The High Court Report

Oral Argument: NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton | Case No. 22-555 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Date Decided: 7/1/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Throughout our Nation's history, the First Amendment's freedoms of speech and press have protected private entities' rights to choose whether and how to publish and disseminate speech generated by others. E.g., Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 570, 575 (1995); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974). Over two decades ago, this Court held there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to" speech disseminated on "the Internet." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). Today, many Internet websites publish and disseminate curated collections of expression generated by themselves and others. Nevertheless, the State of Texas-much like Florida before it-has enacted a viewpoint-, content-, and speaker-based law (House Bill 20 or "HB20") targeting certain disfavored "social media" websites. HB20 Section 7 prohibits these websites from making editorial choices based on "viewpoint." And HB20 Section 2 imposes on these websites burdensome operational and disclosure requirements, chilling their editorial choices. This Court has already ensured once that Respondent cannot enforce this law against Petitioners' members. NetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 142 S. Ct. 1715, 1715-16 (2022).Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-, content-, or speaker-based laws restricting select websites from engaging in editorial choices about whether, and how, to publish and disseminate speech-or otherwise burdening those editorial choices through onerous operational and disclosure requirements.Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-277).Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: Moody v. NetChoice, LLC | Case No. 22-277 | Date Argued: 2/26/24 | Case No. 7/1/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Florida has enacted a law that attempts to prevent social-media companies from abusing their enormous power to censor speech.Question Presented: Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring that social-media companies host third-party communications, and from regulating the time, place, and manner in which they do so. Whether the First Amendment prohibits a State from requiring social-media companies to notify and provide an explanation to their users when they censor the user's speech.Holding: The judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded, because neither the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 11th Circuit nor the 5th Circuit conducted a proper analysis of the facial First Amendment challenges to the Florida and Texas laws regulating large internet platforms.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined in full, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I, II and III-A. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. (Opinion together with No. 22-555).Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: For Petitioners: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.For Respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy | Case No. 22-1078 | Date Argued: 2/21/2024 | Date Decided: 5/9/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether, under the discovery accrual rule applied by the Circuit Courts and the Copyright Act's statute of limitations for civil actions, 17 U.S.C. §507(b), a copyright plaintiff can recover damages for acts that allegedly occurred more than three years before the filing of a lawsuit.Holding: The Copyright Act entitles a copyright owner to obtain monetary relief for any timely infringement claim, no matter when the infringement occurred.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Joe Wesley Earnhardt, New York, N.Y.; and Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Ohio v. EPA | Case No. 23A349 | Date Argued: 2/21/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/2024 Case consolidated with Kinder Morgan, Inc. v. EPA, Case No. 23A350, American Forest & Paper Assn. v. EPA, Case No. 23A351 and U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, Case No. 23A384.Link to Docket: Here.Holding: The enforcement of the Environmental Protection Agency's federal implementation plan against the applicant states, whose own state implementation plans were determined by EPA to be inadequate because they failed to adequately address certain obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision, shall be stayed pending disposition of the applicants' petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought.Result: Application for stay granted.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For state applicants: Mathura J. Sridharan, Deputy Solicitor General, Columbus, Ohio. For industry applicants: Catherine E. Stetson, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For state Respondents: Judith N. Vale, Deputy Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors, FRS | Case No. 22-1008 | Date Argued: 2/20/2024 | Date Decided: 7/1/2024 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Petitioner Corner Post, Inc. is a convenience store and truck stop in North Dakota that first opened for business in 2018. In 2021, Corner Post sued the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging a Board rule adopted in 2011 that governs certain fees for debit-card transactions. The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims were barred by 28 U.S.C. §2401 (a)'s six-year statute of limitations. In so doing, it adopted the majority position in an acknowledged circuit split on when APA claims "first accrue[]" under §2401(a). The Eighth Circuit held that Corner Post's APA claims "first accrue[d]" when the Board issued the rule in 2011-even though Corner Post did not open for business until seven years later. As a result, Corner Post's limitations period expired in 2017-a year before it opened for business. The court did not explain how Corner Post could have "suffer[ed] legal wrong" from or been "adversely affected or aggrieved by" the Board's rule-a predicate to stating an APA claim, 5 U.S.C. §702-before Corner Post accepted even one debit-card payment subject to the rule.Question Presented: Does a plaintiff's APA claim "first accrue[]" under 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) when an agency issues a rule-regardless of whether that rule injures the plaintiff on that date (as the Eighth Circuit and five other circuits have held)-or when the rule first causes a plaintiff to "suffer[] legal wrong" or be "adversely affected or aggrieved" (as the Sixth Circuit has held)?Holding: An Administrative Procedure Act claim does not accrue for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), the default 6-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States, until the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Bryan K. Weir, Arlington, Va. For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC | Case No. 23-51 | Date Argued: 2/20/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Federal Arbitration Act exempts the "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. The First and Seventh Circuits have held that this exemption applies to any member of a class of workers that is engaged in foreign or interstate commerce in the same way as seamen and railroad employees-that is, any worker "actively engaged" in the interstate transportation of goods. The Second and Eleventh Circuits have added an additional requirement: The worker's employer must also be in the "transportation industry."Question Presented: To be exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act, must a class of workers that is actively engaged in interstate transportation also be employed by a company in the transportation industry?Holding: A transportation worker need not work in the transportation industry to be exempt from coverage under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal. For Respondents: Traci L. Lovitt, New York, N.Y.

