The High Court Report

Case Info: Dewberry Group, Inc. v. Dewberry Engineers Inc. | Case No. 23-900 | Date Argued: 12/11/24 | Date Decided: 2/26/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether an award of the "defendant's profits" under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), can include an order for the defendant to disgorge the distinct profits of legally separate non-party corporate affiliates.Holding: In awarding the “defendant’s profits” to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit under the Lanham Act, §1117(a), a court can award only profits ascribable to the “defendant” itself. And the term “defendant” bears its usual legal meaning: the party against whom relief or recovery is sought—here, Dewberry Group. The Engi­neers chose not to add the Group’s affiliates as defendants. Accord­ingly, the affiliates’ profits are not the (statutorily disgorgable) “de­fendant’s profits” as ordinarily understood.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Thomas G. Hungar, Washington, D. C. For United States, as amicus curiae: Nicholas S. Crown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Elbert Lin, Richmond, Va.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Seven County Coalition v. Eagle County | Case No. 23-975 | Date Argued: 12/10/24Link to Docket: Here.Background:In Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004), this Court held that when an agency cannot prevent an environmental effect "due to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions," the National Environmental Policy Act does not require it to study that effect. This holding has divided the courts of appeals. Five circuits read Public Citizen to mean that an agency's environmental review can stop where its regulatory authority stops. Two circuits disagree and require review of any impact that can be called reasonably foreseeable. Here, the Surface Transportation Board relied on Public Citizen to cabin its environmental review of a new rail line in Utah. But the D.C. Circuit rejected that approach, ruling that the Board "cannot avoid" environmental review "on the ground that it lacks authority to prevent, control, or mitigate" distant environmental effects. As a result, it ordered the Board to study the local effects of oil wells and refineries that lie outside the Board's regulatory authority. Question Presented: Whether the National Environmental Policy Act requires an agency to study environmental impacts beyond the proximate effects of the action over which the agency has regulatory authority.Holding: The D.C. Circuit failed to afford the Board the substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases and incorrectly interpreted NEPA to require the Board to consider the environmental effects of upstream and downstream projects that are separate in time or place from the Uinta Basin Railway.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Link to Opinion: Here. Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For federal respondents supporting petitioners: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.For respondents Eagle County, et al.: William M. Jay, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas | Date Decided: 12/10/24 | Case No. 23-583Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion­ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of” the agency.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y. For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Kousisis v. United States | Case No. 23-909 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 5/22/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented: Whether deception to induce a commercial exchange can constitute mail or wire fraud, even if inflicting economic harm on the alleged victim was not the object of the scheme. Whether a sovereign's statutory, regulatory, or policy interest is a property interest when compliance is a material term of payment for goods or services. Whether all contract rights are "property."Holding: A defendant who induces a victim to enter into a transaction under materially false pretenses may be convicted of federal fraud even if the defendant did not seek to cause the victim economic loss.Result: Affirmed. Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion con¬curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Feliciano v. Dept. of Transportation | Case No. 23-861 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/30/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:This case presents a question of critical importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans who serve their country both as federal civilian employees and members of the Armed Services' reserve components. Congress enacted the differential pay statute, 5 U.S.C. § 5538, to eliminate the financial burden that reservists face when called to active duty at pay rates below their federal civilian salaries. To ensure that these reservists suffer no financial penalty for active-duty service, the differential pay statute requires that the government make up the difference. Federal civilian employees are entitled to differential pay when performing active duty "pursuant to a call or order to active duty under * * * a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10." That section, Section 101(a)(13)(B), enumerates several statutory authorities and includes a catchall provision: "any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress." Recently, in a decision that departed from settled understandings of this language, the Federal Circuit held that reservists relying on Section 101(a)(13)(B)'s catchall provision to claim differential pay must show that they were "directly called to serve in a contingency operation." Adams v. DHS, 3 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Under that demanding, fact-intensive standard, the Federal Circuit has rejected claims for differential pay even by reservists like petitioner whose activation orders expressly invoked a presidential emergency declaration. Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeWebsite Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Holding: Tennessee's law prohibiting certain medical treatments for transgender minors is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and satisfies rational basis review. SB1 satisfies rational basis review. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice Thomas, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Barrett joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Parts I and II–B. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined in full, and in which Justice Kagan joined as to Parts I–IV. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N.Y. For Respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.

Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Case No. 23-867 | Date Argued: 12/03/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:A foreign sovereign is generally immune from suit in domestic courts, subject to the specific exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the expropriation exception, claims involving rights in property taken in violation of international law may be heard if "property or any property exchanged for such property" has a commercial nexus with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Specifically, the property or its proceeds must be either "present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity" or "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." Id. The circuit courts have split as to the showing required to meet the commercial nexus requirement. Questions Presented:Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that  proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the  expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to  affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law  have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here. Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: United States v. Miller | Case No. 23-824 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25Link to Docket: Here. Background:The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any prepetition transfer of the debtor's property that would be voidable "under applicable law" outside bankruptcy by an actual unsecured creditor of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). The applicable law may be state law. Elsewhere, the Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governmental units "to the extent set forth in this section with respect to" various sections of the Code, including Section 544. 11 U.S.C. 106(a)(l). The court of appeals below joined a circuit split in holding that Section 106(a)(l) permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b), even though no actual creditor could have obtained relief outside of bankruptcy in light of sovereign immunity, the Supremacy Clause, and the Appropriations Clause. Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim. Result: Reversed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Case No. 23-1038 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. The agency may grant such authorization only if the applicant shows, among other things, that the marketing of the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." 21 U.S.C. 387j(c)(2)(A). In this case, the agency denied respondents' applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products because they had failed to show that marketing the products would be appropriate for the protection of the public health. The Fifth Circuit set aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious, relying on legal theories that have been rejected by other courts of appeals that have reviewed materially similar FDA denial orders. Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB | Case No. 23-970 | Date Argued: 11/13/24 | Date Decided: 12/11/24Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes "[e]xacting pleading requirements" on plaintiffs who file securities fraud class actions. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 311, 313 (2007). To state a claim, plaintiffs must "state with particularity all facts" supporting their allegations of falsity and must also allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of the required mental state. 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1), (2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs frequently try to meet these requirements by claiming that internal company documents contradicted the company's public statements. Questions Presented: Whether plaintiffs seeking to allege scienter under the PSLRA based on allegations about internal company documents must plead with particularity the contents of those documents. Whether plaintiffs can satisfy the PSLRA's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion to substitute for particularized allegations of fact.Result: Writ of certiorari DISMISSED as improvidently granted by per curiam Opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C.For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Case No. 23-825 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 3/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), a felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Courts have disagreed about how to apply use-of-force language to crimes that require proof of a victim's bodily injury or death but can be committed by failing to take action. In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that any crime requiring proof of death or bodily injury categorically involves the use of physical force, even if it can be committed through inaction-such as by failing to provide medicine to someone who is sick or by failing to feed a child. That ruling reflects the law in eight circuits. Two courts of appeals, by contrast, have held that the use of force is not an element of such crimes if the crime may be committed by inaction. One of those courts recently rejected the government's petition for rehearing en banc, which had argued that any crime requiring proof of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be  committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A). Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-929 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 4/22/25Link to Docket: Here. Background: Federal immigration law allows the government to grant a "voluntary departure" period of up to 60 days to a noncitizen "of good moral character" who receives an adverse decision in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b). If the noncitizen fails to depart during that window, he or she is subject to a civil fine and is ineligible for various forms of immigration relief (like cancellation of removal or adjustment of status) for 10 years. §1229c(d)(1). If, however, the noncitizen "file[s] a post-decision motion to reopen or reconsider during the period allowed for voluntary departure," the penalties for failure to voluntarily depart do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(3)(iii). Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Gerard J. CedroneFor Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor GeneralWebsite Link to Opinion Summary: Here. Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank | Case No. 23-980 | Date Argued: 11/6/24Link to Docket: Here.Background:This petition presents two important questions that have divided the federal courts of appeals.First, the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the "risk factors" section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm.Second, the circuits disagree on the proper pleading standard for the loss causation element of a private securities-fraud claim. The Fourth Circuit holds that loss causation allegations must satisfy Federal Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud, while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply the ordinary Rule 8 standard. The Ninth Circuit here initially applied Rule 8, then substituted citations of Rule 9(b) without changing its analysis. Questions Presented: Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm? Does Federal Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) supply the proper pleading standard for loss causation in a private securities-fraud action?Result: Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted by per curiam.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Case No. 23-217 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25 Link to Docket: Here.Background: The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covers more than 140 million workers and guarantees eligible workers a minimum wage and overtime pay. But the FLSA also contains 34 exemptions from those requirements. Employers do not have to pay overtime to, e.g., bona fide executives, agricultural workers, and outside salesmen. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(b). The question presented is: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the  applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six  circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an em­ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gor­such filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS | Case No. 23-715 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 4/29/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Because low-income patients are often costlier to treat, Congress directed the government to reimburse hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low--income patients at higher Medicare rates. A hospital qualifies for higher payments in part based on the number of days that a hospital provides inpatient care to senior (or disabled) low- income patients, measured as those who "were entitled to benefits under part A of [Medicare] and were entitled to supplementary security income [SSI] benefits." 42 U.S.C.