Faster, Please! — The Podcast

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers in America and around the world:Anxiety is running rampant about the future of artificial intelligence and its place in society. When technology CEOs warn of an impending white-collar jobpocalypse (or jobageddon, if you prefer), it’s no wonder public pessimism is so widespread. Today on Faster, Please!—The Podcast, I chat with tech policy analyst Dean Ball to help us sift through some of the uncertainty.We talk about recursive self-improvement, the role of AI in everything from medicine to defense, and what to think about the possible growing risk of AI company nationalization.(FYI: Our chat occurred just before the White House released new guidelines for AI federal legislation, about which Ball opined on X/Twitter: “The White House’s proposal for a nationwide AI law is a thoughtful document that will serve as an excellent foundation for the legislative work ahead. I would be happy to see these principles, if translated well into statute, become law.”) Ball is a senior fellow at FAI, the Foundation for American Innovation. He recently served as senior policy advisor for Artificial Intelligence and Emerging Technology at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, as well as strategic advisor for AI at the National Science Foundation. He was previously a research fellow at the Mercatus Center and a policy fellow at Fathom. He’s also the author of the excellent Hyperdimensional Substack newsletter.In This Episode* Public pessimism (1:37)* Differing narratives (4:21)* The nationalization risk (16:15)* Accountability via audit (25:55)* Productivity projection (34:18)(A lightly edited transcript of our conversation will be appear in my Week in Review issue on Saturday. Another option is using the Substack auto transcript function.)On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers in America and around the world:Headlines portend rising seas, raging storms, and a planet in crisis. It’s easy to feel like the future is something to fear; however, the key to cooling things down isn’t scaling civilization back. If the world wants to cut back on carbon emissions without sacrificing growth, the answer lies in bold innovation. A sustainable tomorrow requires smart energy investment and long-term thinking today.On this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Roger Pielke Jr. about the ever-evolving discussion around climate change. We talk about the benefits of embracing new energy technology and identifying some easy wins.Pielke is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute where his research focuses on science and technology policy. He is also a professor emeritus at University of Colorado Boulder, a distinguished fellow at Japan’s Institute of Energy Economics, a research associate with Risk Frontiers in Australia, and an honorary professor at University College London. Pielke has authored and edited several books, including The Climate Fix: What Scientists and Politicians Won’t Tell You About Global Warming. He also writes The Honest Broker Substack.In This Episode* The Shale Story (1:42)* Unknown Unknowns (7:42)* The Weather Forecast (14:19)* Alternate History (25:23)* The Path Forward (28:25)(A lightly edited transcript of our conversation will be appear in my Week in Review issue on Saturday. Another option is using the Substack auto transcript function.)On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers in America and around the world:Since humanity’s beginning, we’ve been pondering about our end. From war, to disease, to divine reckoning, the means of our destruction seem endless. The advent of the atomic bomb, concerns around climate change, and now AI have prompted many to wonder whether our demise will be random, or if it will come as the result of our own actions.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Dorian Lynskey about the way we talk about the end times. We discuss whether catastrophizing leads to action or paralysis and the role of hope in our narratives.Lynskey is a prolific journalist and the author of three books. His most recent: Everything Must Go: The Stories We Tell About the End of the World, which was released last month in the US. He also co-hosts two podcasts, Origin Story and Oh God, What Now?.In This Episode* Scare Tactics (1:32)* Effects of Hopefulness (10:25)* AI Doomsayers (17:01)* Countdown to Catastrophe (21:15)(A lightly edited transcript of our conversation will be appear in my Week in Review issue on Saturday. Another option is using the Substack auto transcript function.)On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers in America and around the world:The human pursuit of progress stems from our desire for security and a higher quality of life. Yet, even as today’s advanced economies are the richest and most comfortable they’ve ever been, something is amiss. What explains the decline in R&D growth, mental health, and birth rates, just to name a few challenges?In his new book, The Permanent Problem: The Uncertain Transition from Mass Plenty to Mass Flourishing, author Brink Lindsey identifies the critical gap between material abundance and abundant human flourishing.