The High Court Report

Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law. Nance’s requested relief still places his execution in Georgia’s control. If Georgia wants to carry out the death sentence, it can enact legislation approving what a court has found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. Although that 3 Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus may take more time and effort than changing an agency protocol, Hill explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure is irrelevant to the vehicle question—which focuses on whether the requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate the death sentence. 547 U. S., at 583. And anyway, Georgia has given no reason to think that passing new legislation would be a substantial impediment. The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion only by wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. In its view, granting Nance relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence because Georgia law must be taken as “fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1211. But one of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and thus compel change of—state laws when necessary to v

Nance v. Ward | Case No. 21-439 | Date Argued: 4/25/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: In Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019), "all nine Justices" agreed that a person challenging a State's method of execution could allege an alternative "not ... authorized under current state law" and that there was therefore "little likelihood that an inmate facing a serious risk of pain will be unable to identify an available alternative." Id. at 1136 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In the proceedings below, Petitioner filed a § 1983 suit bringing an as-applied challenge to Georgia's sole statutorily authorized method of execution, lethal injection. Petitioner alleged the use of a firing squad as an alternative method. A divided panel held that Petitioner's challenge could not be heard. The panel ruled that Petitioner must bring his challenge in habeas rather than via § 1983 because he had alleged an alternative method not currently authorized under Georgia law. It further held that Petitioner's claim would be an impermissible successive petition notwithstanding that the claim would not have been ripe at the time of Petitioner's first petition.Question Presented: Whether an inmate's as-applied method-of-execution challenge must be raised in a habeas petition instead of through a § 1983 action if the inmate pleads an alternative method of execution not currently authorized by state law. Whether, if such a challenge must be raised in habeas, it constitutes a successive petition where the challenge would not have been ripe at the time of the inmate's first habeas petition.Holding: Section 1983 remains an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim where, as here, the prisoner proposes an alternative method not authorized by the State’s death-penalty statute. Both §1983 and the federal habeas statute enable a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477, 480. A prisoner may generally sue under §1983, unless his claim falls into that statute’s “implicit exception” for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U. S. 74, 79. When a prisoner seeks relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” he comes within the core and must proceed in habeas. Heck, 512 U. S., at 487. The Court has twice held that prisoners could bring method-ofexecution claims under §1983. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 644–647; Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 580–583. Although these cases predated the Court’s requirement that prisoners identify alternative methods of execution, each prisoner had still said enough to leave the Court convinced that alternatives to the challenged procedures were available. See Nelson, 541 U. S., at 646; Hill, 547 U. S., at 580–581. Because alternatives were available, the prisoners’ challenges would not “necessarily prevent [the State] from carrying out [their] execution[s].” Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original); see Hill, 547 U. S., at 583. That made §1983 a proper vehicle. In Nelson and Hill, the Court observed that using a different method required only a change in an agency’s uncodified protocol. Here, Georgia would have to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. Except for that fact, this case would even more clearly than Nelson and Hill be fit for §1983. Since those cases, the Court has required a prisoner bringing a method-of-execution claim to propose an alternative way of carrying out his death sentence. Thus, an order granting the prisoner relief does not, as required for habeas, “necessarily prevent” the State from implementing the execution. Nelson, 541 U. S., at 647 (emphasis in original). Rather, the order gives the State a pathway forward. That remains true even where, as here, the proposed alternative is one unauthorized by present state law. Nance’s requested relief still places his execution in Georgia’s control. If Georgia wants to carry out the death sentence, it can enact legislation approving what a court has found to be a fairly easy-to-employ method of execution. Although that 3 Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus may take more time and effort than changing an agency protocol, Hill explained that the “incidental delay” involved in changing a procedure is irrelevant to the vehicle question—which focuses on whether the requested relief would “necessarily” invalidate the death sentence. 547 U. S., at 583. And anyway, Georgia has given no reason to think that passing new legislation would be a substantial impediment. The Court of Appeals could reach the contrary conclusion only by wrongly treating Georgia’s statute as immutable. In its view, granting Nance relief would necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence because Georgia law must be taken as “fixed.” 981 F. 3d, at 1211. But one of the “main aims” of §1983 is to “override”—and thus compel change of—state laws when necessary to v

Vega v. Tekoh | Case No. 21-499 | Date Argued: 4/20/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), this Court announced a prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. That rule generally prohibits criminal trial courts from admitting into evidence against a criminal defendant any self- incriminating statement made by that defendant while he was in custody, unless the defendant first received certain warnings spelled out in Miranda. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a damages remedy for deprivations of any right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff may state a claim for relief against a law enforcement officer under Section 1983 based simply on an officer's failure to provide the warnings prescribed in Miranda.Holding: A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a §1983 claim.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Roman Martinez, Washington, D.C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Paul L. Hoffman, Hermosa Beach, Cal.

