January 28, 1997: Three Mile Island Disaster - Scott Portzline
The Art Bell Archive · Arthur William Bell III
August 17, 20232h 37m
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Show Notes
Scott Portzline, a researcher who spent 13 years investigating the Three Mile Island nuclear incident and reviewed over 30,000 pages of documents, joins Art Bell to present evidence suggesting the 1979 disaster may not have been an accident. Portzline details how emergency feedwater valves were found inexplicably closed, critical paperwork went missing, and a local cult had warned members to leave Harrisburg before April 1979, with a newspaper editorial specifically urging Three Mile Island to increase security.
The technical chronology of the disaster reveals how close Pennsylvania came to catastrophe. Fuel melted twice inside the reactor, temperatures exceeded 5,000 degrees, and the Rogovin Commission concluded the state was within 30 minutes of a release that could have killed 130,000 people and rendered an area the size of Pennsylvania uninhabitable. Portzline describes how the FBI opened and then denied a sabotage investigation within 24 hours.
The conversation shifts to present-day vulnerabilities at nuclear plants nationwide, including vehicle barriers that remain open half the day, spent fuel pools accessible to truck bombs, and 149 of 150 known sabotage incidents committed by insiders. Portzline's testimony before Congress and the NRC exposed security gaps that remain deeply unsettling nearly two decades after the original disaster.
The technical chronology of the disaster reveals how close Pennsylvania came to catastrophe. Fuel melted twice inside the reactor, temperatures exceeded 5,000 degrees, and the Rogovin Commission concluded the state was within 30 minutes of a release that could have killed 130,000 people and rendered an area the size of Pennsylvania uninhabitable. Portzline describes how the FBI opened and then denied a sabotage investigation within 24 hours.
The conversation shifts to present-day vulnerabilities at nuclear plants nationwide, including vehicle barriers that remain open half the day, spent fuel pools accessible to truck bombs, and 149 of 150 known sabotage incidents committed by insiders. Portzline's testimony before Congress and the NRC exposed security gaps that remain deeply unsettling nearly two decades after the original disaster.