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Brink and I chat about what constitutes a truly healthy society, beyond surface-level affluence. We identify the conditions for continual progress after our basic needs have been met and far exceeded.Linsey is a senior vice president at the Niskanen Center. He previously served as vice president for research at the Cato Institute and as a senior scholar at the Kauffman Foundation. He has authored and co-authored six books on economics and culture, and is the author of his own Substack, also titled The Permanent Problem.In This Episode* More of everything . . . !? (1:54)* Falling fertility (7:31)* What we’ve lost (10:20)* Evaluating flourishing (13:13)* A culture of growth (20:24)* Future-world problems (28:04)(A lightly edited transcript of our conversation will be appear in my Week in Review issue on Saturday. Another option is using the Substack auto transcript function.)On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers in America and around the world:Headlines abound with news of the coming nuclear renaissance — a long-awaited era of clean, abundant energy to power our future. But this is hardly the first time the media has heralded the dawn of the atomic age. Still, this round of nuclear optimism is seeing unprecedented corporate investment, more cost-effective modular reactors, and a greater sense of political consensus.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Jessica Lovering about past obstacles to growth, and what we might expect from the US going forward.Lovering is an advocate for nuclear power currently based in Sweden. She is the co-founder and former executive director of the Good Energy Collective, as well as a senior fellow with the Nuclear Innovation Alliance and the Energy for Growth Hub. She also authors her own Substack, Nuclear Power to the People.In This Episode* The lost Atomic Age (1:30)* To regulate or not to regulate (8:26)* Reactor capacity past and future (10:44)* The economics of nuclear (14:51)* Power projection (18:32)* The new nuclear status quo (24:04)(A lightly edited transcript of our conversation will be appear in my Week in Review issue on Saturday. Another option is using the Substack auto transcript function.)On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers in America and around the world:NASA is attempting the difficult task of juggling highly ambitious goals, but also possibly intense budget cuts. Despite personnel losses and unclear leadership, the administration is racing to put humans on the Moon — ideally ahead of China — and then Mars.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I’m chatting with Casey Dreier about this complicated new era in NASA’s history. We’ll discuss whether or not we’re really in a space race, what to make of the differing visions of Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos, and the rise of planetary defense.Dreier is chief of space policy at The Planetary Society where he advocates for planetary exploration, defense, and the search for extraterrestrial life. He has been featured in major publications from The New York Times to the Washington Post, and hosts his own podcast, Planetary Radio: Space Policy Edition.In This Episode* The return of Isaacman (1:32)* Ditch the Space Race (7:42)* Visions of space (14:48)* Planetary defense (21:23)* Proceed with optimism (24:51)(A lightly edited transcript of our conversation will be appear in my Week in Review issue on Saturday. Another option is using the Substack auto transcript function.)On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers in America and around the world:What really gets AI optimists excited isn’t the prospect of automating customer service departments or human resources. Imagine, rather, what might happen to the pace of scientific progress if AI becomes a super research assistant. Tom Davidson’s new paper, How Quick and Big Would a Software Intelligence Explosion Be?, explores that very scenario.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Davidson about what it would mean for automated AI researchers to rapidly improve their own algorithms, thus creating a self-reinforcing loop of innovation. We talk about the economic effects of self-improving AI research and how close we are to that reality.Davidson is a senior research fellow at Forethought, where he explores AI and explosive growth. He was previously a senior research fellow at Open Philanthropy and a research scientist at the UK government’s AI Security Institute.In This Episode* Making human minds (1:43)* Theory to reality (6:45)* The world with automated research (10:59)* Considering constraints (16:30)* Worries and what-ifs (19:07)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Making human minds (1:43). . . you don’t have to build any more computer chips, you don’t have to build any more fabs . . . In fact, you don’t have to do anything at all in the physical world.Pethokoukis: A few years ago, you wrote a paper called “Could Advanced AI Drive Explosive