Science From the Fringe

In this episode of In Defense of Virology, Bryce Nickels speaks with virologist Simon Wain-Hobson about Simon’s essay, “WHO Wordplay on COVID Origins,” which critiques the WHO SAGO report and a related Nature commentary on what is known about the origins of COVID-19.The discussion begins with SAGO’s claim that most peer-reviewed evidence supports a natural origin, while acknowledging that key intelligence and data remain unavailable. Simon argues this creates a misleading sense of certainty—presenting a conclusion while admitting critical gaps.The conversation then turns to peer review, emphasizing that it is not a final stamp of truth but the beginning of quality control. Publication does not settle questions; real scrutiny happens afterward. Both Simon and Bryce note that top journals can give findings outsized authority before they are fully validated.They argue that in politically sensitive areas like gain-of-function research and COVID origins, the publication system can shift from gatekeeping to gate blocking, limiting debate and shaping consensus prematurely. This has downstream effects, as institutions like SAGO and the Government Accountability Office rely heavily on published literature that may itself be incomplete or biased.The episode also highlights the value of work outside traditional journals, pointing to independent researchers who have contributed meaningful analyses. Dismissing such work solely for lacking peer review, Simon argues, is circular when the formal system restricts what gets published.A key theme is openness versus defensiveness. Drawing on his experiences in the HIV-era experience, Simon argues that confronting difficult hypotheses openly builds trust, while suppressing debate erodes it. This is reflected in the muted in-person response to Matt Ridley’s NIH lecture on the likely lab origin of SARS-CoV-2, which contrasts with stronger criticism expressed online.The episode concludes with potential reforms, including reducing the gatekeeping role of journals and expanding incentives for replication. Both emphasize that science functions best when dissent is allowed, evidence is openly examined, and no single institution defines the boundaries of truth.(recorded March 25, 2026) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In the second episode of In Defense of Climate Change, Bryce Nickels speaks with climate policy scholar Roger Pielke Jr. about his recent review of Science Under Siege (SUS), a book by Michael Mann and Peter Hotez arguing that an “anti-science movement” threatens society.Roger argues that SUS is less a serious analysis than a partisan manifesto—one that treats political disagreement, especially from Republicans, as a form of scientific heresy. A central theme is the book’s use of terms like “anti-science cabal” and “anti-science ecosystem.” He contends that these categories are vague and elastic, functioning less as analytic concepts than as labels for people the authors oppose. Rather than clarifying how science is distorted in public life, he suggests, the book collapses disagreement into moral warfare.The episode also explores the broader politicization of science. Roger argues that parts of the scientific community have grown too comfortable embracing openly partisan narratives, thereby risking science’s credibility as a public enterprise meant to serve everyone—not just one political faction. At the same time, he criticizes heavy-handed political attacks on scientific institutions, arguing that restoring trust will require greater openness, pluralism, and tolerance for disagreement.(recorded March 31, 2026) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

Climate change is one of the most politically charged issues in science, often framed as a choice between denial and apocalypse. In the first episode of In Defense of Climate Change, Bryce Nickels speaks with climate policy scholar Roger Pielke Jr. about why that framing distorts the realities of climate science.At the center of the conversation is the role of scenarios in climate research—what Roger calls “the best kept secret in climate science.” Climate models do not predict the future; they simulate how the climate would respond under different assumptions about how the world develops, including population growth, economic activity, and energy use. These assumptions, known as emissions scenarios, determine how much carbon dioxide is emitted and, in turn, how much warming is projected.Roger explains that many of the most widely used scenarios—particularly those developed in the early 2000s—were built around assumptions of rapidly expanding coal use. These scenarios helped produce some of the most alarming projections of future warming and came to dominate both the scientific literature and public discussion. However, the world has not followed that trajectory, and many of these scenarios are now outdated—even as they continue to be used in current research.He emphasizes that climate change is real and serious, and that scenarios are a necessary tool for understanding possible futures. But he argues that failing to distinguish between plausible and implausible scenarios—and to update those assumptions as the world changes—can distort how climate science is interpreted.The episode also examines how institutional and methodological factors can slow the updating of scenarios, allowing outdated assumptions to persist in research, media coverage, and policy discussions.