The High Court Report

Watson v. Republican National Committee | Case No. 24-1260 | Docket Link: Here | Oral Argument: 3/23/26Question Presented: Whether federal election-day statutes preempt state laws allowing ballots cast by election day to arrive after that day.Overview: Mississippi allows mail ballots postmarked by election day to count if received within five business days after. Republicans challenge this under federal statutes setting election day, raising fundamental questions about mail voting nationwide.Posture: District court upheld Mississippi law; Fifth Circuit reversed unanimously; Supreme Court granted certiorari November 2025.Main Arguments:Petitioner (Mississippi): (1) "Election" means voters' conclusive choice when casting ballots, not officials' receipt afterward; (2) Counting lawfully occurs post-election day, so receipt can too; (3) Nearly thirty states permit post-election receipt; invalidating these laws disenfranchises military voters protected under UOCAVA.Respondents (RNC): (1) "Election" means state's public process of selecting officers, concluding when officials close ballot box and receive final ballots; (2) Every Civil War-era soldier-voting law required election-day receipt despite early voting; (3) UOCAVA creates narrow exception proving baseline rule requires election-day receipt.Implications: Petitioner victory preserves mail-ballot practices in nearly thirty states and protects military voters relying on extended receipt deadlines under federal law. Respondent victory requires states to receive all ballots by election day, potentially disenfranchising voters facing mail delays and invalidating extended military-ballot protections, forcing nationwide restructuring of absentee voting systems before next federal election.The Fine Print:2 U.S.C. § 7: "The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the Congress"Mississippi Code § 23-15-637(1)(a): Mail ballots "postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election" count toward final talliesPrimary Cases:Foster v. Love (1997): Federal election-day statutes mandate holding all elections for Congress and Presidency on single day throughout Union; Louisiana's open-primary system allowing October final selection violated federal requirement.Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (2020): Court recognized ballot "casting" as fundamental to elections; reversed district court decision permitting voters to mail ballots after election day during pandemic.

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport reaches far beyond one truck accident. The Supreme Court must answer a fundamental question: Does federal law shield freight brokers from state tort claims when they select a motor carrier that causes a catastrophic crash?Marc S. Blubaugh joins The High Court Report to break down this high-stakes case. Marc serves as Partner at Benesch Friedlander Coplan & Aronoff LLP and Counsel of Record for the Transportation Intermediaries Association — the trade group representing over 1,700 freight brokerage companies. He wrote the amicus brief Justice Kavanaugh cited by name and page number during oral argument.Marc explains the legal framework, then pulls back to reveal the full picture. The $343 billion freight brokerage industry operates on the premise that federal law — not state juries — determines which motor carriers may operate on America's roads. But plaintiffs' lawyers now name brokers in virtually every major truck accident case, threatening to reshape who enters the market and how efficiently America's supply chain runs.The stakes cut both directions. Injured parties deserve recourse when dangerous carriers cause catastrophic accidents. Marc walks through why petitioner's counsel argues an 80,000-pound truck sits at the center of every negligent hiring claim — and why the safety exception exists precisely to preserve that theory.A broker victory brings certainty and supply chain efficiency. A petitioner victory turns brokers into federal safety inspectors without the tools to do the job. The Court's reasoning will define preemption fights in the transportation industry for years.Listen to the full March 4, 2026 oral argument: Here.Listen to The High Court Report case preview: Here.Connect with Marc Blubaugh on LinkedIn: Here.Connect with Marc Blubaugh at Benesch Law: Here.Fine Print• §14501(c)(1): Preempts state laws "related to a price, route, or service" of interstate brokers• §14501(c)(2)(A): Preserves state authority to regulate safety "with respect to motor vehicles"• §14501(b)(1): Preempts state laws "relating to intrastate rates, routes, or services" of brokersTimestamps:[00:00:00] Episode Preview[00:00:40] Guest Introduction[00:01:57] 60 Second Takeaway from Oral Arguments[00:09:04] Logistics Ecosystem[00:10:35] What Brokers Do[00:10:53] Broker Licensing Basics[00:11:04] Motor Carriers Explained[00:11:27] Drivers and Authority[00:11:54] Consignee at Delivery[00:14:29] Legal Battle Over Liability[00:18:43] How the Arguments Unfolded at Oral Arguments[00:30:08] What Happens if Montgomery Wins? If the Brokers Win?[00:33:26] Wrap Up

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Date Decided: 3/4/26 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether federal appeals courts must defer to immigration agency findings — or take a fresh, independent look — when deciding if an asylum seeker suffered persecution severe enough to qualify for protection.Overview: A Salvadoran family fled a hitman who shot two relatives, tracked them through four moves, and kept demanding money under threat of death — yet immigration judges still denied their asylum claim. The family lost at every level before reaching the Supreme Court, which took the case to settle a nationwide disagreement over how much power federal judges hold to second-guess immigration agencies on asylum decisions.Holding: The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that federal judges must defer to the agency — meaning they can only reverse when the evidence so overwhelmingly favors the asylum seeker that no reasonable person could rule against them.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Majority's Rationale: The Court's 1992 decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias already required deferential review of the entire persecution determination, including its legal application. Congress codified that standard nearly verbatim when it enacted §1252(b)(4)(B) in 1996's IIRIRA amendments. IIRIRA's overall structure consistently narrowed federal court review of immigration decisions, making any expansion anomalous.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CAFor Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Link to Opinion: Here.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B): "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary" — meaning agency decisions stand unless no reasonable person could agree with them.8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A): A "refugee" qualifies as someone "unable or unwilling to return" to their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" — meaning the applicant must show targeted mistreatment tied to who they are or what they believe.Primary Cases:INS v. Elias-Zacarias (1992): To obtain judicial reversal of an agency persecution determination, an asylum applicant must show the evidence "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution" — establishing substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecution inquiry.Nasrallah v. Barr (2020): §1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential "substantial-evidence standard" for review of agency factual findings in removal proceedings.

CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposesOverview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.Holding: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous CourtMajority Reasoning: New Jersey structured NJ Transit as a legally separate corporation responsible for its own debts and judgments. The statutory firewall explicitly blocked state liability, and NJ Transit itself conceded New Jersey owed nothing on its obligations. Two hundred years of precedent confirm that state-created corporations carrying their own debts do not qualify as state arms.Result: Affirmed (24–1113); Reversed (24–1021)Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.The Fine Print:• N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"• Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"Primary Cases:• Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive• Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi | Date Decided: 3/4/26 | Oral Argument Date: 12/1/25 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether federal appeals courts must defer to immigration agency findings — or take a fresh, independent look — when deciding if an asylum seeker suffered persecution severe enough to qualify for protection.Overview: A Salvadoran family fled a hitman who shot two relatives, tracked them through four moves, and kept demanding money under threat of death — yet immigration judges still denied their asylum claim. The family lost at every level before reaching the Supreme Court, which took the case to settle a nationwide disagreement over how much power federal judges hold to second-guess immigration agencies on asylum decisions.Holding: The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that federal judges must defer to the agency — meaning they can only reverse when the evidence so overwhelmingly favors the asylum seeker that no reasonable person could rule against them.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.Majority's Rationale: The Court's 1992 decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias already required deferential review of the entire persecution determination, including its legal application. Congress codified that standard nearly verbatim when it enacted §1252(b)(4)(B) in 1996's IIRIRA amendments. IIRIRA's overall structure consistently narrowed federal court review of immigration decisions, making any expansion anomalous.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Urias-Orellana): For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, CAFor Respondent (United States): For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Link to Opinion: Here.The Fine Print:8 U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B): "the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary" — meaning agency decisions stand unless no reasonable person could agree with them.8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A): A "refugee" qualifies as someone "unable or unwilling to return" to their home country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion" — meaning the applicant must show targeted mistreatment tied to who they are or what they believe.Primary Cases:INS v. Elias-Zacarias (1992): To obtain judicial reversal of an agency persecution determination, an asylum applicant must show the evidence "so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution" — establishing substantial-evidence review for the entirety of the persecution inquiry.Nasrallah v. Barr (2020): §1252(b)(4)(B) prescribes a deferential "substantial-evidence standard" for review of agency factual findings in removal proceedings.

CSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: Here Consolidated with CSX NJ Transit Corp. v. Colt | Argument Date: 1/14/26 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the New Jersey Transit Corporation functions as an arm of the State of New Jersey for interstate sovereign immunity purposesOverview: NJ Transit claims sovereign immunity after bus injured passenger in Philadelphia, raising fundamental federalism questions about state power to extend constitutional immunity to state-created corporations while disclaiming their debts and liabilities.Posture: Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed lower courts, holding NJ Transit qualifies as state arm based on statutory mission and structure.Holding: NJ Transit Corporation is not an arm of New Jersey and thus is not entitled to share in New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous CourtMajority Reasoning: New Jersey structured NJ Transit as a legally separate corporation responsible for its own debts and judgments. The statutory firewall explicitly blocked state liability, and NJ Transit itself conceded New Jersey owed nothing on its obligations. Two hundred years of precedent confirm that state-created corporations carrying their own debts do not qualify as state arms.Result: Affirmed (24–1113); Reversed (24–1021)Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (New Jersey Transit Corp.): Michael Zuckerman, Deputy Solicitor General, Trenton, New Jersey.For Respondents (Galette and Colt): Michael Kimberly, Washington, D.C.The Fine Print:• N.J. Stat. § 27:25-17: "All expenses incurred by the corporation in carrying out the provisions of this act shall be payable from funds available to the corporation...No debt or liability of the corporation shall be deemed or construed to create or constitute a debt, liability, or a loan or pledge of the credit of the State"• Eleventh Amendment: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State"Primary Cases:• Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994): Treasury factor constitutes "most salient factor" that "homes in on the impetus for the Eleventh Amendment: the prevention of federal-court judgments that must be paid out of a State's treasury"; when evidence on structure and control factors appears mixed, treasury factor becomes dispositive• Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia (1824): When government becomes partner in trading company, it "devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen"; corporate form precluded sovereign immunity regardless of state ownership or control