Economic Growth?,” which argued that growth could accelerate dramatically if AI would start generating ideas the way human researchers once did. In your view, population growth historically powered kind of an ideas feedback loop. More people meant more researchers meant more ideas, rising incomes, but that loop broke after the demographic transition in the late-19th century but you suggest that AI could restart it: more ideas, more output, more AI, more ideas. Does this new paper in a way build upon that paper? “How quick and big would a software intelligence explosion be?”The first paper you referred to is about the biggest-picture dynamic of economic growth. As you said, throughout the long run history, when we produced more food, the population increased. That additional output transferred itself into more people, more workers. These days that doesn’t happen. When GDP goes up, that doesn’t mean people have more kids. In fact, the demographic transition, the richer people get, the fewer kids they have. So now we’ve got more output, we’re getting even fewer people as a result, so that’s been blocked.This first paper is basically saying, look, if we can manufacture human minds or human-equivalent minds in any way, be it by building more computer chips, or making better computer chips, or any way at all, then that feedback loop gets going again. Because if we can manufacture more human minds, then we can spend output again to create more workers. That’s the first paper.The second paper double clicks on one specific way that we can use output to create more human minds. It’s actually, in a way, the scariest way because it’s the way of creating human minds which can happen the quickest. So this is the way where you don’t have to build any more computer chips, you don’t have to build any more fabs, as they’re called, these big factories that make computer chips. In fact, you don’t have to do anything at all in the physical world.It seems like most of the conversation has been about how much investment is going to go into building how many new data centers, and that seems like that is almost the entire conversation, in a way, at the moment. But you’re not looking at compute, you’re looking at software.Exactly, software. So the idea is you don’t have to build anything. You’ve already got loads of computer chips and you just make the algorithms that run the AIs on those computer chips more efficient. This is already happening, but it isn’t yet a big deal because AI isn’t that capable. But already, one year out, Epoch, this AI forecasting organization, estimates that just in one year, it becomes 10 times to 1000 times cheaper to run the same AI system. Just wait 12 months, and suddenly, for the same budget, you are able to run 10 times as many AI systems, or maybe even 1000 times as many for their most aggressive estimate. As I said, not a big deal today, but if we then develop an AI system which is better than any human at doing research, then now, in 10 months, you haven’t built anything, but you’ve got 10 times as many researchers that you can set to work or even more than that. So then we get this feedback loop where you make some research progress, you improve your algorithms, now you’ve got loads more researchers, you set them all to work again, finding even more algorithmic improvements. So today we’ve got maybe a few hundred people that are advancing state-of-the-art AI algorithms.I think they’re all getting paid a billion dollars a person, too.Exac

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,China’s spacefaring ambitions pose tough competition for America. With a focused, centralized program, Beijing seems likely to land taikonauts on the moon before another American flag is planted. Meanwhile, NASA faces budget cuts, leadership gaps, and technical setbacks. In his new book, journalist Christian Davenport chronicles the fierce rivalry between American firms, mainly SpaceX and Blue Origin. It’s a contest that, despite the challenges, promises to propel humanity to the moon, Mars, and maybe beyond.Davenport is an author and a reporter for the Washington Post, where he covers NASA and the space industry. His new book, Rocket Dreams: Musk, Bezos, and the Inside Story of the New, Trillion-Dollar Space Race, is out now.In This Episode* Check-in on NASA (1:28)* Losing the Space Race (5:49)* A fatal flaw (9:31)* State of play (13:33)* The long-term vision (18:37)* The pace of progress (22:50)* Friendly competition (24:53)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Check-in on NASA (1:28)The Chinese tend to do what they say they’re going to do on the timeline that they say they’re going to do it. That said, they haven’t gone to the moon . . . It’s really hard.Pethokoukis: As someone — and I’m speaking about myself — who wants to get America back to the moon as soon as possible, get cooking on getting humans to Mars for the first time, what should I make of what’s happening at NASA right now?They don’t have a lander. I’m not sure the rocket itself is ready to go all the way, we’ll find out some more fairly soon with Artemis II. We have flux with