus count as only one offense for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion that was unanimous in the judgment to reverse the lower court. The ordinary meaning of the word “occasion” does not require occurrence at precisely one moment in time. For example, an ordinary person would describe Wooden as burglarizing ten units “on one occasion” but would not say “on ten occasions, Wooden burglarized a unit in the facility.” And indeed “Wooden committed his burglaries on a single night, in a single uninterrupted course of conduct.” The history of the ACCA confirms this understanding, as Congress added an “occasions clause,” which requires that prior crimes occur on “occasions different from one another.” This interpretation is also consistent with the purpose of the ACCA, which is to address the “special danger” posed by the “armed career criminal”—a concern not presented by the situation of a single criminal episode. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurrence noting that on the facts, she agreed with the majority that Wooden’s prior convictions did not take place on “occasions different from one another” but also with Justice Neil Gorsuch’s point that the rule of lenity provides an independent basis for ruling in favor of a defendant in a closer case. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurrence explaining why the rule of lenity has played a limited role in the Court’s criminal case law and why the presumption of mens rea addresses Justice Gorsuch’s concern about fair notice. Justice Amy Coney Barrett, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Barrett agreed with the majority about the ordinary meaning of the word “occasion” but disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the statutory history. Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Sotomayor joined in part. Justice Gorsuch argued that the rule of lenity provides a definitive rule of decision in these types of cases, in contrast to a list of factors to consider, which could lead to inconsistent outcomes in cases where the facts are less clear.

Mississippi v. Tennessee Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 4, 2021.Decided on Nov 22, 2021. Petitioner: State of Mississippi.Respondent: State of Tennessee, et al.. Advocates: John V. Coghlan (On Behalf of the Plaintiff) David C. Frederick (On Behalf of the Defendant) Frederick Liu (for the United States as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Overruling Plaintiff's Exceptions) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The State of Mississippi sued the State of Tennessee in 2014, alleging that Tennessee was taking Mississippi’s groundwater by allowing a Tennessee utility company to pump large amounts of groundwater from the Middle Claiborne Aquifer, which is located at the Mississippi-Tennessee border. Mississippi argues that the groundwater stored in the aquifer lies entirely within Mississippi and would never flow into Tennessee if it were not for the pumping. Mississippi expressly disclaims any equitable apportionment remedy, arguing that the principle does not apply to this dispute. Instead it seeks only damages and related relief. The Special Master recommended that the Court dismiss the complaint but grant Mississippi leave to amend its complaint to seek equitable apportionment. Question Is Mississippi entitled to damages, injunctive, and other equitable relief for the groundwater taken by Tennessee? Conclusion Mississippi is entitled only to the remedy of equitable apportionment, and since its complaint expressly disclaimed equitable apportionment, its complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Equitable apportionment is a judicial remedy that seeks to fairly allocate a shared water resource between two or more states. Although the Court has not previously considered whether the doctrine of equitable apportionment applies to interstate aquifers, it has applied the remedy when transboundary water resources were at issue, and the same reasoning applies. First, like other transboundary water resources, the Middle Claiborne Aquifer has a “multistate character.” Second, it contains water that naturally flows between the states. And third, actions taken in Tennessee affect the portion of the aquifer that underlies Mississippi. For these reasons, equitable apportionment applies to the waters of the Middle Claiborne Aquifer.

Terry v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on May 4, 2021.Decided on Jun 14, 2021. Petitioner: Tarahrick Terry.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting reversal) Adam K. Mortara (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Tarahrick Terry pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing a “detectable” amount of cocaine base (3.9 grams), thus triggering the penalties in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Based on his prior convictions, the statutory term of imprisonment was 0 to 30 years, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment with 6 years’ supervised release. Terry moved for a sentence reduction on the basis that the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 raised the weight ceiling of § 841(b) from 5 grams of cocaine base to 28 grams. The district court denied his motion, concluding that Terry did not commit a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for relief under the First Step Act, which made retroactive the statutory penalties for certain offenses committed before August 3, 2010. Because the Fair Sentencing Act did not expressly amend § 841(b)(1)(C), Terry’s offense was not a “covered offense.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question Do pre-August 3, 2010, crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act? Conclusion Crack offenders sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) do not have a “covered offense” under Section 404 of the First Step Act because a sentence reduction under the Act is available only if an offender’s prior conviction of a crack cocaine offense triggered a mandatory minimum sentence. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court. An offender is eligible for a sentence reduction only if he previously received “a sentence for a covered offense,” which the Act defines as “a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by” certain provisions in the Fair Sentencing Act. The Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalties only for offenses that triggered mandatory-minimum penalties. Because Terry was convicted for an offense that does not have a mandatory minimum, his offense was not a “covered offense” and thus was not eligible for a sentence reduction under the Act. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. She expressly declined to join the majority’s “sanitized” description of the history of penalties for crack offenses and pointed out that because Terry was both convicted under subparagraph (C) and sentenced as a career offender, he never had a chance to ask for a sentence that reflects today’s understanding of the lesser severity of his crime, and he never will get that chance without action by the political branches.

Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2021.Decided on Jun 23, 2021. Petitioner: Mahanoy Area School District.Respondent: B. L., a Minor, By and Through Her Father, Lawrence Levy, and Her Mother, Betty Lou Levy. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) David D. Cole (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), tried out for and failed to make her high school's varsity cheerleading team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over a weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat with the caption “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” The photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year. B.L. sued the school under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment; (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory; and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.’s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Question Does the First Amendment prohibit public school officials from regulating off-campus student speech? Conclusion The First Amendment limits but does not entirely prohibit regulation of off-campus student speech by public school officials, and, in this case, the school district’s decision to suspend B.L. from the cheerleading team for posting to social media vulgar language and gestures critical of the school violates the First Amendment. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. Although public schools may regulate student speech and conduct on campus, the Court’s precedents make clear that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression” when they enter campus. The Court has also recognized that schools may regulate student speech in three circumstances: (1) indecent, lewd, or vulgar speech on school grounds, (2) speech promoting illicit drug use during a class trip, and (3) speech that others may reasonably perceive as “bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school,” such as that appearing in a school-sponsored newspaper. Moreover, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court held that schools may also regulate speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” The school’s interests in regulating these types of student speech do not disappear when the speaker is off campus. Three features of off-campus speech diminish the need for First Amendment leeway: (1) off-campus speech normally falls within the zone of parental responsibility, rather than school responsibility, (2) off-campus speech regulations coupled with on-campus speech regulations would mean a student cannot engage in the regulated type of speech at all, and (3) the school itself has an interest in protecting a student’s unpopular off-campus expression because the free marketplace of ideas is a cornerstone of our representative democracy. In this case, B.L. spoke in circumstances where her parents, not the school, had responsibility, and her speech did not cause “substantial disruption” or threaten harm to the rights of others. Thus, her off-campus speech was protected by the First Amendment, and the school’s decision to suspend her violated her First Amendment rights. Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, explaining his understanding of the Court’s decision. Justice Alito argued that a key takeaway of the Court’s decision is that “the regulation of many types of off-premises student speech raises serious First Amendment concerns, and school officials should proceed cautiously before venturing into this territory.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that schools have historically had the authority to regulate speech when it occurs off campus, so long as it has a proximate tendency to harm the school, its faculty or students, or its programs. Justice Thomas viewed the facts of this case as falling squarely within that rule and thus would have held that the school could properly suspend B.L. for her speech.

PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2021.Decided on Jun 29, 2021. Petitioner: PennEast Pipeline Co. LLC.Respondent: New Jersey, et al.. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717Z, permits private companies to exercise the federal government’s power to take property by eminent domain, subject to certain jurisdictional requirements. PennEast Pipeline Co. obtained federal approval to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey and sued under the NGA to gain access to the properties along the pipeline route, of which the State of New Jersey owns 42. New Jersey sought dismissal of PennEast’s lawsuits for lack of jurisdiction based on the state’s sovereign immunity and, separately, because PennEast failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the NGA. The district court ruled in favor of PennEast and granted a preliminary injunctive relief for immediate access to the properties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding that while the NGA delegates the federal government’s eminent-domain power, it does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. PennEast’s lawsuits are thus barred by Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Question Does the Natural Gas Act delegate the federal government’s eminent-domain power, and does it abrogate state sovereign immunity in such cases? Conclusion Section 717(h) of the Natural Gas Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to delegate to a private company the power to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. States are generally immune from lawsuits unless they have consented or Congress has abrogated their immunity. With respect to the federal eminent domain power, the states waived their sovereign immunity when they ratified the Constitution. That power carries with it the ability to condemn property in court. Because the Natural Gas Act delegates the federal eminent domain power to private parties, those parties can initiate condemnation proceedings, including against state-owned property. This understanding is consistent with the nation’s history and the Court’s precedents. Thus, PennEast’s condemnation of New Jersey land to build the pipeline does not offend state sovereignty. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Joining Justice Barrett’s dissenting opinion in full, Justice Gorsuch added only a clarification that states have two federal-law immunities from suit: structural immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The lower court should consider whether either type of immunity bars the suit. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined. Justice Barrett argued that Congress’s power to strip states of their sovereign immunity is extremely limited, and there is no reason to treat private condemnation actions as within one of those limited exceptions.

United States v. Palomar-Santiago Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2021.Decided on May 24, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Refugio Palomar-Santiago. Advocates: Erica L. Ross (for the Petitioner) Bradley N. Garcia (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Refugio Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national, was granted permanent resident status in the United States in 1990. In 1991, he was convicted of a felony DUI in California, and he was subsequently deported because a DUI is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and felony DUI is an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), that a DUI is not a crime of violence and later held that classification to apply retroactively. United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2013). Palomar-Santiago returned to live in the United States, this time without authorization. He was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which requires a district court to dismiss a § 1326 indictment if the defendant proves (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) he was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review at the deportation hearing; and (3) that the deportation order was fundamentally unfair. However, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a defendant does not need to prove the first two elements if he can show the crime underlying the original removal was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and does not need to show the third element if he can show the removal should not have occurred at all. The district court held that Palomar-Santiago met his burden in showing his crime was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and that he was wrongfully removed from the United States. On appeal, the federal government disputed that circuit precedent required the result the district court reached but argued that the precedent is wrong. Lacking authority to overturn circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed without addressing the merits of the government’s claims. Question Is a defendant who has been charged with unlawful reentry into the United States after removal automatically entitled to the defense of invalid removal if he was removed for a crime that would not be considered a removable offense under current law in that circuit? Conclusion A defendant seeking dismissal of a prior deportation order must prove each statutory requirement for bringing such a collateral attack. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Section 1326(d) requires that defendants charged with unlawful reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless” they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation to the contrary—that the first two elements are not required if the noncitizen was removed for an offense that should not have rendered him removable—is incompatible with the text of that provision. The first element, exhaustion of administrative remedies, exists “precisely so noncitizens can challenge the substance of immigration judges’ decisions.” Additionally, all of the requirements apply regardless of whether the defendant alleges the removal order was procedurally flawed or substantively invalid.

HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2021.Decided on Jun 25, 2021. Petitioner: HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al..Respondent: Renewable Fuels Association, et al.. Advocates: Peter D. Keisler (for the Petitioners) Christopher G. Michel (for the federal Respondent) Matthew W. Morrison (for the private Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress amended the Clean Air Act through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in an effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels. The legislation set certain targets for replacing fossil fuels with renewable fuels but created several exemptions, including one for small refineries if compliance in a given year would impose disproportionate economic hardship. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated three different orders granting extensions of the small refinery exemption, but these orders were not made publicly available. A group of renewable fuels producers challenged the orders, alleging that the orders exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that a small refinery may obtain an exemption only when it had received uninterrupted, continuous extensions of the exemption for every year since 2011. Question To qualify for a hardship exemption under Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) of the Renewable Fuel Standards, must a small refinery have received uninterrupted, continuous hardship exemptions for every year since 2011? Conclusion A small refinery that previously received a hardship exemption may obtain an “extension” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) even if it saw a lapse in exemption coverage in a previous year. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion. Although the key term “extension” is not defined in the statute, three textual clues indicate that it means an extension in time. The plain meaning of the word “extension” in a temporal sense does not require unbroken continuity. Without modifiers like “successive” or “consecutive,” nothing in the statute suggests that a lapse in coverage precludes the extension. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Barrett argued that the question before the Court is simply whether the provision limits the EPA to prolonging exemptions currently in place, or instead allows the EPA to provide exemptions to refineries that lack them. Justice Barrett concluded that the text and structure of the statute make clear that the EPA cannot “extend” an exemption that a refinery no longer has.

Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2021.Decided on Jul 1, 2021. Petitioner: Americans for Prosperity Foundation.Respondent: Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California. Advocates: Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Aimee A. Feinberg (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The California Attorney General’s office has a policy requiring charities to provide the state, on a confidential basis, information about their major donors, purportedly to help the state protect consumers from fraud and the misuse of their charitable contributions. Petitioner Americans for Prosperity (and the petitioner in the consolidated case, Thomas More Law Center) either failed to file or filed redacted lists of their major donors with the California Attorney General’s office, despite filing complete lists with the federal Internal Revenue Service, as required by federal law. In response to demands by the California Attorney General that they file the lists, the organizations filed a lawsuit alleging that the filing requirement unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right to free association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The organizations provided evidence that although the state is required to keep donor names private, the state’s database was vulnerable to hacking, and many donor names were repeatedly released to the public. Based in part on this finding, the district court granted both organizations’ motions for a preliminary injunction and then ultimately found for them after a trial, holding that the organizations and their donors were entitled to First Amendment protection under the principles established in the Supreme Court’s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. In so holding, the court reasoned that the government’s filing demands were not the “least restrictive means” of obtaining the information and thus did not satisfy “strict scrutiny.” A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, based on its conclusion that “exacting scrutiny” rather than “strict scrutiny” was the appropriate standard, and “exacting scrutiny” requires that the government show that the disclosure and reporting requirements are justified by a compelling government interest and that the legislation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc. Question Does the policy of the California attorney general’s office requiring charities to disclose the names and addresses of their major donors violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court. Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy is a type of restraint on freedom of association. Such a restraint is subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Though the government-mandated disclosure regime need not be the “least restrictive means” of achieving the government’s interest, it must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve it. California’s disclosure requirement is “dramatically mismatch[ed]” to the state’s interest in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing, imposing an unjustifiable “widespread burden on donors’ associational rights.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas would apply strict scrutiny to the disclosure requirement, leading to the same conclusion that it is facially invalid. However, Justice Thomas took issue with the Court’s opinion that the statute is unconstitutional in all applications. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito disagreed with the majority that precedents establish that exacting scrutiny applies in these types of cases. He noted that the outcome is the same under either level of scrutiny, so he would not decide what level of scrutiny applies. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority accepts, without requiring the plaintiffs to show, an actual First Amendment burden. In effect, Justice Sotomayor argued, the majority allows regulated entities to avoid obligations “by vaguely waving toward First Amendment ‘privacy concerns.’”

Guam v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2021.Decided on May 24, 2021. Petitioner: Territory of Guam.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The United States captured the island of Guam from Spain in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. From 1903, the United States maintained military rule until the passage of the Guam Organic Act in 1950, which formally transferred power from the United States to Guam’s newly formed civilian government. Guam remains an “unincorporated territory of the United States.” In the 1940s, the Navy constructed and operated the Ordot Dump for the disposal of municipal and military waste, allegedly including munitions and chemicals such as DDT and Agent Orange, and continued to use the landfill throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Ordot Dump lacked basic environmental safeguards, and as a result, contaminants were released into the Lonfit River, which ultimately flows into the Pacific Ocean. In 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the Ordot Dump to its National Priorities List, and in 1988, it designated the Navy as a potentially responsible party. However, because the Navy had relinquished sovereignty over the island, Guam remained the owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. As such, the EPA repeatedly ordered Guam to propose plans for containing and disposing of waste at the landfill. In 2002, the EPA sued Guam under the Clean Water Act, asking the court to require Guam to comply with the Act, in part by submitting plans and a compliance schedule for a cover system of the Ordot Dump, and by completing construction of the cover system. The EPA and Guam agreed that Guam would pay a civil penalty, close the Ordot Dump, and design a cover system. Guam closed the Ordot Dump in 2011. In 2017, Guam sued the United States, alleging that the Navy was responsible for the Ordot Dump’s contamination and was thus responsible for the costs of closing and remediating the landfill. Guam’s claims rested on two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Section 107 allows for a “cost-recovery” action and Section 113(f) allows for a “contribution” action. The statute of limitations for the former action is six years, compared to only three for the latter. The district court concluded that Guam’s agreement with the EPA did not trigger section 113, so Guam could maintain its section 107 claim against the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. Question Can Guam sue the Navy under CERCLA Section 113(f) over its contribution to the environmental hazards arising from the Ordot Dump? Conclusion Guam can pursue its lawsuit against the federal government over the cleaning costs associated with the Ordot Dump. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Subsection 113(f) allows a party to seek contribution “from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA” and provides that “a person who has resolved its liability to the United States . . . may seek contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in § 113(F)(2).” The language and structure of this statute support the interpretation that the right of contribution is predicated on CERCLA liability. Because the statutory language is best understood only in reference to CERCLA, the most natural reading of the provision is that a party may seek contribution under CERCLA only after settling a CERCLA-specific liability, not resolving environmental liability under some other law. Thus, the agreement between the EPA and Guam did not trigger the statute of limitations for seeking contribution.

Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2021.Decided on Jun 29, 2021. Petitioner: Minerva Surgical, Inc..Respondent: Hologic, Inc., et al.. Advocates: Robert N. Hochman (for the Petitioner) Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Matthew M. Wolf (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Hologic, Inc. and another company sued Minerva Surgical, Inc. for patent infringement (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,872,183 and 9,095,348). The patents relate to procedures and devices for endometrial ablation, which is a treatment involving the destruction of the lining of the uterus in order to treat menorrhagia, or abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding. Both of the patents at issue list as an inventor Csaba Truckai, who assigned his interests in both patents to NovaCept, Inc., a company he co-founded. NovaCept was subsequently acquired by another company, and Hologic acquired that company. Hologic is the current assignee of both patents and sells the resulting NovaSure system throughout the United States. Truckai left NovaCept and, in 2008, founded the accused infringer in this case, Minerva Surgical. Truckai and others at Minerva developed the Endometrial Ablation System (EAS), which received FDA approval in 2015 for the same indication as Hologic’s NovaSure system. In 2015, Hologic sued Minerva alleging that Minerva’s EAS infringed certain claims of its patents. Minerva asserted that the patents were invalid based on lack of enablement and failure to provide an adequate written description, and moreover were not patentable due to prior art. Hologic moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel, which bars a patent’s seller from attacking the patent’s validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The court granted the motion as to both patents, based on the relationship between the inventor Truckai and his company Minerva. The court of appeals affirmed as to the infringement. Question May a defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent, or is in privity with an assignor of the patent, have a defense of invalidity heard on the merits? Conclusion A defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent can be barred under the doctrine of assignor estoppel from asserting a defense of invalidity if, and only if, the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations the assignor made in assigning the patent. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The doctrine of assignor estoppel dates back to late 18th-century England, and the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized and approved it in American jurisprudence in Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924). The doctrine is grounded in a principle of fairness, that an inventor should not be able to assert invalidity of a patent he assigned but can merely argue about how to construe the patent’s claims. The Court refused to abandon the doctrine of assignor estoppel entirely, finding that doing so would have broad effects that contradict many of the Court’s precedents. Moreover, the principle of fairness that originally grounded the doctrine applies equally still. Specifically, when an inventor warrants that a patent claim is valid and then assigns it to another, his denial of the validity violates norms of equitable dealing. However, to fully serve that purpose of fairness, the doctrine has its limits. If the assignor did not make explicit or implicit representations that conflict with the invalidity defense, there is no ground for applying assignor estoppel. In this case, the Federal Circuit erred by not considering whether Hologic’s new claim was materially broader than the ones Truckai had assigned, which would mean that Truckai could not have warranted its validity when making the assignment. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority avoids answering the essential threshold question whether Westinghouse should be overruled and thus cannot answer the question presented in the petition in this case. Justice Alito would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the majority recrafted a rule of assignor estoppel entirely different from that in Westinghouse. Because the Patent Act of 1952 does not incorporate the doctrine of assignor estoppel, Justice Barrett would hold the doctrine no longer applies.

San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2021.Decided on May 27, 2021. Petitioner: City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities.Respondent: Hotels.com, L.P., et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) David B. Salmons (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class-action lawsuit against various online travel companies (OTCs), such as Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “cost of occupancy” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel. Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for "an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties." The OTCs’ proposed order stated that "costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39." San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC’s proposed order. Then the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $2.3 million, which included over $2 million for “post-judgment interest” and “premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds.” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite. Question Do district courts have the discretion to deny or reduce appellate costs deemed “taxable” in district court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e)? Conclusion Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals’ allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that Rule. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Rule 39 gives the courts of appeals discretion over the allocation of appellate costs, setting default rules that apply unless the court “orders otherwise.” These default rules and the language and structure of Rule 39 suggest that the appeals court makes all determinations as to the costs. This comprehensive scheme leaves no room for the district court to modify the appeals court’s allocation of costs, and indeed to read the Rule as giving the district court such power would undermine the authority of the appeals court to make the determination in the first place.

Greer v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2021.Decided on Jun 14, 2021. Petitioner: Gregory Greer.Respondent: United States. Advocates: M. Allison Guagliardo (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “punishable as an Armed Career Criminal” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months’ imprisonment. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, not the residual clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif. On remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer’s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Question May a federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights or impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial. Conclusion A federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, and an error under Rehaif v. United States, is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion. Rule 51(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant can preserve a claim of error “by informing the court” of the claimed error when the relevant “court ruling or order is made or sought.” Rule 52(b) allows an appellate court to review for “plain error” “even though it was not brought to the court’s attention” if it “affects substantial rights.” Thus, the defendant must show that, if the district court had correctly instructed the jury on the mental culpability element of a felon-in-possession offense, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted. If the defendant does not dispute the fact of his prior convictions, he has not met this burden. Such is the case here. Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an appellate court conducting plain-error review may consider the entire record—not just the record from the particular proceeding where the error occurred. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor noted that the Court’s analysis does not extend to harmless-error review and that the knowledge-of-status element is an element just like any other, which the government must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, while defendants seeking relief based on Rehaif errors bear must prove only plain error. She joined the majority as to Greer’s case but as to Gary in the consolidated case would vacate the judgment below and remand so the Fourth Circuit below could address the question whether Gary can prove that the error affected his substantial rights.

United States v. Gary Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2021.Decided on Jun 14, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Michael Andrew Gary. Advocates: Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the Petitioner) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2017, Michael Andrew Gary was driving with his cousin when police pulled them over for running a red light. Gary admitted he was driving on a suspended license, so he was placed under arrest. Upon a search of his car, police found a loaded gun. He was charged under state law with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Five months later, Gary had another encounter with police, and upon consenting to a search, police found him in possession of a stolen firearm which Gary admitted was his. Gary was arrested and charged under state law with possession of a stolen firearm. A federal grand jury indicted Gary on two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The state charges were dropped, and Gary pleaded guilty to the two federal charges. The district court advised Gary that if he proceeded to trial, the government would have to prove four elements, but did not mention that the government would also need to prove Gary was aware that he was a felon. Gary agreed with the prosecutor’s summary of the facts and entered a guilty plea. Gary then appealed his sentence but did not challenge the conviction itself. While the appeal was pending, in 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, holding that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. Gary then submitted a letter raising the relevance of the Rehaif decision. After receiving supplemental briefings from the parties on the relevance of Rehaif, the court of appeals vacated Gary’s convictions and remanded to the district court. Because Gary had not challenged the validity of his plea in the district court, the court of appeals reviewed the lower court’s decision for plain error. The court found not only that the error was plain, but also that it was structural and thus necessarily affected the outcome of the proceedings, even without a showing of as much. Question Is a defendant who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a), automatically entitled to plain-error relief if the district court did not advise him that one element of that offense is knowledge of his status as a felon, regardless of whether he can show that the district court’s error affected the outcome of the proceedings? Conclusion A federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, and an error under Rehaif v. United States, is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion in the consolidated case, Greer v. United States, No. 19-8709.

Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2021.Decided on Jun 25, 2021. Petitioner: Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury.Respondent: Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, et al.. Advocates: Matthew Guarnieri (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Jeffrey S. Rasmussen (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) For over a century after the Alaska Purchase in 1867, the federal government had no settled policy on recognition of Alaska Native groups as Indian tribes. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which authorized the creation of two types of corporations to receive money and land: Alaska Native Regional Corporations and Alaska Native Village Corporations (collectively ANCs). In 1975, Congress enacted the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) to “help Indian tribes assume responsibility for aid programs that benefit their members.” ISDA defines an “Indian tribe” as “any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688), which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.” In 2020, Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act), Title V of which makes certain funds available to the recognized governing bodies of any "Indian Tribe" as that term is defined in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA). The Department of the Treasury concluded that ANCs were eligible to receive Title V funds. Six federally recognized tribes in Alaska and twelve federally recognized tribes in the lower 48 states challenged that determination, arguing that ANCs are not “Indian Tribes” within the meaning of the CARES Act or ISDA. Although the government conceded that ANCs have not been historically recognized as eligible for special programs and services because of their status as Indians, it nevertheless argued that Congress expressly included ANCs within the ISDA definition. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that ANCs must qualify as Indian tribes to give effect to their express inclusion in the ISDA definition, even though no ANC has been recognized as an Indian tribe. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that ANCs are not eligible for funding under Title V of the CARES Act because they are not “recognized” as Indian tribes. Question Are Alaska Native regional and village corporations established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act “Indian Tribes” for purposes of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act? Conclusion Alaska Native Corporations (ANCs) are “Indian tribe[s]” under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA) and thus eligible for funding available to “Tribal governments” under Title V of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The majority determined that under the plain meaning of the ISDA, ANCs are Indian tribes. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) is the only statute the ISDA’s “Indian tribe” definition mentions by name, so eligibility for ANCSA’s benefits satisfies the definition’s final “recognized-as-eligible” clause. The respondents failed to demonstrate that the phrase “Indian tribe” is a term of art that should exclude ANCs, and none of their other arguments for reading “Indian tribes” as exclusive of ANCs were persuasive. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Elena Kagan. Justice Gorsuch argued that the plain language and construction of the ISDA suggest that ANCs are not “Indian tribes,” supported by analogy to another statute with “nearly identical language in remarkably similar contexts,” and that the majority overlooked the critical statutory word “recognized.”

Sanchez v. Mayorkas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2021.Decided on Jun 7, 2021. Petitioner: Jose Santos Sanchez, et al..Respondent: Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al.. Advocates: Amy M. Saharia (for the Petitioners) Michael R. Huston (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners Jose Sanchez and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 1997 and again in 1998. Following a series of earthquakes in El Salvador in 2001, they applied for and received temporary protected status (TPS) and were subsequently permitted to remain in the United States due to periodic extensions of TPS eligibility for El Salvadoran nationals by the Attorney General. In 2014, Sanchez and his wife applied to become lawful permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied their applications, finding that Sanchez was “statutorily ineligible” for adjustment of status because he had not been admitted into the United States. They challenged the denial in federal district court, and the district court granted their motion for summary judgment, holding a grant of TPS meets § 1255(a)’s requirement that an alien must be “inspected and admitted or paroled” to be eligible for adjustment of status. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, finding no support in the text, context, structure, or purpose of the statutes for the claim that a grant of TPS may serve as an admission for those who entered the United States illegally. Question Does the conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a constitute an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255? Conclusion The conferral of Temporary Protected Status under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a does not constitute an “admission” into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, so recipients of such status are not eligible to become lawful permanent residents. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Section 1255 provides a way for a “nonimmigrant”—that is, a foreign national who is lawfully present in the United States for a designated, temporary basis—to become a lawful permanent resident (LPR). One requirement for eligibility is an “admission” into the country, and “admission” is defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Entering the country via a provision of humanitarian law that bypasses the inspection and authorization procedure does not meet the requirement for “admission,” so those who are present in the country by that means are not eligible to become lawful permanent residents.

National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Alston Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2021. Petitioner: National Collegiate Athletic Association.Respondent: Shawne Alston, et al.. Advocates: Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioners) Jeffrey L. Kessler (for the Respondents) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), the Supreme Court struck down the NCAA’s television plan as violating antitrust law, but in so doing it held that the rules regarding eligibility standards for college athletes are subject to a different and less stringent analysis than other types of antitrust cases. Because of this lower standard, the NCAA has long argued that antitrust law permits them to restrict athlete compensation to promote competitive equity and to distinguish college athletics from professional sports. Several Division 1 football and basketball players filed a lawsuit against the NCAA, arguing that its restrictions on “non-cash education-related benefits,” violated antitrust law under the Sherman Act. The district court found for the athletes, holding that the NCAA must allow for certain types of academic benefits, such as “computers, science equipment, musical instruments and other tangible items not included in the cost of attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic studies.” However, the district court held that the NCAA may still limit cash or cash-equivalent awards for academic purposes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, recognizing the NCAA’s interest in “preserving amateurism,” but concluding nevertheless that its practices violated antitrust law. Question Does the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)’s prohibition on compensation for college athletes violate federal antitrust law? Conclusion The NCAA’s rules restricting certain education-related benefits for student-athletes violate federal antitrust laws. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch upheld the trial court’s ruling. The Court affirmed that the traditional “rule of reason” standard was appropriate in this case and rejected the NCAA’s call for a more deferential standard. Because the student-athletes who brought the lawsuit did not appeal the Ninth Circuit’s ruling upholding the NCAA’s rules “untethered to education,” the Court did not pass judgment on that aspect of the case. In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Court clarified that a prior statement made in the 1984 case NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma noting that the NCAA’s role in maintaining the “revered tradition of amateurism” was “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act” was not a shield against all challenges to compensation restrictions, as such rules were not even at issue in that case. Instead, there was nothing so unique about the NCAA or amateur sports to alter the traditional method of analysis applied to claims of antitrust violations. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted that while other rules limiting student-athlete compensation unrelated to academics remain in place because they were not properly before the Court, this decision makes clear that the same traditional “rule of reason” analysis would apply. He concluded, “there are serious questions whether the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules can pass muster under ordinary rule of reason scrutiny.”

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2021.Decided on Jun 25, 2021. Petitioner: TransUnion LLC.Respondent: Sergio L. Ramirez. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Samuel Issacharoff (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In February 2011, Sergio Ramirez went with his wife and father-in-law to purchase a car. When the dealership ran a joint credit check on Ramirez and his wife, it discovered that Ramirez was on a list maintained by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), of people with whom U.S. companies cannot do business (i.e. “a terrorist list”). Ramirez and his wife still bought a car that day, but they purchased it in her name only. TransUnion, the company that had prepared the report, eventually removed the OFAC alert from any future credit reports that might be requested by or for Ramirez. On behalf of himself and others similarly situated, Ramirez TransUnion in federal court, alleging that the company’s actions violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). The district court certified a class of everyone who, during a six-month period, had received a letter from TransUnion stating that their name was a “potential match” for one on the OFAC list, although only a fraction of those class members had their credit reports sent to a third party. The jury awarded each class member nearly $1,000 for violations of the FCRA and over $6,000 in punitive damages, for a total verdict of over $60 million. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statutory damages but reduced the punitive damages to approximately $32 million. TransUnion asked the Supreme Court to resolve two questions, of which the Court agreed to decide only the first. Question Does either Article III of the Constitution or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 permit a damages class action when the majority of the class did not suffer an injury comparable to that of the class representative? Conclusion Only a plaintiff concretely harmed by a defendant’s violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act has Article III standing to seek damages against that private defendant in federal court. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 5-4 majority opinion. To have Article III standing to sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show that she suffered concrete injury in fact, that the injury was fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct, and that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling by the court. To show a concrete injury, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the asserted harm is similar to a harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts—i.e., a close historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury. Of the 8,185 class members, TransUnion provided third parties with credit reports containing OFAC alerts for only 1,853 individuals; these individuals have standing. The remaining 6,332 class members stipulated that TransUnion did not provide their credit information to any potential creditors during the designated class period and thus have failed to demonstrate concrete harm required for Article III standing. Mere risk of future harm is insufficient to establish standing. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Thomas argued that injury in law to a private right has historically been sufficient to establish “injury in fact” for standing purposes, and each class member in this case has demonstrated violation of their private rights. Justice Kagan authored a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor arguing that Congress expressly allowed these plaintiffs to bring their claim of violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, yet the majority disallows them from doing so. Justice Kagan noted her slightly different understanding of the “concrete injury” requirement for Article III standing that Justice Thomas described in his dissent but suggested such a difference would not lead to a different outcome.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 29, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2021. Petitioner: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al..Respondent: Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, et al.. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Thomas C. Goldstein (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Shareholders of Goldman Sachs Group filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the company and several of its executives committed securities fraud by misrepresenting the company’s freedom from, or ability to combat, conflicts of interest in its business practices. The district court certified a shareholder class, but in 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order because the district court did not apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in determining whether Goldman had rebutted the legal presumption that the shareholders relied on Goldman’s alleged misstatements in purchasing its stock at the market price (known as the Basic presumption). On remand, the district court certified the class once more, and this time, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order certifying the class. The court concluded that, on remand, the district court had applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Goldman’s rebuttal evidence to conclude that it had failed to rebut the Basic presumption. Question 1. May a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of classwide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements in showing that the statements had no impact on the price of the security? 2. Does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion? Conclusion While a defendant in a securities class action may point to the generic nature of the alleged misrepresentations to show that those statements had no impact on the price of the security in overcoming the Basic presumption, that defendant bears not only the burden of production, but also the burden of persuasion. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion of the Court, in which she was joined in full by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh. Justice Neil Gorsuch—joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito—concurred in part and in the judgment, while Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in part but dissented from the judgment. Justice Barrett wrote, “The parties now agree, as do we, that the generic nature of a misrepresentation often in important evidence of price impact courts should consider at class certification” and not just at the merits phase of securities litigation. Because the Court concluded that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may not have properly considered the generic nature of the alleged statements, it vacated that court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. As for which party bears the burden of persuasion, the Court held that the Second Circuit properly allocated the burden to the defendant but noted that “the burden of persuasion should rarely be outcome determinative” at the class certification stage. While concurring in the decision to remand the case because the Court of Appeal did not sufficiently consider the generic nature of the alleged misstatements, Justice Gorsuch disagreed that the defendant should bear the burden of persuasion in overcoming the Basic presumption. Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, dissented from the Court’s judgment because she believed the Court of Appeal had, in fact, adequately considered the generic nature of the alleged misstatements before granting class certification. In other words, while she agreed with the entirety of the Court’s analysis of how to proceed, she believed that the Second Circuit had met that standard and would not have vacated its ruling.

Caniglia v. Strom Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2021.Decided on May 17, 2021. Petitioner: Edward A. Caniglia.Respondent: Robert F. Strom, et al.. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner) Marc Desisto (for the Respondent) Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Edward Caniglia and his wife Kim got into a heated argument, during which Caniglia displayed a gun and told Kim something to the effect of “shoot me now.” Fearing for her husband’s state of mind, Kim decided to vacate the premises for the night. The next morning, she asked an officer from the Cranston Police Department to accompany her back to the house because she was worried that her husband might have committed suicide or otherwise harmed himself. Kim and several police officers went to the house, and while the encounter was non-confrontational, the ranking officer on the scene determined that Caniglia was imminently dangerous to himself and others and asked him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which Caniglia agreed to. While Caniglia was at the hospital, the ranking officer (with telephone approval from a superior officer) seized two of Caniglia’s guns, despite knowing that Caniglia did not consent to their seizure. Caniglia was evaluated but not admitted as an inpatient. In October of 2015, after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve his firearms from the police, Caniglia’s attorney formally requested their return, and they were returned in December. Subsequently he filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 alleging the seizure of his firearms constituted a violation of his rights under the Second and Fourth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Caniglia appealed. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “community caretaking” as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in the context of a vehicle search, whether that concept applies in the context of a private home was a matter of first impression within the First Circuit. The appellate court held that the doctrine does apply in the context of a private home and affirmed the lower court’s decision. Question Does the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extend to the home? Conclusion The “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, described in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), does not extend to the home. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion, holding that police officers’ seizure of the petitioner’s guns from his home violated his Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches and seizures. The lower court’s conclusion that the “community caretaking” exception permitted the officers to seize the petitioner’s guns relied on an extension of Cady, which held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that vehicle searches are different in kind from home searches, the latter of which are subject to the highest level of protection the Constitution affords. The Court has repeatedly declined to expand the scope or number of exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home, and it declined to do so here. Chief Justice John Roberts authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Stephen Breyer joined, to clarify that the Court’s decision does not disturb the Court’s holding in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), that a peace officer does not need a warrant to enter a home in situations where there is a “need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion to note that while he agrees with the Court’s opinion, there are certain related questions the Court did not decide.