Dr. Adam Feldman called it before the Court released it. His 25-year dataset — 1,700+ cases — flagged the timing before anyone else caught on. The High Court Report sits down with Dr. Feldman to break down exactly what the numbers revealed.In this episode:Why 107 days and six separate opinions directly predict each other — and what that pattern means for the 48 cases still ahead.How one dataset predicted the Trump Tariff ruling's timing, complexity, and doctrinal fractures before the Court said a word.Why the Court now pushes more than half its rulings into June — and what Trump's emergency application surge does to that trend.Whether the Court's faster pace this term marks real change — or a one-year blip.About Dr. Adam Feldman:Founder of Empirical SCOTUS. Statistics Editor at SCOTUSblog. Head of legal analytics firm Empirilaw. J.D., UC Berkeley. Ph.D. in Political Science, USC. Post-doctoral fellow, Columbia Law School. Author of 15 peer-reviewed articles. Former trial lawyer.Reach Adam Feldman via:LinkedIn: Here;Empirical SCOTUS: Here;Legalytics: Here;Empirilaw: Here.Adam Feldman's Work:The Supreme Court’s Vanishing Fall Docket: How Decision Timing Has Transformed Since 2000 (Jan. 26, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-supreme-courts-vanishing-fall?utm_source=publication-searchThe $133 Billion Question: Inside the Supreme Court’s Historic Tariff Case (Feb. 6, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-133-billion-question-inside-the?utm_source=publication-search

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | Oral Argument: 3/4/2026 | Case No. 24-1238 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts state common-law tort claims against brokers for negligently selecting motor carriers or drivers whose vehicles subsequently cause accidents.Overview: Trucking broker liability case determines whether federal deregulation law blocks state tort claims for negligent hiring practices that result in highway accidents with severe injuries.Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed preemption; Ninth Circuit rejected preemption; circuit split.Main Arguments:• Montgomery (Petitioner): (1) Federal safety exception explicitly preserves state tort claims against broker negligent selection; (2) Fair interpretation requires consistent broad reading of both preemption provision and safety exception; (3) Longstanding common law negligent hiring claims predate federal trucking regulation• C.H. Robinson/Caribe (Respondents): (1) Federal law preempts broadly any state regulation of broker services and selection decisions; (2) Safety exception applies narrowly only to direct motor vehicle operation regulation; (3) Comprehensive federal regulatory scheme provides adequate safety oversightImplications: Montgomery victory preserves state tort accountability for broker hiring decisions, incentivizing highway safety through market liability. Respondent victory eliminates broker accountability for negligent selection, potentially reducing safety screening while limiting victim compensation options for trucking accidents.The Fine Print:49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1): states may not enforce laws "related to a price, route, or service" of brokers "with respect to the transportation of property"49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A): the preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles"49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1): states may not enforce laws "relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services" of brokersPrimary Cases:• Dan's City Used Cars v. Pelkey (2013): Phrase "with respect to the transportation of property" in FAAAA preemption provision "massively limits" federal preemption scope, requiring direct connection to transportation services• Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide (9th Cir. 2020): State negligent hiring claims against motor carrier brokers fall within FAAAA safety exception because they represent state authority to regulate safety through common-law tort claimsOral Advocates:For Petitioner (Montgomery): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Petitioner Montgomery.For Respondents (C.H. Robinson and Caribe Transport): Ted Boutrous of Gibson Dunn.For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Caribe): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Case Preview[00:00:53] Oral Advocates[00:01:09] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:17] Montgomery Opening Statement[00:03:15] Montgomery Free for All Questions[00:26:20] Montgomery Round Robin Questions[00:44:00] Caribe and Robinson Opening Statement[00:46:15] Caribe and Robinson Free for All Questions[01:04:17] Caribe and Robinson Round Robin Questions[01:09:37] United States Opening Statement[01:11:07] United States Free for All Questions[01:20:35] United States Round Robin Questions[01:36:19] Montgomery Rebuttal

Hunter v. United States | Oral Argument: 3/3/2026 | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Criminal defendant challenges mandatory medication condition after judge told him he could appeal despite signed appeal waiver, creating fundamental questions about plea agreement enforcement and judicial authorityQuestion Presented: Whether appeal waivers in plea agreements can only include exceptions for ineffective assistance claims and sentences exceeding statutory maximums, and whether judicial statements about appeal rights override written waiversOral Advocates:For Petitioner: Lisa S. Blatt of Williams & Connolly LLP argued for Petitioner Hunter.For Respondent: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, argued for Respondent United States.Posture: Fifth Circuit dismissed appeal citing two-exception rule; Supreme Court granted certiorariMain Arguments:• Hunter (Petitioner): (1) Contract law requires broader exceptions protecting reasonable expectations beyond two rigid categories; (2) Other circuits successfully recognize additional exceptions without creating chaos; (3) Judicial statements about appeal rights combined with government silence modify plea agreements• United States (Respondent): (1) Appeal waivers constitute binding contracts requiring enforcement according to written terms; (2) Appeal rights remain statutory rather than constitutional making waivers more enforceable; (3) Post-plea judicial misstatements cannot undermine knowing and voluntary waiversImplications: Hunter victory creates safety valve for extreme sentences but weakens prosecutorial bargaining power and plea agreement finality. Government victory cements nationwide enforcement of broad appeal waivers while potentially allowing constitutional violations without appellate oversight.The Fine Print:• Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"• 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): Courts may require defendants "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment as specified by the court"Primary Cases:• Garza v. Idaho (2019): "No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims" because plea agreements function essentially as contracts subject to traditional defenses• United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Even "most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution" may be waived through knowing and voluntary agreements including plea bargainsTimestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:00] Oral Advocates[00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:18] Hunter Opening Statement[00:03:10] Hunter Free for All Questions[00:27:27] Hunter Round Robin Questions[00:45:07] United States Opening Statement[00:46:54] Hunter Free for All Questions[01:15:22] United States Round Robin Questions[01:33:51] Hunter Rebuttal

Villarreal v. Texas | Case No. 24-557 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25 | Date Decided: 2/25/26OverviewDavid Villarreal took the witness stand as the sole defense witness in his Texas murder trial, testifying he stabbed the victim in self-defense.During his testimony, a scheduling conflict forced a 24-hour recess mid-direct examination.Before breaking, the trial judge ordered defense counsel not to "manage" Villarreal's ongoing testimony overnight while expressly permitting all other consultation, including strategy, sentencing, and plea discussions.The jury convicted Villarreal, and he received a 60-year sentence.The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the judge's order as a permissible balance between the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the truth-seeking function of trial.Question Presented: Whether a trial judge may order defense counsel not to discuss a testifying defendant's ongoing testimony during a mid testimony overnight recess without violating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.Holding: A qualified conferral order prohibiting only testimony management during a midtestimony overnight recess permissibly balances the Sixth Amendment right to counsel against the truth-seeking function of trial.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment joined by Justice Gorsuch.Result: Affirmed.Majority's Rationale: The constitutional line separating Geders and Perry runs on subject matter, not time — testimony coaching loses Sixth Amendment protection once a defendant takes the stand. Courts may restrict discussion of testimony for its own sake while leaving all other attorney-client consultation — strategy, plea negotiations, witness decisions — fully protected. The judge's order targeted only testimony management and left every other protected topic available to Villarreal and his counsel overnight.Alito Concurrence: A recess should not alter the baseline rule that juries hear a defendant's testimony in his own words without counsel's real-time coaching. Indirect attempts to shape testimony carry the same constitutional infirmity as direct ones, regardless of strategic framing. Counsel may advise a client to consider a plea because the trial looks rough, but may not tell the client to clean up specific mistakes from the stand.Thomas Concurrence in Judgment: The trial judge's order plainly survived under Geders and Perry without any need for new rules or expanded doctrine. The majority announced a new "incidental testimony" carve-out that Perry never recognized and that these facts never required. Perry endorsed orders categorically forbidding testimony discussion — the majority created a protection Perry specifically declined to establish.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Stuart Banner, Los Angeles, Cal.For Respondent: Andrew N. Warthen, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, Tex.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)Link to Opinion: Here.Link to Docket: HerePreview Episode: HereTimestamps:[00:00:00] Case Overview[00:01:59] Trial Scene Setup[00:03:15] Geders vs Perry[00:04:34] Content Based Line[00:07:36] Applying to Villarreal[00:08:13] Concurrences Split[00:08:32] Alito Sharpens Rule[00:10:34] Thomas Pushes Back[00:12:24] Nationwide Impact[00:13:43] Final Takeaways[00:14:37] Wrap Up and Subscribe

United States v. Hemani | Oral Argument: 3/2/2026 | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Constitutional challenge to federal law criminalizing firearm possession by marijuana users tests Supreme Court's new historical framework for gun regulations after millions potentially face prosecution.Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondentPosture: Fifth Circuit granted summary affirmance dismissing prosecution; government appeals seeking reversal.Main Arguments:• Government (Petitioner): (1) Founding-era laws restricting "habitual drunkards" provide historical precedent supporting marijuana user disarmament; (2) Circuit courts split on constitutional analysis requiring Supreme Court intervention; (3) Section 925(c) relief process addresses constitutional concerns through administrative remedies• Hemani (Respondent): (1) Government's historical analogues fail Bruen-Rahimi "why" and "how" requirements for constitutional restrictions; (2) No genuine circuit split exists warranting Supreme Court review; (3) Administrative relief cannot cure fundamental constitutional violationsImplications:Government victory enables continued prosecution of millions combining legal state marijuana use with lawful firearm ownership, expanding congressional power over combined legal activities. Hemani victory requires narrow tailoring of federal gun restrictions, potentially invalidating broad categorical prohibitions lacking specific historical justification and forcing legislative reconsideration of drug user firearm restrictions.The Fine Print:• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to...possess...any firearm"• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"Primary Cases:• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Government must demonstrate historical tradition supporting firearm regulations through relevantly similar "why" and "how" justifications from founding era• United States v. Rahimi (2024): Historical analogues need not provide "historical twin" but must address comparable problems through similar regulatory approaches under constitutional analysisOral Advocates:For Petitioner (United States): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues for Petitioner United States.For Respondent (Hemani): Erin Murphy of Clement & Murphy, PLLC argues for Respondent Hemani.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Case Preview[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:08] United States Opening Statement[00:03:09] United States Free for All Questions[00:26:14] United States Round Robin Questions[01:00:32] Hemani Opening Statement[01:02:37] Hemani Free for All Questions[01:31:01] Hemani Round Robin Questions[01:50:46] United States Rebuttal

Geo Group, Inc. v. Menocal | Case No. 24-758 | Oral Argument Date: 11/10/25 | Docket Link: HereOverviewToday, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Geo Group versus Menocal, which examines whether derivative sovereign immunity creates a fast-pass to appeal. Detainees sue a private contractor running an ICE facility, claiming forced labor—the company says "the government told me to do it" and wants to skip straight to appeal after the trial court found that the contractor held no derivative sovereign immunity. Must government contractors face years of expensive, potentially politically-motivated litigation first, or can they appeal immediately?Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (GEO Group): Dominic E. Draye, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Menocal): Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, California.For United States as Amicus Curiae (Supporting Respondent): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.Holding: Parties cannot immediately appeal pretrial orders denying derivative sovereign immunity.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and in which Justice Thomas joined as to Parts I and III. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.Link to Opinion: Here.

Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist | Date Decided: 2/24/26 | Oral Argument Date: 11/4/25 | Docket Link: HereOverviewToday, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Hain Celestial Group versus Palmquist, a forum fight about when courts keep cases they never should have had. A Texas family sued two companies over their child's heavy metal poisoning from baby food—but after a federal court wrongly kicked out one defendant and ran a two-week trial, an appeals court said the case never belonged in federal court, forcing everyone back to square one.Questions Presented:Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal.Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim.Holding: Because the federal trial court wrongly dismissed Whole Foods Market, the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Hain and Whole Foods): Sarah E. Harrington, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Palmquist): Russell S. Post, Houston, Texas

United States v. Hemani reaches far beyond marijuana policy. This case forces the Supreme Court to answer a fundamental question: Can the government strip Second Amendment rights without clearly defining who loses them?Adeel Bashir joins The High Court Report to break down this high-stakes case. Adeel works as Federal Public and Community Defenders Sentencing Resource Counsel and defended numerous clients charged under this exact statute.Adeel explains the case from each angle then widens the lens. Controlled substances under federal law include Adderall, Xanax, cough medicine, and supplements common in gyms across America. Millions of Americans could fall within the statute's reach without ever knowing it.But the stakes cut both directions. The government argues that courts should defer to congressional judgment about which groups pose risks; a principle that, if accepted, preserves legislative flexibility to address evolving public safety concerns. Adeel walks through Congress' power to classify conduct as dangerous while noting that other prohibited-person categories may face similar challenges.Something must give. The Court's reasoning here will define Second Amendment battles for years. You don't want to miss this episode.Oral arguments take place Monday, March 2nd. To learn more about the case, check out The High Court Report case preview: Here.Connect with Adeel Bashir on LinkedIn: Here.

Postal Service v. Konan | Case No. 24-351 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25 | Opinion Date: 2/24/26OverviewToday we break down the February 24, 2026 Supreme Court opinion in United States Postal Service versus Konan. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the postal exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act shields the government even when postal workers deliberately refuse to deliver your mail—not just when they mess up accidentally.Justice Thomas wrote for the majority. Justice Sotomayor fired back with a sharp dissent, accusing the majority of handing the Postal Service blanket immunity that Congress never intended to give.Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereQuestion Presented: Whether a plaintiff can sue the postal service for intentional mail nondelivery where the statute at issue (the Federal Tort Claims Act) permits lawsuits for "loss", "miscarriage", and "negligent transmission".Holding: The United States retains sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the intentional nondelivery of mail because both “miscarriage” and “loss” of mail under the FTCA’s postal exception can occur as a result of the Postal Service’s intentional failure to deliver the mail.Result: Vacated.Voting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Easha Anand, Menlo Park, Ca.

Dr. Adam Feldman called it before the Court released it. His 25-year dataset — 1,700+ cases — flagged the timing before anyone else caught on. The High Court Report sits down with Dr. Feldman to break down exactly what the numbers revealed.In this episode:Why 107 days and six separate opinions directly predict each other — and what that pattern means for the 48 cases still ahead.How one dataset predicted the Trump Tariff ruling's timing, complexity, and doctrinal fractures before the Court said a word.Why the Court now pushes more than half its rulings into June — and what Trump's emergency application surge does to that trend.Whether the Court's faster pace this term marks real change — or a one-year blip.About Dr. Adam Feldman:Founder of Empirical SCOTUS. Statistics Editor at SCOTUSblog. Head of legal analytics firm Empirilaw. J.D., UC Berkeley. Ph.D. in Political Science, USC. Post-doctoral fellow, Columbia Law School. Author of 15 peer-reviewed articles. Former trial lawyer.Reach Adam Feldman via:LinkedIn: Here;Empirical SCOTUS: Here;Legalytics: Here;Empirilaw: Here.Adam Feldman's Work:The Supreme Court’s Vanishing Fall Docket: How Decision Timing Has Transformed Since 2000 (Jan. 26, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-supreme-courts-vanishing-fall?utm_source=publication-searchThe $133 Billion Question: Inside the Supreme Court’s Historic Tariff Case (Feb. 6, 2026), available at: https://legalytics.substack.com/p/the-133-billion-question-inside-the?utm_source=publication-search

OverviewThe Pung family lost their $194,400 home over a $2,242 tax bill — a tax bill they never owed. Isabella County auctioned the home for $76,000 and returned only $73,766. The family lost over $118,000 in home equity.Question: Can local governments pay a person their home’s auction price or their home’s fair market value when the government auctions the home at a foreclosure sale?Background: The Pung family lost $194,400 home over $2,242 tax bill they never owed. Isabella County auctioned the home, fetching $76,000. Pung family received only $73,766 back.Pung Argues: Counties must give fair market value as compensation when government takes property, not whatever an auction produces. Losing $118,000 over $2,242 creates grossly disproportionate punishment violating Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause.Isabella County Argues: Just compensation means what someone pays at a free and fair auction. No penalty exists, the Pungs lost only difference between auction price and debt.Stakes: If Pung wins: Property owners get market value from forced home sales regardless of what a person pays at an auction. If Isabella County wins: property owners risk losing home equity over small, disputed, but unpaid property taxes.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Pung): Philip L. Ellison of Outside Legal Counsel PLC.United States as Amicus Curiae: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.For Respondent (Isabella County, Michigan): Matthew Nelson of Warner Norcross and Judd.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:11] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:20] Pung Opening Statement[00:02:58] Pung Free for All Questions[00:26:21] Pung Round Robin Questions[00:51:09] United States Opening Statement[00:52:18] United States Free for All Questions[00:59:56] United States Round Robin Questions[01:19:40] Isabella County Opening Statement[01:21:46] Isabella County Free for All Questions[01:39:59] Isabella County Round Robin Questions[01:43:00] Pung Rebuttal

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here |Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.Main Arguments:• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstancesImplications: Enbridge victory expands defendant flexibility for late federal court access when genuine emergencies arise but risks encouraging strategic removal delays. Nessel victory enforces strict congressional deadlines and prevents removal manipulation but could bar federal jurisdiction even when international treaties or diplomatic relations face genuine threats. Middle-ground ruling might distinguish ordinary delays from cases involving actual foreign policy implications, creating specialized removal doctrine for international law contexts.The Fine Print:• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"Primary Cases:• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express onesOral Advocates:For Petitioners (Petitioners Enbridge Energy): John Bursch of Bursch Law PLLC.For Respondent (Nessel): Ann Sherman, Michigan's Solicitor General.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:00:40] Argument Begins[00:00:51] Enbridge Opening Statement[00:02:46] Enbridge Free for All Questions[00:21:13] Enbridge Round Robin Questions[00:31:21] Nessel Opening Statement[00:33:22] Nessel Free for All Questions[00:55:18] Nessel Round Robin Questions[00:58:18] Enbridge Rebuttal

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Case No. 24-983 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether Title III liability requires proving defendants trafficked in property plaintiff currently owns a claim to, or property plaintiff would own absent confiscation.Overview: Cuban property confiscation case challenges Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis" requiring proof of hypothetical property ownership, potentially gutting Congress's primary tool for pressuring hostile regimes.Posture: Eleventh Circuit reversed district court grant of summary judgment for petitioner.Main Arguments:• Havana Docks (Petitioner): (1) Statute creates liability when plaintiff "owns the claim," not hypothetical property ownership; (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock facilities, not abstract concession rights; (3) Narrow interpretation defeats congressional deterrence objectives• Cruise Lines (Respondent): (1) Property law requires respecting temporal limitations on original rights; (2) Concession excluded passenger services, preventing trafficking in cargo-only rights; (3) Congress balanced deterrence against property law principlesImplications: Havana Docks victory preserves congressional sanctions tool and reinforces meaningful private remedies against hostile regimes. Cruise lines victory creates roadmap for exploiting confiscated property through temporal limitations arguments, undermining deterrent effect and foreign policy objectives toward Cuba.The Fine Print:• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person who traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated shall face liability to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"• 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A): "Property" includes "any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest"Primary Cases:• Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935): Congress can restrict presidential removal power for independent agencies through "for cause" requirements, establishing legislative authority over agency independence• United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (2007): Courts reject interpretations that "reduce potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering statutory provisions a dead letter"Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Havana Docks Corp.): Richard Klingler of Ellis George LLP.United States as Amicus Curiae: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.For Respondents (Royal Caribbean Cruises): Paul D. Clement of Clement & Murphy, PLLC.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:02] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:12] Havana Docks Opening Statement[00:03:15] Havana Docks Free for All Questions[00:19:05] Havana Docks Round Robin Questions[00:36:46] United States Opening Statement[00:38:14] United States Free for All Questions[00:47:30] United States Round Robin Questions[00:57:21] Royal Caribbean Opening Statement[00:59:35] Royal Caribbean Free for All Questions[01:28:15] Royal Caribbean Round Robin Questions[01:30:23] Havana Docks Rebuttal

Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corpora Cion Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) | Oral Argument: 2/23/26 | Case No. 24-699 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Constitutional challenge to D.C. Circuit decision dismissing lawsuit against Cuban state-owned companies operating stolen American oil facilities raises fundamental questions about congressional authority to override sovereign immunity for targeted foreign policy objectives.Question Presented: Whether Exxon Mobil can sue Cuban companies for seizing Exxon Mobil’s oil refineries and related property.Posture: D.C. District Court denied Cuban companies' motion to dismiss; D.C. Circuit reversed for lack of jurisdictionMain Arguments:• Exxon (Petitioner): (1) Title III's "any person" language including foreign instrumentalities effects clear immunity abrogation; (2) Congressional purpose requires Cuban government accountability without FSIA compliance; (3) Supreme Court precedent eliminates magic-words requirement for immunity waiver• Cimex (Respondent): (1) Kirtz distinction applies because FSIA creates restrictive immunity regime allowing suit progression; (2) Statutory harmonization principles permit Title III and FSIA coexistence without implied repeal; (3) Petitioner's interpretation creates subject-matter jurisdiction gapsImplications: Exxon victory enables $9 billion in Cuban expropriation claims while establishing congressional authority for targeted immunity abrogation. A Cimex victory preserves traditional sovereign immunity protections, requiring Americans to satisfy onerous FSIA exceptions for Cuban trafficking claims.The Fine Print:• Helms-Burton Act § 6082(a)(1): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"• 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11): "'Person' means any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"Primary Cases:• Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Fair Credit Reporting Act abrogated federal sovereign immunity through "any person" language creating government liability; clear congressional intent overcomes immunity presumptions• Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (2023): Statutory immunity abrogation requires "unmistakably clear" congressional language; recognizing immunity would negate authorized cause of action entirelyOral Advocates:For Petitioner (Exxon Mobil): Morgan Ratner of Sullivan & Cromwell LLP argues for Petitioner Exxon Mobil.United States as Amicus Curiae: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice.For Respondents (Corporación Cimex): Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.Link to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:00:55] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:10] Exxon Mobil Opening Statement[00:03:23] Exxon Mobil Free for All Questions[00:18:48] Exxon Mobil Round Robin Questions[00:32:32] United States Opening Statement[00:33:51] United States Free for All Questions[00:42:54] United States Round Robin Questions[00:59:32] Corporacion Cimex Opening Statement[01:01:51] Corporacion Cimex Free for All Questions[01:28:01] Corporacion Cimex Round Robin Questions[01:30:24] Exxon Mobil Rebuttal

OverviewThis episode captures the most electrifying moments from the Supreme Court's November 2025 oral arguments in the consolidated Trump Tariff Cases—constitutional blockbusters that pit presidential emergency powers against Congress's exclusive authority to tax. These cases represent the most significant separation of powers challenge since the New Deal, with over $4 trillion in tariffs hanging in the balance.TIMESTAMPS[00:00:00] Episode Intro[00:01:16] Introduction to the Major Question Doctrine[00:01:16] Trump Tariff Cases Highlights[00:01:28] Common-Sense Interpretation and Historical Context[00:02:54] Debating Presidential Powers and Tariffs[00:03:54] Historical Precedents and Legal Interpretations[00:05:59] The Nixon Example and Its Significance[00:09:30] Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation[00:19:26] Nondelegation Principle and Constitutional Concerns[00:24:17] Congressional Delegation and Political Oversight[00:26:52] Historical Context of Presidential Tariff Authority[00:28:10] Legal Interpretations of 'Regulate Importation'[00:29:23] Debating the Scope of Presidential Powers[00:32:07] Judicial Review and Congressional Intent[00:33:15] Revenue-Raising vs. Embargoes[00:35:08] Nondelegation Doctrine and Emergency Powers[00:39:18] Clarifying the Nixon and Algonquin Precedents[00:41:42] Final Arguments and Hypotheticals[00:53:02] Episode Conclusion

Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: HereConsolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: HereOverviewToday, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the Trump Tariff cases—Trump versus V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources versus Trump—a constitutional clash over tariffs and separation of powers. President Trump put sweeping tariffs on trillions of dollars in imports using a 1977 emergency law that says he can "regulate" trade—but the law never mentions tariffs, duties, or taxes, and the Constitution gives only Congress the power to tax.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, OregonQuestion Presented: Whether the President can impose tariffs under IEEPA.Holding: IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs.Voting Breakdown: 6-3. Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A–1, and II–B, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II–A–2 and III, in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett joined. Justice Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion. Justice Barrett filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined.Reasoning:Majority (Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson)The Constitution gives Congress alone the power to tax, and tariffs represent a tax on imports. IEEPA's authority to "regulate importation" lets the President control, restrict, or block foreign transactions—but it never gave him power to reach into Americans' pockets by imposing taxes Congress never authorized.Gorsuch ConcurrenceThe major questions doctrine protects Congress's lawmaking power by requiring clear authorization before the President can claim extraordinary authority, and that principle traces back centuries through English and American law. When Congress wants to hand over its most fundamental power—the power to tax—it must speak clearly, and IEEPA's generic emergency language falls far short.Barrett ConcurrenceCourts interpret statutes using context and common sense, and any reasonable reader would expect Congress to make trillion-dollar tax policy decisions itself rather than hiding them in vague emergency language. The major questions doctrine simply reflects ordinary interpretation informed by constitutional structure—not some special thumb on the scale against executive power.Kagan Concurrence (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson)No special doctrine needed here—"regulate" simply doesn't mean "tax" in any dictionary, any statute, or any universe where words retain their ordinary meaning. When Congress actually delegates tariff power, it uses words like "duty" and "surcharge" and imposes strict limits; IEEPA does none of that.Jackson ConcurrenceThe official congressional reports accompanying IEEPA describe the law as granting "freezing control" authority over foreign property—not power to tax imports. Courts should examine what Congress actually said it intended, not speculate about what makes sense to judges decades later.Kavanaugh Dissent (joined by Justices Thomas and Alito)Text, history, and precedent all confirm that "regulate importation" includes tariffs—President Nixon used identical language for worldwide tariffs in 1971, courts upheld it, and Congress copied that exact phrase into IEEPA six years later. The Court's decision extends the major questions doctrine into foreign affairs for the first time, potentially handcuffing future Presidents when America faces genuine emergencies requiring rapid trade responses.Thomas DissentThe Constitution only prevents Congress from delegating "core legislative power" over life, liberty, and property—but regulating foreign trade involves privileges the government grants, not fundamental rights it must protect. Congress can freely delegate tariff authority to the President, and it did so through IEEPA's broad emergency powers.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, OregonTimestamps:[00:00:00] Episode Intro[00:05:13] Opinion by the Page Count[00:06:26] Tariff Timeline[00:07:55] Tariff Laws

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Chiles v. Salazar | Can States Ban Therapists from Discussing Conversion Therapy?Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: Here Question Presented: Whether a law that censors certain conversations between counselors and their clients based on the viewpoints expressed regulates conduct or violates the Free Speech Clause. In plain English, this case asks: Can states ban therapists from discussing conversion therapy?Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: James A. Campbell, Lansdowne, Va.For United States as Amicus Curiae: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Shannon W. Stevenson, Colorado Solicitor GeneralTimestamps:[00:00:00] Case Preview[00:00:50] Argument Begins[00:00:57] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:02:46] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:17:59] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:27:48] United States Opening Statement[00:35:27] United States Sequential Questions[00:45:41] Respondent Opening Statement[01:09:00] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:22:28] Petitioner Rebuttal

Trump v. V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. | Oral Argument: November 5, 2025 | Case No. 25-250 | Docket Link: HereConsolidated with: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump | Case No. 24-1287 | Docket Link: HereOverviewToday, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in the Trump Tariff cases—Trump versus V.O.S. Selections and Learning Resources versus Trump—a constitutional clash over tariffs and separation of powers. President Trump put sweeping tariffs on trillions of dollars in imports using a 1977 emergency law that says he can "regulate" trade—but the law never mentions tariffs, duties, or taxes, and the Constitution gives only Congress the power to tax.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Federal Parties): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Private Parties): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (State Parties): Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, OregonLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Website Link to Oral Argument: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Overview[00:00:44] Argument Begins[00:00:56] Federal Parties Opening Statement[00:02:53] Federal Parties Free for All Questions[00:36:05] Federal Parties Sequential Questions[01:15:56] Private Parties Opening Statement[01:18:27] Private Parties Free for All Questions[01:36:30] Private Parties Sequential Questions[02:12:28] State Parties Opening Statement[02:13:28] State Parties Free for All Questions[02:33:00] State Parties Sequential Questions[02:35:40] Federal Parties Rebuttal

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC | Oral Argument: 3/4/2026 | Case No. 24-1238 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts state common-law tort claims against brokers for negligently selecting motor carriers or drivers whose vehicles subsequently cause accidents.Overview: Trucking broker liability case determines whether federal deregulation law blocks state tort claims for negligent hiring practices that result in highway accidents with severe injuries.Posture: Seventh Circuit affirmed preemption; Ninth Circuit rejected preemption; circuit split.Main Arguments:• Montgomery (Petitioner): (1) Federal safety exception explicitly preserves state tort claims against broker negligent selection; (2) Fair interpretation requires consistent broad reading of both preemption provision and safety exception; (3) Longstanding common law negligent hiring claims predate federal trucking regulation• C.H. Robinson/Caribe (Respondents): (1) Federal law preempts broadly any state regulation of broker services and selection decisions; (2) Safety exception applies narrowly only to direct motor vehicle operation regulation; (3) Comprehensive federal regulatory scheme provides adequate safety oversightImplications: Montgomery victory preserves state tort accountability for broker hiring decisions, incentivizing highway safety through market liability. Respondent victory eliminates broker accountability for negligent selection, potentially reducing safety screening while limiting victim compensation options for trucking accidents.The Fine Print:• 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1): "a State may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier...or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property"• 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A): the preemption provision "shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles"Primary Cases:• Dan's City Used Cars v. Pelkey (2013): Phrase "with respect to the transportation of property" in FAAAA preemption provision "massively limits" federal preemption scope, requiring direct connection to transportation services• Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide (9th Cir. 2020): State negligent hiring claims against motor carrier brokers fall within FAAAA safety exception because they represent state authority to regulate safety through common-law tort claims

Hunter v. United States | Oral Argument: 3/3/2026 | Case No. 24-1063 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Criminal defendant challenges mandatory medication condition after judge told him he could appeal despite signed appeal waiver, creating fundamental questions about plea agreement enforcement and judicial authorityQuestion Presented: Whether appeal waivers in plea agreements can only include exceptions for ineffective assistance claims and sentences exceeding statutory maximums, and whether judicial statements about appeal rights override written waiversPosture: Fifth Circuit dismissed appeal citing two-exception rule; Supreme Court granted certiorariMain Arguments:• Hunter (Petitioner): (1) Contract law requires broader exceptions protecting reasonable expectations beyond two rigid categories; (2) Other circuits successfully recognize additional exceptions without creating chaos; (3) Judicial statements about appeal rights combined with government silence modify plea agreements• United States (Respondent): (1) Appeal waivers constitute binding contracts requiring enforcement according to written terms; (2) Appeal rights remain statutory rather than constitutional making waivers more enforceable; (3) Post-plea judicial misstatements cannot undermine knowing and voluntary waiversImplications: Hunter victory creates safety valve for extreme sentences but weakens prosecutorial bargaining power and plea agreement finality. Government victory cements nationwide enforcement of broad appeal waivers while potentially allowing constitutional violations without appellate oversight.The Fine Print:• Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"• 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(9): Courts may require defendants "undergo available medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment as specified by the court"Primary Cases:• Garza v. Idaho (2019): "No appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all appellate claims" because plea agreements function essentially as contracts subject to traditional defenses• United States v. Mezzanatto (1995): Even "most fundamental protections afforded by the Constitution" may be waived through knowing and voluntary agreements including plea bargains