Kemp v. United States | Case No. 21-5726 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022Background: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorizes relief from final judgment based on "mistake," as well as inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.Question Presented: The question presented is: Whether Rule 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court's error of law.Holding: The term “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law. Because Kemp’s motion alleged such a legal error, it was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(1) and untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. For Respondent: Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

George v. McDonough | Case No. 21-234 | Date Argued: 4/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Background: In the veterans-benefits system, Congress has provided that an otherwise-final agency decision is subject to revision if that decision is based on "clear and unmistakable error." Here, the Federal Circuit held that the agency's application of a regulation that conflicts with the plain meaning of a statute cannot amount to "clear and unmistakable error." The Federal Circuit reasoned that a federal court's later invalidation of such a regulation is merely a change in interpretation of the law. But this Court has made clear that when a court interprets the plain meaning of a statute, it is not announcing a change but rather declaring what the statute has always meant. An agency regulation that departs from that plain meaning is — and always was — legally invalid. And if the agency relied on that unlawful regulation in an adjudication, that adjudication is infected with a legal error that is clear and unmistakable on the face of the ruling.Question Presented: When the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) denies a veteran's claim for benefits in reliance on an agency interpretation that is later deemed invalid under the plain text of the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the denial, is that the kind of "clear and unmistakable error" that the veteran may invoke to challenge VA's decision?Holding: The invalidation of a VA regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief based on clear and unmistakable error.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IIâC.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022Question Presented: Whether a state workers' compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities "in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State."Holding: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Wash.

United States v. Washington | Case No. 21-404 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022Question Presented: Whether a state workers' compensation law that applies exclusively to federal contract workers who perform services at a specified federal facility is barred by principles of intergovernmental immunity, or is instead authorized by 40 U.S.C. 3172(a), which permits the application of state workers' compensation laws to federal facilities "in the same way and to the same extent as if the premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State."Holding: Washington’s law facially discriminates against the Federal Government and its contractors. Because §3172 does not clearly and unambiguously waive the Federal Government’s immunity from discriminatory state laws, Washington’s law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Tera M. Heintz, Deputy Solicitor General, Olympia, Wash.

Siegel v. Fitzgerald | Case No. 21-441 | Date Argued: 4/18/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022Background: This case presents a clear and acknowledged conflict over the constitutionality of a federal statute governing the quarterly fees in large Chapter 11 bankruptcies. The Bankruptcy Clause authorizes Congress to "establish * * * uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." Notwithstanding this directive, Congress has divided the nation's bankruptcy courts into two distinct programs: 88 judicial districts operate under the U.S. Trustee program, and 6 judicial districts (all in North Carolina and Alabama) operate under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Each program generally performs similar tasks, and each program-until recently-imposed the same quarterly fees on Chapter 11 debtors in their districts. In the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, however, Congress adopted a five-year increase in quarterly fees paid only in U.S. Trustee districts-increasing the maximum fee from $30,000 to $250,000 for all pending cases. 28 U.S.C. 1930(a)(6)(B) (2018). That same increase was not imposed in Administrator districts until nine months later, and it applied only to cases filed after that date. The result is a wide disparity in fees paid by identically situated debtors based solely on the geographic location of their bankruptcy. The total difference exceeds $100 million in aggregate fees in Chapter 11 cases nationwide. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit (each over dissents) in upholding these non-uniform fees; the Second Circuit has rejected those decisions and declared the 2017 Act unconstitutional.Question Presented: Whether the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in U.S. Trustee districts.Holding: Congress’ enactment of a significant fee increase that exempted debtors in two States violated the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondent: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana | Case No. 20-1573 | Date Argued: 3/30/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Background: In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011), and Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2018), this Court held that when parties agree to resolve their disputes by individualized arbitration, those agreements are fully enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). Courts are not free to disregard or "reshape traditional individualized arbitration" by applying rules that demand collective or representational adjudication of certain claims. Epic, 138 S.Ct. at 1623. The FAA allows the parties not only to choose arbitration but to retain the benefits of arbitration by maintaining its traditional, bilateral form. While California courts follow Concepcion and Epic when a party to an individualized arbitration agreement tries to assert class-action claims, they refuse to do so when a party to such an agreement asserts representative claims under the California Private Attorneys General Act ("PAGA"), which — like a class action — allows aggrieved employees to seek monetary awards on a representative basis on behalf of other employees. See Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014). As a result, Concepcion and Epic have not caused bilateral arbitration to flourish in California, as this Court intended, but have merely caused FAA-defying representational litigation to shift form.Question Presented: Whether the Federal Arbitration Act requires enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims, including under PAGA.Holding: The FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Gorsuch joined in which Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Parts I and III and in which Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to Part III. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, inLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Scott L. Nelson, Washington, D.C.

Torres v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety | Case No. 20-603 | Date Argued: 3/29/2022 | Date Decided: 6/29/2022Background: In the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Congress gave the over 19 million military servicemembers — including over 800,000 who work for state and local government employers — a cause of action to remedy adverse employment actions taken because of their military service. It enacted USERRA pursuant to its constitutional War Powers, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 11-16, recognizing that unremedied employment discrimination by state employers based on military service could interfere with the nation's "ability to provide for a strong national defense." H.R. Rep. No. 105-448, at 5 (1998). USERRA's cause of action against state employers may be pursued only in state courts. In a sharply divided decision that conflicts with the Constitution's text, structure, and history, the court below, a Texas intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over more than 2 million Texas citizens, held that USERRA's cause of action is unconstitutional because Congress lacks the power to authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.Question Presented: Whether Congress has the power to authorize suits against nonconsenting states pursuant to its War Powers.Holding: By ratifying the Constitution, the States agreed their sovereignty would yield to the national power to raise and support the Armed Forces. Congress may exercise this power to authorize private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in USERRA.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.; and Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon | Case No. 21-309 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022Question Presented: Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") provides that the FAA does not apply "to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1. In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), this Court held that Section 1 applies only to interstate "transportation workers." The Court did not define the term "transportation worker."Holding: Saxon belongs to a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” to which §1’s exemption applies.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined except Justice Barrett, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.

LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. | Case No. 20-807 | Date Argued: 3/28/2022 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: [NO INFORMATION]Result: Voting information not foundVoting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not foundLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Colleen E. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: J. Scott Ballenger, Washington, D.C.

Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

Golan v. Saada | Case No. 20-1034 | Date Argued: 3/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Question Presented: Whether, upon finding that return to the country of habitual residence places a child at grave risk, a district court is required to consider ameliorative measures that would facilitate the return of the child notwithstanding the grave risk finding.Holding: A court is not categorically required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Karen R. King, New York, N.Y. For United States, as amicus curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Richard Min, New York, N.Y.

Berger v. North Carolina State Conf. of NAACP | Case No. 21-248 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: The leaders of North Carolina's Republican-controlled legislature retained a private attorney to represent them, purportedly on behalf of the State, to defend the constitutionality of North Carolina's voter-ID law. Rather than allowing both Executive Branch officials and legislative leaders to speak on behalf of the State as they did at the district court, the Fourth Circuit ordered the dismissal of the legislative leaders from the case on appeal.Question Presented: Whether a state agent authorized by state law to defend the State's interest in litigation must overcome a presumption of adequate representation to intervene as of right in a case in which a state official is a defendant.Holding: North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: David H. Thompson, Washington, D.C. For NAACP Respondents: Elisabeth S. Theodore, Washington, D.C. For state Respondents: Sarah Boyce, Deputy Solicitor General, Raleigh, N. C.

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. | Case No. 21-328 | Date Argued: 3/21/2022 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022Background: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right and, in the context of contracts, occurs when one party to a contract either explicitly repudiates its rights under the contract or acts in a manner inconsistent with an intention of exercising them.Question Presented: Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate this Court's instruction that lower courts must "place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts?" AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).Holding: The Eighth Circuit erred in conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Federal courts have generally resolved cases like this one as a matter of federal law, using the terminology of waiver. The parties dispute whether that framework is correct. Assuming without deciding that it is, federal courts may not create arbitration-specific variants of federal procedural rules, like those concerning waiver, based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24. That policy “is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.” Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 561 U. S. 287, 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind. But a court may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over litigation. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 218–221. The federal policy is about treating arbitration contracts like all others, not about fostering arbitration. The text of the FAA makes clear that courts are not to create arbitration-specific procedural rules like the one here. Section 6 of the FAA provides that any application under the statute—including an application to stay litigation or compel arbitration—“shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions” (unless the statute says otherwise). A directive to treat arbitration applications “in the manner provided by law” for all other motions is simply a command to apply the usual federal procedural rules, including any rules relating to a motion’s timeliness. Because the usual federal rule of waiver does not include a prejudice requirement, Section 6 instructs that prejudice is not a condition of finding that a party waived its right to stay litigation or compel arbitration under the FAA. Stripped of its prejudice requirement, the Eighth Circuit’s current waiver inquiry would focus on Sundance’s conduct. Did Sundance knowingly relinquish the right to arbitrate by acting inconsistently with that right? On remand, the Court of Appeals may resolve that question, or determine that a different procedural framework (such as forfeiture) is appropriate. The Court’s sole holding today is that it may not make up a new procedural rule based on the FAA’s “policy favoring arbitration.”.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Karla A. Gilbride, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C.

Egbert v. Boule | Case No. 21-147 | Date Argued: 3/2/2022 | Date Decided: 6/8/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: Bivens does not extend to create causes of action for Boule’s Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and First Amendment retaliation claim.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Sarah M. Harris, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Felicia H. Ellsworth, Boston, Mass.

Ruan v. United States | Case No. 20-1410 | Date Argued: 3/1/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022Background: A physician otherwise authorized to prescribe controlled substances may be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) if his prescriptions "fall outside the usual course of professional practice." United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 124 (1975).Question Presented: Whether a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice may be convicted under Section 841(a)(1) without regard to whether, in good faith, he "reasonably believed" or "subjectively intended" that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice.Holding: Section 841’s “knowingly or intentionally” mens rea applies to the statute’s “except as authorized” clause. Once a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was “authorized,” the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IâA, IâB and II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner in 20-1410: Lawrence S. Robbins, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner in 21-5261: Beau B. Brindley, Chicago, Ill. For Respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

West Virginia v. EPA | Case No. 20-1530 | Date Argued: 2/28/2022 | Date Decided: 6/30/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: [NO INFORMATION]Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For state Petitioners: Lindsay S. See, Solicitor General, Charleston, W. Va. For private Petitioners: Jacob M. Roth, Washington, D.C. For federal Respondents: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For power company Respondents: Beth S. Brinkmann, Washington, D.C.