§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I). In Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, this Court agreed with the agency that "entitled to [Medicare part A] benefits" included "all those qualifying for the [Medicare] program," whether or not Medicare paid for that hospital stay. 597 U.S. 424, 445 (2022). But Empire expressly left open the question of whether "entitled to [SSI] benefits" likewise includes all those who qualify for the SSI program. Id. at 434 n.2. The agency still insists, contrary to its Medicare interpretation, that only patients who received an SSI cash payment for the month of their hospital stay are "entitled to benefits." This case thus presents Empire's open question: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and SSI, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here. Advocates: For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus SherryFor Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath | Case No. 23-1127 | Date Argued: 11/4/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to further the goal of universal access to telecommunications services. In response, the FCC established what's known as the "E-rate" program to provide discounted services to eligible schools and libraries. The program is administered by a private, non-profit corporation and funded entirely by contributions from private telecommunications carriers. After telecommunications carriers provide services to eligible schools and libraries, either the schools and libraries or the providers can submit reimbursement requests to the private corporation for the amount of the discount. In this way, the E-rate program distributes up to $4.5 billion each year. Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por­tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.Result: Affirmed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex. For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA | Case No. 23-713 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/5/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:For more than a century, veterans have been entitled to the benefit of the doubt on any close issue relating to their eligibility for service-related benefits. As presently codified, "[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant." 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b). In 2002, Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits Act. Among other things, the Act supplemented the responsibilities of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "Veterans Court") by requiring it to "take due account of the Secretary's application of section 5107(b)" as part of its review of benefits appeals. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1). In these cases, the Federal Circuit held that § 7261(b)(1) "does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond the clear error review" of underlying factual findings - something already required by the pre-2002 review statute, under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a). Pet. App. 16a-17a (quoting Pet. App. 8a- 11a). Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38  U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's  application of that rule?Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-re­lated disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error. Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Case No. 23-753 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:Congress designed the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) to ensure that anyone holding a discharge permit issued under the Act has notice of how much they must control their discharges to comply with the law. The CWA requires that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized states provide this notice by prescribing specific pollutant limitations in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits they issue. Consistent with its text, this Court and the Second Circuit have read the Act to require EPA and states to develop specific limits to achieve goals for surface waters, called water quality standards. Parting with these decisions, the Ninth Circuit held here that EPA may issue permits that contain generic prohibitions against violating water quality standards. Rather than specify pollutant limits that tell the permitholder how much they need to control their discharges as required by the CWA, these prohibitions effectively tell permitholders nothing more than not to cause "too much" pollution. These generic water quality terms expose San Francisco and numerous permitholders nationwide to enforcement actions while failing to tell them how much they need to limit or treat their discharges to comply with the Act. Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose  generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their  discharges must conform.Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end­ result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per­mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissent­ing in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal. For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. CWebsite Link to Oral Arguments: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security | Case No. 23-583 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 12/10/24Link to Docket: Here.Background:When considering whether to approve a petition for an immigrant visa, the government must adhere to certain nondiscretionary criteria. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (c) (providing that "[n]o petition shall be approved" if the individual seeking a visa has previously entered a marriage "for the purpose of evading the immigration laws"). When a visa petition is denied based on a petitioner's failure to satisfy such a nondiscretionary requirement, it is generally understood that the petitioner has a right to judicial review of that decision. Once a visa petition has been approved, the government has the power to revoke approval of the visa petition for "good and sufficient cause" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155. The circuits are in open conflict over whether judicial review is available when the government revokes an approved petition on the ground that it had initially misapplied nondiscretionary criteria during the approval process. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that judicial review is available under these circumstances, but the Second, Third, Seventh, and now the Eleventh Circuit all hold that revocations are "discretionary" decisions for which there is no right to judicial review, even when they are based on a misapplication of the same nondiscretionary criteria that would be reviewable if the petition had originally been denied. Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion­ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of ” the agency.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y. For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Case No. 23-365 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) creates a civil treble-damages action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of” certain offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury. Result: Affirmed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concur­ring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C. For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Case No. 22-7466 | Date Argued: 10/9/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when  assessing the materiality of  Brady and Napue claims. Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction  is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.Holdings:This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C. For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Case No. 23-852 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25Link to Docket: Here.Background:In the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., Congress imposed licensing, background-check, recordkeeping, and serialization requirements on persons engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. The Act defines a "firearm" to include "any weapon * * * which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," as well as "the frame or receiver of any such weapon." 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) and (B). In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives issued a regulation clarifying that certain products that can readily be converted into an operational firearm or a functional frame or receiver fall within that definition. See 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (codified in relevant part at 27 C.F.R. 478.11, 478.12(c)). The Fifth Circuit held that those regulatory provisions are inconsistent with the Act. Questions Presented:Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); andWhether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined.  Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.  Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Case No. 23-621 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Williams v. Washington | Case No. 23-191 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required to bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court.Holding: Where a state court’s application of a state exhaustion require­ment in effect immunizes state officials from §1983 claims challenging delays in the administrative process, state courts may not deny those §1983 claims on failure-to-exhaust grounds. Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Result: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Gorsuch and Barrett joined as to Part II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., Solicitor General, Montgomery, Ala.Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger | Case No. 23-677 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25Link to Docket: Here.Questions Presented:Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates: For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.