United States v. Hemani | Oral Argument: 3/2/2026 | Case No. 24-1234 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Constitutional challenge to federal law criminalizing firearm possession by marijuana users tests Supreme Court's new historical framework for gun regulations after millions potentially face prosecution.Question Presented: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondentPosture: Fifth Circuit granted summary affirmance dismissing prosecution; government appeals seeking reversal.Main Arguments:• Government (Petitioner): (1) Founding-era laws restricting "habitual drunkards" provide historical precedent supporting marijuana user disarmament; (2) Circuit courts split on constitutional analysis requiring Supreme Court intervention; (3) Section 925(c) relief process addresses constitutional concerns through administrative remedies• Hemani (Respondent): (1) Government's historical analogues fail Bruen-Rahimi "why" and "how" requirements for constitutional restrictions; (2) No genuine circuit split exists warranting Supreme Court review; (3) Administrative relief cannot cure fundamental constitutional violationsImplications:Government victory enables continued prosecution of millions combining legal state marijuana use with lawful firearm ownership, expanding congressional power over combined legal activities. Hemani victory requires narrow tailoring of federal gun restrictions, potentially invalidating broad categorical prohibitions lacking specific historical justification and forcing legislative reconsideration of drug user firearm restrictions.The Fine Print:• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3): "It shall be unlawful for any person...who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance...to...possess...any firearm"• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"Primary Cases:• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen (2022): Government must demonstrate historical tradition supporting firearm regulations through relevantly similar "why" and "how" justifications from founding era• United States v. Rahimi (2024): Historical analogues need not provide "historical twin" but must address comparable problems through similar regulatory approaches under constitutional analysis

Enbridge Energy v. Nessel | Oral Argument: 2/24/2026 | Case No. 24-783 | Docket Link: Here |Overview: Pipeline company removes Michigan environmental lawsuit to federal court two years late, claiming extraordinary circumstances involving international treaty and state forum manipulation justify extending statutory deadline.Question Presented: Can federal may extend the 30-day removal deadline under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) for extraordinary circumstances.Posture: District court allowed late removal; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered remand to state court.Main Arguments:• Enbridge (Petitioner): (1) Equitable tolling presumption applies to all non-jurisdictional filing deadlines; (2) Congressional exceptions elsewhere don't preclude judicial flexibility here; (3) International treaty invocation and state forum manipulation create extraordinary circumstances• Nessel (Respondent): (1) Removal deadlines govern forum selection, not claim staleness; (2) Six express statutory exceptions rebut tolling presumption; (3) Strategic litigation choices don't constitute extraordinary circumstancesImplications: Enbridge victory expands defendant flexibility for late federal court access when genuine emergencies arise but risks encouraging strategic removal delays. Nessel victory enforces strict congressional deadlines and prevents removal manipulation but could bar federal jurisdiction even when international treaties or diplomatic relations face genuine threats. Middle-ground ruling might distinguish ordinary delays from cases involving actual foreign policy implications, creating specialized removal doctrine for international law contexts.The Fine Print:• 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1): "The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading"• 1977 U.S.-Canada Transit Pipelines Treaty, Article II(1): "Each Party shall ensure that no public authority in its jurisdiction implements any measure that would have the effect of impeding, redirecting, redirecting or interfering with in any way the transmission of hydrocarbons in transit"Primary Cases:• Young v. United States (2002): Equitable tolling applies to statutory deadlines that "prescribe a period within which certain rights may be enforced" unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise• Arellano v. McDonough (2023): Detailed statutory exceptions within same provision rebut equitable tolling presumption; courts cannot add implied exceptions where Congress specified express ones

Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. | Oral Argument: 2/23/2026 | Case No. 24-983 | Docket Link: HereQuestion Presented: Whether Title III liability requires proving defendants trafficked in property plaintiff currently owns a claim to, or property plaintiff would own absent confiscation.Overview: Cuban property confiscation case challenges Eleventh Circuit's "counterfactual analysis" requiring proof of hypothetical property ownership, potentially gutting Congress's primary tool for pressuring hostile regimes.Posture: Eleventh Circuit reversed district court grant of summary judgment for petitioner.Main Arguments:• Havana Docks (Petitioner): (1) Statute creates liability when plaintiff "owns the claim," not hypothetical property ownership; (2) Cuba confiscated physical dock facilities, not abstract concession rights; (3) Narrow interpretation defeats congressional deterrence objectives• Cruise Lines (Respondent): (1) Property law requires respecting temporal limitations on original rights; (2) Concession excluded passenger services, preventing trafficking in cargo-only rights; (3) Congress balanced deterrence against property law principlesImplications: Havana Docks victory preserves congressional sanctions tool and reinforces meaningful private remedies against hostile regimes. Cruise lines victory creates roadmap for exploiting confiscated property through temporal limitations arguments, undermining deterrent effect and foreign policy objectives toward Cuba.The Fine Print:• 22 U.S.C. §6082(a)(1)(A): "Any person who traffics in property which the Cuban Government confiscated shall face liability to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"• 22 U.S.C. §6023(12)(A): "Property" includes "any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein, including any leasehold interest"Primary Cases:• Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935): Congress can restrict presidential removal power for independent agencies through "for cause" requirements, establishing legislative authority over agency independence• United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. (2007): Courts reject interpretations that "reduce potential plaintiffs to almost zero, rendering statutory provisions a dead letter"

Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corpora Cion Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) | Oral Argument: 2/23/26 | Case No. 24-699 | Docket Link: HereOverview: Constitutional challenge to D.C. Circuit decision dismissing lawsuit against Cuban state-owned companies operating stolen American oil facilities raises fundamental questions about congressional authority to override sovereign immunity for targeted foreign policy objectives.Question Presented: Whether Exxon Mobil can sue Cuban companies for seizing Exxon Mobil’s oil refineries and related property.Posture: D.C. District Court denied Cuban companies' motion to dismiss; D.C. Circuit reversed for lack of jurisdictionMain Arguments:• Exxon (Petitioner): (1) Title III's "any person" language including foreign instrumentalities effects clear immunity abrogation; (2) Congressional purpose requires Cuban government accountability without FSIA compliance; (3) Supreme Court precedent eliminates magic-words requirement for immunity waiver• Cimex (Respondent): (1) Kirtz distinction applies because FSIA creates restrictive immunity regime allowing suit progression; (2) Statutory harmonization principles permit Title III and FSIA coexistence without implied repeal; (3) Petitioner's interpretation creates subject-matter jurisdiction gapsImplications: Exxon victory enables $9 billion in Cuban expropriation claims while establishing congressional authority for targeted immunity abrogation. A Cimex victory preserves traditional sovereign immunity protections, requiring Americans to satisfy onerous FSIA exceptions for Cuban trafficking claims.The Fine Print:• Helms-Burton Act § 6082(a)(1): "Any person that traffics in property which was confiscated...shall be liable to any United States national who owns the claim to such property"• 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11): "'Person' means any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state"Primary Cases:• Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz (2024): Fair Credit Reporting Act abrogated federal sovereign immunity through "any person" language creating government liability; clear congressional intent overcomes immunity presumptions• Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. (2023): Statutory immunity abrogation requires "unmistakably clear" congressional language; recognizing immunity would negate authorized cause of action entirely

Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Wolford): Alan A. Beck, San Diego, California.For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues.For Respondent (Lopez): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.Question Presented: Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit concealed carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without property owner express permission.Overview: Post-Bruen constitutional challenge to Hawaii's affirmative-consent requirement for carrying firearms on private property open to public creates circuit split over intersection of Second Amendment rights and traditional property law principles.Posture: District court enjoined law; Ninth Circuit reversed, creating conflict with Second and Third Circuits.Main Arguments:• Petitioner: (1) Carrying firearms on private property open to public falls within Second Amendment's plain text protection; (2) Hawaii's presumptive prohibition effectively abolishes public carry rights through property law circumvention; (3) Colonial and Reconstruction-era scattered laws fail to establish sufficient historical tradition under Bruen framework• Respondent: (1) Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without owner consent under English common law inheritance; (2) Hawaii's law vindicates fundamental property owners' right to exclude rather than restricting Second Amendment rights; (3) Multiple colonial and Reconstruction-era historical analogues constitute "dead ringers" supporting Hawaii's approach requiring express consentImplications: Petitioner victory establishes robust Second Amendment protection in privately-owned publicly-accessible spaces, potentially invalidating similar post-Bruen restrictions across multiple states and expanding public carry rights significantly. Respondent victory permits states to circumvent direct gun control restrictions through property law mechanisms, enabling broader firearms regulations while preserving traditional property rights and potentially creating complex patchwork of varying consent requirements across jurisdictions affecting everyday carry practices.The Fine Print:• H.R.S. § 134-9.5(b): "No person shall carry or possess a firearm on any private property unless that person has been given express authorization by the property owner or the owner's authorized agent through unambiguous written or verbal authorization or clear and conspicuous signage"• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"Primary Cases:• NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022): Second Amendment protects individual right to carry handguns publicly for self-defense; government restrictions must demonstrate consistency with historical tradition of firearm regulation rather than interest-balancing approach• Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (2021): Property owners possess fundamental right to exclude others from their premises, constituting "one of the most treasured rights of property ownership" requiring government compensation for regulatory takingsLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:24] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:34] Wolford Opening Statement[00:03:03] Wolford Free for All Questions[00:19:29] Wolford Round Robin Questions[00:33:22] United States Opening Statement[00:34:36] United States Free for All Questions[00:44:23] United States Round Robin Questions[01:07:53] Lopez Opening Statement[01:10:09] Lopez Free for All Questions[01:39:01] Lopez Round Robin Questions[01:51:14] Wolford Rebuttal