(recorded March 12, 2026) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In the eighth episode of In Defense of Virology, distinguished virologist Simon Wain-Hobson joins host Bryce Nickels to discuss Simon’s recent essay, “You Couldn’t Make Body Bags Fast Enough.” The essay examines a largely overlooked gain-of-function influenza experiment involving the avian virus H7N1 (Sutton et al., Airborne transmission of highly pathogenic H7N1 influenza virus in ferrets, published in Journal of Virology, June 15, 2014).In that study, researchers engineered an H7N1 influenza virus capable of airborne transmission in ferrets while retaining high lethality, killing three of five infected animals. Simon argues that if a virus with similar properties spread among humans, the consequences could be catastrophic.The conversation revisits earlier gain-of-function controversies—most notably the 2012 H5N1 experiments by Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka—and asks why the H7N1 work drew far less scrutiny. Simon points to structural pressures within science—funding incentives, prestige journals, and deference to authority—that can discourage open criticism of risky research. He also discusses the role of journals in publishing studies with clear dual-use implications.Bryce and Simon also discuss the incentives that shape scientific behavior. They argue that current funding structures and the pursuit of high-profile publications can normalize increasingly risky experiments. The episode concludes with a call for clearer boundaries between “cutting-edge” research that benefits the public and “bleeding-edge” work that may put lives at risk—emphasizing that protecting the public from dangerous research requires confronting difficult questions about responsibility, transparency, and acceptable risk.(recorded March 8, 2026) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In this episode of Science from the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels speaks with cardiologist and medical commentator Dr. Anish Koka about his recent article examining the forces that led to physician-scientist Vinay Prasad’s departure from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). They discuss how Prasad’s efforts to strengthen evidentiary standards for drug approvals quickly ran up against powerful political, financial, and institutional interests. The conversation explores how his brief tenure became a case study in the difficulty of reforming institutions where scientific standards, patient desperation, political pressure, and financial incentives collide.As Anish explains, Vinay Prasad is an unusually independent thinker within academic medicine who built a reputation challenging weak evidentiary standards for drug approvals long before entering government. Once at the FDA, he attempted to raise those standards—particularly for vaccines and costly therapies approved on limited or indirect evidence. Those efforts quickly triggered backlash from pharmaceutical companies, investors, patient advocacy groups, biotech media, and political actors with stakes in the approval pipeline.Anish walks through a detailed timeline of the flashpoints that defined Prasad’s short tenure: disputes over gene therapies for rare diseases, conflicts with companies such as Sarepta, Moderna, and UniQure, and broader debates about how regulators should weigh desperate patient demand against uncertain clinical evidence. He explains how controversial trial designs—such as reliance on historical controls or small datasets—can allow extremely expensive treatments to reach the market without clear proof they improve patient outcomes. In his view, Prasad’s push to tighten evidentiary standards exposed deeper structural problems in the drug-approval system.The conversation also explores the political and media dynamics surrounding Prasad’s tenure, including accusations that he created “chaos” at the agency, personal attacks, and media leaks that intensified pressure on FDA leadership. Bryce and Anish argue that Prasad’s willingness to publicly take responsibility for regulatory decisions—and to challenge entrenched interests—made him an unusually rare figure in Washington.The episode concludes with a broader discussion about incentives in drug regulation: the influence of pharmaceutical profits, the vulnerability of rare-disease communities to exploitation, and whether meaningful reform of the FDA’s approval process is possible from within the current system. Despite Prasad’s departure, Anish argues that his brief tenure exposed important weaknesses at the intersection of science, regulation, industry, and media.