Oral Argument: Trump v. Anderson | Case No. 23-719 | Date Argued: 2/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Supreme Court of Colorado held that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding the office of President because he "engaged in insurrection" against the Constitution of the United States-and that he did so after taking an oath "as an officer of the United States" to "support" the Constitution. The state supreme court ruled that the Colorado Secretary of State should not list President Trump's name on the 2024 presidential primary ballot or count any write-in votes cast for him. The state supreme court stayed its decision pending United States Supreme Court review.Question Presented: Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?Holding: Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the states, responsible for enforcing Section 3 of the 14th Amendment against federal officeholders and candidates, the Colorado Supreme Court erred in ordering former President Donald Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot.Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per curiam opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex. For Respondents Anderson, et al.: Jason C. Murray, Denver, Colo. For Respondent Griswold: Shannon W. Stevenson, Solicitor General, Denver, Colo.

Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo | Case No. 22-451 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Case consolidated with Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, Case No. 22-1219.Link to Docket: Here.Background: The Magnuson-Stevens Act (MSA) governs fishery management in federal waters and provides that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may require vessels to "carry" federal observers onboard to enforce the agency's myriad regulations. Given that space onboard a fishing vessel is limited and valuable, that alone is an extraordinary imposition. But in three narrow circumstances not applicable here, the MSA goes further and requires vessels to pay the salaries of the federal observers who oversee their operations-although, with the exception of foreign vessels that enjoy the privilege of fishing in our waters, the MSA caps the costs of those salaries at 2-3% of the value of the vessel's haul. The statutory question underlying this petition is whether the agency can also force a wide variety of domestic vessels to foot the bill for the salaries of the monitors they must carry to the tune of 20% of their revenues. Under well-established principles of statutory construction, the answer would appear to be no, as the express grant of such a controversial power in limited circumstances forecloses a broad implied grant that would render the express grant superfluous. But a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit answered yes under Chevron on the theory that statutory silence produced an ambiguity that justified deferring to the agency.Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Relentless, Inc. v. Department of Commerce | Case No. 22-1219 | Date Argued: 1/17/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Magnuson-Stevens Act ("MSA'') governs fishery management in federal waters. It states that, with the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") may require fishing vessels to carry federal observers who enforce the agency's regulations. Congress appropriates funds for these observers. In three circumstances absent here, but not elsewhere, the MSA allows federal observers to be paid in some manner by the regulated party. Deeming annual Congressional appropriations for the federal observers insufficient, the agency asserted a right to force the fishing vessels into contracts to pay the federal observers. The First Circuit approved this practice without stating whether its conclusion was a "product of Chevron step one or step two." It held the mere fact that the MSA provides for federal observers gave the agency carte blanche to charge the regulated party for those observers. Neither Chevron nor the MSA provision allowing measures "necessary and appropriate" to enforce the statute allows this result.Question Presented: Whether the Court should overrule Chevron or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency.Holding: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is overruled.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as it applies to No. 22-1219. Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P. | Case No. 22-1165 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Section l0(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits deception in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. To that end, SEC Rule l0b-5 declares it unlawful to make an untrue statement or omit a material fact "necessary" to make an affirmative statement "not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b). A violation of this requirement can give rise to a private claim-a judicially implied private right of action that this Court has construed narrowly. Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K calls for additional disclosures under a different standard. Item 303 is an administrative rule that requires a company to disclose known trends or uncertainties that are likely to have a material impact on its financial position, regardless of whether the company had made any statements that would otherwise be misleading.Question Presented: Whether the Second Circuit erred in holding-in conflict with the Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits-that a failure to make a disclosure required under Item 303 can support a private claim under Section l0(b), even in the absence of an otherwise-misleading statement.Holding: Pure omissions are not actionable under SEC Rule 10b-5(b), which makes it unlawful to omit material facts in connection with buying or selling securities when that omission renders "statements made" misleading.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Linda T. Coberly, Chicago, Ill. For Respondent Moab Partners, L.P.: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Devillier v. Texas | Case No. 22-913 | Date Argued: 1/16/24 | Date Decided: 4/16/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, this Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause was "self-executing" and that "[s]tatutory recognition was not necessary" for claims for just compensation because they "are grounded in the Constitution itself[.]" 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987). Since First English, several state courts of last resort have held that the self-executing nature of the Takings Clause requires them to entertain claims directly under the Clause without the need for statutory authorization. Two federal Circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, disagree and have held that claims for just compensation are only available if they are legislatively authorized.Question Presented: May a person whose property is taken without compensation seek redress under the self-executing Takings Clause even if the legislature has not affirmatively provided them with a cause of action?Holding: Owners of property north of U.S. Interstate Highway 10 adversely affected by the flood evacuation barrier constructed by Texas should be permitted on remand to pursue their takings clause claims through the cause of action available under Texas law.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Robert J. McNamara, Arlington, Va.For Respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: Smith v. Arizona | Case No. 22-899 | Date Argued: 1/10/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independent opinion and the analyst's statements are offered not for their truth but to explain the expert's opinion, and (b) the defendant did not independently seek to subpoena the analyst.Holding: When an expert conveys an absent lab analyst's statements in support of the expert's opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth, and thus implicate the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and IV. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed opinions concurring in part. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Hari Santhanam, Chicago, Ill. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Alexander W. Samuels, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz.

Oral Argument: United States Trustee v. John Q. Hammons Fall 2006, LLC | Case No. 22-1238 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Section 1004(a) of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.115-72, Div. B, 131 Stat. 1232 (28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018)), amended the schedule of quarterly fees payable to the United States Trustee in certain pending bankruptcy cases. In Siegel v. Fitzgerald, 142 S. Ct. 1770 (2022), this Court held that that provision contravened Congress's constitutional authority to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies," U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4, because it was initially applied only in the 88 federal judicial districts that have United States Trustees but not in the 6 districts that have Bankruptcy Administrators. This Court left open the question of "the appropriate remedy" for the violation. Siegel, 142 S. Ct. at 1783.Question Presented: Whether the appropriate remedy for the constitutional uniformity violation found by this Court in Siegel, supra, is to require the United States Trustee to grant retrospective refunds of the increased fees paid by debtors in United States Trustee districts during the period of disuniformity, or is instead either to deem sufficient the prospective remedy adopted by Congress or to require the collection of additional fees from a much smaller number of debtors in Bankruptcy Administrator districts.Holding: Prospective parity (i.e., requiring equal fees for otherwise identical Chapter 11 debtors going forward) is the appropriate remedy for the short-lived and small disparity created by the fee statute held unconstitutional in Siegel v. Fitzgerald.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. "Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex.