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Oral Argument Date: 10/14/25Overview: Ellingburg committed a crime in 1996 before Congress enacted a new law requiring convicted defendants to pay restitution to victims. Courts later sentenced Ellingburg under this new law and ordered him to pay $7,567.25 - money he never paid. Ellingburg challenged this restitution order as unconstitutional retroactive punishment, arguing the government cannot apply new penalties to old crimes. The case forces the Supreme Court to determine whether victim restitution constitutes criminal punishment protected by the Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws.Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereQuestion Presented: Whether criminal restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) is penal for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner.For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur.For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.Holding: The Supreme Court held that restitution under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment subject to Ex Post Facto Clause analysis.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch.Majority's Rationale: Congress explicitly labeled MVRA restitution as a "penalty" for criminal offenses imposed during sentencing alongside imprisonment and fines. The statute appears in the criminal code and requires courts to follow criminal procedure rules when ordering restitution. Defendants who refuse to pay face potential imprisonment for punishment and deterrence purposes, confirming the criminal nature.Concurring Rationale: Justice Thomas argued the Court should abandon its current twelve-factor test for determining criminal punishment. The original 1798 understanding of ex post facto laws protected against any retroactive government penalties for public wrongs. Modern courts should focus on whether laws impose coercive sanctions for offenses against government authority, regardless of civil labels.Link to Opinion: Here.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:00:58] Argument Begins[00:01:06] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:14] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:14:04] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:18:36] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Opening Statement[00:19:45] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Free for All Questions[00:33:22] Respondent in Support of Vacatur Sequential Questions[00:34:41] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Opening Statement[00:37:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Free for All Questions[01:01:03] For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below Sequential Questions[01:02:09] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Case v. Montana | Case No. 24-624 | Oral Argument Date: 10/15/25Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: HereQuestion Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los AngelesFor Respondent: Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, MontanaUnited States as Amicus Curiae: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of JusticeHolding: Brigham City’s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and was satisfied in this case.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Episode Preview[00:00:50] Argument Begins[00:01:02] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:12] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:27:25] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:39:50] Respondent Opening Statement[00:41:41] Respondent Free for All Questions[00:55:44] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:00:52] United States as Amicus Curaie Opening Statement[01:02:01] United States as Amicus Curaie Free for All Questions[01:09:15] United States as Amicus Curaie Sequential Questions[01:10:40] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Berk v. Choy | Case No. 24-440 | Oral Argument Date: 10/6/25Link to Docket: HereEpisode Preview: HereBackground: Question Presented: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, CO.Holding: Delaware’s affidavit law does not apply in federal court.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion. Justice Jackson wrote an opinion concurring in the result.Link to Opinion: Here.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Intro[00:00:33] Argument Begins[00:00:39] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:02:57] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:25:46] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:31:36] Respondent Opening Statement[00:33:52] Respondent Free For All Questions[00:59:19] Respondent Sequential Questions[01:00:05] Petitioner Rebuttal

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | Case No. 24-808 | Oral Argument Date: 11/5/25 | Docket Link: HereOverviewToday, the Supreme Court hears oral arguments in Coney Island Auto Parts versus Burton, a time trap tangle examining when void verdicts gain validity. Coney Island's bank account gets frozen for nearly $100,000 based on a 2015 Tennessee judgment they claim they never knew about. When Coney finally fights back seven years later, the Sixth Circuit dismisses the case, saying that you waited too long to challenge the judgment Coney didn’t even know about. "If something never existed in the first place, does waiting too long to challenge it make it real?Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Coney): Daniel Ginzburg, Freehold, N.J.For Respondent (Burton): Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.Holding: Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4).Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.Majority's Rationale: Rule 60(c)(1) clearly requires all Rule 60(b) motions within reasonable time, including void judgment challenges. Even void judgments face timing limits because no constitutional principle grants unlimited challenge time. Allowing indefinite challenges would create extreme consequences like ignoring appeal and certiorari deadlines.Concurring Rationale: Rule 60's text and structure clearly require reasonable time limits for all motions. The majority unnecessarily addressed constitutional questions that no party raised or argued. Courts should stick to deciding actual disputes, not inventing constitutional theories.Link to Opinion: Here.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:00:58] Argument Begins[00:01:07] Petitioner Opening Statement[00:03:17] Petitioner Free for All Questions[00:19:12] Petitioner Sequential Questions[00:19:15] Respondent Opening Statement[00:20:33] Respondent Free for All Questions[00:34:10] Petitioner Rebuttal

Oral Argument Re-Listen: Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Case No. 24-568 | Oral Argument Date: 10/8/25Link to Docket: HereCase Preview: https://scotus-oral-arguments.captivate.fm/episode/upcoming-oral-argument-bost-v-illinois-ballot-box-bout-when-can-candidates-challenge-election-rules/Background: Federal law sets the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the federal Election Day. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7; and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Several states, including Illinois, have enacted state laws that allow ballots to be received and counted after Election Day. Petitioners contend these state laws are preempted under the Elections and Electors Clauses. Petitioners sued to enjoin Illinois' law allowing ballots to be received up to fourteen days after Election Day.Question Presented: Whether Petitioners, as federal candidates, have pleaded sufficient factual allegations to show Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.;United States, as Amicus Curiae: Michael Talent, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Jane E. Notz, Solicitor General, Chicago, Ill.Link to Opinion: Here.Holding: As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost holds standing to challenge the laws that govern the counting of votes in his election.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Overview:This episode offers six critical insights from last week's opinions.Six Pack Roadmap:1. Deceptive Unanimity Statistics Court achieves 71% unanimity rate (versus 42% last year) by clearing uncontested low hanging fruit cases; rate will drop as complex constitutional questions arrive later this term.2. Fractures Behind Unanimous Results: Two cases feature justices concurring only in judgment—agreeing with outcomes but rejecting majority reasoning; Jackson splits on procedural methodology in Berk v. Choy; Sotomayor objects to unnecessary constitutional analysis in Coney Island v. Burton.3. Strategic Opinion Authorship Pattern: Each majority opinion authored by different justice; only Gorsuch and Thomas remain without majority opinions this term, suggesting strategic distribution of constitutional precedent-setting opportunities.4. Thomas's Doctrinal Attack Signal: Thomas writes Ellingburg concurrence (joined by Gorsuch) targeting current Ex Post Facto jurisprudence, continuing his pattern of using separate opinions to undermine established legal frameworks.5. Ex Post Facto Originalism: Thomas advocates abandoning modern twelve-factor balancing tests for 1798 Calder v. Bull approach; would subject civil penalties, administrative enforcement, and regulatory sanctions to constitutional scrutiny regardless of legislative labeling.6. Emergency Docket Constitutional Chaos: Trump v. Cook oral arguments reveal dangers of rushed litigation creating inadequate factual records; Justice Alito highlights how time pressure forces courts into constitutional holdings rather than narrower statutory grounds.Referenced Cases:• Berk v. Choy - Unanimous decision on Delaware affidavit requirements conflicting with federal civil procedure rules; Jackson concurrence only in judgment preferring Rule 3 over Rule 8 analysis• Coney Island v. Burton - Unanimous decision with Sotomayor concurrence only in judgment objecting to unnecessary due process constitutional analysis• Ellingburg v. United States - Thomas concurrence (joined by Gorsuch) advocating originalist Ex Post Facto interpretation based on Calder v. Bull (1798)• Trump v. Cook - Emergency docket case involving Federal Reserve governor removal; oral arguments criticized rushed litigation timeline creating inadequate factual development

OverviewThe High Court Report covers three major oral arguments from this past week, analyzing constitutional clashes over Second Amendment rights, pension plan calculations, and presidential removal powers. Each case presents fundamental questions about constitutional interpretation, federal authority, and the balance between individual rights and government power.Takeaways:Wolford v. Lopez• Second Amendment treated as second-class right compared to First Amendment protections• Historical evidence battle focuses on colonial anti-poaching laws and Black Codes versus modern concealed carry contexts• Justices skeptical that 1771 hunting regulations justify modern permission slip requirements for constitutional rightsM&K Employee Solutions v. IAM• Pension liability calculation dispute centers on timing of actuarial assumptions versus measurement dates• Built-in statutory safeguards include professional ethics requirements and mandatory arbitration processes• Court likely to rule that "as of" creates reference point rather than deadline for calculationsTrump v. Cook• Presidential removal authority clashes with Federal Reserve independence principles• "For cause" standard requires judicial review to prevent arbitrary executive actions• Procedural defects provide potential narrow ruling path without resolving broader constitutional questionsAttribution Episode analysis draws from Daniel Thompson's Substack piece "Litigating Originalism in Bruen: A Brief-Level Coding Study of History, Evidence, and Argument Form" available at https://legalytics.substack.com/p/litigating-originalism-in-bruen-a

Ellingburg v. United States | Case No. 24-482 | Docket Link: HereLinks: Opinion: Here.Oral Argument: HereCase Preview: HereOverview: Ellingburg committed a crime in 1996 before Congress enacted a new law requiring convicted defendants to pay restitution to victims. Courts later sentenced Ellingburg under this new law and ordered him to pay $7,567.25 - money he never paid. Ellingburg challenged this restitution order as unconstitutional retroactive punishment, arguing the government cannot apply new penalties to old crimes. The case forces the Supreme Court to determine whether victim restitution constitutes criminal punishment protected by the Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws.Question Presented: Whether restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.Holding: The Supreme Court held that restitution under the MVRA constitutes criminal punishment subject to Ex Post Facto Clause analysis.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kavanaugh wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion joined by Justice Gorsuch.Majority's Rationale: Congress explicitly labeled MVRA restitution as a "penalty" for criminal offenses imposed during sentencing alongside imprisonment and fines. The statute appears in the criminal code and requires courts to follow criminal procedure rules when ordering restitution. Defendants who refuse to pay face potential imprisonment for punishment and deterrence purposes, confirming the criminal nature.Concurring Rationale: Justice Thomas argued the Court should abandon its current twelve-factor test for determining criminal punishment. The original 1798 understanding of ex post facto laws protected against any retroactive government penalties for public wrongs. Modern courts should focus on whether laws impose coercive sanctions for offenses against government authority, regardless of civil labels.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Amy M. Saharia, Washington, D.C. argued for petitioner.For Respondent in Support of Vacatur: Ashley Robertson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice argued for respondent in support of vacatur.For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: John F. Bash, Austin, Texas.