(recorded March 8, 2026)Timestamps00:31 – Introducing Anish Koka and the Vinay Prasad story02:12 – Why Prasad’s FDA appointment was surprising03:20 – Prasad’s background and COVID-era break from consensus04:24 – The core issue: declining evidentiary standards at FDA06:41 – Prasad’s integrity and inevitable clash with the system09:57 – Was Prasad set up?12:08 – Why Peter Marks mattered politically13:19 – Prasad’s new vaccine approval framework14:18 – Sarepta and weak evidence in rare disease drugs17:13 – Media leaks and the role of Stat News19:33 – Marty Makary backs Prasad20:05 – “Bad politics” or principled regulator?21:58 – The Moderna dispute over vaccine evidence23:51 – Accountability and why Prasad stood out27:49 – Personal attacks and mounting pressure28:09 – The UniQure controversy30:53 – What a sham control is33:55 – The problem with historical controls36:00 – Who decides trial matching?38:00 – Media narratives of “chaos” at FDA40:19 – Political pressure from Congress42:39 – The chain of events leading to Prasad’s exit45:04 – Rare disease desperation and potential exploitation49:03 – What Prasad exposed about the FDA ecosystem50:45 – The rare disease approval loophole53:45 – Investors, incentives, and distorted evidence54:13 – Why few would want Prasad’s job54:39 – Final reflections on integrity and institutional pressureintro and outro by Tess Parks Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In the seventh episode of In Defense of Virology, distinguished virologist Simon Wain-Hobson discusses the science (or lack thereof) behind two of the most influential publications on the origin of SARS-CoV-2: “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2” (“Proximal Origin,” published in Nature Medicine on March 17, 2020) and “Statement in Support of the Scientists, Public Health Professionals, and Medical Professionals of China Combating COVID-19” (“Calisher et al.,” published in The Lancet on March 7, 2020).These publications were instrumental in establishing the false narrative that the weight of scientific evidence strongly favored a natural origin over a laboratory origin. While both papers have been widely criticized for years (including by Science From the Fringe host Bryce Nickels, who has been part of multiple calls for Proximal Origin to be retracted - see, Proximal Origin Retraction Request #1; Proximal Origin Retraction Request #2; Petition to Retract Proximal Origin), Simon’s comments in this episode, including his own call for their retraction, represent one of the strongest condemnations of these papers from a member of the virology community itself. The conversation concludes with a discussion of the importance of accountability in cases (such as “Proximal Origin” and “Calisher et al.”) where established scientific norms are violated in such an odious manner.This episode serves as a companion to Simon’s essay, “Distal truths,” in which he elaborates on these arguments in written form.(recorded February 2, 2026) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In the sixth episode of In Defense of Virology, Rutgers professor and Science From the Fringe host Bryce Nickels speaks with distinguished virologist Simon Wain-Hobson about a potentially catastrophic biosafety issue: the human H2N2 influenza virus is not classified as a federal select agent, yet live samples remain stored in laboratory freezers around the world. The discussion is prompted by Simon’s recent essay, “The virus not on the Select Agent list.”The discussion centers on a concerning exchange between NIH Director Jay Bhattacharya and NIAID Acting Director Jeffrey Taubenberger on an August 2025 episode of The Director’s Desk podcast. During that conversation, Taubenberger—a prominent influenza researcher best known for his role in the highly controversial resurrection of the deadly 1918 “Spanish flu” virus—said that the virus responsible for the 1957 pandemic, H2N2, poses a serious concern. He noted that since 1968, no one has been exposed to this virus, even though it was fully adapted to humans. Despite this, H2N2 is not a select agent. Taubenberger explained that his lab voluntarily handles it under the same conditions as the 1918 virus, though such precautions are not required, and acknowledged that H2N2 likely remains in clinical, diagnostic, and basic virology laboratory freezers around the world. He admitted that this situation “really scares” him, since most of the global population born after 1968 lacks immunity to H2N2—a virus known to have already caused a pandemic.Simon highlights Taubenberger’s striking acknowledgment that live H2N2 stocks persist in numerous laboratories without select agent designation or enhanced biosafety requirements. This stands in sharp contrast to the 1918 influenza virus—reconstructed by Taubenberger himself—which is designated as a Tier 1 select agent and subject to the highest level of regulatory control. Given the well-documented record of laboratory accidents, Simon argues that keeping H2N2 stocks under minimal oversight poses an unacceptable risk of a lab-acquired pandemic.The episode questions why, if Taubenberger himself is “really scared” by the existence of H2N2 stocks in laboratories worldwide, neither he nor the NIH Director has taken concrete action since their podcast discussion. Simon maintains that H2N2 is uniquely dangerous: it is fully adapted to humans, highly transmissible, and capable of causing millions of deaths in today’s densely populated, interconnected world—potentially matching or exceeding the impact of COVID-19. In his view, any speculative scientific value in retaining live H2N2 virus stocks is vastly outweighed by their global hazard.Emphasizing that pandemic potential depends primarily on transmissibility rather than case fatality—unlike pathogens such as Ebola—Simon calls for urgent corrective measures. He advocates adding human H2N2 to the Federal Select Agent List as a Tier 1 agent, destroying all unnecessary laboratory stocks under U.S. jurisdiction, retaining only genomic sequences for possible future reconstruction if ever justified, and encouraging equivalent actions internationally.The conversation places these recommendations within the broader “Do No Harm” ethos of the series, arguing that responsible virology sometimes requires restraint, remediation, and the deliberate elimination of nonessential risks.