Oral Argument: Sheetz v. County of El Dorado | Case No. 22-1074 | Date Argued: 1/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/12/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:George Sheetz applied, to the County of El Dorado, California, for a permit to build a modest manufactured house on his property. Pursuant to legislation enacted by the County, and as the condition of obtaining the permit, Mr. Sheetz was required to pay a monetary exaction of $23,420 to help finance unrelated road improvements. The County demanded payment in spite of the fact that it made no individualized determination that the exaction-a substantial sum for Mr. Sheetz bore an "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" to the purported impacts associated with his modest project as required in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Mr. Sheetz challenged the exaction as an unconstitutional condition under Nollan and Dolan. A California trial court upheld the exaction, holding that, because it was authorized by legislation, the exaction was immune from Nollan/Dolan review. In a published decision, the California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied review. California's judicially-created exemption from Nollan/Dolan scrutiny for legislative exactions conflicts with the decisions of other federal and state courts across the country, and is in strong tension with this Court's more recent precedents.Question Presented: Whether a permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan and Dolan simply because it is authorized by legislation.Holding: The Fifth Amendment's takings clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul J. Beard, II, Los Angeles, Cal. For Respondent: Aileen M. McGrath, San Francisco, Cal.; and Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Oral Argument: FBI v. Fikre | Case No. 22-1178 | Date Decided: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/19/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Individuals are sometimes removed from the No Fly List during ongoing litigation about their placement on that list. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that an individual's removal from the No Fly List moots a case when the government represents that the individual will not be placed back on the list based on currently available information. In conflict with those decisions, the Ninth Circuit held in this case that Respondent's claims were not moot even though he was removed from the No Fly List in 2016 and the government provided a sworn declaration stating that he "will not be placed on the No Fly List in the future based on the currently available information."Question Presented: Whether Respondent's claims challenging his placement on the No Fly List are moot.Holding: The government failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that Yonas Fikre's removal from the government's No Fly List mooted his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case because its declaration did not disclose the conduct that landed Fikre on the No Fly List and did not ensure that he would not be placed back on the list for engaging in the same or similar conduct in the future.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Gadeir Abbas, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Campos-Chaves v. Garland | Case No. 22-674 | Date Argued: 1/8/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24 Host Note: This case was consolidated with Garland v. Singh, Case No. 22-884.Link to Docket: Here.Background: The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that a noncitizen who does not appear at a removal hearing shall be ordered removed in absentia, but only if she was provided "written notice required under paragraph (l) or (2) of section 1229(a).'' 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (b)(5)(A). The Act authorizes rescission of an in absentia order if the noncitizen "did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)." Id. § 1229a (b)(5)(C)(ii). Paragraph (1) of section 1229(a) requires a single notice document that contains all the information specified in the statute, including the "time and place" of proceedings. See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480-1485 (2021). Paragraph (2) requires notice of the "new time and place" "in the case of any change or postponement in the time and place of such proceedings."Question Presented: If the government serves an initial notice document that does not include the "time and place" of proceedings, followed by an additional document containing that information, has the government provided notice "required under" and "in accordance with para- graph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a)" such that an immigration court must enter a removal order in absentia and deny a noncitizen's request to rescind that order?Holding: Because each of the aliens in this case received a proper notice for the removal hearings they missed and at which they were ordered removed from the United States, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), they cannot seek rescission of their in absentia removal orders on the basis of defective notice under Section 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).Result: Affirmed. Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General: Charles L. McCloud, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner in 22-674 and Respondents in 22-884: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.

Oral Argument: Muldrow v. St. Louis | Case No. 22-193 | Date Argued: 12/6/23 | Date Decided: 4/17/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual" with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Eighth Circuit below followed binding circuit precedent to hold that discriminatory job transfers (and denials of requested transfers) are lawful under Title VII when they do not impose "materially significant disadvantages" on employees.Question Presented: Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees?Holding: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant.Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh each filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian Wolfman, Washington, D.C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Moore v. United States | Case No. 22-800 | Date Argued: 12/5/23 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Beginning with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), this Court's decisions have uniformly held "income," for Sixteenth Amendment purposes, to require realization by the taxpayer. In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit approved taxation of a married couple on earnings that they undisputedly did not realize but were instead retained and reinvested by a corporation in which they are minority shareholders. It held that "realization of income is not a constitutional requirement" for Congress to lay an "income" tax exempt from apportionment. App.12. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit became "the first court in the country to state that an 'income tax' doesn't require that a 'taxpayer has realized income.'" App.38 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).Question Presented: Whether the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states.Holding: The Mandatory Repatriation Tax, "which attributes the realized and undistributed income of an American-controlled foreign corporation to the entity's American shareholders, and then taxes the American shareholders on their portions of that income" does not exceed Congress's constitutional authority.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew M. Grossman, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. | Case No. 23-124 | Date Argued: 12/4/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by nondebtors against nondebtor third parties, without the claimants' consent.Holding: The bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C. For Respondents The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Purdue Pharma L.P., et al.: Pratik A. Shah, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: SEC v. Jarkesy | Case No. 22-859 | Date Argued: 11/29/23 | Date Decided: 6/27/24 Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented: Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment.Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine.Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.Holding: When the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant for securities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial.Result: Affirmed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: S. Michael McColloch, Dallas, Tex.