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton | Date Decided: 1/21/26 | Case No. 24-808Docket Link: HereOverviewThis case involves a time trap tangle examining when void verdicts gain validity. Coney Island's bank account gets frozen for nearly $100,000 based on a 2015 Tennessee judgment they claim they never knew about. When Coney finally fights back seven years later, the Sixth Circuit dismisses the case, saying that you waited too long to challenge the judgment Coney didn’t even know about. If a judgment was invalid from the start, does waiting too long make it become valid? Question Presented: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.Holding: Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4).Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.Majority's Rationale: Rule 60(c)(1) clearly requires all Rule 60(b) motions within reasonable time, including void judgment challenges. Even void judgments face timing limits because no constitutional principle grants unlimited challenge time. Allowing indefinite challenges would create extreme consequences like ignoring appeal and certiorari deadlines.Concurring Rationale: Rule 60's text and structure clearly require reasonable time limits for all motions. The majority unnecessarily addressed constitutional questions that no party raised or argued. Courts should stick to deciding actual disputes, not inventing constitutional theories.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Coney): Daniel Ginzburg, Freehold, N.J.For Respondent (Burton): Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.

Berk v. Choy | Date Decided: 1/20/26 | Case No. 24-440Docket Link: HereEpisode Preview: HereOverview: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure conflict with state screening requirements raises fundamental questions about procedural uniformity in diversity jurisdiction and limits on state authority over federal court operations.Question Presented: Whether a state law providing that a complaint must be dismissed unless it is accompanied by an expert affidavit may be applied in federal court.Holding: Delaware’s affidavit law does not apply in federal court.Result: Reversed and remanded.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Barrett wrote the majority opinion. Justice Jackson wrote an opinion concurring in the result.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Frederick R. Yarger, Denver, CO.Posture: Third Circuit affirmed dismissal; Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed unanimously.Main Arguments:Berk (Petitioner): (1) Rule 8 requires only "short and plain statement," precluding additional merit requirements; (2) Rule 12 forbids considering materials outside pleadings for dismissal; (3) Federal Rules displace conflicting state procedural laws in diversity casesDefendants (Choy and Beebe): (1) Rule 11 creates statutory exception allowing state affidavit requirements; (2) Delaware law addresses different issue than Federal Rules; (3) State screening mechanisms constitute substantive law under Erie doctrineImplications: Berk victory establishes federal procedural rule supremacy over conflicting state requirements, protecting diversity jurisdiction access while potentially eliminating state tort reform screening mechanisms in federal court. Defendants victory would enable states to impose additional federal court barriers beyond Federal Rules requirements, potentially creating procedural chaos through conflicting state requirements and undermining uniform federal court procedures nationwide.The Fine Print:Federal Rule 8(a)(2): "A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"Delaware Code § 6853(a)(1): "No action for medical negligence shall be filed unless the complaint is accompanied by an affidavit of merit signed by a medical professional"Primary Cases:Hanna v. Plumer (1965): Valid Federal Rules displace contrary state law even when state law qualifies as substantive under Erie; Federal Rules govern procedure in federal courtShady Grove v. Allstate (2010): Federal Rule displaces state law when it "answers the question in dispute" unless the Federal Rule exceeds statutory authorization

Trump v. Cook | Argument Date: 1/21/26 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates:For Petitioner (Trump): D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent (Cook): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Virginia.Question Presented: Whether Federal Reserve Board governors possess Fifth Amendment property rights in their offices and whether "for cause" removal authority permits presidential removal based on pre-office conduct.Overview: President Trump's 30-minute ultimatum removal of Fed Governor Cook over mortgage misrepresentations creates unprecedented constitutional crisis testing presidential power against central bank independence and due process rights.Posture: D.C. Circuit denied emergency stay by 2-1 vote; Governor Cook continues serving pending appeal.Main Arguments:• Trump (Petitioner): (1) Federal offices constitute no Fifth Amendment property interest under longstanding precedent; (2) "For cause" permits broad removal discretion for misconduct affecting fitness including pre-office conduct; (3) Presidential removal determinations remain unreviewable by courts absent explicit congressional authorization• Cook (Respondent): (1) Tenure-protected officers possess constitutionally protected property interest requiring pre-removal hearing under Loudermill; (2) "For cause" historically limited to in-office conduct under 1913/1935 statutory backdrop; (3) Judicial review prevents presidential circumvention of congressional restrictions protecting agency independenceImplications: Trump victory eliminates due process protections for principal officers while expanding presidential control over independent agencies through discretionary "for cause" interpretations. Cook victory establishes constitutional hearing requirements for tenure-protected removal while constraining presidential authority to politicize Federal Reserve monetary policy decisions affecting national economic stability.The Fine Print:• 12 U.S.C. § 242: "Any member of the Board may be removed for cause by the President"• Fifth Amendment: "No person shall be...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"Primary Cases:• Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (1985): Tenure-protected public employees possess property interest in continued employment requiring pre-termination notice and hearing opportunity• Taylor v. Beckham (1900): Political offices constitute no property rights protected by Due Process Clause; removal from office triggers no constitutional process requirementsLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:51] Oral Argument Begins[00:02:00] Trump Opening Statement[00:04:02] Trump Free for All Questions[00:27:07] Trump Round Robin Questions[01:00:10] Cook Opening Statement[01:02:05] Cook Free for All Questions[01:30:37] Cook Round Robin Questions[01:56:24] Trump Rebuttal

Oral Advocates:For Petitioner (Wolford): Alan A. Beck, San Diego, California.For United States (as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice argues.For Respondent (Lopez): Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D.C.Question Presented: Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Hawaii may presumptively prohibit concealed carry permit holders from carrying handguns on private property open to the public without property owner express permission.Overview: Post-Bruen constitutional challenge to Hawaii's affirmative-consent requirement for carrying firearms on private property open to public creates circuit split over intersection of Second Amendment rights and traditional property law principles.Posture: District court enjoined law; Ninth Circuit reversed, creating conflict with Second and Third Circuits.Main Arguments:• Petitioner: (1) Carrying firearms on private property open to public falls within Second Amendment's plain text protection; (2) Hawaii's presumptive prohibition effectively abolishes public carry rights through property law circumvention; (3) Colonial and Reconstruction-era scattered laws fail to establish sufficient historical tradition under Bruen framework• Respondent: (1) Second Amendment never protected armed entry onto private property without owner consent under English common law inheritance; (2) Hawaii's law vindicates fundamental property owners' right to exclude rather than restricting Second Amendment rights; (3) Multiple colonial and Reconstruction-era historical analogues constitute "dead ringers" supporting Hawaii's approach requiring express consentImplications: Petitioner victory establishes robust Second Amendment protection in privately-owned publicly-accessible spaces, potentially invalidating similar post-Bruen restrictions across multiple states and expanding public carry rights significantly. Respondent victory permits states to circumvent direct gun control restrictions through property law mechanisms, enabling broader firearms regulations while preserving traditional property rights and potentially creating complex patchwork of varying consent requirements across jurisdictions affecting everyday carry practices.The Fine Print:• H.R.S. § 134-9.5(b): "No person shall carry or possess a firearm on any private property unless that person has been given express authorization by the property owner or the owner's authorized agent through unambiguous written or verbal authorization or clear and conspicuous signage"• Second Amendment: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"Primary Cases:• NYSRPA v. Bruen (2022): Second Amendment protects individual right to carry handguns publicly for self-defense; government restrictions must demonstrate consistency with historical tradition of firearm regulation rather than interest-balancing approach• Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (2021): Property owners possess fundamental right to exclude others from their premises, constituting "one of the most treasured rights of property ownership" requiring government compensation for regulatory takingsLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Argument Preview[00:01:24] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:34] Wolford Opening Statement[00:03:03] Wolford Free for All Questions[00:19:29] Wolford Round Robin Questions[00:33:22] United States Opening Statement[00:34:36] United States Free for All Questions[00:44:23] United States Round Robin Questions[01:07:53] Lopez Opening Statement[01:10:09] Lopez Free for All Questions[01:39:01] Lopez Round Robin Questions[01:51:14] Wolford Rebuttal

M & K Employee Solutions, LLC v. Trustees of The IAM Pension Fund | Argument Date: 1/20/26 | Docket Link: HereOral Advocates:For Petitioner (M&K Employee Solutions): Michael E. Kenneally, Jr., Washington, D.C.For Respondent (IAM National Pension Fund): John E. Roberts, Providence, Rhode Island.For United States as (Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.Question Presented: Can pension plans charge higher prices using future prices, or must they stick with the original prices?Overview: Four companies' pension withdrawal liability tripled from timing of actuarial assumption changes, creating circuit split over whether "as of" December 31st calculations require December 31st assumptions or permit retrospective professional judgment.Posture: Arbitrators favored companies; D.C. District Court and Circuit reversed, permitting post-measurement assumption adoption with restrictions.Main Arguments:Petitioners: (1) "As of" language creates statutory deadline requiring pre-measurement assumption adoption; (2) Legislative framework expected annual assumption reviews before measurement dates; (3) Anti-manipulation principles from Section 1394 should apply to actuarial assumptionsRespondents: (1) "As of" establishes reference date, not completion deadline for retrospective valuations; (2) "Best estimate" requirement mandates current professional judgment over stale assumptions; (3) Standard actuarial practice permits and encourages post-measurement selectionImplications: Petitioner victory creates uniform nationwide timing deadlines for actuarial assumptions but potentially forces use of outdated professional judgments. Respondent victory maintains professional flexibility and accuracy in pension calculations but creates potential manipulation risks and planning uncertainty. Decision affects multiemployer pension withdrawals nationwide, involving billions in liability calculations. Ruling influences broader questions about statutory interpretation incorporating professional standards and temporal requirements in technical regulatory contexts.The Fine Print:29 U.S.C. § 1391: "The amount of an employer's withdrawal liability...shall be computed...as of the end of the plan year preceding the plan year in which the withdrawal occurs"29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(1): "actuarial assumptions and methods which...offer the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan"Primary Cases:National Retirement Fund v. Metz Culinary Management (2020): Second Circuit held actuarial assumptions for withdrawal liability must exist by measurement date; automatic rollover applies absent timely changesConcrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust (1993): Withdrawal liability creates "fixed and certain debt"; actuarial determinations receive presumption of correctness due to professional constraints and statutory requirementsLink to Opinion: TBD.Website Link to Opinion Summary: TBD.Timestamps:[00:00:00] Oral Argument Preview[00:01:30] Oral Argument Begins[00:01:41] M & K Opening Statement[00:03:33] M & K Free for All Questions[00:26:54] M & K Round Robin Questions[00:31:47] IAM Opening Statement[00:34:23] IAM Free for All Questions[00:47:28] IAM Round Robin Questions[00:47:31] United States Opening Statement[00:48:39] United States Free for All Questions[00:53:44] United States Round Robin Questions[00:53:50] M & K Rebuttal