(recorded January 9, 2026) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In Episode 5 of In Defense of Virology, Bryce Nickels and Simon Wain-Hobson have a sobering conversation about the emerging risks of applying artificial intelligence to virus design.The discussion centers on a recent Stanford preprint in which researchers trained AI models on bacteriophage genomes and used those models to generate entirely new viral sequences. From hundreds of AI-generated designs, the team synthesized 16 fully functional viruses. One replicated faster than its natural reference phage, while six displayed striking genetic stability, accumulating no detectable mutations at all. Even for Simon, whose career spans decades of studying viral evolution, the results were genuinely surprising.Although bacteriophages are often framed as promising therapeutic tools, particularly for treating antibiotic-resistant infections, Simon cautions that the implications of this work extend far beyond phage biology. Applying similar AI-driven approaches to animal or human viruses could unintentionally generate pathogens that are more transmissible or more virulent—effectively producing gain-of-function outcomes without any traditional laboratory manipulation.The episode places these findings within a broader and increasingly urgent context. Leaders in the AI community have begun sounding alarms about AI-enabled biology. Most notably, Yoshua Bengio warned in a New York Times op-ed that the implications of this technology are “terrifying.” Similar concerns were echoed at the September Red Lines AI meeting, where pandemic genesis was identified as the foremost global risk.Simon and Bryce argue that this moment demands restraint rather than curiosity. They urge scientists to refrain from applying AI-based viral design to human-relevant pathogens and call on research funders, including the National Institutes of Health, philanthropies, and private foundations, to withhold support for work that could escalate existential risk. (Such restraint would align with recent U.S. executive orders aimed at preventing the enhancement of dangerous pathogens.)The episode closes with Simon making a broader appeal for scientists to stop prioritizing technical novelty and high-risk experimentation, but for a renewed commitment to the principle of do no harm. Biology, he contends, should focus its energy on urgent human challenges (e.g., cancer, neurodegenerative disease, and mental health) where progress can be transformative without carrying the risk of catastrophic consequences.(recorded December 7, 2025) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In this episode of Science From the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels speaks with Dana Parish—an award-winning songwriter, patient-rights advocate, advisory board member of the Bay Area Lyme Foundation, co-author of Chronic, and host of The Dana Parish Podcast—about her personal experience with Lyme disease, the broader scientific, medical, and political controversies surrounding tick-borne illness, and the historical significance of the Lyme Disease Roundtable hosted by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on Monday, December 15, 2025.The conversation begins with Dana’s personal Lyme story: a tick bite that abruptly derailed her music career and led to severe multisystem illness, including heart failure, after early treatment failed. She describes a long and difficult journey to diagnosis, the discovery of co-infections such as Bartonella, and her eventual recovery through extended antibiotic treatment under Dr. Steven Phillips. That experience ultimately led her to co-author Chronic, a project shaped by striking parallels between Lyme disease politics and the public response to COVID-19.Dana discusses her advocacy work with organizations such as the Bay Area Lyme Foundation and the Lyme Disease Biobank, emphasizing the urgent need for improved diagnostics, increased research funding, insurance coverage, and formal recognition of chronic Lyme disease. The episode also explores the recent HHS Chronic Lyme Disease Roundtable, featuring figures such as RFK Jr., Dr. Oz, Dr. Steven Phillips, and Dr. Bob Bransfield. The discussion highlights growing acknowledgment of chronic Lyme’s reality, the severe neuropsychiatric consequences many patients face—including rage, psychosis, and suicide risk—and calls for systemic reforms in testing, treatment, and coverage.Interwoven with humor and banter—including jokes about exterminating ticks, “limited hangouts,” and mutual suspicions of being “spooks”—the episode confronts deeper issues: institutional denial, media bias, insurance barriers, failed vaccine efforts, and the enormous personal and economic toll of untreated chronic illness. Dana and Bryce also explore links between Lyme disease, toxic mold exposure, reactivated infections, and long COVID, underscoring the complexity of chronic inflammatory conditions.The episode closes with cautious optimism about potential reforms under new HHS leadership, stressing both the urgency of alleviating patient suffering and the need for skepticism and follow-through to ensure that recent developments amount to real change rather than symbolic optics.