The question presented in this case is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.The Supreme Court held: Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts. There is no immunity for unofficial acts.TIMESTAMPS:00:00 Introduction00:14 Question Presented00:30 Voting Breakdown01:10 Chief Justice Roberts Majority Opinion02:08 Holding21:32 Justice Thomas Concurring Opinion23:48 Justice Barrett Opinion Concurring in Part28:59 Justice Sotomayor Dissenting Opinion38:40 Justice Jackson Dissenting Opinion

The Question Presented is: Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.Argued:For Petitioner: D. John Sauer; For Respondent: Michael R. Dreeben, Counselor to the Special Counsel, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.TIMESTAMPS:00:00 Introduction00:05 Petitioner Opening Statement Begins1:58 Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin27:18 Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin57:34 Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins59:27 Respondent Free for All Questions Begin128:11 Respondent Sequential Questions Begin2:39:15 Respondent Questions End, Rebuttal (D. John Sauer said he had nothing further)

Oral Argument: Moyle v. United States | Case No. 23-726 | Date Argued: 4/24/24 | Date Decided: 6/27/24 Case consolidated with Idaho v. United States, Case No. 23-727.Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether EMTALA preempts state laws that protect human life and prohibit abortions, like Idaho's Defense of Life Act.Holding: Certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted.Result: Dismissed.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Per curiam opinion. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, and Justice Gorsuch joined as to Parts I and II.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Joshua N. Turner, Chief of Constitutional Litigation and Policy, Boise, Idaho. For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. VIDED.

Oral Argument: Department of State v. Muñoz | Case No. 23-334 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., the decision to grant or deny a visa application rests with a consular officer in the Department of State. Under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii), any noncitizen whom a consular officer "knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, seeks to enter the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in* * * unlawful activity" is ineligible to receive a visa or be admitted to the United States.Question Presented: Whether a consular officer's refusal of a visa to a U.S. citizen's noncitizen spouse impinges upon a constitutionally protected interest of the citizen.Whether, assuming that such a constitutional interest exists, notifying a visa applicant that he was deemed inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) suffices to provide any process that is due.Holding: A U.S. citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Eric T. Lee, Southfeld, Mich.