United States v. Cooley Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2021.Decided on Jun 1, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Joshua James Cooley. Advocates: Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner) Eric R. Henkel (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joshua James Cooley was parked in his pickup truck on the side of a road within the Crow Reservation in Montana when Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe approached his truck in the early hours of the morning. During their exchange, the officer assumed, based on Cooley’s appearance, that Cooley did not belong to a Native American tribe, but he did not ask Cooley or otherwise verify this conclusion. During their conversation, the officer grew suspicious that Cooley was engaged in unlawful activity and detained him to conduct a search of his truck, where he found evidence of methamphetamine. Meanwhile, the officer called for assistance from county officers because Cooley “seemed to be non-Native.” Cooley was charged with weapons and drug offenses in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Saylor was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law enforcement officer when he seized Cooley, in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court granted Cooley’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Saylor, a tribal officer, lacked jurisdiction to detain Cooley, a non-Native person, without first making any attempt to determine whether he was Native. Question May a police officer for a Native American tribe detain and search a non-tribe member within a reservation on suspicion of violating a state or federal law? Conclusion A tribal police officer has the authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-tribe member traveling on a public right-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Native American tribes are “distinct, independent political communities” exercising a “unique and limited” sovereign authority within the United States. Among the limitations is the general lack of inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members. However, the Court recognized two exceptions to this rule in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). First, a tribe may regulate the activities of non-tribal members “who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Second, a tribe may “exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” The authority at issue in this case aligns with the second exception “almost like a glove.” None of the policing provisions Congress has enacted fit the circumstances of this case as well as the Court’s understanding in Montana, and particularly the second exception. Rather, legislation and executive action appear to assume that tribes retain the detention authority presented in this case. Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion noting that his agreement is limited to a narrow reading of the Court’s holding.

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 22, 2021.Decided on Jun 23, 2021. Petitioner: Cedar Point Nursery, et al..Respondent: Victoria Hassid, et al.. Advocates: Joshua P. Thompson (for the Petitioners) Michael J. Mongan (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1975, California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”), which, among other things, created the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“the Board”). Shortly after Act went into effect and established the Board, the Board promulgated a regulation allowing union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites under specific circumstances. Cedar Point Nursery, an Oregon corporation, operates a nursery in Dorris, California, that raises strawberry plants for producers. It employs approximately 100 full-time workers and more than 400 seasonal workers at that location. On October 29, 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers union ("the UFW") entered the nursery, without providing prior written notice of intent to take access as required by the regulation. The UFW allegedly disrupted the workers, and some workers left their work stations to join the protest, while a majority of workers did not. Sometime later, the UFW served Cedar Point with written notice of intent to take access. Cedar Point filed a charge against the UFW with the Board, alleging that the UFW had violated the access regulation by failing to provide the required written notice before taking access. The UFW likewise filed a countercharge, alleging that Cedar Point had committed an unfair labor practice. Cedar Point then sued the Board in federal district court alleging that the access regulation, as applied to them, amounted to a taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and an illegal seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Cedar Point appealed. Reviewing the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss de novo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the access regulation does not violate either provision, and it affirmed the lower court. Question Does the California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property to solicit support for unionization constitute a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion The California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property to solicit support for unionization constitutes a per se physical taking. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property for public use “without just compensation.” There are two types of takings: physical appropriations of land and imposition of regulations that restrict the landowner’s ability to use the land. Physical takings must be compensated. Use restrictions are evaluated using a flexible test developed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which balances factors such as the “economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” In this case, the California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property is a physical taking. The regulation does not restrict the growers’ use of their own property, but instead appropriates the owners’ right to exclude third parties from their land, “one of the most treasured rights” of property ownership. By granting access to third-party union organizers, even for a limited time, the regulation confers a right to physically invade the growers’ property and thus constitutes a physical taking. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion describing another way the Court could have arrived at the same conclusion, using a different precedent. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the regulation does not physically appropriate growers’ property; rather, it temporarily regulates their right to exclude others and as such should be subject to the “flexible” Penn Central rule.

Carr v. Saul Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2021.Decided on Apr 22, 2021. Petitioner: Willie Earl Carr, et al..Respondent: Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioners) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Willie Earl Carr sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied his claim and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review the decision. Carr appealed to a federal district court. While his case in the district court was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, that Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs are “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and as inferior officers, they must be appointed by the President, a court, or the head of the agency. In response to Lucia, the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA’s ALJs. After these appointment actions, Carr raised a claim for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. The district court agreed, vacating the SSA’s decision and remanding the case for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. By agreeing on the merits, the district court held that Carr had not waived his right to raise an Appointments Clause claim by failing to raise that claim during the administrative proceedings. The SSA Commissioner appealed, arguing that Carr did waive the Appointments Clause challenge by failing to raise it earlier. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court. Question Does a person seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act forfeit their ability to challenge the appointment of an administrative law judge under the Appointments Clause if they fail to present that challenge during administrative proceedings? Conclusion Persons seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act need not argue at the agency level that the administrative law judges hearing their disability claims were unconstitutionally appointed for that argument to be preserved on appeal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion. Generally, administrative review schemes require parties to give the agency an opportunity to address an issue before seeking judicial review of that question, known as “issue exhaustion.” However, if there is not a statute or regulation that imposes an issue-exhaustion requirement, courts decide whether to require issue exhaustion in a manner consistent with “the rule that appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts.” In this case, issue exhaustion was not necessary. First, agency adjudications are not well suited to address structural constitutional challenges because such issues usually fall outside the adjudicators’ areas of technical expertise. Second, issue exhaustion is generally not required when the agency is unable to provide meaningful relief to resolve the issue. As such, the Courts of Appeals erred in imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement on petitioners’ Appointments Clause claims. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Thomas agreed with the Court that there was no need for an exhaustion rule based solely on the conclusion that the proceedings bear little resemblance to adversarial litigation. Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, noting that in his view, the “nonadversarial nature” of the agency’s procedures is generally irrelevant to whether the ordinary rule requiring issue exhaustion ought to apply.” However, the Appointments Clause challenges at issue fall into the well-established exceptions for constitutional and futile claims.

Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2021.Decided on Jul 2, 2021. Petitioner: Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al..Respondent: Democratic National Committee, et al.. Advocates: Michael A. Carvin (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1258 (Arizona Republican Party, et al.)) Mark Brnovich (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1257 (Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al.)) Jessica R. Amunson (for Respondent Secretary Hobbs) Bruce V. Spiva (for Respondents Democratic National Committee, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Arizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or during an early-vote period, or (2) “early voting” whereby the voter receives the ballot by mail and either mails back the voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off location. Arizona law permits each county to choose a vote center or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. In counties using the vote-center system, registered voters may vote at any polling location in the county. In counties using the precinct-based system, registered voters may vote only at the designated polling place in their precinct. About 90% of Arizona’s population lives in counties using the precinct-based system. If a voter arrives at a polling place and is not listed on the voter rolls for that precinct, the voter may cast a provisional ballot. After election day, election officials review all provisional ballots to determine the voter’s identity and address. If officials determine the voter voted out of precinct (OOP), the county discards the ballot in its entirety, even if (as is the case in most instances), the OOP voter properly voted (i.e., was eligible to vote) in most of the races on the ballot. The Democratic National Committee challenged this OOP policy as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it adversely and disparately affects Arizona’s Native American, Hispanic, and African American citizens. Arizona law has permitted early voting for over 25 years, allowing voters to request an early vote-by-mail ballot either on a per-election basis or on a permanent basis. Some counties permit voters to drop their early ballots in special drop boxes, but all counties permit the return of early ballots by mail, or in person at a polling place, vote center, or authorized election official’s office. Many voters (particularly minorities) who vote early use third parties to collect and drop off voted ballots, which, until 2016, was permissible. Despite “no evidence of any fraud in the long history of third-party ballot collection in Arizona,” Republican legislators in 2016 passed H.B. 2023, which criminalized the collection and delivery of another person’s ballot. The DNC challenged H.B. 2023 as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment because it was enacted with discriminatory intent. After a ten-day bench trial, the district court found in favor of Arizona on all claims. The DNC appealed, and a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. A majority of the full Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and the court reversed, finding the district court “clearly erred.” Question 1. Does Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act? 2. Does Arizona’s H.B. 2023 violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Fifteenth Amendment? Conclusion Neither Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor H.B. 2023 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and H.B. 2023 was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. As a threshold matter, the petitioner, Arizona Attorney General Brnovich, has standing to appeal the decision below because he is an authorized representative of the state. Additionally, the Court declined to establish a test to govern all VRA § 2 challenges; its decision applies only to the facts of the cases below. This is the first time the Court has considered how Section 2 of the VRA applies to time, place, or manner voting rules. The text of that provision prohibits a state from abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Although the statute requires equal openness and equal opportunity to vote, they are not separate requirements; equal openness is the “core.” This openness is assessed using the “totality of the circumstances.” Neither Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor H.B. 2023, the ballot-collection law, violates Section 2 of the VRA. Neither imposes burdens on voters that exceed the “usual burdens of voting,” and any racial disparity in burdens is “small in absolute terms.” The state has legitimate and important interests in ensuring even distribution of voters among polling places and preserving the integrity of election procedures. Finally, the Court accept

United States v. Arthrex, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 1, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Arthrex, Inc., et al.. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States) Mark A. Perry (for Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al.) Jeffrey A. Lamken (for Arthrex, Inc.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Patent Trial and Appeal Board consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, a Commissioner for Patents, a Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative patent judges. Under 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), appoints Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) to the Board. Among other responsibilities, APJs decide questions of patentability in inter partes review, a “hybrid proceeding” with “adjudicatory characteristics similar to court proceedings.” Arthrex owns a patent that was subject to inter partes review, and a three-judge panel consisting of three APJs issued a final written decision finding the claims unpatentable. Arthrex appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, claiming that the appointment of APJs violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that the statute as currently constructed makes APJs principal officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The court severed the portion of the Patent Act restricting removal of the APJs in order to render them inferior officers and thus remedy the constitutional appointment problem. Question 1. Are administrative patent judges principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, or inferior officers who may be appointed by a department head? 2. If they are principal officers, can they be rendered inferior officers by severing the portion of the Patent Act restricting their removal? Conclusion The unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during inter partes review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court, in which he was joined in that holding by Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Having found a constitutional violation, Chief Justice Roberts cured the defect by requiring that the Director of the USPTO hold the ultimate authority to review the final outcome of inter partes review proceedings--a departure from the statutory scheme passed by Congress. Though only Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined this part of the opinion, a concurring opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan approved of the remedy despite disagreeing with the holding that made it necessary. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. While he was part of the majority that held APJs wielded unconstitutional authority, his remedy would have been to invalidate the statutory scheme and send the problem to Congress for a fix that complied with the Constitution. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from the majority’s approach. He concluded both that the APJs were inferior officers under the Constitution under the statutory scheme approved by Congress, and that the appropriate remedy once the Court held otherwise was to have vacated the decision of the APJs at the heart of the dispute.