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas | Case No. 20-493 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Background: In 1987, following years of negotiation and drafting, the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo (the "Pueblo") and Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Texas (together, the "Tribes") secured restoration of their trust relationships with the federal government through the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama-Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act ("Restoration Act"). That Act includes a "Gaming Activities" provision that states in relevant part: (a) IN GENERAL.- All gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe ... (b) NO STATE REGULATORY JURISDICTION.-Nothing in this section shall be construed as a grant of civil or criminal regulatory jurisdiction to the State of Texas. In 1994, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Ysleta I") eschewed the Restoration Act's plain language, legislative history, and this Court's governing precedent to grant Texas regulatory jurisdiction over non-prohibited gaming activities on the Tribes' lands. Ysleta I and its progeny effectively read Section 107(b) out of the Restoration Act and deprive the Pueblo of its sovereign authority to regulate its own non-prohibited gaming.Question Presented: Whether the Restoration Act provides the Pueblo with sovereign authority to regulate non-prohibited gaming activities on its lands (including bingo), as set forth in the plain language of Section 107(b), the Act's legislative history, and this Court's holding in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), or whether the Fifth Circuit's decision affirming Ysleta I correctly subjects the Pueblo to all Texas gaming regulations.Holding: The Restoration Act bans as a matter of federal law on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito and Kavanaugh joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Brant C. Martin, Fort Worth, Tex.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Lanora C. Pettit, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

Denezpi v. United States | Case No. 20-7622 | Date Argued: 2/22/2022 | Date Decided: 6/13/2022Background: In April 2017, a Court of Indian Offenses in Colorado prosecuted petitioner Merle Denezpi for violations of federal regulatory laws and the code of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe. In June 2018, more than a year after sentencing for those offenses, a federal court in Colorado indicted Mr. Denezpi for one count of aggravated sexual abuse. The indictment was based on the same incident for which Mr. Denezpi had been prosecuted and sentenced in the Court of Indian Offenses. Mr. Denezpi moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds.Question Presented: Whether the Court of Indian Offenses of Ute Mountain Ute Agency is a federal agency such that a defendant's conviction in that court bars a subsequent prosecution for a federal offense arising out of the same incident.Holding: The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined as to Parts I and III.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Michael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Erica L. Ross, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate | Case No. 21-12 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 5/16/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: 1. Appellees have standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of Section 304.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For appellant: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For appellees: Charles J. Cooper, Washington, D.C.

Concepcion v. United States | Case No. 20-1650 | Date Argued: 1/19/2022 | Date Decided: 6/27/2022Question Presented: [cannot locate]Holding: The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Kagan and Gorsuch joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection | Case No. 20-1566 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Background: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 ("FSIA"), provides that where a foreign state or an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state is not entitled to immunity, a federal court should "apply the law of the forum state, including its choice-of-law rules." Here, the foreign state defendant (an agency or instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain) seeks to avoid California's choice-of-law rule and instead asks the federal court to apply federal common law.Question Presented: Whether a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the FSIA must apply the forum state's choice-of-law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or whether it may apply federal common law.Holding: In an FSIA suit raising non-federal claims against a foreign state or instrumentality, a court should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Here, that means applying the forum State’s choiceof-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. The FSIA provides a baseline principle of foreign sovereign immunity from civil actions unless a statutory exception applies (including the expropriation exception found to apply here). See §§1604–1607. Yet the FSIA was never “intended to affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state or instrumentality” deemed amenable to suit. First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U. S. 611, 620. To the contrary, Section 1606 of the statute provides: “As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under [the FSIA], the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” When a foreign state is not immune from suit, it is subject to the same rules of liability (the same substantive law) as a private party. See First Nat. City Bank, at 622, n. 11. Section 1606 dictates the selection of a choice-of-law rule: It must mirror the rule that would apply in a similar suit between private parties. Only the same choice-of-law rule can guarantee use of the same substantive law—and thus guarantee the same liability. Consider two suits seeking recovery of a painting: one suit against a foreign-statecontrolled museum (as here), the other against a private museum. If the choice-of-law rules in the two suits differed, so might the substantive law chosen. And if the substantive law differed, so might the suits’ outcomes. Contrary to Section 1606, the two museums would not be “liable to the same manner and to the same extent.” In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-oflaw rule—because that is the rule a court would use in comparable private litigation. Consider the just-hypothesized suit against a private museum, brought as this case was in California and asserting 3 Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) Syllabus non-federal claims. If the private suit were filed in state court, California’s choice-of-law rule would govern. And if the private suit were filed in federal court, the same would be true, because a federal court sitting in diversity borrows the forum State’s choice-of-law rule. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496. If California’s choice-of-law rule applies in the private-museum suit, it must also apply in the suit here, against the Foundation. That is the only way to ensure—as Section 1606 demands—that the Foundation, although a Spanish instrumentality, will be liable in the same way as a private party. Even absent the clarity of Section 1606, the Court would likely reach the same result. Scant justification exists for federal common lawmaking in this context. Judicial creation of federal common law to displace state-created rules must be “necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.” Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 640. While foreign relations is an interest of that kind, here even the Federal Government disclaims any necessity for a federal choiceof-law rule in FSIA suits raising non-federal claims.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: David Boies, Armonk, N.Y.; and Masha G. Hansford, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Thaddeus J. Stauber, Los Angeles, Cal.