Oral Argument: Wilkinson v. Garland | Case No. 22-666 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 3/19/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of non-permanent residents who satisfy four eligibility criteria, including "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the applicant's immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Congress stripped courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but expressly preserved their jurisdiction to review "questions of law." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as this Court has already held, this "statutory phrase 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts"—that is, a "mixed question of law and fact." Guerrero-Lasprilla u. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020).Question Presented: Whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.Holding: The Immigration Judge's discretionary decision that Situ Kamu Wilkinson failed to satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D)'s "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard for determining eligibility for cancellation of removal is a mixed question of law and fact, reviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(D)'s jurisdiction restoring exception for "questions of law"; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit's holding that the IJ's decision was unreviewable under Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) was in error.Result: Reversed in part, Vacated in part, remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jaime A. Santos, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: McElrath v. Georgia | Case No. 22-721 | Date Argued: 11/28/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal on one criminal charge and its verdict of guilty on a different criminal charge arising from the same facts were logically and legally impossible to reconcile. It called the verdicts "repugnant," vacated both of them, and subsequently held that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time on both charges.Question Presented: Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?Holding: The jury's verdict that the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity of malice murder constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury's other verdicts.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Richard A. Simpson, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Stephen J. Petrany, Solicitor General, Atlanta, Ga.

Oral Argument: Brown v. United States | Case No. 22-6389 | Date Argued: 11/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/23/24 Host Note: Case consolidated with Jackson v. United States, Case No. 22-6640.Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum.Question Presented: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach?Holding: For purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act's 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on certain defendants with three or more previous convictions, a state drug conviction counts as an ACCA predicate if it involved a drug on the federal schedules at the time of that conviction.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined, and in which Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I, II, and III.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner Brown: Jeffrey T. Green, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner Jackson: Andrew Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, Fla. For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Rudisill v. McDonough | Case No. 22-888 | Date Argued: 11/8/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.Holding: Service members who, through separate periods of service, accrue educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills may use either one, in any order, up to 38 U.S.C. § 3695(a)'s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: For Petitioner: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill.For Respondent: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: United States v. Rahimi | Case No. 22-915 | Date Argued: 11/7/23 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.Holding: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion for the Court, in which Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: J. Matthew Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Amarillo, Tex.

Oral Argument: Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Serv. v. Kirtz | Case No. 22-846 | Argument Date: 11/6/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.Holding: A consumer may sue a federal agency under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 16810 for defying the terms of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Nandan M. Joshi, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Vidal v. Elster | Case No. 22-704 | Date Argued: 11/1/23 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Question Presented: Whether the refusal to register a mark under Section 1052(c) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.Holding: The Lanham Act's names clause "which prohibits the registration of a mark that "[c]onsists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent," does not violate the First Amendment.Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III. Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined that opinion in full; Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined all but Part III; and Justice Barrett joined Parts I, II-A, and II-B. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Kagan joined, in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to Parts I, II, and III-B, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Parts I and II. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier | Case No. 22-324 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/2024Question Presented: Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.Holding: Judgment vacated and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion in Lindke v. Freed.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Per Curiam opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Washington, D.C.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)For Respondents: Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford, Cal.