Lange v. California Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2021.Decided on Jun 23, 2021. Petitioner: Arthur Gregory Lange.Respondent: California. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner) Samuel T. Harbourt (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur) Amanda K. Rice (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A California Highway Patrol officer observed a parked car “playing music very loudly,” and then the driver, Arthur Gregory Lange, honked the horn four or five times despite there being no other vehicles nearby. Finding this behavior unusual, the officer began following Lange, intending to conduct a traffic stop. After following Lange for several blocks, the officer activated his overhead lights, and Lange “failed to yield.” Lange turned into a driveway and drove into a garage. The officer followed and interrupted the closing garage door. When asked whether Lange had noticed the officer, Lange replied that he had not. Based on evidence obtained from this interaction, Lange was charged with two Vehicle Code misdemeanors and an infraction. Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the garage. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that Lange committed a misdemeanor when he failed to stop after the officer activated his overhead lights and that the officer had probable cause to arrest Lange for this misdemeanor offense. Based on this probable cause, the prosecutor argued that exigent circumstances justified the officer’s warrantless entry into Lange’s garage. Lange’s attorney argued that a reasonable person in Lange's position would not have thought he was being detained when the officer activated his overhead lights, and the officer should not have entered Lange's garage without a warrant. The court denied Lange’s motion to suppress, and the appellate division affirmed. Lange pled no contest and then appealed the denial of his suppression motion a second time. The appellate division affirmed Lange's judgment of conviction. In the meantime, Lange filed a civil suit, asking the court to overturn the suspension of his license, and the civil court granted the petition after determining Lange's arrest was unlawful. The court reasoned that the “hot pursuit” doctrine did not justify the warrantless entry because when the officer entered Lange's garage, all the officer knew was that Lange had been playing his music too loudly and had honked his horn unnecessarily, which are infractions, not felonies. Based on the inconsistent findings of the courts, Lange petitioned for transfer to the California Court of Appeal, which concluded that Lange's arrest was lawful and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Question Does the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement apply when police are pursuing a suspect whom they believe committed a misdemeanor? Conclusion Pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not categorically qualify as an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry into a home. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a police officer to obtain a warrant to enter a home, but under settled law, an officer may enter a home without a warrant under certain specific circumstances, including exigency. The Court has recognized exigent circumstances when an officer must act to prevent imminent injury, the destruction of evidence, or a felony suspect’s escape. That a suspect is fleeing does not categorically create exigency. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the Court recognized that the “hot pursuit” of a felony suspect created exigency that justified warrantless entry into a home. However, that case did not address hot pursuit of misdemeanor suspects. Rather, the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents support a case-by-case assessment of the exigencies arising from a particular suspect’s flight. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion noting that the reasoning of the majority and that of Chief Justice John Roberts in his opinion concurring in the judgment are not so dissimilar as they might seem at first. Rather, cases involving fleeing misdemeanor suspects “will almost always” involve a recognized exigent circumstance” such that warrantless entry into a home is justified. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas noted that the general case-by-case rule described by the majority is subject to historical, categorical exceptions. Joined by Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Thomas also noted that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence discovered in the course of pursuing a fleeing suspect. Chief Justice Roberts authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Samuel Alito joined. The Chief

Garland v. Dai Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2021.Decided on Jun 1, 2021. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.Respondent: Ming Dai. Advocates: Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Petitioner) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent in No. 19-1156 (Alcaraz-Enriquez)) David J. Zimmer (for the Respondent in No. 19-1155 (Dai)) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Ming Dai, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum in the United States. An immigration judge denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, although it did not expressly state that Dai’s testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s decision. Dai appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the BIA and the immigration judge's ruling, holding that Dai was entitled to withholding of removal proceedings. The appellate court specifically noted that absent a finding that Dai was not credible, he was entitled to a presumption of credibility. This case was consolidated with Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, No. 19-1156. Question Can a court of appeals presume that an immigrant’s testimony is credible and true if an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals did not specifically find that he was not credible? Conclusion A court of appeals cannot presume that an immigrant’s testimony is true or credible simply based on an absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires that a court reviewing a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) accept “administrative findings” of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Coupled with the established principle that a reviewing court is “generally not free to impose” additional judge-made procedural requirements on agencies, this requirement means that so long as the record contains “contrary evidence” that a reasonable factfinder could find sufficient, a reviewing court may not overturn the agency’s factual determination. Although another provision of the INA does describe a presumption of credibility on appeal, it notes that outside the appeal, there is no such presumption of credibility. However, a court’s review of decisions by the BIA is not an appeal in this context. The only “appeal” is from the immigration judge (IJ) to the BIA. Subsequent judicial review is not an appeal but a “petition for review”; as such, there is no presumption of credibility at that stage of review.

Florida v. Georgia Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 22, 2021.Decided on Apr 1, 2021. Petitioner: Florida.Respondent: Georgia. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the Plaintiff) Craig S. Primis (for the Defendant) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This is an ongoing case of original jurisdiction, the facts of which are explained here. In sum, the case involves a water-rights dispute between Georgia and Florida over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. Question Is Florida is entitled to equitable apportionment of the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and appropriate injunctive relief against Georgia to sustain an adequate flow of fresh water into the Apalachicola Region? Conclusion Florida failed to establish that Georgia’s overconsumption of interstate waters was either a substantial factor contributing to, or the sole cause of, Florida’s injuries. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court. To succeed on its claim, Florida must show by the heightened “clear and convincing evidence” that the harm it suffered—collapse of its oyster fisheries—was caused by Georgia’s overconsumption. The record evidence establishes at most that increased salinity and predation contributed to the collapse of Florida’s fisheries, not that Georgia’s overconsumption caused the increased salinity and predation. Thus, Florida failed to meet its burden of persuasion, so its exceptions to the findings of the Special Master’s report are overruled, and the case is dismissed.

BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 19, 2021.Decided on May 17, 2021. Petitioner: BP P.L.C., et al..Respondent: Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Brinton Lucas (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Victor M. Sher (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In July 2018, the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed suit in Maryland state court against 26 oil and gas companies that Maryland says are partly responsible for climate change. The complaint asserted eight causes of action, all founded on Maryland law, and sought monetary damages, civil penalties, and equitable relief. Two of the defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting eight grounds for removal. Baltimore then moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court rejected all eight grounds for removal and granted Baltimore’s motion for remand back to state court. The defendants appealed the remand order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1442 does not provide a proper basis for removal of the suit. Question Does federal law permit a court of appeals to review any issue included in a district court’s order remanding a case to state court, or only the ground for removal? Conclusion A federal appellate court has jurisdiction to consider all of a defendant’s grounds for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-1 majority opinion of the Court. Section 1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” In this case, the defendants had relied on the federal officer removal statute in § 1442, which is precisely one of the situations in which § 1447(d) permits an appeal. While the Fourth Circuit interpreted the provision as authorizing only the part of the district court’s order discussing § 1442, the ordinary meaning of § 1442—particularly the use of the word “order”—does not support that interpretation. Rather, § 1447(d) permits appellate review of the district court’s remand order without qualification. This conclusion is consistent with the Court’s most analogous precedent, Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), in which it held that another provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which allows a district court to certify “an order,” is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court. Finally, the Court found Baltimore’s policy arguments “cannot overcome a clear statutory directive.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Court’s holding allows defendants to “sidestep” § 1447(d)’s bar on appellate review simply by “shoehorning a § 1442 or § 1443 argument into their case for removal.” This, Justice Sotomayor argued, “lets the exception swallow the rule.” Justice Samuel Alito took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 19, 2021.Decided on Apr 1, 2021. Petitioner: Federal Communications Commission, et al..Respondent: Prometheus Radio Project, et al.. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1231) Helgi C. Walker (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1241) Ruthanne M. Deutsch (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains a collection of rules governing ownership of broadcast media, intended to promote “competition, diversity, and localism.” In 1996, in response to sentiment that the rules were overly restrictive, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act, of which Section 202(h) required the Commission to review the broadcast ownership rules on a regular basis. The FCC’s performance of its duties under that section has been the subject of extensive litigation. In 2017, the FCC issued an order eliminating altogether newspaper/broadcast and television/radio cross-ownership rules, and making other substantial changes. It also announced its intention to adopt an incubator program, calling for comment on various aspects of the program. In August 2018, the FCC established a radio incubator program. Numerous parties filed petitions for review challenging various aspects of the FCC’s order. Among them, Petitioner Prometheus Radio Project argued that the FCC did not adequately consider the effect its rule changes would have on ownership of broadcast media by women and racial minorities. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that although the FCC did “ostensibly” consider this issue, its analysis was “so insubstantial” that it cannot provide a “reliable foundation” for the FCC’s conclusions. As such, the Third Circuit vacated the bulk of the agency’s actions over the past three years as arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Question Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit err in vacating as arbitrary and capricious the FCC’s orders that substantially changed its approach to regulation of broadcast media ownership? Conclusion The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)’s 2017 decision to repeal or modify three of its media ownership rules was not arbitrary or capricious for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion on behalf of a unanimous Court. The FCC has broad authority to regulate broadcast media “as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires.” In considering whether to repeal or modify its existing ownership rules, the agency considered evidence in the record and reasonably concluded that the three ownership rules at issue were no longer necessary to serve the agency’s public interest goals of competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity, and that the rule changes were not likely to harm minority and female ownership. The FCC acknowledged the gaps in data on which it relied and noted that despite requesting data supporting the contention that harm would result to minority- and female-owned media companies, it received no such data. Because its decision was based on the record and was reasonable, its decision to repeal or modify three of its rules was not arbitrary or capricious. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to argue that the Third Circuit improperly imposed nonstatutory procedural requirements on the FCC by forcing it to consider ownership diversity in the first place.

AMG Capital Management, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 13, 2021.Decided on Apr 22, 2021. Petitioner: AMG Capital Management, LLC, et al..Respondent: Federal Trade Commission. Advocates: Michael Pattillo (on behalf of the Petitioners) Joel R. Marcus (on behalf of the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Scott Tucker owned several companies that provided high-interest, short-term loans via several websites. The loans allegedly required customers to agree to terms that were obscured in several long, cross-referenced agreements. In April 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”) filed a lawsuit against Tucker and his businesses in federal court in Nevada. The Commission alleged that Tucker’s loan business violated § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)’s prohibition against “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” The Commission asked the court to enjoin Tucker from engaging in consumer lending and to order him to disgorge his profits from the scheme. The court granted the Commission’s requested relief, enjoined Tucker from providing loans, and ordered him to pay approximately $1.27 billion in equitable monetary relief to the Commission. The court instructed the Commission to direct “as much money as practicable” to “direct redress to consumers,” then to “other equitable relief” related to the practices described in the Commission’s complaint, and finally to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement. Tucker appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. In relevant part, the Ninth Circuit rejected Tucker’s argument that the FTC Act authorizes district courts only to enter “injunctions,” and that the district court’s order to pay “equitable monetary relief” is not an injunction. The Ninth Circuit noted that its precedent squarely holds that § 13 of the FTC Act “empowers district courts to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice.” Question Does Section 13(b) of the FTC Act authorize the FTC to demand monetary relief such as restitution? Conclusion Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not authorize the Commission to seek, or a court to award, equitable monetary relief such as restitution or disgorgement. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Congress established the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 to enforce the Act’s prohibitions on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” by initiating administrative proceedings under Section 5 of the Act. Section 13(b) of the Act, which Congress added in 1973, authorizes the Commission to obtain “in proper cases” a permanent injunction in federal court against “any person, partnership, or corporation” that the Commission believes “is violating, or is about to violate, any provision of law” that the Commission enforces. In the late 1970s, the Commission began using Section 13(b) to obtain court orders in consumer protection cases without the prior use of the administrative proceedings in Section 5 of the Act, and in the 1990s, it extended that practice to seek monetary awards in antitrust cases. Today, the Commission frequently uses Section 13(b) to seek equitable monetary relief directly in court. The Court concluded that the Commission’s practice effectively bypasses the process set forth in Section 5 and was not the intent of the Congress that enacted Section 13(b). The provision does not explicitly authorize the Commission to obtain court-ordered monetary relief, and such relief is foreclosed by the structure and history of the Act.

Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 12, 2021.Decided on Mar 8, 2021. Petitioner: Chike Uzuegbunam, et al..Respondent: Stanley C. Preczewski, et al.. Advocates: Kristen Kellie Waggoner (on behalf of the Petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (Counselor to the Solicitor General, for the United States, as amicus curiae) Andrew A. Pinson (on behalf of the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In July 2016, Chike Uzuegbunam, a student at Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC), began distributing religious literature in an outdoor plaza on GGC’s campus. The campus police stopped him, however, citing GGC’s “Freedom of Expression Policy,” which stated that students were generally permitted to engage in expressive activities only in two designated speech zones, and only after reserving them. Later, Uzuegbunam reserved one of the designated speech zones to speak to students about his religious beliefs, and campus police again stopped him. According to the police, he was exceeding the scope of his reservation by speaking in addition to handing out literature. After this incident, neither Uzuegbunam nor Joseph Bradford—another GGC student who wishes to speak publicly on campus about his religious beliefs—have attempted to speak publicly or distribute literature on campus. Uzuegbunam and Bradford filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the school’s policies, both facially and as-applied, violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They also sought nominal damages for the violation of these rights. GGC filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and while that motion was pending, GGC revised its “Freedom of Expression Policy” to allow students to speak anywhere on campus without having to obtain a permit, except in limited circumstances. It also removed the portion of its student code of conduct that Uzuegbunam and Bradford had challenged. After making these changes, the school filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot. The district court dismissed the case as moot, concluding that the claims for nominal damages could not save otherwise moot constitutional challenges. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question Can an award of nominal damages by itself redress a past injury, or does revision of the unconstitutional policy render moot the constitutional challenge? Conclusion A constitutional challenge to a school policy that seeks nominal damages is not rendered moot if the constitutional policy is revised during litigation because an award of nominal damages can redress the past injury. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for the 8-1 majority. To satisfy the Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) they suffered an injury in fact, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and (3) that the remedy sought from the Court would redress the injury. The parties did not dispute that Uzuegbunam had established the first two elements, leaving only the question whether the remedy he sought—nominal damages—can redress the constitutional violation that Uzuegbunam alleged occurred. Common law demonstrates that while early English courts required a plaintiff to prove monetary damages, they later “reasoned that every legal injury necessarily causes damage,” so courts award nominal damages even if there is no evidence of other damages. At the time of the Constitution’s ratification, courts were already following the latter approach. Thus, an award of nominal damages does redress any legal injury. Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority in full but wrote separately to note his agreement with the Chief Justice and the U.S. Solicitor General that “a defendant should be able to accept the entry of a judgment for nominal damages against it and thereby end the litigation without a resolution of the merits.” Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the case is moot because the plaintiffs are no longer students, the challenged restrictions no longer exist, and the plaintiffs have not alleged actual damages. The Chief Justice noted that if nominal damages can preserve a live controversy to establish Article III standing, future plaintiffs have every incentive to “tack[] on a request for a dollar” to ensure that federal courts resolve their disputes.

