The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

We conduct Mission Analysis in order to determine the desired endstate for the deployment of 1 ATF to Nui Dat and the orders for D/6 as they patrolled out to Long Tan. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series and is presented by MAJ Trevor Watson RAA. Without the ability to learn and adapt to new and emerging circumstances a military organisation will be unable to achieve success in combat. Military organisations must be agile in their ability to learn and adapt to main an advantage over their adversary. This looks at artillery command and control and the change from the emphasis on destruction to nuetralisation. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company, is the plenary session, with MC MAJ GEN Tim Ford. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This presentation, part of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company, is by Keith Glyde and is presented by LT COL Nick Floyd. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Dr William Westerman presents this episode on the career of LT GEN Sir Joseph John Talbot Hobbs, KCB, KCMG, VD, who served as both commander of Australian Artillery and then as the Commander of the Australian 5th Division. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We continue our look at women's service in the Great Patriotic War with the book by Svetlana Alexievich. If you haven't already listened to it, please listen to the first episode that looks at some of the history of women in war. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This podcast looks at the contribution of Soviet women to the military in the Great Patriotic War. Based on the The Unwomanly Face of War, by Svetlana Alexievich which received a Nobel Prize for Literature. We discuss: Women in the Air Transport Auxiliary Mary Ellis, the ferry pilot with over 1,000 missions Natalya Meklen, one of the Nacht Hexen with over 800 combat missions in a Po 2. What does the female contribution to Total War mean for a moral centre of gravity. Check out the show notes for more details on the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This lecture by LT COL David Brooks is presented by BRIG John Cox. We look at the changes in the technology and the industrial base as Britain and Australia moved to an industrial war footing for the production and development of artillery ammunition. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Dr Garth Pratten looks at the how the BEF was developing it's organisation, doctrine and weapons in preparation for the Somme Offensive. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

The is the latest episode in our long interview with Dave Sabben, Pl Comd 11 Pl at the Battle of Long Tan. There is a lot of valuable experience shared about what made D Coy different and how they were trained and prepared for war. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We continue our discussion with Dave Sabben, PL COMD of 11 Pl at Long Tan. We discuss hand overs and the long term impact of the Long Tan victory by D Coy 6 RAR. We look at how MAJ Harry Smith prepared the Coy - the training, the techniques and the mindset that set them up for success. What had his experiences been and how did that help set D Coy up for success on the battlefield? What was the reaction to the US forces to the reports of the battle that had been sent by the Task Force and why did they get the Presidential Unit Citation? Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This is the Plenary Session in the 2nd Seminar of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Society's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series. This is a panel discussion about some of the issues with the employment of Artillery at Gallipoli. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This is the 5th episode in the 2nd Seminar of the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Society's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series. Dr Rhys Crawley discusses how logistics were handled at Gallipoli. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This is the fourth session of the second seminar in the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Company's Firepower Seminar Series. This presentation looks at the conduct of counter battery fire at Gallipoli. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This is the third session of the second seminar in the Royal Australian Artillery Historical Association's Firepower: Lessons from the Great War Seminar Series. How was the Turkish artillery organised at Gallipoli? Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

What were the artillery tasks at ANZAC? How was artillery employed? How did the fireplans for Lone Pine and The Nek differ in implementation and effect? Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We continue our discussion with Dave Sabben about the Battle of Long Tan. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player. Long Tan The Defence of Nui Dat NVA Casualties, 275th NVA Regiment and D445 Battalion.

This is the next episode in our Long Tan Series with Dave Sabben. Our last episode discussed the final defensive position. This episode starts a 4 part Q+A with Dave, looking at the conduct of the battle. The show notes have all of details on what is discussed. Please check them out. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We look at the current doctrine around Mission Command. This follows on from our podcast interview with BRIG Ulf Henricsson and the performance of Nordbat 2 in Bosnia. Check out the show notes for the podcast for all of the information that we cover in this episode as well as the images and other details that didn't make it into the podcast. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Our guest on the podast today is BRIG Ulf Henricsson from the Swedish Army. He was the commander of Nordbat 2, which was recognised as one of the most successful units that where committed to UNPROFOR for the peacekeeing effort in Bosnia. I first read about Nordbat 2 in an Article on Strategy Bridge. We start with the discussion about how Mission Command has been used in the Swedish Army, and how it is taught within the Swedish Army, including the way that Mission Command is used in barracks. We discuss the composition of Nordbat 2. The composition is the start of the success of Nordbat 2 and the composition was driven by the Mision Analysis that was conducted. Of the 1,300 members of Nordbat 2, around 1,000 were reservists who had volunteered for service in Bosnia. The Mission is a critical part of Mission Command, including the intent, so we look at explicit and implied tasks in the mission that was given. He found that within Bosnia, the discussion about the mission was a lot easier than the discussions between countries. This leads to a discussion about the Rules of Engagement and how they were used. BRIG Henricsson has a relatively free interpretation of the rules of engagement with that interpretation devolved down the chain of command. We discuss some of the examples of Mission Command that lead to the success of Nordbat 2, including the incident at Stupni Do. The use of Mission Command and robust peacekeeping lead to a reputation that assisted Nordbat 2 in the accomplishment of their mission. We look at Mission Analysis and how it lead to a composition for Nordbat 2 that set some of the conditions for success. Another component was the rules of engagement that were provided by nations providing troops to UNPROFOR. The RoE and the interpretation of the RoE was often manipulated by warring forces and lead to some units being ineffective in their role. BRIG Henriccson discusses support he received from his Commander in Bosnia, and he also discusses the risks that he ran with the use of Mission Command. We finish with a look at some of the reasons that Mission Command is difficult to practice and what some of the conditions are required for the successful use of Mission Command. He finishes off with his advice for commanders today on how to use Mission Command to enhance your chances of mission success. Some questions that are raised are: Are some societies better placed to enact Mission Command? How often is there a clear intent in orders that you receive? Is their a difference between the employment of Mission Command in barracks vs on Operation or Exercise?