Oral Argument: Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney | Case No. 23-367 | Date Argued: 4/23/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Under the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issues, prosecutes, and adjudicates complaints alleging that employers committed unfair labor practices. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). Section 10(j) of the Act authorizes federal district courts, while the NLRB adjudication remains pending, to grant preliminary injunctive relief at the NLRB's request "as [the court] deems just and proper." Id. § 160(j).Question Presented: Whether courts must evaluate the NLRB's requests for section 10(j) injunctions under the traditional, stringent four-factor test for preliminary injunctions or under some other more lenient standard.Holding: When considering the National Labor Relations Board's request for a preliminary injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, district courts must apply the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Austin Raynor, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Smith v. Spizzirri | Case No. 22-1218 Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:This case presents a clear and intractable conflict regarding an important statutory question under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.1-16. The FAA establishes procedures for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court. Under Section 3 of the Act, when a court finds a dispute subject to arbitration, the court "shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until [the] arbitration" has concluded. 9 U.S.C. 3 (emphasis added). While six circuits read Section 3's plain text as mandating a stay, four other circuits have carved out an atextual "exception" to Section 3's stay requirement-granting district courts discretion to dismiss (not stay) if the entire dispute is subject to arbitration. In the proceedings below, the Ninth Circuit declared itself bound by circuit precedent to affirm the district court's "discretion to dismiss," despite "the plain text of the FAA appear[ing] to mandate a stay." The panel candidly acknowledged the 6-4 circuit conflict, and a two-judge concurrence emphasized "the courts of appeals are divided," asserted the Ninth Circuit's position is wrong, and urged "the Supreme Court to take up this question"-an issue this Court has twice confronted but reserved in the past.Question Presented: Whether Section 3 of the FAA requires district courts to stay a lawsuit pending arbitration, or whether district courts have discretion to dismiss when all claims are subject to arbitration.Holding: When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves an arbitrable dispute and a party has requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act compels the court to issue a stay, and the court lacks discretion to dismiss the suit.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Daniel L. Geyser, Dallas, Tex. For Respondents: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N. Y.

Oral Argument: City of Grants Pass v. Johnson | Case No. 23-175 | Date Argued: 4/22/24 | Date Decided: 6/28/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:In Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019), the Ninth Circuit held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prevents cities from enforcing criminal restrictions on public camping unless the person has "access to adequate temporary shelter." Id. at 617 & n.8. In this case, the Ninth Circuit extended Martin to a classwide injunction prohibiting the City of Grants Pass from enforcing its public-camping ordinance even though civil citations. That decision cemented a conflict with the California Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, which have upheld similar ordinances, and entrenched a broader split on the application of the Eighth Amendment to purportedly involuntary conduct. The Ninth Circuit nevertheless denied rehearing en banc by a 14-to-13 vote.Question Presented: Does the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?Holding: The enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Theane D. Evangelis, Los Angeles, Cal. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Kelsi B. Corkran, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Thornell v. Jones | Case No. 22-982 | Date Argued: 4/17/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Over thirty years ago, Respondent Danny Lee Jones beat Robert Weaver to death and also beat and strangled Weaver's 7-year-old daughter, Tisha, to death, for which he was convicted and sentenced to death. The district court denied habeas relief following an evidentiary hearing on Jones's ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claims. But a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court, giving no deference to the district court's detailed factual findings. Judge Mark Bennett authored a nine-judge dissent from the denial of en banc rehearing.Question Presented: Did the Ninth Circuit violate this Court's precedents by employing a flawed methodology for assessing Strickland prejudice when it disregarded the district court's factual and credibility findings and excluded evidence in aggravation and the State's rebuttal when it reversed the district court and granted habeas relief?Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit's grant of habeas relief on Danny Lee Jones's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was based on an erroneous interpretation and application of Strickland v. Washington.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jason D. Lewis, Deputy Solicitor General, Phoenix, Ariz. For Respondent: Jean-Claude Andre, Santa Monica, Cal.Timestamps:

Oral Argument: Fischer v. United States | Case No. 23-5572 | Date Argued: March 25, 2024 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Did the D.C. Circuit err in construing 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (“Witness, Victim, or Informant Tampering"). Which prohibits obstruction of congressional inquiries and investigations to include acts unrelated to investigations and evidence?Holding: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so.Result: Vacated and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey T. Green, Bethesda, Md. For Respondent: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Introduction[00:00:07] Petitioner Opening Statement Begins[00:01:52] Petitioner Free for All Questions Begin[00:25:37] Petitioner Sequential Questions Begin[00:34:25] Petitioner Questions End, Respondent Opening Statement Begins[00:36:31] Respondent Free for All Questions Begin[01:05:01] Respondent Sequential Questions Begin[01:36:13] Respondent Sequential Questions End, Petitioner Rebuttal Begins