Shurtleff v. Boston | Case No. 20-1800 | Date Argued: 1/18/2022 | Date Decided: 5/2/2022Background: Boston creates designated public forums in many contexts, including on City Hall Plaza. Over a twelve-year period, the City approved 284 applications from private organizations to use one of the City's three flagpoles on the Plaza, which the City designated as a public forum for private speech. Boston approved all prior applications, denying none, and exercised no substantive control over the content of these 284 flag raisings. The City rejected only one application, Camp Constitution's request to briefly raise a Christian flag in connection with an event celebrating the civic contributions of Boston's Christian community. Although the City admitted that the flag raisings are private speech, it invoked the Establishment Clause to justify censoring Camp Constitution's Christian viewpoint.Question Presented: Whether the First Circuit's failure to apply this Court's forum doctrine to the City's exclusion of the Christian flag from a city hall flagpole, which was designated as a public forum open to "all applicants" until the City denied access to the Christian flag, is inconsistent with this Court's precedents holding that speech restrictions based on religious viewpoint violate the First Amendment or are otherwise subject to strict scrutiny. Whether the First Circuit's classifying private religious speech as government speech because it occurs on a government flagpole in a public forum, when nothing about the religious speech or the circumstances of the temporary flag display in the forum is attributable to the government, conflicts with this Court's decisions in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017), Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), and Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). Whether the First Circuit's finding that the Establishment Clause justified a city's viewpoint-based exclusion of religious expression from a flagpole forum that was open to "all applicants" conflicts with this Court's precedents in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).Holding: 1. Boston’s flag-raising program does not express government speech.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Mathew Staver, Orlando, Fla.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Washington, D.C.

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue | Case No. 20-1472 | Date Argued: 1/12/2022 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Background: Section 6330(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code establishes a 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").Question Presented: Whether the time limit in Section 6330(d)(1) is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling.Holding: Section 6330(d)(1)’s 30-day time limit to file a petition for review of a collection due process determination is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Melissa Arbus Sherry, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Gallardo v. Marstiller | Case No. 20-1263 | Date Argued: 1/10/2022 | Date Decided: 6/6/2022Question Presented: Whether the federal Medicaid Act provides for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid's payment of a beneficiary's past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary's tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses.Holding: The Medicaid Act permits a State to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed dissenting opinion in which, Justice Breyer joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Bryan S. Gowdy, Jacksonville, Fla.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Henry C. Whitaker, Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Fla.

Carson v. Makin | Case No. 20-1088 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022Background: In Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020), this Court held that a state cannot exclude families and schools from participating in a student-aid program because of a school's religious status. The Court expressly declined to address religious use—that is, whether a state may exclude families and schools based on what they plan to do with the money.Question Presented: Does a state violate the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution by prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or "sectarian," instruction?Holding: Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violates the Free Exercise Clause.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined as to all but Part IâB. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Michael Bindas, Seattle, Wash. For Respondent: Christopher C. Taub, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Augusta, Me.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Shinn v. Ramirez | Case No. 20-1009 | Date Argued: 12/8/2021 | Date Decided: 5/23/2022Question Presented: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), precludes a federal court from considering evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney has failed to diligently develop the claim's factual basis in state court, subject to only two statutory exceptions. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), this Court announced an equitable exception to the procedural default bar, holding that a prisoner may obtain federal habeas review of a defaulted claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel if post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it. The Ninth Circuit has held that Martinez also requires an exception to § 2254(e)(2)'s prohibition on expansion of the state-court record in federal court. Does Martinez justify a federal habeas court's disregard of § 2254(e)(2)'s clear prohibition on expanding the state-court record?Holding: Under §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brunn W. Roysden, III, Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz. For Respondents: Robert M. Loeb, Washington, D.C.

United States v. Taylor | Case No. 20-1459 | Date Argued: 12/7/2021 | Date Decided: 6/21/2022Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(A)'s definition of "crime of violence" excludes attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951(a).Holding: Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under §924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 7-1. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito filed dissenting opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Rebecca Taibleson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.

Hughes v. Northwestern University | Case No. 19-1401 | Date Argued: 12/6/2021 | Date Decided: 1/24/2022Background: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1104, a plan fiduciary must discharge its duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters" would use. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). Petitioners filed a class action alleging that respondents violated their duty of prudence by: (1) failing to monitor and control recordkeeping fees, resulting in unreasonably high costs to plan participants; (2) offering retail class mutual funds with higher fees than those charged by otherwise identical share classes of the same funds; and (3) offering options with unnecessary fees when other options with lower costs and identical investment guarantees were available to the plan fiduciaries.Question Presented: Whether allegations that a defined-contribution retirement plan paid or charged its participants fees that substantially exceeded fees for alternative available investment products or services are sufficient to state a claim against plan fiduciaries for breach of the duty of prudence under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).Holding: The Seventh Circuit erred in relying on the participants’ ultimate choice over their investments to excuse allegedly imprudent decisions by respondents. Determining whether petitioners state plausible claims against plan fiduciaries for violations of ERISA’s duty of prudence requires a context-specific inquiry of the fiduciaries’ continuing duty to monitor investments and to remove imprudent ones as articulated in Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U. S. 523. Tibble concerned allegations that plan fiduciaries had offered “higher priced retail-class mutual funds as Plan investments when materially identical lower priced institutional-class mutual funds were available.” Id., at 525–526. The Tibble Court concluded that the plaintiffs had identified a potential violation with respect to certain funds because “a fiduciary is required to conduct a regular review of its investment.” Id., at 528. Tibble’s discussion of the continuing duty to monitor plan investments applies here. Petitioners allege that respondents’ failure to monitor investments prudently—by retaining recordkeepers that charged excessive fees, offering options likely to confuse investors, and neglecting to provide cheaper and otherwise-identical alternative investments—resulted in respondents failing to remove imprudent investments from the menu of investment offerings. In rejecting petitioners’ allegations, the Seventh Circuit did not apply Tibble’s guidance but instead erroneously focused on another component of the duty of prudence: a fiduciary’s obligation to assemble a diverse menu of options. But respondents’ provision of an adequate array of investment choices, including the lower cost investments plaintiffs wanted, does not excuse their allegedly imprudent decisions. Even in a defined-contribution plan where participants choose their investments, Tibble instructs that plan fiduciaries must conduct their own independent evaluation to determine which investments may be prudently included in the plan’s menu of options. See id., at 529–530. If the fiduciaries fail to remove an imprudent investment from the plan within a reasonable time, they breach their duty. The Seventh Circuit’s exclusive focus on investor choice elided this aspect of the duty of prudence. The court maintained the same mistaken focus in rejecting petitioners’ claims with respect to recordkeeping fees on the grounds that plan participants could have chosen investment options with lower expenses. The Court vacates the judgment below so that the Seventh Circuit may reevaluate the allegations as a whole, considering whether petitioners have plausibly alleged a violation of the duty of prudence as articulated in Tibble under applicable pleading standards. The content of the duty of prudence turns on “the circumstances . . . prevailing” at the time the fiduciary acts, 29 U. S. C. §1104(a)(1)(B), so the appropriate inquiry will be context specific. Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U. S. 409, 425.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Barrett, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: David C. Frederick, Washington, D.C.; and Michael R. Huston, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Gregory G. Garre, Washington, D.C.

Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health | Case No. 19-1392 | Date Argued: 12/1/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022Question Presented: Whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional. Whether the validity of a pre-viability law that protects women's health, the dignity of unborn children, and the integrity of the medical profession and society should be analyzed under Casey's "undue burden" standard or Hellerstedt's balancing of benefits and burdens. Whether abortion providers have third-party standing to invalidate a law that protects women from the dangers of late-term abortions by restricting inhumane dismemberment abortions.Holding: The Constitution does not confer a right to abortion; Roe and Casey are overruled; and the authority to regulate abortion is returned to the people and their elected representatives.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, filedLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Scott G. Stewart, Solicitor General, Jackson, Miss. For Respondents: Julie Rikelman, New York, N.Y.; and Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

American Hospital Assn. v. Becerra | Case No. 20-1114 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 6/15/2022Question Presented: Whether Chevron deference permits HHS to set reimbursement rates based on acquisition cost and vary such rates by hospital group if it has not collected hospital acquisition cost survey data. Whether petitioners' suit challenging HHS's adjustments is precluded by 42 U.S.C. § 1395l(t)(12), which bars judicial review of "the development of the [outpatient prospective payment] classification system," "the establishment of" various groups of outpatient services, and "adjustments" pursuant to certain provisions of the statute.Holding: 1. The statute does not preclude judicial review of HHS’s reimbursement rates. Judicial review of final agency action is traditionally available unless “a statute’s language or structure” precludes it, Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U. S. 480, 486, and this Court has long recognized a “strong presumption” in its favor, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Serv., 586 U. S. ___, ___. Here, no provision in the Medicare statute precludes judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates. HHS cites two nearby provisions that preclude review of the general payment methodology that HHS employs to set rates for other Medicare outpatient services. See §§1395l(t)(12)(A), (C). But HHS sets rates for outpatient prescription drugs using a different payment methodology. HHS also argues that other statutory requirements would make allowing judicial review of the 2018 and 2019 reimbursement rates impractical. Regardless, such arguments cannot override the text of the statute and the traditional presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Christopher G. Michel, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Cummings v. Premier Rehab | Case No. 20-219 | Date Argued: 11/30/2021 | Date Decided: 4/28/2022Background: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating based on race, color, or national origin, and provides that victims of discrimination may recover compensatory damages for intentional violations. This Court has interpreted Title VI's implied private right of action as providing victims of intentional discrimination compensatory, but not punitive, damages. Congress has expressly incorporated Title VI's remedial scheme into other statutes that prohibit recipients of federal funds from discriminating on other grounds, including disability.Question Presented: Whether the compensatory damages available under Title VI and the statutes that incorporate its remedial scheme include compensation for emotional distress.Holding: Emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a private action to enforce either the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Affordable Care Act.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew Rozynski, New York, N.Y.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation | Case No. 20-1312 | Date Argued: 11/29/2021 | Date Decided: 6/24/2022Background: The Medicare statute provides that a hospital that serves a "significantly disproportionate number of low-income patients" is entitled to an upward adjustment in the rate at which the federal government reimburses the hospital for services provided to Medicare patients. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(i)(I), (ii). That adjustment-known as a "disproportionate share hospital" (DSH) adjustment-requires a determination of the percentage of the hospital's patients who are eligible for Medicaid, the low-income healthcare program.Question Presented: Whether the Secretary has permissibly included in a hospital's Medicare fraction all of the hospital's patient days of individuals who satisfy the requirements to be entitled to Medicare Part A benefits, regardless of whether Medicare actually paid the hospital for those particular days.Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, individuals “entitled to [Medicare Part A] benefits” are all those qualifying for the program, regardless of whether they receive Medicare payments for part or all of a hospital stay.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Breyer, Sotomayor and Barrett joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jonathan C. Bond, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Daniel J. Hettich, Washington, D.C.

Austin v. Reagan National Advertising | Case No. 20-1029 | Date Argued: 11/10/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Background: Austin sign code provisions distinguish between on-premise and off-premise signs based solely on location—specifically, whether a sign is located at the same location as the business, person, activity, goods, products, or services being advertised. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, this Court held that, because the Gilbert sign code "single[d] out specific subject matter for differential treatment," it was content-based regardless of the government's purpose. 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015).Question Presented: Is the city code's distinction between on- and off-premise signs a facially unconstitutional content-based regulation under Reed v. Town of Gilbert?Holding: The City’s on-/off-premises distinction is facially content neutral under the First Amendment.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Kagan and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C.; and Benjamin Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C.