We continue our examination of the Battle of Long Tan with Dave Sabben. 12 Pl has returned to the D Coy position, with some of the survivors of 11 Pl and the Coy prepares to receive the next assault. BRIG Jackson is faced with the dilemma of trying to divine the true intentions of the enemy. Is it a diversion in preparation for a move against the Task Force base, or is it an attempt to destroy a Coy outside the base. B Coy is ordered to return to the D Coy location and 10 APCs are loaded with troops from A Coy at Nui Dat and dispatched to reinforce the D Coy position. 6 RAR CO, LT COL Townsend recalls the APCs because he wants to go out with the APCs. How does LT Roberts respond to a call to return for the CO, when he knows that D Coy is in a critical situation with low ammunition. At 18:30 what is enabling the Coy to survive in the face of ongoing assaults? What air support was available, how was it used and how effective was it? The enemy starts to mass and commences further assaults against the position. The pace of the assaults increases and the troops don't have enough time to fully reload their magazines. The sun has set and it is becoming increasingly dark. At 18:55 increase numbers of waves assault the position, around the perimeter. Troops, controlled by whistle blasts walking in firing from the hips. It is now dark and the only illumination available to the defenders is the flashes from the artillery. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

For an information operation that is fought of Facebook, how do you identify the Avenues of Approach? We use OCOKA to conduct the terrain analysis for Information Analysis. We look to orientate everyone to the human terrain in an information operation that is conducted using social media. Observation and Fields of Fire: Observation is no longer blocked by terrain nor limited by range. The Internet Research Agency is located in Russia, but they are able to conduct operations as if they were based in Washington DC. Tools like Twitterfall. We look at spearfishing email attacks. Facebook has tools inbuilt to enable adjusting the fall of shot for each of the posts that you are using. Cover and Concealment: In a Social Media war, cover comes from the privacy settings. Cover is asymmetric in a Social Media war. We compare Op Tidal Wave 2, a conventional propaganda campaign with leaflet drops, compared to how it could be conducted with Social Media. Obstacles: We look at culture and language – grammar in particular. These are the real barriers for operations conducted on Social Media. Key and Decisive Terrain: The concept of key terrain is fundamentally changed when operations move onto social media. We compare the 228 massacre in Taiwan and the Key Terrain there with disintermediation that social media creates. Avenues of Approach: Traditionally the enemy is canalised into an engagement area, before they can reach their objective. Social Media war can strike directly at civilians in a target country. There is no physical terrain to defend. The avenues of approach now depend on the target demographic – Linkedin, vKontact, Facebook or Snapchat. We briefly discuss the evolution of avenues of approach for information operations. This concludes the ground brief for social media operations. Are there any questions? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We look at some of the actions that were used in an attempt to influence the US democratic system through the use of social media. Using the military to conduct regime change is extremely expensive in terms of blood and treasure - we look at some of the measures that can be used with non-kinetic means to create regime change. We look at the use of Social media from the point of view of how marketers use social media, because Social Media Warfare is often about using marketing tools to sell an idea, rather than more conventional uses for Social Media. To win the 100 victories in 100 battles is not the acme of skill, but to subdue the enemy without fight is the acme of skill. If this is the case, then the use of Social Media to achieve regime change would definitely qualify as the acme of skill. We compare kinetic strikes above the detection threshold with non-kinetic strike below the detection threshold. We also look at an example of a pre-emptive strike to achieve regime change before a state has become an enemy of the state. The pre-emptive strike starts the war before the enemy has a chance to prepare for war, which is important if you believe that if you find yourself in a fair fight, then you have done something wrong. Kinetic strikes are by their very nature above the detection threshold. Non-kinetic means have a much lower signature, and therefore could be below the detection threshold. We look at FDR's speech following the strike on Pearl Harbour. What if there are now tools to allow regime change that does not require the use of military force? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This episode of the podcast sees the transition from the encounter battle through to D Coy moving to being completely on the defensive. 11 Pl becomes decisively engaged, with enemy flanking to the north whilst being engaged by 3 MGs from the front. As 11 Pl starts the call for fire, MAJ Smith calls for reinforcements in order to regain the initiative. As the tempo of the artillery support increases, the audience at the Little Patty concert moves away to support the Coy in contact. 