(recorded December 19, 2025) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In this episode of Science From the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels speaks with documentary filmmaker Jenner Furst, the Director of Thank You, Dr. Fauci, which examines the career and controversies surrounding Dr. Anthony Fauci.The conversation explores Jenner’s motivation for making the film, which began when independent financiers approached him to investigate Fauci’s record during the COVID-19 pandemic. Jenner describes his deep dive into Fauci’s involvement in gain-of-function research, the lab-origin hypothesis for SARS-CoV-2, and what he characterizes as a vast scientific cover-up, reconstructed through emails, publications, and whistleblower testimony.They discuss interviews featured in the film with figures such as Fauci’s long time nemesis Richard Ebright, former CDC Director Dr. Robert Redfield, and current FDA Commissioner Dr. Marty Makary, while critically examining institutional incentives, possible intelligence-community entanglements, and how crises can be leveraged for power, profit, and political advantage.Interspersed with humor—ranging from bad Christmas songs and Ghostbusters metaphors to behind-the-scenes filming anecdotes—the discussion also confronts darker themes: suppressed dissent, fraud in science, failures of transparency, and the structural weaknesses of modern biosafety and public-health oversight.The episode asks how ambition, distorted incentives, and institutional corruption may have contributed to a global catastrophe—and whether meaningful accountability or reform is possible under new leadership. Listeners are encouraged to watch the film for a fuller reckoning.(Recorded December 13, 2025) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In the fourth episode of In Defense of Virology, Rutgers Professor and Science From the Fringe host Bryce Nickels and distinguished virologist Simon Wain-Hobson argue that labs should destroy frozen stocks of dangerous, nonessential pathogens produced through gain-of-function research or historical resurrection—simple to do, high-impact for reducing global risk.Simon highlights precedent—from post-eradication smallpox and rinderpest—and cites a recent Newcastle disease virus re-emergence in China strongly suggestive of a freezer escape. Given that even top labs leak, he argues, destruction of unnecessary stocks is common-sense risk reduction.The episode concludes with an overlooked puzzle: despite SARS-CoV-2’s devastating impact, fewer than 100 related genomes have been disclosed, compared to more than 240 for SARS-1. Whether due to undersampling or undisclosed sequences, Simon contends the gap is a public-health failure—surveillance is essential, but must not be confused with the risky manipulation that helped create today’s biosafety crisis. Virology must decide between continued high-risk work and responsibly “cleaning house.”(recorded November 22, 2025) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In this episode of Science from the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels speaks with Dr. Meryl Nass—medical adviser to Robert F. Kennedy Jr., biological warfare expert, publisher of Meryl’s CHAOS letter, and founder of DoorToFreedom.org—about the urgent need to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).The conversation examines the escalating risks posed by bioweapons research, and why the current political moment—with HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. and President Trump openly calling for an end to bioweapons development—may offer the strongest opportunity in decades to close the gaps in the Biological Weapons Convention.Dr. Nass recounts that President Nixon’s 1969–70 decision to renounce U.S. offensive bioweapons work led to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention—now joined by nearly 200 nations—but one deliberately drafted without verification, inspections, or penalties in order to secure rapid international agreement. She explains that in 2001 the Bush administration abruptly dismantled a nearly completed verification protocol, fracturing international trust and leaving the treaty effectively unenforceable.Dr. Nass further notes that, since 2001, the surge in biodefense and “pandemic preparedness” funding has actively encouraged dangerous gain-of-function research—and that this research enterprise has itself become a significant source of global public-safety risk.Still, she sees a historic opportunity to reduce this danger by finally fixing the BWC. President Trump’s May 2025 executive order restricting gain-of-function research, his September 23, 2025 UN speech urging all nations to end biological weapons development, and RFK Jr.’s continued focus on the issue at HHS together create an unprecedented chance to add the verification, inspection, and enforcement mechanisms the treaty has lacked for more than fifty years.The episode offers a stark warning: today’s gravest biological threat is not nature but dangerous gain-of-function research. Dr. Nass argues that this moment must be seized—before the next accident or deliberate release makes COVID-19 look modest by comparison.