United States v. Vaello-Madero | Case No. 20-303 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Question Presented: Whether Congress violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income—a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind, and disabled individuals—in the 50 States and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not extending it to Puerto Rico.Holding: The Constitution does not require Congress to extend SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U. S. 1, and Harris v. Rosario, 446 U. S. 651, the Court applied the deferential rational-basis test to uphold Congress’s decision not to extend certain federal benefits to Puerto Rico, noting that because Congress chose to treat residents of Puerto Rico differently from residents of the States for purposes of tax laws, it could do the same for benefits programs. Those two precedents dictate the result here. Congress’s decision to exempt Puerto Rico’s residents from most federal income, gift, estate, and excise taxes supplies a rational basis for likewise distinguishing residents of Puerto Rico from residents of the States for purposes of the SSI benefits program. Vaello Madero’s contrary position would usher in potentially far-reaching consequences, with serious implications for the Puerto Rican people and the Puerto Rican economy. The Constitution does not require that extreme outcome.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch filed concurring opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Hermann Ferre, New York, N.Y.

Ramirez v. Collier | Case No. 21-5592 | Date Argued: 11/9/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022Question Presented: Under the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), if a prisoner requests a religious accommodation that the state rejects, must the prisoner prove that the state has substantially burdened his religious exercise, or does the state need to prove that its denial of the religious accommodation satisfies strict scrutiny?Holding: Ramirez is likely to succeed on his RLUIPA claims because Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s compelling interests.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh filed concurring opinions. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Seth Kretzer, Houston, Tex. For United States, as amicus curiae: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

FBI v. Fazaga | Case No. 20-828 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022Background: Section 1806 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., governs the "[u]se of information" obtained or derived from electronic surveillance conducted under FSIA. Section 1806(c) requires the government to notify a person of its intent to use or disclose such information against that person in a judicial or administrative proceeding in specified circumstances.Question Presented: Whether Section 1806(f) displaces the state-secrets privilege and authorizes a district court to resolve, in camera and ex parte, the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of government surveillance by considering the privileged evidence.Holding: Section 1806(f) does not displace the state secrets privilege.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Agent Respondents: Catherine M.A. Carroll, Washington, D.C. For Respondents Fazaga, et al.: Ahilan T. Arulanantham, Los Angeles, Cal.

Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. | Case No. 20-915 | Date Argued: 11/8/2021 | Date Decided: 2/24/2022Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit err in breaking with its own prior precedent and the findings of other circuits and the Copyright Office in holding that 17 U.S.C. § 411 requires referral to the Copyright Office where there is no indicia of fraud or material error as to the work's registrability, but rather only good-faith mistakes in the registration application?Holding: Section 411(b) does not distinguish between a mistake of law and a mistake of fact; lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under §411(b)(1)(A)’s safe harbor.Result: Judgment VACATED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Gorsuch joined except as to Part II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N.Y.; and Melissa N. Patterson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: Peter K. Stris, Los Angeles, Cal.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen | Case No. 20-843 | Date Argued: 11/3/2021 | Date Decided: 6/23/2022Background: New York prohibits its ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying a handgun outside the home without a license, and it denies licenses to every citizen who fails to convince the state that he or she has "proper cause" to carry a firearm. In District of Columbia v. Heller, this Court held that the Second Amendment protects "the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation," 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008), and in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that this right "is fully applicable to the States," 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010).Question Presented: Whether the Second Amendment allows the government to prohibit ordinary law-abiding citizens from carrying handguns outside the home for self-defense.Holding: New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Sotomayor and KaganLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, New York, N.Y.; and Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Badgerow v. Walters | Case No. 20-1143 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/31/2022Background: This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important jurisdictional question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). When parties to an arbitration seek to confirm, vacate, or modify their award under Sections 9, 10, and 11 of the FAA, those provisions do not themselves create federal jurisdiction. Instead, there must be an independent jurisdictional basis for federal courts to act. This Court has established that there is no "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 of the FAA absent complete diversity between the parties. But the circuits are hopelessly split on whether there is "look through" jurisdiction under Section 10 for federal question cases. This case asks a straightforward question: Does the "look through" approach to federal jurisdiction apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitration awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA?Question Presented: Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award under Sections 9 and 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question.Holding: Vaden’s “look-through” approach to determining federal jurisdiction does not apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Houston Community College Sys. v. Wilson | Case No. 20-804 | Date Argued: 11/2/2021 | Date Decided: 3/24/2022Question Presented: Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member's speech?Holding: Mr. Wilson does not possess an actionable First Amendment claim arising from the Board’s purely verbal censure.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Richard A. Morris, Houston, Tex.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondent: MIchael B. Kimberly, Washington, D.C.

Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson | Case No. 21-463 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021Background: The State of Texas adopted a law banning abortions at approximately six weeks of pregnancy, in clear violation of this Court's precedent. Rather than forthrightly defending the constitutionality of the law, or even the propriety of a state court enforcement proceeding, Texas crafted an unprecedented enforcement scheme that was designed to evade judicial review and shield this unconstitutional statute from the normal mechanisms by which state officials would otherwise have to enforce it. This state of affairs should not be tolerated in our federal system, especially where the rights at issue are explicitly protected by the Federal Constitution.Question Presented: Whether a State can insulate from federal-court review a law that prohibits the exercise of a constitutional right by delegating to the general public the authority to enforce that prohibition through civil actions.Holding: The order of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded. ___F. Supp. 3d ___, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. JUSTICE GORSUCH announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part II–C, concluding that a pre-enforcement challenge to S. B. 8 under the Federal Constitution may proceed past the motion to dismiss stage against certain of the named defendants but not others.Result: Adjudged to be AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Gorsuch, announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court except as to Part IIâC. Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined that opinion in full and Justice Thomas joined except for Part IIâC. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Chief Justice Roberts filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which Justices Breyer and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioners: Marc A. Hearron, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.

United States v. Texas | Case No. 21-588 | Date Argued: 11/1/2021 | Date Decided: 12/10/2021Question Presented: THE APPLICATION IS TREATED AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: MAY THE UNITED STATES BRING SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT AND OBTAIN INJUNCTIVE OR DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE, STATE COURT JUDGES, STATE COURT CLERKS, OTHER STATE OFFICIALS, OR ALL PRIVATE PARTIES TO PROHIBIT S.B. 8 FROM BEING ENFORCED.Holding: Dismissed as Improvidently GrantedResult: Voting information not foundVoting Breakdown: ?-?. Voting breakdown not foundLink to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For state Respondent: Judd E. Stone, II, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex. For private Respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

United States v. Tsarnaev | Case No. 20-443 | Date Argued: 10/13/2021 | Date Decided: 3/4/2022Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that respondent's capital sentences must be vacated on the ground that the district court, during its 21-day voir dire, did not ask each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard, or seen about respondent's case. Whether the district court committed reversible error at the penalty phase of respondent's trial by excluding evidence that respondent's older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which respondent was convicted.Holding: The Court of Appeals improperly vacated Dzhokhar’s capital sentences.Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 6-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined and in which Justice Sotomayor joined except as to Part IIâC.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Ginger D. Anders, Washington, D.C.

Thompson v. Clark | Case No. 20-659 | Date Argued: 10/12/2021 | Date Decided: 4/4/2022Question Presented: I. Whether the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process requires the plaintiff to show that the criminal proceeding against him has "formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020); or that the proceeding "ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence," as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2018); or that the proceeding terminated without a conviction, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and several other circuits have held. II. Whether, if the Supreme Court adopts the "affirmative indication of innocence" standard, the withdrawal of criminal charges suffices to satisfy that rule.Holding: To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution for purposes of the Fourth Amendment claim under §1983 for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff need not show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence. A plaintiff need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction. Thompson has satisfied that requirement here.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Amir H. Ali, Washington, D.C.; and Jonathan Y. Ellis, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For Respondents: John D. Moore, New York, N.Y.

United States v. Zubaydah | Case No. 20-827 | Date Argued: 10/6/2021 | Date Decided: 3/3/2022Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred when it rejected the United States' assertion of the state-secrets privilege based on the court's own assessment of potential harm to the national security, and required discovery to proceed further under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a) against former Central Intelligence Agency contractors on matters concerning alleged clandestine CIA activities.Holding: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 938 F. 3d 1123, reversed and remanded. JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to all but Parts II–B–2 and III, concluding that, in the context of Zubaydah’s §1782 discovery application, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state secrets privilege did not apply to information that could confirm or deny the existence of a CIA detention site in Poland.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 4-1. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Parts II-B-2 and III. Chief Justice Roberts joined that opinion in full, Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett joined as to all but Part II-B-2, Justice Kagan joined as to all but Parts III and IV and the judgment of dismissal and Justices Thomas and Alito joined Part IV. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: David F. Klein, Washington, D.C.

Brown v. Davenport | Case No. 20-826 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 4/21/2022Background: In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), the Court held that the test for determining whether a constitutional error was harmless on habeas review is whether the error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the verdict. Later, in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court held that, in addition to satisfying Brecht, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). AEDPA provides that federal courts cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law."Question Presented: May a federal habeas court grant relief based solely on its conclusion that the Brecht test is satisfied, or must the court also find that the state court's Chapman application was unreasonable under AEDPA?Holding: [NO INFORMATION]Result: Judgment REVERSED.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, Lansing, Mich. For Respondent: Tasha Bahal, Boston, Mass.

Hemphill v. New York | Case No. 20-637 | Date Argued: 10/5/2021 | Date Decided: 1/20/2022Background: A litigant's argumentation or introduction of evidence at trial is often deemed to "open the door" to the admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence. In People v. Reid, the New York Court of Appeals announced an "open door" rule of constitutional dimension, separate and apart from the traditional evidentiary rule. Under this rule, a criminal defendant who, in the court's view, "opened the door" to responsive evidence, may thereby forfeit hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections that would otherwise preclude admission of the responsive evidence. The New York court has applied that rule even where it rests on an accused's truthful trial arguments or evidence; the accused has not engaged in a course of conduct suggesting that the right to object to responsive evidence would be abused; nor, indeed, the accused has done anything that could be construed as a knowing waiver of constitutional protections.Question Presented: Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant who opens the door to responsive evidence also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause.Holding: The trial court’s admission of the transcript of Morris’ plea allocution over Hemphill’s objection violated Hemphill’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.Result: Judgment REVERSED and case REMANDED.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For Respondent: Gina Mignola, Assistant District Attorney, Bronx, N.Y.