Johnson v. Guzman Chavez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 11, 2021.Decided on Jun 29, 2021. Petitioner: Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al..Respondent: Maria Angelica Guzman Chavez, et al.. Advocates: Vivek Suri (Assistant to the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Petitioners) Paul W. Hughes (on behalf of the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Respondents are a class of noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders, which generally are not open to challenge. However, if a noncitizen has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in the countries designated in their removal orders, the person may pursue withholding of removal. That is the remedy the respondents in this case sought, and they are being detained by the government while they await the outcome of those withholding-only proceedings. The respondents requested individualized bond hearings, which could lead to their release during the withholding-only proceedings. The government argued that they are not entitled to individualized bond hearings because they were subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and bond hearings were denied. The noncitizens argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226, rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1231, governs their detention. Section 1226 provides for detention "pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States" and allows for discretionary release on bond. The district court ruled in favor of the noncitizens, finding that the text of the two statutes made clear that § 1226 applied. The court held that § 1231 does not come into play until the government has “the present and final legal authority to actually execute that order of removal.” A divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Question Are the respondents—who were subject to reinstated removal orders, but with pending claims for withholding of removal—detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 or under 8 U.S.C. § 1231? Conclusion Section §1231, not §1226, governs the detention of aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court. Section 1231 authorizes detention “when an alien is ordered removed” and enters the “removal period,” which begins on “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” The presence of the word “administratively,” means DHS does not need to wait for the alien to seek or exhaust judicial review of that order. Even if the alien pursues withholding-only relief, the removal order remains in full force, and DHS retains the authority to remove the alien to any other authorized country. The validity of removal orders is not affected by the outcome of withholding-only proceedings. The statutory structure confirms this interpretation. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, concurring except as to the majority’s determination that it has jurisdiction to review the decision below. Justice Thomas argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear challenges to detention during the removal process but otherwise agreed with the majority’s opinion. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that it is unreasonable to infer, and statutory language does not support, that Congress intended to deny a bond hearing to individuals who reasonably fear persecution or torture, and who, as a result, face proceedings that may last for many months or years.

Collins v. Yellen Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 9, 2020.Decided on Jun 23, 2021. Petitioner: Patrick J. Collins, et al..Respondent: Janet L. Yellen, Secretary of the Treasury, et al.. Advocates: Hashim M. Mooppan (on behalf of the federal parties) Aaron L. Nielson (Court-appointed amicus curiae) David H. Thompson (on behalf of the petitioners in 19-422 and the respondents in 19-563) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that purchase mortgages, buy and sell mortgage-backed securities, and guarantee many of the mortgages in the United States. In 2005 and 2006, as the housing market was reaching its peak, Fannie and Freddie over-invested in risky mortgages in an attempt to compete with large investment banks and mortgage lenders. In the aftermath of the 2008 housing crisis, during which Fannie and Freddie required billions of dollars in federal bailouts, Congress created the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), an independent agency to oversee the two GSEs. FHFA was to be led by a single director who could be fired by the President “for cause.” Upon its creation, FHFA placed Fannie and Freddie in a conservatorship with itself as the conservator and negotiated agreements with the Department of Treasury. Under the agreements, the Treasury would invest billions of dollars in the GSEs in return for compensation consisting in part of fixed dividends. For several years, the GSEs’ dividend obligations exceeded their total earnings, requiring them to draw even more money from the Treasury. FHFA and Treasury negotiated and came up with the “Third Amendment,” which replaced the fixed dividend with a variable quarterly dividend equal to the GSEs’ net worth minus a specified capital reserve. Collins and others are shareholders in Fannie and Freddie. They filed a lawsuit challenging the actions of FHFA, claiming the agency had destroyed the value of their ownership interests. The shareholders argued that FHFA had exceeded its authority under two federal statutes and that the structure of FHFA violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The district court dismissed the statutory claims and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claim. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the statutory claims but reversed the judgment as to the constitutional claim, finding that the structure of FHFA was unconstitutional but the remedy was to invalidate the provision addressing removal of FHFA’s director. In a deeply divided opinion, the Fifth Circuit, rehearing the case en banc, affirmed as to one statutory claim, reversed as to the other statutory claim, held that FHFA’s structure violated the Constitution, and held that the appropriate remedy was to declare unconstitutional the removal provision, not to invalidate the Third Amendment. Question 1. Did the shareholders of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac properly bring a claim under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008? 2. Does the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) structure violate the separation of powers? 3. If FHFA’s structure violates the separation of powers, what is the proper remedy for a final agency action that FHFA took when it was unconstitutionally structured? Conclusion 1. Because the FHFA did not exceed its authority under the Recovery Act as a conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the anti-injunction provisions of the Recovery Act bar the statutory claim brought by shareholders of those entities. 2. The structure of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which restricts the President’s power to remove the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Director, violates the separation of powers. 3. It is unnecessary to set aside the entire Third Amendment, but the case is remanded for the lower court to determine the proper remedy based on the harms suffered. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Court first considered whether the shareholders were barred from bringing their statutory claim. The Recovery Act contains a provision known as the anti-injunction provision, stating that unless review is specifically authorized by a provision or requested by the Director, “no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.” This provision applies only when the FHFA exercised its “powers or functions” “as a conservator or a receiver,” and not when it exceeds those powers or functions. When the FHFA agreed to the Third Amendment, it was acting in the best interests of the regulated entity or the Agency, as required by statute, and thus it was exercising authority granted to it by the Recovery Act. As such, the shareholders are barred from bringing their statutory claim. The Court then considered the shareholders’ constitutional clai

Facebook, Inc. v. Duguid Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2020.Decided on Apr 1, 2021. Petitioner: Facebook, Inc..Respondent: Noah Duguid. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the petitioner) Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) Bryan A. Garner (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Noah Duguid brought this lawsuit because Facebook sent him numerous automatic text messages without his consent. Duguid did not use Facebook, yet for approximately ten months, the social media company repeatedly alerted him by text message that someone was attempting to access his (nonexistent) Facebook account. Duguid sued Facebook for violating a provision of the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 that forbids calls placed using an automated telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), or autodialer. Facebook moved to dismiss Duguid’s claims for two alternate reasons. Of relevance here, Facebook argued that the equipment it used to send text messages to Duguid is not an ATDS within the meaning of the statute. The district court dismissed the claim, and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Facebook’s equipment plausibly falls within the definition of an ATDS. TCPA defines an ATDS as a device with the capacity “to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.” Ninth Circuit precedent further clarifies that an ATDS “need not be able to use a random or sequential generator to store numbers,” only that it “have the capacity to store numbers to be called and to dial such numbers automatically.” Question Does the definition of an "automatic telephone dialing system" in the Telephone and Consumer Protection Act of 1991 encompass any device that can “store” and “automatically dial” telephone numbers, even if the device does not “use a random or sequential number generator”? Conclusion Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, to qualify as an “automatic telephone dialing system,” a device must have the capacity either to store or to produce a telephone number using a random or sequential number generator. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the opinion of the Court. Section 227(a)(1) defines an autodialer as “equipment which has the capacity...to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and to dial such numbers.” Contrary to Duguid’s contention, the clause “using a random or sequential number generator” modifies both verbs to “store” and to “produce” telephone numbers. Because Facebook’s notification system neither stores nor produces numbers “using a random or sequential number generator,” it is not an autodialer. Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment to caution about the majority’s overreliance on a canon of statutory construction, that “when there is a straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series,’ a modifier at the end of the list ‘normally applies to the entire series.’”

Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2020.Decided on Jan 25, 2021. Petitioner: Henry Schein Inc..Respondent: Archer and White Sales Inc.. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner) Daniel L. Geyser (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2019, the Court unanimously held in Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. that under the Federal Arbitration Act, a court may not decide whether an arbitration agreement applies to the particular dispute if the parties “clearly and unmistakably” delegated the question to an arbitrator, even if the court believes that the argument for arbitrability is “wholly groundless.” On remand the U.S. Court of Appeals again refused to compel arbitration, finding that the parties had delegated at least some questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. Notably, the Fifth Circuit held that because the arbitration agreement included a provision exempting certain claims from arbitration, the agreement did not “clearly and unmistakably” delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. Question Does an arbitration agreement that exempts certain claims from arbitration negate an otherwise clear and unmistakable delegation of questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator? Conclusion The writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.

Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 7, 2020.Decided on Feb 3, 2021. Petitioner: Federal Republic of Germany, et al..Respondent: Alan Philipp, et al.. Advocates: Jonathan M. Freiman (for the petitioners) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Nicholas M. O'Donnell (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1929, just weeks before the October 1929 global stock market crash, several Jewish art dealers in Germany purchased a collection of medieval reliquaries. During the ensuing global depression, the dealers sold about half the pieces and stored the remainder in the Netherlands. Nazi leaders negotiated with the dealers to buy the remaining pieces; the parties dispute whether this negotiation was made under coercive circumstances. After World War II, the collection was transferred to Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (“SPK”), a German governmental institution that holds the cultural artifacts of former Prussia, and has been on display in a German museum nearly continuously since then. In 2014, heirs of the Jewish art dealers—respondents in this case—participated in a non-binding mediation process before the Advisory Commission for the Return of Cultural Property Seized as a Result of Nazi Persecution, Especially Jewish Property (the “Advisory Commission”). In what the heirs describe as a “predetermined conclusion, and against the evidence,” the Advisory Commission recommended against restitution of the collection. The respondents filed a lawsuit in federal court in the District of Columbia, invoking the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity when “rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue,” as the jurisdictional basis for their claims. Germany and SPK moved to dismiss, and the district court largely denied the motion, holding the claims fell within the scope of the expropriation exception. Germany and SPK appealed, and the U.S. Appeals Court for D.C. affirmed as to jurisdiction, reiterating its holding in a prior case that a genocidal taking is a violation of international law and rejecting Germany’s and SPK’s argument based on principles of international comity. Question 1. Does the “expropriation exception” of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provide jurisdiction over claims that a foreign sovereign has violated international human-rights law when taking property from its own national within its own borders? 2. Does the doctrine of international comity preclude the exercise of jurisdiction in this case? Conclusion The expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3), incorporates the domestic takings rule, which recognizes that a foreign sovereign’s taking of its own nationals’ property is not a violation of international law. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion for a unanimous Court. FSIA immunizes foreign sovereigns from the jurisdiction of United States courts, subject to several specific exceptions, including the so-called expropriation exception, which abrogates immunity in any case “in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue.” 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3). The taking of property by a foreign sovereign from its own nationals, at issue in this case, does not violate international law because it does not interfere with relations among states. Known as the domestic takings rule, this principle has endured, notwithstanding developments in other areas of international human rights law. The text of FSIA’s expropriation exception supports this interpretation, as do other provisions of FSIA. Because Germany took property from its own citizens, that act did not violate international law and thus cannot be the basis for an exemption to sovereign immunity under the FSIA’s expropriation exemption.