10 Pl moves towards the foot hills to the north, observing a force attempting to flank 11 Pl. The Task Force initially refuses to reinforce the NZ 161 Bty, requiring time consuming switching between targets and adjustment. On later is 161 reinforced with 2 further batteries. 2LT Dave Sabbens 12 Pl detaches a section to provide security to CHQ and moves off 2 up to attempt to marry up with 11 Pl. By now 2 hours into the battle, each Pl has a bty in support. 10 Pl is down to 50% ammunition and requests and ammo resupply. This is initially refused. The pilots who had bought up Little Patty to Nui Dat. The US resupply would be 30 minutes which could be too late. Moral and physical courage is shown by the RAAF pilots as they ignore restrictions from Canberra about flying into contact in order to provide supply to the troops in contact. The situation is so desperate that SGT Bob Buick, the PL SGT in 11 Pl calls in artillery on his on position. The FO refuses to bring the artillery onto their position, but brings the rounds in as close as possible. 11 Pl moves back marry up with 12 Pl and they commence to move back to CHQ. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We continue our discussion with Dave Sabben, picking in the in the second half of July. The base was being heavily reconnoitered. We discuss the preparation for the defences at Nui Dat. Dave suggests that Canberra believed that the base was considered to be safe and unlikely to be attacked. The South Vietnamese intelligence was treated as suspect, as was the US intelligence because a lot of it was sourced from the South Vietnamese. A radio intercept unit was located at Nui Dat. They were tracking the morse code communications. With direction finding, the sigint was providing some good intelligence showing a large force moving towards the east of Nui Dat 2. The shelling on the 17th of August by mortars, RCLs and at least one artillery piece. B Coy was sent to locate the location of the mortar base plates and attempt to track down the force responsible. Tracking the enemy was laborious, in dangerous terrain. B Coy remained out on the 17th and D Coy was sent to relieve them. D Coy finds bullock tracks and blood stains leading into the rubber plantation. The tracks split and 10 Pl follows one and 11 Pl follows the second with 12 Pl bringing up the rear. An minor obstacle crossing drill is conducted by the Coy as they come across a cattle fence. Sgt Bob Buick, the Pl SGT for 11 Pl sees 6 - 7 enemy soldiers with slung AK-47s, completely non tac. He opens fire with his Armalite, hitting at least one. Six 6 vs a platoon with 30 troops is a good troop ratio orders Maj Smith gives LT Sharp to follow up the enemy. Shortly, they are engaged by a force that looks like another Pl, so the Coy needs to to reinforce 11 Pl. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We discuss the terrain in Phuoc Tuy, including Long Tan and the defensive base at Nui Dat. We discuss the demarcation in responsibility between the ARVN and the Australian troops and the impact of ARVN having responsibility for dealing with the roads and villages. We also discuss the strategic hamlet program and the impact of resettling the population out of Long Tan village and the creation of a free Fire zone in the area. How did the resettlement of villagers impact their lives? The intent for the establishment of 1 ATF was to, "Help stop the fighting the South." 1 ATF turned this into "we will dominate Phuoc Tuy province in order to help stop the fighting in the South." The plan was to secure the base and then expand the influence out from around the base and disrupt VC operating in the bush. We discuss the impact of Lina Alpha, the 5km line out from Nui Dat that was to act as an exclusion zone,but but the time of Long Tan, there was 1 significant issue with it - we talk about the road that runs through the defensive perimeter and how the VC could conduct recon on the suspected minefields. The road was used to access Binh Ba in the north. This sets the scene our next Episode - The Encounter Battle. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Dave Sabben describes his experience when he joins D Coy, 6 RAR. Dave makes an important point, many of the officers and SNCOs were newly promoted into their roles, a function of the rapid expansion of the Army. Fifty percent of the diggers in Delta were National Servicemen. In March 1966, 6 RAR is notified that they will be going to Vietnam. Delta left in early July, The first birthday of 6 RAR was the 6th of June in 1966 and celebrated it's first birthday on the beach of Vung Tau. Dave and the rest of Delta Coy joined the battalion on the next day. Training was conducted in air mobile operations and weapons training intensified. Second hand Armalites were issued to replace the Owen guns. The Owen gun was designed in 1939, The building of the base at Nui Dat was commenced by 5 RAR in May. 6 RAR was deployed quickly to the base after intelligence suggested that an attack was being planned for the poorly defended base at Nui Dat. We look at the creation of 1 Australian Task Force and look at the reasons behind it's placement in Phuoc Tuy Province. The name Nui Dat, comes from the name of one of the terrain features, meaning small hill. We discuss the importance of the Vung Tau. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