(Recorded November 24, 2025)Timestamps00:30 — Introduction of Dr. Meryl Nass02:37 — Discovering Pentagon-funded bioweapons work at UMass (1989)07:43 — Joining the Council for Responsible Genetics; early BWC history09:50 — Nixon’s renunciation and the intentional omission of verification11:49 — Failures of five-year review conferences; Bush’s 2001 sabotage14:10 — Context of the 2001 walkout: 9/11 and the anthrax attacks15:20 — Why the U.S. abruptly killed the verification protocol17:35 — Trump’s 2025 UN speech and executive order on GOF19:55 — The global boom in “pandemic preparedness” funding22:23 — USAID’s $44B budget and dangerous research abroad24:15 — Why narrow GOF definitions are misleading26:56 — The number of lab incidents that occur each year30:37 — Risks of basic research on natural Ebola-level pathogens31:24 — The 2018–19 Ebola vaccine rollout: unresolved issues35:06 — Rand Paul’s oversight bill vs. the broader Trump/RFK Jr. strategy36:03 — Financial incentives behind the global biodefense system40:45 — Rebuilding trust and addressing entrenched interests41:45 — The opportunity created by RFK Jr. at HHS46:22 — Concrete steps that signal real progress48:55 — AI, synthetic biology, and the future of bioweapons oversight52:33 — Why public understanding of biowarfare risks remains limited01:00:14 — Closing remarksintro and outro by Tess Parks Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In this episode of Science From the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels, speaks with David Zweig—a New York City–based journalist, author, and contributor to The Atlantic, The New York Times, and The Free Press—about his new book, An Abundance of Caution: American Schools, the Virus, and the Story of Bad Decisions.Their conversation traces David’s motivation for writing the book, beginning with his early recognition of the devastating effects of remote learning on children during the COVID-19 pandemic. David explains how a mix of action bias, politicization, and institutional inertia led to catastrophic decisions on school closures and mitigation measures such as masking, distancing, and barriers.David critiques the reliance on flawed models, the role of teachers’ unions, and the class divides that deepened the harms, while highlighting how real-time evidence from Europe and elsewhere was ignored. The discussion also explores the erosion of public trust, the suppression of dissent, and the moral grandstanding that replaced evidence-based reasoning.At its core, this episode examines how “good” intentions and systemic dysfunction combined to produce policies that harmed children with little to no public health benefit, and what it will take to ensure more intellectually honest, transparent, and evidence-driven decision-making in future crises.(recorded November 10, 2025) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In this episode of Science from the Fringe, host Bryce Nickels, Professor of Genetics at Rutgers University, speaks with Aaron Siri—civil rights attorney, managing partner at Siri & Glimstad LLP, and author of Vaccines Amen: The Religion of Vaccines. Together, they discuss the corrupting influence of commercial interests on scientific integrity and public policy, and how, in the case of vaccines, appeals to authority are sold to the public as unassailable fact.The conversation begins with the historical inflection point of the little known 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, which established legal immunity for vaccine manufacturers and reshaped the incentives that underpin vaccine development and public health policy. The discussion then turns to how this unprecedented legal structure has contributed to shortcuts in scientific oversight, particularly in “placebo” trial design, post-licensure safety evaluation, and mechanisms for compensating vaccine injuries.Aaron argues that many vaccine claims are rooted in dogma rather than evidence, critiques the role of figures like Dr. Stanley Plotkin in shaping vaccine policy, and highlights cases of coercion, censorship, and inadequate safety oversight. He emphasizes the importance of informed consent, individual rights, and persuading the public on merits rather than mandates, while touching on potential unintended consequences of vaccination programs, including the potential disruption of humanity’s ecological relationship with certain pathogens.At its core, this “scientist meets lawyer” conversation probes how scientific integrity can be distorted by profit-driven systems, what happens when healthy skepticism becomes verboten, and the human cost of trading transparency for expedience.