Oral Argument: Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon | Case No. 23-50 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:To make out a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that legal process was instituted without probable cause. Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1338 (2022). Under the charge-specific rule, a malicious prosecution claim can proceed as to a baseless criminal charge, even if other charges brought alongside the baseless charge are supported by probable cause. Under the "any-crime" rule, probable cause for even one charge defeats a plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims as to every other charge, including those lacking probable cause.Question Presented: Whether Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims are governed by the charge-specific rule, as the Second, Third, and Eleventh circuits hold, or by the "any-crime" rule, as the Sixth Circuit holds.Holding: Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, the presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondents: Megan M. Wold, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Snyder v. United States | Case No. 23-108 | Date Argued: 4/15/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) makes it a federal crime for a state or local official to "corruptly solicit[,] demand[,] ... or accept[] ... anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any" government business "involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more."Question Presented: Whether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.Holding: Federal law proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past acts.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Erlinger v. United States | Case No. 23-370 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether the Constitution requires a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to find that a defendant's prior convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another," as is necessary to impose an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).Holding: The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make the determination beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant's past offenses were committed on separate occasions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Barrett joined. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas filed concurring opinions. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined, and in which Justice Jackson joined except as to Part III. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Menlo Park, Cal. For Respondent supporting Petitioner: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Court-appointed Amicus Curiae in support of the judgment below: D. Nick Harper, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Connelly v. United States | Case No. 23-146 | Date Argued: 3/27/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Closely held corporations often enter into agreements requiring the redemption of a shareholder's stock after the shareholder's death in order to preserve the closely held nature of the business. Corporations that enter such agreements often purchase life insurance on the shareholder in order to fund the transaction.Question Presented: Whether the proceeds of a life-insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder's stock should be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder's shares for purposes of the federal estate tax.Holding: A corporation's contractual obligation to redeem shares is not necessarily a liability that reduces a corporation's value for purposes of the federal estate tax.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine | Case No. 23-235 | Date Argued: 3/26/24 | Date Decided: 6/13/24 Case consolidated with Danco Laboratories, L.L.C. v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine, Case No. 23-236.Link to Docket: Here.Background:In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved Danco's drug Mifeprex for termination of early pregnancy based on the agency's expert judgment that clinical data showed the drug to be safe and effective. The agency later modified certain conditions of use for mifepristone in 2016 and 2021, again relying on clinical data and the agency's expert judgment that the drug would remain safe and effective under the modified conditions of use. In 2022, associations of doctors who have never prescribed Mifeprex sued FDA, arguing that FDA's actions modifying the drug's conditions of use in 2016 and 2021 violated the Administrative Procedure Act.Question Presented: Whether an association can demonstrate Article III standing to enjoin a government action by arguing that some unspecified member may be injured at some future time by the challenged action; andWhether the Fifth Circuit erred in upholding the preliminary injunction of FDA's 2016 and 2021 actions based on the court's review of an incomplete administrative record.Holding: Plaintiffs lack Article Ill standing to challenge the Food and Drug Administration's regulatory actions regarding mifepristone.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For federal Petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Petitioner Danco Laboratories, L.L.C.: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Harrow v. Department of Defense | Case No. 23-21 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 5/16/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:When a federal employee petitions the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review shall be filed within 60 days after the Board issues notice of the final order or decision of the Board." In the decision below, the Federal Circuit relied on settled circuit precedent holding this filing deadline to be jurisdictional, despite recent opinions from other Circuits and this Court holding analogous filing deadlines to be nonjurisdictional.Question Presented: Whether the 60-day deadline in Section 7703(b)(1)(A) is jurisdictional.Holding: Title 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(l)'s 60-day filing deadline for a federal employee to petition the Federal Circuit to review a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is not jurisdictional.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Joshua P. Davis, San Francisco, Cal. For Respondent: Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe | Case No. 23-250 | Date Argued: 3/25/24 | Date Decided: 6/6/24 Case consolidated with Becerra v. Northern Arapaho Tribe, Case No. 23-253.Link to Docket: Here.Background:The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 5301 et seq., permits eligible Indian tribes to contract with the federal government to assume responsibility for federal health care programs administered for the benefit of Indians. Upon entering into the contract, a tribe is entitled to the appropriated funds that the Indian Health Service (IHS) would have otherwise allocated to the federal program. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(1). The Act also requires IHS to pay "contract support costs"-funds "added to" that appropriated amount to cover the costs of activities the tribe must undertake to operate the transferred program, but which either "normally are not carried on" by IHS when acting as program operator, or which IHS would have "provided * * * from resources other than" the appropriated funds transferred under the contract. 25 U.S.C. 5325(a)(2). Separately, contracting tribes are permitted to collect payment from third-party payors-like private insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid-when they provide health care services to covered individuals.Question Presented: Whether IHS must pay "contract support costs" not only to support IHS-funded activities, but also to support the tribe's expenditure of income collected from third parties.Holding: The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act requires the Indian Health Service to pay the contract support costs that a tribe incurs when it collects and spends program income (i.e., revenue from third-party payers like Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers) to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to it from IHS in a self-determination contract.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Caroline A. Flynn, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent in 23-253: Adam G. Unikowsky, Washington, D.C. For Respondent in 23-250: Lloyd B. Miller, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Texas v. New Mexico | Case No. 141, Orig. | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/21/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: EXCEPTION OF THE UNITED STATE TO THE THIRD INTERIM REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER: The United States excepts to the Special Master's recommendation that the States' joint motion to enter a consent decree be granted.Holding: Because the proposed consent decree would dispose of the United States’ Compact claims without its consent, the States’ motion to enter the consent decree is denied.Result: Exception sustained.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Barrett joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For United States, as intervenor: Ann O'Connell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For plaintiff: Scott A. Keller, Solicitor General of Texas, Austin, Texas. For defendant Colorado: Frederick R. Yarger, Solicitor General of Colorado, Denver, Colo. For defendant New Mexico: Marcus J. Rael, Jr., Albuquerque, N.M.