This lecture is presented by Dr Rhys Crawley, the author of Climax at Gallipoli. Dr Crawley compares artillery at Gallipoli with the employment of artillery in 1915 on the Western Front. Artillery was still seen as an accessory for the artillery, rather than as a separate arms distinct from the infantry. What lessons where learnt at the Battle of Neuve Chappelle and how were those lessons applied at Gallipoli? We look at the concentration of artillery at Gallipoli and compare it to the Western Front. We look at troop / gun ratios and the actual guns that were deployed to Gallipoli. What was the quality like of the guns that were used? How many men were required to move the guns? The average incline was 9% and in some places it was twice that. This significantly decreased the mobility of the guns and limited the flexibility in the employments of the guns. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We look at the Scheyville Experience. This is important because it highlights the process required to train junior officers to be able to lead soldiers into combat and to win. Scheyville had 1883 graduates, 1690 were National Serviceman, 355 served in Vietnam, and 8 gave there lives in Vietnam. We look at the syllabus at OTU Scheyville, and we talk to Dave Sabben about his experience at Scheyville, from his Officer Selection Board, through to the training that he received at Scheyville. What was the success rate of those volunteering to be officers? What was the training like? How did they distill the concept of Leadership into the officer cadets? Given Dave's experience in Vietnam, how would he have improved it? In just 22 weeks, Dave Sabben graduated from OTU Scheyville. We look at his recollections of the training and how he felt prepared to graduate as a Platoon Commander in 6 RAR. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We start our look at the Battle of Long Tan, which occured on the 18th August 1966, 4km east of the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat. Outnumber 20:1, the Australians took 18 KIA and 24 WIA in one of the most important and most famous battles of the whole Australian involvement in Long Tan. Our guide through Australian Military's History most famous rubber plantation is Dave Sabben. Dave was the Platoon Commander of 12 Platoon, Delta Company on that day at Long Tan. Conscription has been used by many countries through history as they rapidly increase the size of their defence forces in response to changing strategic circumstances, circumstances that have changed quickly and require a faster response than could be achieved with the full time Defence Force. How did the Australian Defence Force mobilised for operations in Vietnam? We look at conscription and the history of professional armies. We start by looking at some of the components of a professional army and what the role of conscription is within the concept of National readiness. Professional armies are very expensive to maintain and so we look at 2 components of readiness that are used to decrease the cost of having a large standing force. How was conscription for Vietnam different to conscription in Australia during World War 2? Dave starts by talking us through the conscription process and his initial training at Kapooka. We look at the reason for the conscription in the 1960's. Dave discusses what the aim of the training program was and the skills that officers were to receive at Scheyville. How was the training program designed and how were leadership skills developed at OTU Scheyville? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Why did the soldiers hold short of their objectives on the first day of the landings at ANZAC? The 3rd Brigade were the first to land at Gallipoli. Why did COL Sinclair-Maclagan hesitate? How costly was this action? What was the Turkish dispositions on the morning of the 25th? If third ridge had been taken, what would have the impact for the campaign been? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Brigadier Muhammad Asgharpresents a fascinating look at the forgotten gunners of Gallipoli, the 7th Mountain Indian Artillery Brigade, comprising the 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery and 26th Jacob's Batteries. These Batteries become a part of the 1st Mountain Regiment in 1947 in Pakistan. Jacob's Battery was the only gun in action on the 25th of April at ANZAC. On the 26th of April Jacob's Bty was reinforced with Australian gunners, creating an amalgam battery. Jacob's and Royal Kohat batteries were the only guns in action at ANZAC on the second day. A great story of crater analysis unearths the story of Turkish rounds marked CSF@RPA (made at Cossipore and filled at Rawalpindi). How did Indian ammunition end up being fired at Australian troops? 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery was in action for 238 dayas and fired 12,248 round. They had 11 men killed, 134 wounded, (5 died of wounds), 35 animals killed, 199 animals wounded and 1 missing. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

In 1911 the NZ Government purchases 18 pounders and 4.5 inch howitzers as it starts to modernise. Their first deployment was to German Somoa, as a part of the Samoa Expeditionary Force, retaking the islands from the Germans. The ANZAC the NZ guns land, howitzers, on the 26th of April, 1915 and the field guns lands on the 27th. Constrained by lack of suitable firing positions and ammunition, they supported Australian, New Zealand and British across the Gallipoli peninsula. The withdrawal commenced on the night of the 11th of December and the the last guns were withdrawn on the night of the 19th of December. What were the key lessons that were learnt?

This bonus episode of the Firepower Seminar looks at the role of Naval Gunfire Support at Gallipoli by Commander David Stevens, RANR. What issues did NGFS have at Gallipoli? How where targets identified and how was command and control managed? As a secondary effort, there was to few guns at Gallipoli and the Navy attempted to make up the difference. What was the impact the NGFS on the Gallipoli campaign and how did the terrain impact it's effectiveness? NGFS at Gallipoli makes an early attempt at creating Joint Effects. What is the legacy for the ADF today? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

MAJ Daryl Kelly OAM looks at the human side of the Gunners at Gallipoli. He looks at some of the stories of the individual Gunners who served at Gallipoli, looking at the conditions and at Gallipoli during the landing operations. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We continue our discussion on the Center of Gravity with COL Dale Eikmeier. How important is the relationship between different CoG? What impact does this relationship have for operational planning? Does the CoG breakdown when their are multiple actors? How are they related and how does it impact in planning an operation? What is the best way to deal with the increasing complexity? Does the Centre of Gravity continue to be useful as the complexity of the environment and the number of stakeholders increases? What is the impact of time on the Centre of Gravity? Can the CoG change over time? We look at the application of the CoG outside of the military. Could it be used in Foreign Policy? What are COL Eikmeier's thoughts on Moral Centers of Gravity? Are they useful in planning campaigns? What is the future of Joint Planning? How will it change over the next 20 years? What will be the impact on a Whole of Government approach to strategy? How will the Centre of Gravity evolve over time? This concludes our look at the Centre of Gravity construct. Next week we will start our next major battle study as we look at the Battle of Long Tan.