(Recorded October 29th, 2025)Timestamps00:30 — Introduction of Aaron Siri01:17 — Aaron’s definition of a vaccine03:03 — Aaron shares his personal opinion on vaccine policy08:32 — Dr. Stanley Plotkin: a central figure in vaccinology12:04 — Aaron’s 2018 deposition of Plotkin in a custody case15:28 — The 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act19:57 — How the 1986 Act inverted market incentives for vaccine safety22:24 — Design defect claims and the Supreme Court’s ruling on vaccine liability 26:19 — Lucrativeness of vaccines for pharmaceutical companies28:26 — The Mandate for Safer Childhood Vaccines and HHS’s failure to fulfill it32:36 — Potential for HHS under RFK Jr. to enforce vaccine safety mandates35:55 — Mistreatment of vaccine injured: the case of Maddie de Garay42:20 — Broader societal treatment of vaccine-injured and unvaccinated44:14 — GSK’s 2017 pertussis vaccine ad and litigation over misleading claims48:19 — Exchange with Dr. Paul Offit on placebo trials57:26 — Humanity’s ecological relationship with infectious diseases01:08:35 — Measles mortality decline pre-vaccine and potential long-term effects of eradication01:11:50 — Aaron describes his vision for a world without mandatesintro and outro by Tess Parks Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In the third episode of In Defense of Virology, Rutgers Professor and Science From the Fringe host Bryce Nickels and distinguished virologist Simon Wain-Hobson discuss two striking examples of reckless virology research—one well known and the other largely forgotten—and issue a call to change the culture of modern science.The first example revisits the controversial resurrection of the 1918 Spanish flu, a virus that killed tens of millions worldwide. Simon explains how NIH-funded researchers extracted genetic fragments from frozen cadavers, used PCR to reconstruct the viral genome, and then revived the virus in 2005, publishing the full sequence in Science. Despite claims that the work would aid vaccine development, he argues that no public-health benefit ever materialized, while the potential for misuse dramatically increased.The second example, less known but equally concerning, involves retroviruses resurrected from fragments within the human genome. In work published in 2006 and 2007, researchers in France and New York chemically synthesized what they believed to be defunct human viruses—naming one “Phoenix.” Although performed with NIH and national-science-foundation support, there was no transparency about biosafety levels or prior ethical review. Simon argues that such experiments, however clever, violate the moral boundary between curiosity and recklessness.From these examples, Simon and Bryce turn to solutions—chief among them a Hippocratic Oath for scientists. Just as physicians swear to “do no harm,” they propose that life-science researchers and funding agencies adopt a similar pledge to avoid work that makes the world more dangerous. Simon envisions a three-part reform: NIH and major foundations embedding the principle into grants, universities incorporating it into graduation ceremonies, and scientific culture embracing it as a moral baseline.The conversation closes with a call to action for listeners: write to local universities or newspapers to support a research culture grounded in humility, safety, and moral responsibility.(recorded October 23, 2025) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe

In the second episode of In Defense of Virology, Genetics Professor and Science From the Fringe host Bryce Nickels engages virologist Simon Wain-Hobson in a nuanced discussion on how recent advances in biotechnology have amplified both the promise and the perils of modern virology research.Building on Episode 1, Simon delves deeper into the dangers of gain-of-function (GOF) research, this time focusing on how today’s biotechnology makes it possible to build entire viruses from digital genetic sequences—blueprints that can be transmitted and replicated worldwide in seconds.Simon is blunt in his assessment: there are no redeeming benefits to dangerous gain-of-function experiments. To better describe the risk, he introduces the concept of “single-use research of concern” (SURC), a term for studies that generate genuine hazards without any plausible public good. This contrasts with the more familiar idea of “dual-use research of concern” (DURC), which acknowledges that some experiments carry risks but may also advance valuable scientific or medical progress.Reflecting on his career during the HIV/AIDS era, Simon recounts helping organize a landmark 2000 Royal Society meeting that addressed verboten questions about whether the oral polio vaccine played a role in HIV’s origins. That experience, he says, underscored the value of humility, transparency, and open communication between scientists and the public. From past vaccine mishaps to the careless publication of viral genome data, Simon warns that the real threat to virology isn’t skepticism from outside—it’s hubris and secrecy from within.(recorded October 20, 2025) Get full access to Science From the Fringe at sciencefromthefringe.substack.com/subscribe