Oral Argument: Gonzalez v. Trevino | Case No. 22-1025 | Date Argued: 3/20/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:In Nieves v. Bartlett, this Court held that probable cause does not bar a retaliatory arrest claim against a "police officer" when a plaintiff shows "that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been." 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). The circuits admittedly disagree on whether only specific examples of non-arrests, Pet. App. 28-29 (5th Cir. 2022), or any "objective proof of retaliatory treatment" can satisfy this standard, Lund v. City of Rockford, 956 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 62 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, a 72-year-old councilwoman organized a petition criticizing a city manager, and unwittingly placed it in her binder during a council meeting. Two months later, Respondents-the city manager's allies- engineered her arrest for tampering with a government record. That charge has no precedent involving similar conduct, was supported by an affidavit based on the councilwoman's viewpoints, and skirted ordinary procedures to ensure her jailing. The councilwoman sued Respondents but no arresting officer.Question Presented: Whether the Nieves probable cause exception can be satisfied by objective evidence other than specific examples of arrests that never happened.Whether the Nieves probable cause rule is limited to individual claims against arresting officers for split-second arrests.Holding: In requiring Petitioner Sylvia Gonzalez to provide specific comparator evidence to support her retaliatory arrest claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit did not properly apply the principles of Nieves v. Barlett.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 8-1. Per curiam opinion. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Anya A. Bidwell, Arlington, Va. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Murthy v. Missouri | Case No. 23-411 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 6/26/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether Respondents have Article III standing; Whether the government's challenged conduct transformed private social-media companies' content-moderation decisions into state action and violated Respondents' First Amendment rights; and Whether the terms and breadth of the preliminary injunction are proper.Holding: Respondents, two states and five individual social media users who sued executive branch officials and agencies, alleging that the government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment, lack Article Ill standing to seek an injunction.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.