We talk to retired COL Dale Eikmeier about the Ends, Ways and Means methodology for determining the Center of Gravity. We talk about some of the problems with the Clausewitzian Centre of Gravity construct. What role do the critical factors, critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities play in the discovery of the Centre of Gravity. We discuss the new Center of Gravity definitions that are starting to be used in Joint planning and how they improve on the traditional definition. How does the CoG construct work in a complex system? We use the Battle of the Atlantic as an example of how the Ends, Ways and Means approach can be used to better understand the process of determining the correct Center of Gravity to target. Is the CoG construct useful at the LT / Platoon level? The Battle of the Atlantic between the Germans and the Allies as the Germans attempted to remove Great Britain from the war, (which required 1,000,000 tons of supplies a week!), and the US attempted to build up men and materiel in Britain to launch it's attack on Occupied Europe. Analysis of the Critical Factors shows the ways to the critical vulnerabilities that can be targeted in the most economical way. We finish with the discussion about the war in Iraq and the choice of the CoG being the Iraqi government as an example of a CoG that is incorrect.

Whilst everyone agrees that determining the Center of Gravity is really important, but there is not a lot of information on the actual process to do that. We look at the inside out methodology by Rueschoff and Dunne as a way of determining the CoG. This methodology starts with objective, then looks at the critical capabilities that allow the achievement of the objective. We pause to look at the role that time in CoG analysis. The CoG can change over time. War on the Rocks had a great article on the procurement of oil in the Pacific and how a limited assessment of future critical factors can lead to issues. Who is doing a future Critical Factor analysis? What role does this have in planning? We then look at the Eikmeier methodology. This is based on Ends, Ways and Means. The Eikmeier methodology provides a user friendly cut down version of systems theory. Identify the desired endstate. ID the ways that it can be achieved. (CCs) List the means required to enable the CC. Select the entity that can achieve the means that can achieve the endstate. This is the CoG. Select critical items from the means on the list. ID the critical requirements that are vulnerable. We look at an example of Madonna deciding to be elected as President of the US. With that Endstate, we look at the ways she could achieve this and the means that she would need to be POTUS. We look at the validity test to ensure that you have the right entity as being the CoG. We look at the CoG example for Hannibal at Cannae. Have a listen to Dan Carlin's Punic Nightmare to get a great idea of what the fighting was like at Cannae. We look at the Roman Army that faces Cannae and how he can defeat it. We look at how Hannibal structured his battle to attack the critical vulnerabilities of the Roman Army. Hannibal was begged to march on Rome, but he only sent a delegation to Rome to discuss surrender. One hundred and fifty thousand males had died fighting Hannibal over 3 crippling losses. What happened after Cannae? How did the Roman moral Center of Gravity impact Hannibal? Hannibal has destroyed 3 operational level centers of gravity, yet he did not destroy the Roman moral centre of gravity.

Artillery doctrine was updated after some of the lessons from the Boer War. What was the role of the artillery at the beginning of the war? How was artillery integrated into the infantry plan? What was the preferred method of employment, indirect or direct, and why? How was artillery organised? What was the role of the CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) and what resources did he have? What fire support was available at ANZAC and how was it controlled? How were adjustments made? In 1915, radio was already in use - particularly with providing co-ordination with the Naval Gun Fire Support. At 06:00 how many Turkish troops opposed the landing? How long did the troops on the beach wait for Turkish reinforcements to arrive? (!) The first battery to land was the 26th (Jacob's) Battery. at 10:30 on the 25th. How did it perform? The Field Artillery didn't get into action on the 25th because Bridges feared that they would be captured. How was the process for calling for fire refined to speed up the response from the guns and how did the role of artillery change as the campaign progressed? Some of the issues faced at ANZAC included the guns themselves not being able to fire at high trajectory, the lack of field positions, with many on lower ground and the difficulty in observing fire with the observers being on the lower ground, and communications between the Forward Observer and gun line. The range was often under 100 meters between the lines of trenches. Enemy counter battery fire, machine gun fire and sniper fire also hampered the provision of offensive support. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