OVERVIEWDon't miss this action packed episode. In it, we cover three things:News that the Supreme Court agreed to hear 4 new cases;News that the Supreme Court will issue opinions Stats, trends, and observations of last week's 4 opinions; andFinal thoughts on this week's oral argumentsNEW CERTIORARI GRANTSCases Added: Four new grants bring total to approximately 57 unique cases for the termGeofence Warrants Case: Constitutional challenge to warrants allowing police access to cell phone user data by specific date, time, and locationPatent Infringement Case: Intellectual property dispute involving patent protection standardsMonsanto/Roundup Case: Product liability challenge over failure to warn about cancer dangersInvestment Fund Case: Securities litigation involving pleading standards for fund underperformance claimsTerm Outlook: Current case count (57 unique cases) approaches last term's 62-63 cases, suggesting limited additional grants expectedJANUARY 20TH OPINIONS FORTHCOMINGRelease Schedule: Supreme Court plans opinion release on Monday, January 20th Coverage Plan: Detailed opinion breakdowns scheduled for Thursday or Friday depending on volume Anticipation: Multiple pending cases await resolution from previous oral argument sessionsSCOTUS OPINION TRENDS & STATISTICAL ANALYSISReversal Patterns: Current term mirrors historical 69% reversal rate3 reversals/vacates vs. 1 affirmance from first four decisionsMontana Supreme Court decision upheld; federal circuit courts overturnedVote Distributions: Early decisions show typical voting patterns2 unanimous (9-0) decisions: Barrett v. United States, Case v. Montana1 decision 7-2, 1 decision 5-43 criminal law cases, 1 standing/election caseAuthorship Patterns: Different justices authored each majority opinionRoberts, Sotomayor, Kagan, Jackson wrote majoritiesGorsuch most active: 2 concurrences, 1 dissentJackson 2nd most active: 1 majority, 1 dissentJudicial Fracturing Analysis: Early emergence of fractured reasoning despite agreement on outcomesNotable example: Bost v. Illinois where Barrett and Kagan joined conclusion but rejected reasoningBarrett criticized majority's "bespoke standing rule for candidates"Fracturing expected to intensify in major constitutional casesLegislative History Debate: Emerging doctrinal battle over legislative history usageBarrett v. United States highlights split: Jackson's Part IV-C attracted only 4 votes (Roberts, Sotomayor, Kagan)Textualist justices (Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett) rejected legislative history relianceRoberts' surprising support suggests institutional concerns over methodological purityFINAL THOUGHTS ON UPCOMING CASESTRUMP V. COOK - Federal Reserve Governor RemovalStrategic Innovation: Cook's supplemental brief marshaling amicus arguments demonstrates tactical geniusAdam Feldman's research shows increasing academic influence in Supreme Court decisionsOral arguments provide inadequate forum for addressing comprehensive written amicus submissionsSupplemental briefs fill procedural gap allowing systematic written response to third-party interventionsCore Constitutional Themes:Judicial Restraint: Courts must enforce only what Congress actually wrote, not judicial interpretations of congressional intent"For Cause" Protection: Risk of rendering statutory protections meaningless if presidents can fabricate misconduct allegationsTrump Tariff Connection: Parallel arguments about congressional authorization requirementsGovernment previously argued against broad executive authority in tariff contextNow uses same textual arguments to deny Cook's statutory process rightsConstitutional consistency demands similar outcomes across separation of powers casesBroader Implications: Potential elimination of congressional removal statute authority if combined with Trump v. Slaughter FTC rulingWOLFORD V. LOPEZ - Second Amendment Property RightsConstitutional Framework: Hawaii's 2023 "vampire rule" requiring owner consent for armed entry onto private propertySimilar laws in California, Maryland, New York, New JerseyPost-Bruen constitutional analysis requires historical tradition supportProperty Rights Clash: Fundamental tension between property owner exclusion rights and Second Amendment protectionsHawaii invokes English law's "sole and despotic dominion" property principleGun owners argue state cannot criminalize conduct where property owners remain silentDistinguishes between property owner choice and state mandateStrategic Burden: Hawaii must prove constitutionality under strict scrutiny post-Bruen frameworkHistorical tradition analysis favors gun rights absent clear precedentFive-vote majority appears unlikely given current Court compositionM & K EMPLOYEE SOLUTIONS V. IAM PENSION FUND - Pension Calculation TimingMain Issue: Whether pension plans can retroactively apply new calculation methods Restaurant Analogy: Changing menu prices after meal consumption parallels pension calculation timing Stakes: Fundamental contr

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in four major cases during the week of January 12, 2026, covering federal contractor jurisdiction, transgender athletics rights, and state agency immunity. The Court issued its first four opinions of the term while demonstrating reluctance to expand constitutional protections in sensitive areas like transgender rights and police emergency powers. Justice concerns about nationwide chaos and disruption emerged as recurring themes across multiple cases involving federalism and state authority questions.Chevron Corporation v. Plaquemines Parish Question Presented: Whether federal contractor removal statute permits federal jurisdiction for conduct "relating to" government contractsOverview: Louisiana oil dumping lawsuit raises federalism questions about protecting contractors from local bias versus state court expertise.Main Analysis:Paul Clement invoked Daniel Webster's 1812 commentary about federal courts protecting nationally important projects from local prejudiceChevron fears massive verdict after Louisiana secured $744 million judgment in similar WWII oil caseChief Justice Roberts expressed "butterfly effect" concerns about sweeping federal jurisdiction for paper clip contractorsBoth sides conceded Fifth Circuit test failed to follow statutory textPrediction: Victory for Chevron or remand for different legal test application. Court disliked Fifth Circuit approach.Key Tension: Federal protection from local bias versus state expertise in Louisiana environmental lawLittle v. Hecox and West Virginia v. B.P.J.Question Presented: Whether Title IX permits excluding transgender students from gender-aligned athleticsOverview: Parallel cases create constitutional clash over state biological sex requirements versus federal anti-discrimination protections.Main Analysis:Majority seemed disinclined to draw constitutional lines protecting transgender peopleGovernment's contradictory positions caught justices' attention - supports state biological sex requirements while challenging California's opposing lawFollows Skrmetti decision recognizing broad state authority over transgender issuesNo appetite for constitutional intervention when states actively disagreePrediction: Idaho and West Virginia victory. Court reluctant to wade into transgender debates.Key Insight: Next frontier involves legitimacy of state laws protecting transgender statusCSX Galette v. NJ Transit Corp. Question Presented: Whether state-created corporations retain sovereign immunity despite corporate structureOverview: Transit authority immunity dispute affects numerous state agencies using corporate structures.Main Analysis:Court focused intensely on formality versus functionality questionJustice Kavanaugh expressed "chaos" concerns about jeopardizing state corporations nationwideConservative justices seemed reluctant to depart from 1980s D.C. Circuit precedent written by Judge Bork and joined by Justice ScaliaGovernor maintains absolute veto power over every board action despite corporate structurePrediction: New Jersey Transit Corporation victory based on formality precedent and chaos avoidanceKey Factor: Risk of nationwide disruption to state transit authorities and similar agencies

Case v. Montana | Date Decided: 1/14/26 | Case No. 24-624Question Presented: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause.BackgroundIn this case, Case challenged the established emergency-aid exception by asking the Supreme Court to require probable cause rather than the current "objectively reasonable belief" standard for warrantless home entries during emergencies.Holding: Brigham City’s objective reasonableness standard for warrantless home entries to render emergency aid applies without further gloss and was satisfied in this case.Result: Affirmed.Voting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justices Sotomayor and Gorsuch filed concurring opinions.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Fred A. Rowley, Jr., Los Angeles, CA.For Respondent: Christian B. Corrigan, Solicitor General, MontanaUnited States as Amicus Curiae: Zoe A. Jacoby, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice.

Bowe v. United States | Date Decided: 1/9/26 | Case No. 24-5438 Background: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), “[ a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed. ” (emphasis added).Question Presented:Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) applies to a claim presented in a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. * * * Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), “[ t]he grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition . . . for a writ of certiorari. ” (emphasis added).Whether 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) deprives this Court of certiorari jurisdiction over the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.Holding: The Court has jurisdiction because §2244(b)(3)(E) does not bar this Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive §2255 motion.Section 2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or successive motions filed under §2255(h) by federal prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences.Result: Vacated and remandedVoting Breakdown: 5-4. Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part I.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Andrew L. Adler, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below as to Question 1: Kasdin M. Mitchell, Dallas, Tex.

Barrett v. United States | Date Decided: 1/14/26 | Case No. 24-5774Question Presented:Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits two sentences for an act that violates 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and§ 924(j), a question that divides seven circuits but about which the Solicitor General and Petitioner agree.Whether "Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under §924(c) (3)(A), a question left open after" United States v. Taylor , 596 U.S. 845 (2022). United States v. Stoney , 62 F.4th 108, 113 (3d Cir. 2023).Holding: Congress did not clearly authorize convictions under both §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (j) for a single act that violates both provisions. One act that violates both provisions therefore may spawn only one conviction. Result: Reversed in part and remandedVoting Breakdown: 9-0. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III, IV–A, and IV–B and an opinion with respect to Part IV–C in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor and Kagan joined. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part.Link to Opinion: Here.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Matthew B. Larsen, Assistant Federal Defender, New York, N. Y.For Respondent in Support of Petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgment Below: Charles L. McCloud, Washington, D.C.

Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections | Date Decided: 1/14/26 | Case No. 24-568Question Presented: Whether candidates running for federal office hold Article III standing to challenge state time, place, and manner regulations concerning their federal elections, specifically the state laws that allow ballots to be receivd and counted after election day.Link to Opinion: Here.Holding: As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost holds standing to challenge the laws that govern the counting of votes in his election.Result: Reversed and remanded. Voting Breakdown: 7-2. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sotomayor joined.Oral Advocates:For Petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.;United States, as Amicus Curiae: Michael Talent, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.For Respondent: Jane E. Notz, Solicitor General, Chicago, Ill.