Republic of Hungary v. Simon Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 7, 2020.Decided on Feb 3, 2021. Petitioner: Republic of Hungary, et al..Respondent: Rosalie Simon, et al.. Advocates: Gregory Silbert (for the petitioners) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Sarah E. Harrington (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Rosalie Simon and other respondents in this case are Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Hungary. They sued the Republic of Hungary and other defendants in federal court in the United States seeking class certification and class-wide damages for property taken from them during World War II. Importantly, they did not first file a lawsuit in Hungary. Rather, they invoked the expropriation exemption of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in claiming the federal court had jurisdiction, though their substantive claims arose from federal and D.C. common law. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that FSIA's treaty exception grants the Hungarian defendants immunity, that the 1947 Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Hungary set forth an exclusive mechanism for Hungarian Holocaust victims to obtain recovery for their property losses, and that permitting the plaintiffs' lawsuit to proceed under FSIA would conflict with the peace treaty's terms. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal as to the non-property claims and reversed as to the property-based claims. The court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether, as a matter of international comity, it should refrain from exercising jurisdiction over those claims until the plaintiffs exhaust domestic remedies in Hungary. On remand, the district court again dismissed the case, holding that international comity required that the plaintiffs first exhaust their claims in Hungary. Again, the D.C. Circuit reversed, noting that its intervening decision in Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany (2018) “squarely rejected” the comity-based ground for declining to exercise jurisdiction. Question Was it proper for the district court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for reasons of international comity, because the plaintiffs made no attempt to exhaust local Hungarian remedies? Conclusion The Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for further proceedings consistent with Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. ___ (2021).

Edwards v. Vannoy Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2020.Decided on May 17, 2021. Petitioner: Thedrick Edwards.Respondent: Darrel Vannoy, Warden. Advocates: Andre Belanger (for the petitioner) Elizabeth Murrill (for the respondent) Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards’s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10-2 vote, so Edwards’s conviction became final in 2010. On April 20, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana. Question Does the Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts, apply retroactively to cases on federal collateral review? Conclusion The jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. A decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral (habeas) review. Applying constitutional rules retroactively undermines the principle of finality, which is “critical to the operation of our criminal justice system.” However, two questions are relevant to the consideration whether a rule may be applied retroactively: (1) whether it is a new rule or applies a settled rule, and (2) whether it is a “watershed” procedural rule. New rules, as opposed to application of settled rules, ordinarily do not apply retroactively unless they are “watershed.” The “watershed” exception is “extremely narrow” and applies only when the new rule “alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” In fact, the only time the Court has recognized a new rule as being watershed was in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which established the right to counsel. First, the Ramos rule is new because it was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Second, Ramos presents none of the considerations for a watershed rule. The situation in Ramos does not support a different outcome from (1) other jury-unanimity cases that the Court did not apply retroactively, (2) other cases decided based on original meaning that the Court did not apply retroactively, and (3) other cases involving race discrimination that the Court did not apply retroactively. As a new rule of criminal procedure, the jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas noted that the Court could alternatively have resolved the case by applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which, in his view, leaves no room for a court to grant relief under the present facts. Justice Gorsuch also filed his own separate concurring opinion, which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that the Court’s decision correctly eliminated the “watershed” exception that was never really an exception at all. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the majority for not only misapplying the “watershed” exception in this case but also for going further and eliminating the exception altogether, preventing any procedural rule from ever benefiting a defendant on habeas review.

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2020.Decided on Jun 17, 2021. Petitioner: Nestlé USA, Inc..Respondent: John Doe I, et al.. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (on behalf of the petitioners) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Paul L. Hoffman (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The plaintiff/respondents in this case are former enslaved children who were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay. They filed a class-action lawsuit against large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, including petitioner Nestle USA (and Cargill Inc., petitioner in a consolidated case). Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., both domestic corporations, effectively control cocoa production in the Ivory Coast and operate “with the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest source of cocoa in the Ivory Coast,” resulting in a “system built on child slavery to depress labor costs.” The respondents allege that the defendants are aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast yet continue to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use forced child labor. The children filed a proposed class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the defendant companies were liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that corporations are liable for aiding and abetting slavery, in part because it found that norms that are “universal and absolute” can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a corporation, and the prohibition of slavery is “universal.” It did not address the defendants’ argument that the complaint sought an extraterritorial application of the ATS, which the U.S. Supreme Court had recently proscribed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). On remand, the district court dismissed the claims alleging aiding and abetting slave labor under the ATS, finding that the complaint sought an impermissible extraterritorial application of the ATS. In the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __ (2018), holding that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. Again the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the holding in Jesner does not disturb its prior holding as to the domestic defendants, Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., and that the specific domestic conduct alleged by the plaintiffs falls within the focus of the ATS and does not require extraterritorial application of that statute. Question 1. May an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States and where the plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms, which occurred abroad at the hands of unidentified foreign actors, to that activity? 2. Does the judiciary have the authority under the Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on domestic corporations? Conclusion To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity; the Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding is reversed, and the case is remanded. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion in which a majority of the Court concluded that the respondents here improperly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS. The Court’s precedents establish “a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.” First, a court must presume that a statute applies only domestically and ask “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication” that rebuts this presumption. Second, where the statute does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.” The ATS does not rebut the presumption, so the question is whether the relevant conduct occurred in the United States. Nearly all the conduct that the respondents describe as aiding and abetting forced labor—providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas farms—occurred in Ivory Coast. As the Court made clear in Kiobel, “mere corporate presence” and activity are not sufficient to support domestic application of the ATS. As such, the respondents did not plead sufficient facts to support domestic application of the ATS. Joined only by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaug

CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2020.Decided on May 17, 2021. Petitioner: CIC Services, LLC.Respondent: Internal Revenue Service, et al.. Advocates: Cameron T. Norris (for the petitioner) Jonathan C. Bond (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2004, Congress delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to gather information about potential tax shelters, which the IRS does by requiring taxpayers their advisors to maintain and submit records pertaining to any "reportable transactions." IRS regulations define what constitutes reportable transactions. Failure to maintain and submit such records can result in substantial penalties for taxpayers and tax advisors. On November 21, 2016, the IRS published Notice 2016-66, which identified certain “micro-captive transactions” as a subset of reportable transactions. As a result, taxpayers and those advising them who engaged in such transactions were required to report them or else be subject to substantial penalties. On March 27, 2017, Petitioner CIC Services, an advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, sued the IRS and the Treasury Department in federal court, alleging that the IRS promulgated Notice 2016-66 in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Petitioner asked the court to stop the IRS from enforcing the Notice. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the federal defendants raised the defense that the lawsuit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Question Does the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on lawsuits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes also bar challenges to unlawful regulatory mandates that are not taxes? Conclusion A lawsuit seeking to enjoin IRS Notice 2016–66 as an unlawful regulatory mandate does not trigger the Anti-Injunction Act, even though a violation of the Notice may result in a tax penalty. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars the filing of lawsuits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” CIC’s lawsuit challenged Notice 2016–66’s reporting obligations, which, alone, would place it clearly beyond the scope of the Act. However, a consequence for failing to report as required under the Notice is a tax penalty, which makes the result in this case less clear. However, when considering a “suit[’s] purpose,” a court looks not at the taxpayer’s subjective motive, but at the relief the suit requests. If the relief sought is an injunction against the collection or assessment of a tax, the Act prohibits it. Because CIC’s suit contests the legality of Notice 2016–66, not the statutory tax penalty, it is not prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. This conclusion is supported by public policy; allowing the lawsuit to proceed will not open the floodgates to pre-enforcement tax litigation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Court’s conclusion might be different if CIC Services were a taxpayer instead of a tax advisor because of the slightly different role tax penalties play with respect to individual taxpayers. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion observing that, in his view, the Court’s ruling in this case established a rule that pre-enforcement suits challenging regulatory taxes or traditional revenue-raising taxes are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, but pre-enforcement suits challenging regulations backed by tax penalties are not barred, even if those suits might preclude the collection or assessment of a tax.

Trump v. New York Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2020.Decided on Dec 18, 2020. Appellant: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al..Appellee: New York, et al.. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (on behalf of the Appellants) Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of the State Appellees) Dale E. Ho (on behalf of the private Appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump announced that the population figures used to determine the apportionment of Congress would, in a reversal of long-standing practice, exclude non-citizens who are not lawfully present in the United States. To implement this new policy, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to provide him two sets of numbers for each state. The first number was the total population as determined in the 2020 census and the second, the total population as determined in the 2020 census minus the number of "aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status." The President left it to the Secretary to determine how to calculate the latter figure, but since the 2020 census did not not collect information regarding citizenship status, let alone legal immigration status in this country, it remained unclear how the Secretary would obtain that number. Immediately after the President filed the memorandum, two sets of plaintiffs—a coalition of 22 States and D.C., 15 cities and counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors (the "Governmental Plaintiffs"); and a coalition of non-governmental organizations—challenged the decision to exclude illegal aliens from the apportionment base for Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitution, statutes governing the census and apportionment, and other laws. The federal district court found for the plaintiffs, concluding that by directing the Secretary to provide two sets of numbers, one derived from the census and one not, and announcing that it is the policy of the United States to use the latter to apportion the House, the memorandum violated the statutory scheme. In addition, the court concluded that the memorandum violated the statute governing apportionment because, so long as they reside in the United States, illegal aliens qualify as “persons in” a “State” as Congress used those words. Question 1. Does a group of states and local governments have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge a July 21, 2020, memorandum by President Donald Trump instructing the secretary of commerce to include in his report on the 2020 census information enabling the president to exclude noncitizens from the base population number for purposes of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives? 2. Is the memorandum is a permissible exercise of the President’s discretion under the provisions of law governing congressional apportionment? Conclusion In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court held that the plaintiffs in this case had not shown standing and that their claims were not ripe for adjudication. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. For a federal court to have jurisdiction to hear a case, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they have standing, which requires “an injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Further, the case must be “ripe”—that is, it must not depend on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Although the President clearly expressed his desire to exclude unlawfully present noncitizens from the apportionment base “to the extent practicable,” it remains mere conjecture whether and how the Executive Branch might eventually implement this general statement of policy. Moreover, the plaintiffs had suffered no concrete harm from the policy itself, because the policy “does not require them ‘to do anything or to refrain from doing anything.’” As such, the courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated Article III standing or that the case is ripe for review. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plaintiffs did have standing based on its own precedents in census cases, which have recognized standing based on a substantial risk of anticipated apportionment harm. Justice Breyer also argued that the question is ripe for resolution, and as such, that the plaintiffs should prevail on the merits because “the plain meaning of the governing statutes, decades of historical practice, and uniform interpretations from all three branches of Government demonstrate that aliens without lawful status cannot be excluded from the decennial census solely on account of that status.”

Van Buren v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2020. Petitioner: Nathan Van Buren.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Nathan Van Buren was a sergeant with the Cumming, Georgia, Police Department. In that capacity, he came to know a man named Andrew Albo, who allegedly paid young prostitutes to spend time with him and then accused the women of stealing the money he gave them. Van Buren asked Albo for a loan, falsely claiming that he needed over $15,000 to settle his son’s medical bills. Unbeknownst to Van Buren, Albo recorded the conversation in which Van Buren requested the loan. Albo presented the recording to a detective in the Forsyth County Sheriff’s Office, alleging that Van Buren was “shaking him down for his money.” As a result, the FBI conducted a sting operation to test how far Van Buren was willing to go for money. As part of the sting operation, Albo asked Van Buren to look into a woman Albo named, to see whether she was an undercover officer before he would provide Van Buren with the full amount of money Van Buren requested. Van Buren searched the woman’s information in a government database maintained by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) and the FBI. The next day, FBI and GBI agents confronted Van Buren, and Van Buren admitted to the fake story about his son to get the loan from Albo, his use of the government database to search for the woman Albo mentioned might be an undercover officer, and that he understood the purpose of searching the database was to discover and reveal to Albo whether the woman was an undercover officer. A federal grand jury charged Van Buren with one count of honest-services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346, and one count of felony computer fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. A jury convicted Van Buren on both counts, and Van Buren appealed his convictions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the jury instructions as to the honest-services count were fatally flawed and remanded that charge for a new trial. It found no deficiencies in the conviction for computer fraud and affirmed that conviction, citing Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that a person with authority to access a computer can be guilty of computer fraud if that person subsequently misuses the computer. Question Does a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violate Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses that information for an improper purpose?