Hannibal was clearly one of the best Generals in history. How could he win 3 major battles against Rome, but he wasn't able to win the second Punic war. We discuss the definition Center of Gravity, where it came from and why it is so confusing and why Hannibal and his staff may have struggled with the concept of Centre of Gravity. Has the meaning of the Center of Gravity been lost in translation? How has the usage of Schwerpunkt transformed over time? The Bundeswehr now uses the term Centre of Gravity, rather than the term in it's native German. We look at the evolution of the definition for CoG from when it was first used in US Army doctrine. LWD 1 gives us the following definition - The centre of gravity is that characteristic, capability or locality from which a force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight. At the tactical level, the centre of gravity will often change as the mission progresses and will frequently be determined by the interaction of enemy and friendly intentions. The approaches to defeating the enemy's centre of gravity are described as dislocation, disruption and destruction. How does this relate to what Clausewitz was originally talking about? Is the characteristic in the definition part of the problem? What about multiple Centers of Gravity? How does that work? How are Centres and Gravities nested? Have a look at the example given in Levels of War and Iraqi CoGs from the 1991 Gulf War. The relationship between Genters of Gravity at different levels of war by Strange and Iron. What about the Center of Gravity in a Coalition? We look at the Scud Hunt was a major part of shielding the CoG of the Coalition. Flexibility for commanders increases with the level of their command because there are more resources and greater scope to shape your enemy. We look at the surfaces and gaps that need to be thought about and how you can shield your CoG and critical capabilities. Would Hannibal had been better off using Joint Doctrine rather than the Army Doctrine for a definition of Centre of Gravity that he and his staff could use? We look at the Carthaginian navy, the development of the corvus and how the Romans took a land strength onto the open seas. Finally - why did Hannibal cross the Alps? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

In a surprise move, we look 2,200 years to look at the Battle of Cannae, a defeat so severe that it is said that every mother in Rome mourned the death of a son. How could such a crushing defeat of a Roman Army. In 1992 the Center of Gravity construct was introduced into LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare and it has been confusing people ever since. What is it? How to build one to give you a list of targetable critical vulnerabilities that you can use to achieve your desired endstate. Cannae was a double envelopment at Cannae, and has been replicated on numerous times since then. We look at the Battle of the Trebia and also the Battle of Lake Trasimene. How did Rome respond to these crushing defeats? How did Fabius functionally dislocate the Carthaginian Army's cavalry? What is the difference between the tactical, operational, and strategic level? What is above the military strategic level of war? How did Grand Strategy impact on the Fabien tactics that the Roman Army was using? How did Varro and Paulus manage the Army after taking control from Fabius? Hannibal has 50,000 troops, but he is faced by a Roman army 86,400. The size of the Roman Army to Gisgo was astonishing. When it comes to unity of Command, how does having 2 consuls in command of the Roman army work? The center of gravity is the key characteristic, capability or locality from which a force derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight. What was the CoG that Hannibal was targeting at Cannae? Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on Twitter or Facebook. If you've learnt something from today's podcast, please leave a review for the Podcast on your podcast player.

We look at the remaining principles of Manoeuvre Warfare in the conduct of the Malaya Campaign. Percival attempted to be strong everywhere and was never able to generate enough combat power to slow the Japanese. We look at the loss of Force Z and how it decreased the Allied ability to influence the war at sea and the sea lines of communication. The loss of Force Z created an exponentially deteriorating situation which denied the Allies the time required to Deception was not really used well. The Allies were quite good at signalling their intentions and movements to the Japanese. Recon Pull was well used by the Japanese with their recon in force. Success was reinforced and any slow down lead to a flanking manoeuvre, either by land or by sea. Combined Arms Teams - why weren't the Allies able to use their combined arms teams to defeat the light Japanese infantry and light tanks? We look at what was lacking. The story of LT Russell 'Bill' McCure highlights the lack of training in the use of artillery for the Battalion COs. Employing the guns worked very effectively when the Allies were able to do it, but sadly, this happened to infrequently. We look at some of issues that lead to the erosion of trust within the Allied battalions. Operational Tempo - the Japanese were able to rotate troops through the front line and bring them out to rest. Some of the Allied COs were sent to hospital with sleep deprivation. This highlights the difference between the Allies and the Japanese. Application of joint fires and effects - The Japanese did a better job than the Allies, however the Japanese didn't fully exploit their advantage that they had with regard to air superiority. What could have made a difference in the Malaya Campaign? Yamashita had culminated just prior to the Allied surrender of Singapore. What would have made a difference in the conduct of the defence? The allocation of resources? More fighters (with trained pilots) and tanks. Tanks! Ensuring that Allied supplies did not fall into the hands of the Japanese. Too many trucks, POL installations, rations, and ammunition fell into the hands of the Japanese. We look at the moral implications in the campaign. Lastly, we discuss the training and leadership of the Allies. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

In the time that we have been producing the Malaya Campaign series in The Principles of War, the Australian Army has produced a new version of the LWD 3-0, so Army Doctrine is moving faster than this podcast! We look at the new doctrine and the application of Manoeuvre Warfare. We look at the application of tenets of manoeuvre theory. Focusing friendly action on the adversary centre of gravity. Achieving surprise. Identify and prioritising a main effort. Utilising deception. Reconnaissance pull. Operation Tempo Combined arms teams. Applications of joint fires and effects. We discuss how the logistics tail for the Japanese could have been the critical vulnerability that the Allies could have targeted. We discuss the question what would it have been if the 9th Division had been in Malaya rather than the 8th Division? Got a favourite Australian military quote? Let us know, we are crowdsourcing a list of best quotes about and by Australians. We discuss how the Japanese were able to target the Allied moral centre of gravity and how the Asia for the Asian memes undermine the effectiveness of the British Army in Malaya. With surprise, we look at the strategic surprise that the Allies experienced with Malaya. The fact that the Singapore strategy was well understood, especially by people like MAJ GEN Lavarack, who was arguing for a better ability to defend the country. We look at Group Captain John Lerew and his famous signal "Morituri vos salutamus". What would cause him to signal his higher headquarters "Those who about to die, salute you." What effect did a racial bias play in the intelligence appreciation of the Japanese capabilities, especially given the kind of operations that the Japanese were conducting in places like Shanghai.