Oral Argument: Diaz v. United States | Case No. 23-14 | Date Argued: 3/19/24 | Date Decided: 6/20/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides: "In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone." Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).Question Presented: In a prosecution for drug trafficking-where an element of the offense is that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs-does Rule 704(b) permit a governmental expert witness to testify that most couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters?Holding: Expert testimony that "most people" in a group have a particular mental state is not an opinion about "the defendant" and thus does not violate Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b).Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, Cal. For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: National Rifle Association of America v. Vullo | Case No. 22-842 | Date Argued: 3/18/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Bantam Books v. Sullivan held that a state commission with no formal regulatory power violated the First Amendment when it "deliberately set out to achieve the suppression of publications" through "informal sanctions," including the "threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation." 372 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1963). Respondent here, wielding enormous regulatory power as the head of New York's Department of Financial Services ("DFS"), applied similar pressure tactics-including backchannel threats, ominous guidance letters, and selective enforcement of regulatory infractions-to induce banks and insurance companies to avoid doing business with Petitioner, a gun rights advocacy group. App. 199-200 ¶ 21. Respondent targeted Petitioner explicitly based on its Second Amendment advocacy, which DFS's official regulatory guidance deemed a "reputational risk" to any financial institution serving the NRA. Id. at 199, n.16. The Second Circuit held such conduct permissible as a matter of law, reasoning that "this age of enhanced corporate social responsibility" justifies regulatory concern about "general backlash" against a customer's political speech. Id. at 29-30.Question Presented: Does the First Amendment allow a government regulator to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory actions if they do business with a controversial speaker, as a consequence of (a) the government's own hostility to the speaker's viewpoint or (b) a perceived "general backlash" against the speaker's advocacy?Holding: The NRA plausibly alleged that former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services Maria Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business relationships with the NRA in order to punish or suppress the NRA's gun-promotion advocacy.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch and Justice Jackson each filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: David D. Cole, Washington, D.C. For United States, as Amicus Curiae: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. For Respondent: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski | Case No. 23-3 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 5/23/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Where parties enter into an arbitration agreement with a delegation clause, should an arbitrator or a court decide whether that arbitration agreement is narrowed by a later contract that is silent as to arbitration and delegation?Holding: Where parties have agreed to two contracts, one sending arbitrability disputes to arbitration, and the other either explicitly or implicitly sending arbitrability disputes to the courts, a court must decide which contract governs.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jessica L. Ellsworth, Washington, D.C. For Respondents: David J. Harris, Jr., San Diego, Cal.

Oral Argument: Garland v. Cargill | Case No. 22-976 | Date Argued: 2/28/24 | Date Decided: 6/14/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background:Since 1986, Congress has prohibited the transfer or possession of any new "machinegun." 18 U.S.C. 922(o)(1). The National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. 5801 et seq., defines a "machinegun" as "any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger." 26 U.S.C. 5845(b). The statutory definition also encompasses "any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun." Ibid. A "bump stock" is a device designed and intended to permit users to convert a semiautomatic rifle so that the rifle can be fired continuously with a single pull of the trigger, discharging potentially hundreds of bullets per minute. In 2018, after a mass shooting in Las Vegas carried out using bump stocks, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) published an interpretive rule concluding that bump stocks are machineguns as defined in Section 5845(b). In the decision below, the en banc Fifth Circuit held that the ATF rule was unlawful because the statutory definition of "machinegun" does not encompass bump stocks.Question Presented: Whether a bump stock device is a "machinegun" as defined in 26 U.S.C. 5845(b) because it is designed and intended for use in converting a rifle into a machinegun, i.e., into a weapon that fires "automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger."Holding: The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a rule that classifies a bump stock as a "machinegun" under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Brian H. Fletcher, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.

Oral Argument: McIntosh v. United States | Case No. 22-7386 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 4/17/24 Link to Docket: Here.Question Presented: Whether a district court may enter a criminal forfeiture order outside the time limitations set forth in Rule 32.2, Fed.R.Crim.P.?Holding: A district court's failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B)'s requirement to enter a preliminary order imposing criminal forfeiture before sentencing does not bar a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Steven Y. Yurowitz, New York, N. Y. For Respondent: Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

Oral Argument: Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A. | Case No. 22-529 | Date Argued: 2/27/24 | Date Decided: 5/30/24 Link to Docket: Here.Background: At least thirteen states have, enacted laws requiring mortgage lenders to pay a minimum interest rate on funds held in mortgage escrow accounts. Congress has since recognized the existence of these state escrow-interest laws and has expressly required national banks to comply with them where applicable. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639d(g)(3).Question Presented: Does the National Bank Act preempt the application of state escrow-interest laws to national banks?Holding: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit failed to analyze whether New York's interest-on-escrow law is preempted as applied to national banks in a manner consistent with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N. A. v. Nelson.Result: Vacated and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Jonathan E. Taylor, Washington, D.C.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (for United States, as Amicus Curiae.) For Respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.