California v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2020.Decided on Jun 17, 2021. Petitioner: The State of California, et al..Respondent: The State of Texas, et al.. Advocates: Michael J. Mongan (for California, et al.) Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the U.S. House of Representatives) Kyle D. Hawkins (for Texas, et al.) Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate. The federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be “severed” from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California’s petition for review, as well as Texas’s cross-petition for review. Question Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to challenge the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which now has a penalty of zero for not buying health insurance? If the plaintiffs have standing, is the individual mandate unconstitutional? If the individual mandate is unconstitutional, is it severable from the remainder of the ACA? Conclusion The plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Affordable Care Act’s minimum essential coverage provision. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. To have standing to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” No plaintiff in this case has shown such an injury. With respect to the individual plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged—past and future payments necessary to carry the minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires—not “fairly traceable” to the allegedly unlawful conduct. There is no penalty for noncompliance, only the statute’s unenforceable language, which alone is insufficient to establish standing. With respect to the state plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged not traceable to the government’s allegedly unlawful conduct. The state plaintiffs alleged direct and indirect injuries. The states alleged indirect injuries in the form of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs, but they failed to show how an unenforceable mandate would cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. The states alleged direct injuries in the form of increased administrative and related expenses, but those expenses are the result of other provisions of the Act, not §5000A(a) and are thus not fairly traceable to the conduct alleged. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, praising Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in this case (describing the “epic Affordable Care Act trilogy”) but stopping short of agreeing with his opinion in its entirety because Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs lack standing in this case. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that Texas and the other state plaintiffs have standing and that because the “tax” imposed by the individual mandate is now $0, the mandate cannot be sustained under the taxing power.

Brownback v. King Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2020.Decided on Feb 25, 2021. Petitioner: Douglas Brownback, et al..Respondent: James King. Advocates: Michael R. Huston (for the petitioners) Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Two undercover FBI agents mistakenly identified petitioner James King as a criminal suspect and approached him. The parties differed in their account of the facts as to whether the agents identified themselves as police officers, but King apparently perceived he was being mugged and resisted their attempts to restrain him. A violent fight ensued, in which the officers severely beat King until onlookers called 911 and local police arrived on the scene. The local police officers ordered bystanders to delete video footage of the altercation because the videos could reveal the identities of undercover FBI officers. King was taken to the hospital, where he received medical treatment and was discharged. On his discharge, police arrested him and took him to Kent County Jail, where he spent the weekend in jail before posting bail and visiting another hospital for further examination. Prosecutors pursued charges, but a jury acquitted King of all charges. King then filed a lawsuit against the United States and both FBI agents, alleging that the agents violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by using excessive force. In general, the United States and its agents are immune from liability under the principle of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity in specific situations, and the plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim bears the burden of showing his claim falls within such situations. The FTCA also contains a “judgment bar” provision that precludes a plaintiff from bringing additional claims concerning the “same subject matter” as an FTCA claim after a judgment is entered on the FTCA claim. The district court found that King failed to prove one of the six requirements for FTCA to apply, and therefore that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear King’s claim against the United States. The court further held that the defendant agents were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in their favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the FTCA judgment bar does not preclude King’s remaining claims because the court did not reach the merits of the FTCA claims and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Question Does the judgment bar provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) prevent a plaintiff whose FTCA claim against the government failed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction from filing another action, against the same defendants and arising from the same set of facts and injuries, under Bivens? Conclusion The district court’s order dismissing King’s FTCA claims was a judgment on the merits and thus triggered the Act’s judgment bar to block his Bivens claims. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The FTCA’s judgment bar was drafted “against the backdrop doctrine of res judicata,” or claim preclusion, and so a judgment on the merits will trigger that bar. A dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is a “quintessential” merits decision because it signifies that the undisputed facts fail to establish all the elements of the FTCA claims. Although the question is “complicated” by the jurisdictional effect of a failure to state a claim, the Court noted that when the pleading of a claim and the pleading of jurisdiction coincide, as in this case, “a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion to note that the Court “does not today decide whether an order resolving the merits of an FTCA claim precludes other claims arising out of the same subject matter in the same suit.

Niz-Chavez v. Garland Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2020.Decided on Apr 29, 2021. Petitioner: Augusto Niz-Chavez.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: David J. Zimmer (for the petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Agusto Niz-Chavez, a Guatemalan native and citizen, came to the United States without inspection in 2005. On March 26, 2013, he was served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge at a date and time to be determined later, and approximately two months later, on May 29, 2013, he received a notice of hearing in removal proceedings. Niz-Chavez made an appearance at the hearing on June 25, 2013, where he conceded removability and stated his intent to seek withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and relief under the Convention Against Torture. After a hearing on the merits, the immigration judge denied both applications, and Niz-Chaves appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition to challenging the immigration judge’s conclusions, Niz-Chavez asked the Board to remand the case in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, in which the Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the specific time and place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule under §1229(a) of the INA. Niz-Chavez argued that under Pereira, he was now eligible for cancellation because of the deficiency of the notice to appear he received. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and denied the motion to remand, finding that Niz-Chavez was not eligible for cancellation under Pereira. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Niz-Chavez’s petition for review of each of the challenged decisions by the Board. Question Under Section 1229(a), must the government serve a specific document that includes all required information, or may the government serve that information over the course of multiple documents? Conclusion The government must serve a single document that includes all the required information for the notice to appear to trigger the IIRIRA’s stop-time rule. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion. Section 1229b(d)(1) states that the stop-time rule is triggered “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a),” and Section 1229(a) states that “written notice...shall be given...to the alien...specifying” the time and place of his hearing, among other listed items. The singular article “a” (as in “a notice”) means, to an ordinary reader, a single document containing the required information, not a series of such document with the information spread across them. The IIRIRA’s statutory structure confirms this interpretation. For example, it refers to “the Notice” and “the time of the notice” in other nearby provisions (emphasis added). Its history, too, supports this reading. In passing the IIRIRA, the Congress intentionally changed the law from authorizing the government “to specify the time and place for an alien’s hearing ‘in the order to show cause or otherwise’” to requiring that the “time and place information...be included in a notice to appear, not ‘or otherwise.’” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, arguing that the government’s provision of notice in two documents, as was the case here, should be sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule.

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2020.Decided on Jun 17, 2021. Petitioner: Sharonell Fulton, et al..Respondent: City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al.. Advocates: Lori H. Windham (for the petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Neal Kumar Katyal (for respondents Philadelphia et al.) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents Support Center for Child Advocates and Philadelphia Family Pride) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In March 2018, the City of Philadelphia barred Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of its policy of not licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. CSS sued the City of Philadelphia, asking the court to order the city to renew their contract. CSS argued that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled it to reject qualified same-sex couples because they were same-sex couples, rather than for any reason related to their qualifications to care for children. The district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the City’s non-discrimination policy was a neutral, generally applicable law and that CSS had not demonstrated that the City targeted CSS for its religious beliefs or was motivated by ill will against its religion. Question 1. To succeed on their free exercise claim, must plaintiffs prove that the government would allow the same conduct by someone who held different religious views, or only provide sufficient evidence that a law is not neutral and generally applicable? 2. Should the Court revisit its decision in Employment Division v. Smith? 3. Does the government violate the First Amendment by conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions and making statements that directly contradict the agency’s religious beliefs? Conclusion The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless CSS agrees to certify same-sex couples as foster parents violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. Philadelphia’s actions burdened CSS’s religious exercise by forcing it either to curtail its mission or to certify same-sex couples as foster parents, in violation of its stated religious beliefs. Although the Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that neutral, generally applicable laws may incidentally burden religion, the Philadelphia law was not neutral and generally applicable because it allowed for exceptions to the anti-discrimination requirement at the sole discretion of the Commissioner. Additionally, CSS’s actions do not fall within public accommodations laws because certification as a foster parent is not “made available to the public” in the usual sense of the phrase. Thus, the non-discrimination requirement is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the government show the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. The Court pointed out that the question is not whether the City has a compelling interest in enforcing its non-discrimination policies generally, but whether it has such an interest in denying an exception to CSS. The Court concluded that it did not. Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined and in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined as to all but the first paragraph. Justice Barrett acknowledged strong arguments for overruling Smith but agreed with the majority that the facts of the case did not trigger Smith. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito would overrule Smith, replacing it with a rule that any law that burdens religious exercise must be subject to strict scrutiny. Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined, criticizing the majority’s circumvention of Smith.

Jones v. Mississippi Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2020.Decided on Apr 22, 2021. Petitioner: Brett Jones.Respondent: Mississippi. Advocates: David M. Shapiro (for the petitioner) Krissy C. Nobile (for the respondent) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” The circuit court held the hearing weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility. Question Does the Eighth Amendment require a sentencing authority to find that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before it may impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole? Conclusion A sentencing authority need not find a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; a discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient to impose a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who committed a homicide when they were under 18. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion. In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held that “a sentencer [must] follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.” And in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the Court stated that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.” Taken together, these two cases refute Jones’s argument that a finding of permanent incorrigibility is constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of life without parole. The Court noted that it expresses neither agreement nor disagreement with Jones’s sentence, and its decision does not preclude states from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving juvenile commission of homicide. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the Court should have reached the same outcome by declaring that Montgomery was incorrectly decided. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority effectively circumvents stare decisis by reading Miller to require only “a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth is considered.” Under Montgomery, sentencing discretion is necessary, but under Miller, it is not sufficient. Rather, a sentencer must actually make the judgment that the juvenile is one of those rare children for whom life without parole is a constitutionally permissible sentence.

Borden v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2020.Decided on Jun 10, 2021. Petitioner: Charles Borden, Jr..Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Police caught Charles Borden, Jr., with a pistol during a traffic stop in April 2017, and he subsequently pleaded guilty possessing that firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government recommended sentencing Borden as an armed career criminal, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Borden objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions—reckless aggravated assault—did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA. Borden argued that reckless aggravated assault requires only a mental state of recklessness, and reckless use of force does not amount to a crime of violence under the ACCA. Retroactively applying Sixth Circuit precedent holding that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent felony under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA, the district court held that all three of Borden’s aggravated assault victims constituted “crime[s] of violence” under the ACCA and designated him as an armed career criminal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompass crimes with an intent requirement of mere recklessness? Conclusion The “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) does not encompass reckless aggravated assault. Justice Elena Kagan authored the four-justice plurality opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment to reverse and remand the case. The elements clause of the ACCA defines “violent felony” as an offense requiring the “use of physical force against the person of another.” According to the plurality, the phrase “against another” requires conduct directed at another individual. Recklessness, which is the disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, cannot be directed at another individual and so cannot meet the definition of a violent felony. Justice Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, reasoning that reckless aggravated assault is not a violent felony under the ACCA because the “use of physical force...has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts designed to cause harm.” Justice Thomas argued that the reckless conduct at issue in this case falls within the ACCA’s residual clause, which the Court (erroneously, in his view) struck down. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the plurality “disregards bedrock principles and longstanding terminology of criminal law, misconstrues ACCA’s text,” and “overrides Congress’s judgment about the danger posed by recidivist violent felons.”

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2020.Decided on Mar 4, 2021. Petitioner: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al..Respondent: Sierra Club, Inc.. Advocates: Matthew Guarnieri (for the petitioners) Sanjay Narayan (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Industrial facilities, power plants, and other manufacturing complexes use water from lakes, rivers, estuaries, and oceans to cool their facilities through cooling water intake structures. Because these structures potentially cause significant harm to aquatic life, Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate their design and operation. In April 2011, the EPA proposed new regulations for cooling water intake structures. As part of the rule-making process and required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, in 2012, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service about the potential impacts of the regulations and produced a written biological opinion on the impacts of the proposed agency action. The Sierra Club made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records generated during the EPA’s rule-making process, including the documents generated as part of the consultation with the Services. The Services withheld some of the requested records, citing Exemption 5 of FOIA, which shields from disclosure documents subject to the “deliberative process privilege.” The district court determined that 12 of the 16 requested records were not protected to the privilege and ordered disclosure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s order to disclose some of the records but reversed as to two of the records. Question Does Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, by incorporating the deliberative process privilege, protect against compelled disclosure of a federal agency’s draft documents that were prepared as part of a formal interagency consultation process under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and that concerned a proposed agency action that was later modified in the consultation process? Conclusion The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) an agency’s in-house draft biological opinions that are both predecisional and deliberative, even if the drafts reflect the agencies’ last views about a proposal. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion. The deliberative process privilege of Exemption 5 of FOIA protects from disclosure “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” The rationale behind the exemption is to encourage officials to communicate candidly with each other during the deliberative process. However, it does not apply to documents reflecting the final agency decision. Documents are “predecisional” if they were generated before the agency’s final decision on the matter and “deliberative” if prepared to help the agency formulate its position. The documents at issue in this case were drafts of biological opinions because “more work needed to be done.” As such, they could not have been generated before the agency’s final decision had been made. That the recommendations ultimately proved to be the last word does not affect their status as “predecisional.” Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer argued that in the specific context of the rulemaking processes of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, so-called Draft Biological Opinions reflect “final” decisions regarding the “jeopardy” the EPA’s then-proposed actions would have caused, and as such, would normally fall outside, not within, Exemption 5.