LT COL Charles Anderson was placed in a very difficult moral dilemma at Parit Sulong. We look at his actions in WW1 in Africa and his Reserve service in the interwar period and how he comes to be the CO of the 2nd/19th Battalion. We also briefly look at BRIG Maxwell, the previous CO of the 2nd/19th. Check out the resources for this podcast, specifically the books by Farrell and Pratten. We look at the events around the engagement that the 2nd/29th fought and pick up the story with the 2nd/19th moving out to hold the ground at Bakri. BRIG Duncan attempts to consolidate his position whilst under attack from the Japanese. Anderson's counterattack sees the Japanese literally 'running around in circles'. However the Japanese are also moving to cut of the lines of retreat. The Japanese 3rd Air Brigade starts attacking the retreating troops, striking the Brigade HQ and killing many of the staff, and wounding BRIG Duncan, making Anderson the commander of the BDE Column. We look at Anderson's retreat of 24km to Parit Sulong from Bakri. The column moves out at walking pace and meets the first Japanese roadblock just 1.5 km down the road. Anderson displays physical courage leading an assault on the road block. BRIG Duncan leads a counterattack with the Jats, and is killed. Anderson discovers that the bridge at Parit Sulong is held by the Japanese. This leaves Anderson needing to clear the bridge to be able to cross the river and move closer to friendly lines. The column is unable to clear the bridge, ammunition is low and casualties are mounting. He is left with the dilemma of what to do - surrender, attack again or leave the wounded and escape in small groups. Overnight the Japanese attack with tanks and a deadly battle between the tanks, the artillery and tank hunting parties goes on through the night. There were only 3 survivors of the massacre at Parit Sulong. What actions did Bennett take to rescue the column? What is the role of the Battalion Commander? When should they personally lead attacks? We look at the role of LT GEN Takuma Nishimura in the Parit Sulong massacre. He confided in the Medical Officer that he had never been so scared as during the retreat from Bakri, but it never showed to the men that he lead as he worked to save the column. This is the fine example of courage and leadership that he set and why he was awarded the VC for his actions. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

A lot of this story has come from an audio interview of LT Russell 'Bill' McCure. It is an amazing record of the preparation, conduct and aftermath of his participation in the Malaya Campaign. LT McCure started out in the 53rd Ack Ack Search Light Bty and he wanted to join the 2nd AIF. The only way was for him to obtain a commission. He undertook that and was assigned to the 58th Infantry Battalion. The CMF was parading 2 nights a week. LT McCure showed multiple examples of Moral Courage. This made it difficult for him to do his job, but he understand what was required of him, in spite of the direct orders from his CO. We look at the Battle of Bakri, especially the initial contacts with the Gotanda Tank Detachment. The Japanese attacked without infantry support and because of the actions of LT McCure they pay the price. Too often in the Malaya campaign, the Japanese weren't held to account for paying off some of the Principles of War. The lack of cooperation of the infantry created the losses at Bakri for the Japanese tanks. How did the 2nd/29th's CO, LT COL Robertson's training let him down when it came to combined arms training? The withdrawal from Bakri was hellish. The Japanese had manoeuvred around the 2nd/29th and cut them off. LT COL Anderson in command of the 2nd/19th pushes forward to bring out the 2nd/29th, but Bill is stuck behind enemy lines. He stays in Malaya for the rest of the war. He spends time attacking Japanese troop, supplies and trains. He ends up with a group of Malay Communists until the end of the war. Bill's story is a great example of Moral Courage and and story that too few people have heard, especially considering that he was active in Malaya for the rest of the war.

As we transition to look at some vignettes of Leadership in Malaya, we pause to look at the composition of the 8th Division. The Commander, Bennett, was a CMF soldier, as were the 3 BDE COMDs. In Malaya, only LT COL Boyes, CO of the 2/26th Bn was PMF. The 8th had more regular officers than the 6th Division, which was the first 2 AIF Division to be raised. We look at Walter Brown VC. He was awarded his VC at Villers-Bretonneux and rejoined the Army to serve in WW2. We discuss the 8 Bn COs to look at the differences between the COs and how that effected each of the Bns. We ponder the difference between authority and leadership. LT COL Black Jack Galleghan was given command of the 2/30th after 4 previous attempts to get a Bn to command. Was it a case of 5th time lucky or was there a dearth of talent in the officer pool? Was he a martinet? How did he deal with a mutiny across the entire Battalion? He expected unwavering loyalty from below, but was scant in offering to his superiors. The role of the 2IC, Gentleman George Ramsay and the role he played in managing Galleghan. We moved onto the conduct of the ambush at Gemas. How were the Japanese shaped into playing into the ambush? B Coy was chosen by lot to conduct the ambush. What actions did Galleghan take that minimised the impact of the ambush? Was Galleghan hamstrung by the lack of training in combined arms? We look at his moral courage in his inability to engage the Japanese with Artillery at Gemas. Why was this and is it fair? Galleghan had abandoned his wireless equipment! Why did he do this? He certainly was a colourful character. When he 'requisitioned' telephone cable from a passing Indian Signals SGT, he told the SGT that it had been taken by 'Colonel Ned Kelly of Australia.' Galleghan came into his own as the Commander of Australian troops at Changi. This is an interesting example of how a leadership styles effectiveness is set in the context of the situation of where it is exercised. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