Case Info: Lindke v. Freed | Case No. 22-611 | Date Argued: 10/31/2023 | Date Decided: 3/15/24Background: Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office." Question Presented: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.Holding: A public official who prevents someone from commenting on the official's social-media page engages in state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if the official both (1) possessed actual authority to speak on the state's behalf on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when speaking in the relevant social-media posts.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Victoria R. Ferres, Port Huron, Mich.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Case Info: Culley v. Marshall | Case No. 22-585 | Date Argued: 10/30/23 | Date Decided: 5/9/24Question Presented: In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.Holding: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the due process clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.; and Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)

Case Info: Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP | Case No. 22-807 | Date Argued: 10/11/23 | Date Decided: 5/23/24Background: The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight-day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job.Questions Presented:Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent?Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case?Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics?Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles?Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?Holding: Because the district court's finding that race predominated in the design of South Carolina's first congressional district was clearly erroneous, the district court's racial-gerrymandering and vote-dilution holdings cannot stand.Result: Reversed in Part, Remanded in Part.Voting Breakdown: 5-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to all but Part III-C. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Appellants: John M. Gore, Washington, D.C. For Appellees: Leah C. Aden, New York, N. Y.For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC | Case No. 22-660 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/8/24Background: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv).Question Presented: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?Holding: A whistleblower seeking to invoke the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act must prove that their protected activity was a contributing factor in the employer's unfavorable personnel action, but need not prove that the employer acted with "retaliatory intent."Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.)For Respondents: Eugene Scalia, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co. | Case No. 22-500 | Date Argued: 10/10/23 | Date Decided: 2/21/24Question Presented: Under federal admiralty law, can a choice of law clause in a maritime contract be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the state whose law is displaced?Holding: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions not applicable in this case.Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey B. Wall, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Howard J. Bashman, Fort Washington, Pa.

Case Info: Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer | Case No. 22-429 | Date Argued: 10/4/23 | Date Decided: 12/5/23Question Presented: Does a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act "tester" have Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation?Holding: Because Deborah Laufer voluntarily dismissed her pending suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Laufer's case against Acheson is moot.Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Jackson filed opinions concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Assn. of America, Ltd. | Case No. 22-448 | Date Argued: 10/3/23 | Date Decided: 4/16/24Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 12 U.S.C. 5497, violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 9, Cl. 7, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the CFPB was receiving such funding.Holding: Congress' statutory authorization allowing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to draw money from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out the bureau's duties, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(l)-(2), satisfies the appropriations clause.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Noel J. Francisco, Washington, D.C.

Case Info: Pulsifer v. United States | Case No. 22-340 | Date Argued: 10/2/23 | Date Decided: 3/15/24Background: The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added).Question Presented: Whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold).Holding: A criminal defendant facing a mandatory minimum sentence is eligible for safety-valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(l) only if the defendant satisfies each of the provision's three conditions.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Argument: Tyler v. Hennepin County | Case No. 22-166 | Date Argued: 4/26/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023

Oral Argument: Yegiazaryan v. Smagin | Case No. 22-381 | Date Argued: 4/25/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: Dupree v. Younger | Case No. 22-210 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 5/25/2023

Oral Argument: Lac du Flambeau Band v. Coughlin | Case No. 22-227 | Date Argued: 4/24/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023

Oral Argument: Counterman v. Colorado | Case No. 22-138 | Date Argued: 4/19/2023 | Date Decided: 6/27/2023

Oral Argument: U.S., ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu Inc. | Case No. 21-1326 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023

Oral Argument: Groff v. DeJoy | Case No. 22-174 | Date Argued: 4/18/2023 | Date Decided: 6/29/2023

Oral Argument: Slack Technologies, LLC v. Pirani | Case No. 22-200 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/1/2023

Oral Argument: Pugin v. Garland | Case No. 22-23 | Date Argued: 4/17/2023 | Date Decided: 6/22/2023

Oral Argument: Samia v. United States | Case No. 22-196 | Date Argued: 3/29/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Lora v. United States | Case No. 22-49 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/16/2023

Oral Argument: Smith v. United States | Case No. 21-1576 | Date Argued: 3/28/2023 | Date Decided: 6/15/2023

Oral Argument: United States v. Hansen | Case No. 22-179 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 6/23/2023

Oral Argument: Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi | Case No. 21-757 | Date Argued: 3/27/2023 | Date Decided: 5/18/2023