Good leadership, thorough training and success on operations will all contribute to high morale. We contrast LT COL Stewart and with other units. The Indian and Australian armies had a lot of new troops, with varying degrees of training. This contrasts with battle hardened IJA troops, some who had many years of experience. Kampar was the high point for the Allied morale. The conduct of the withdrawl is difficult to do and it is difficult to maintain morale during the withdrawl. This continually eroded Allied morale with many of the Brigades. Lack of training in tank fighting was evident in most Brigades. This led to poor performance against the Japanese tanks which eroded morale. Too many senior officers weren't team players. Morale in BDE and DIV HQs was often poor because of the friction generated within the HQs. This impacted decision making and lead to further defeats. The way the Japanese fought neglected many of the principles of war. Trust and co-ordination with units staying in place would have enabled fierce and effective counter attacks. We look at the importance of fighting the battle in the enemy commanders mind and how that impacts the battle. We look at Moral Dislocation, a concept that both Clausewitz and Liddell Hart had discussed. The moral dislocation of the Indian troops. The Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere wanted to deliver Asia for the Asians. The Japanese were coming as liberators of the Indian people. The Indian workers were underpaid. The evacuation of Penang helped dislocate the locals from the British morally. Lastly the operationally tempo increased inversely with morale. The moral dislocation by the Japanese was crowned with the creation of the Indian National Army, consisting of Indian troops wanting to fight the British. The Japanese Army had troops, bought up on a modified Bushido code in school, that were successful, highly motivated and fighting for a cause that they all believed in. What role does / should the education system play in a national defence strategy? Lastly, despite Yamashita's high tempo, he was still able to rotate troops out of the front line for a few days rest. Fresh troops were able to continually harass defeated, depleted and over tired Allied troops with predictable results. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Colourised image courtesy of Colours of Yesterday. It is a great picture showing the moral of the Australian troops.

We look at how the Japanese were able to use operational manoeuvre from the sea as a part of their approach to flexibility. We look at their history of amphib operations and how they developed their capability. We look at the Shanghai Incident and how the IJN demonstrated their already impressive amphib capability. The Japanese are able to launch 3 independent landings to start the offensive in Malaya. We look at the Battle of Kampar and how the Japanese assault bogged down and how they were able to respond to a change in the tactical situation. BRIG Paris wanted a more offensive defence. How did Kampar mask the limitations of the Allied forces? We look at the performance of the British Battalion at Kampar, which differs markedly from that exhibited from a lot of the Allied forces. How was LT COL Stewart was able to train a Battalion that was able to operate effectively in the jungle. How did he do it? Did he use Mission Command to manage for the difficulties created by jungle fighting. What are the requirements for mission command and were they displayed within 8th Division. Check out the show notes for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes.

Sustainment - often the least considered of the principles. How did logistics impact the conduct of the Malaya We look at the interplay of logistics between the forces. There The Japanese were operating from an amphibious operation which severely constrained their operations. The British were fighting a defensive battle, with a lot of trucks on well made roads. What was the relationship between the two? What were the Churchill supplies and why were they so important? How did the conduct of the British withdrawal impact the Japanese supplies? With constrained sea lines, what action did Yamashita take to ensure that he could supply his 4 divisions. What was Yamashita's mobility solution that helped solve his logistics problem and enabled him to outmanoeurve the British by moving a lot quicker than the defenders could. What are the similarities between Sherman's march to the sea with Yamashita's march to Singapore.

Malaya and Economy of Effort We look at the definition and how the Japanese and Allies applied this principle. For the Allies there was too much economy and not enough effort. There wasn't enough resources available to prepare the defences so Allied troops spent a lot of time digging in rather than training. The Royal Navy, Air Force and Army all allocated insufficient resources to be able to achieve the mission. There was a lot of economy of effort in the hope that the US would be able to assist in the defence of Singapore. By the time the perilous situation was realised, it was too late to reinforce before Singapore fell. Synchronisation and Orchestration are implicit in cooperation, so where did the wheels fall off the wagon? It is every commanders job to work towards cooperation, building harmonious relationships between agencies. The base building program for the RAF was kept from the Army. The British provided no strategic guidance provide by higher in London. Brooke Popham was the first Air Force commander of a Joint Command. How did he do? The defence often gives the defender the ability to choice the ground that they will fight on. Percival lost that right because the locations was dictated by the location We look at Brig Ivan Simpson, the CRE for Malaya Command. He was energetic, thoughtful and planned extensive defensive works to slow the Japanese advance. His work was largely ignored for a range of reasons. A lack of training and understanding of the work that engineers do was replicated with other Corps. There was little understanding of the employment of Artillery, Signals was understood poorly. There was very little combined arms training. Artillery was employed by Bn COs, often in the wrong place, meaning that the troops did not receive the support that they needed.