leadership, maybe it’s going to not be an independent-like agency anymore, it’s going to join the Department of Transportation.It all seems a little chaotic. I’m a little worried. Should I be?Davenport: Yes, I think you should be. And I think a lot of the American public isn’t paying attention and they’re going to see the Artemis II mission, which you mentioned, and that’s that mission to send a crew of astronauts around the moon. It won’t land on the moon, but it’ll go around, and I think if that goes well, NASA’s going to take a victory leap. But as you correctly point out, that is a far cry from getting astronauts back on the lunar surface.The lander isn’t ready. SpaceX, as acting NASA administrator Sean Duffy just said, is far behind, reversing himself from like a month earlier when he said no, they appear to be on track, but everybody knew that they were well behind because they’ve had 11 test flights, and they still haven’t made it to orbit with their Starship rocket.The rocket itself that’s going to launch them into the vicinity of the moon, the SLS, launches about once every two years. It’s incredibly expensive, it’s not reusable, and there are problems within the agency itself. There are deep cuts to it. A lot of expertise is taking early retirements. It doesn’t have a full-time leader. It hasn’t had a full-time leader since Trump won the election. At the same time, they’re sort of beating the drum saying we’re going to beat the Chinese back to the lunar surface, but I think a lot of people are increasingly looking at that with some serious concern and doubt.For what it’s worth, when I looked at the betting markets, it gave the Chinese a two-to-one edge. It said that it was about a 65 percent chance they were going to get there first. Does that sound about right to you?I’m not much of a betting man, but I do think there’s a very good chance. The Chinese tend to do what they say they’re going to do on the timeline that they say they’re going to do it. That said, they haven’t gone to the moon, they haven’t done this. It’s really hard. They’re much more secretive, if they have setbacks and delays, we don’t necessarily know about them. But they’ve shown over the last 10, 20 years how capable they are. They have a space station in low earth orbit. They’ve operated a rover on Mars. They’ve gone to the far side of the moon twice, which nobody has done, and brought back a sample return. They’ve shown the ability to keep people alive in space for extended periods of times on the space station.The moon seems within their capabilities and they’re saying they’re going to do it by 2030, and they don’t have the nettlesome problem of democracy where you’ve got one party come in and changing the budget, changing the direction for NASA, changing leadership. They’ve just set the moon — and, by the way, the south pole of the moon, which is where we want to go as well — as the destination and have been beating a path toward that for several years now.Is there anyone for merging NASA into the Department of Transportation? Is there a hidden reservoir? Is that an idea people have been talking about now that’s suddenly emerged to the surface?It’s not something that I particularly heard. The FAA is going to regulate the launches, and they coordinate with the airspace and make sure that the air traffic goes around i

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,Some Faster, Please! readers have told me I spend too little time on the downsides of AI. If you’re one of those folks, today is your day. On this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with self-described “free-market AI doomer” James Miller. Miller and I talk about the risks inherent with super-smart AI, some possible outcomes of a world of artificial general intelligence, and why government seems uninterested in the existential risk conversation.Miller is a professor at Smith College where he teaches law and economics, game theory, and the economics of future technology. He has his own podcast, Future Strategist, and a great YouTube series on game theory and intro to microeconomics. On X (Twitter), you can find him at @JimDMiller.In This Episode* Questioning the free market (1:33)* Reading the markets (7:24)* Death (or worse) by AI (10:25)* Friend and foe (13:05)* Pumping the breaks (20:36)* The only policy issue (24:32)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Questioning the free market (1:33)Most technologies have gone fairly well and we adapt . . . I’m of the belief that this is different.Pethokoukis: What does it mean to be a free-market AI doomer and why do you think it’s important to put in the “free-market” descriptor?Miller: It really means to be very confused. I’m 58, and I was basically one of the socialists when I was young, studied markets, became a committed free-market person, think they’re great for economic growth, great for making everyone better off — and then I became an AI doomer, like wait, markets are pushing us towards more and more technology, but I happen to think that AI is eventually going to lead to destruction of humanity. So it means to kind of reverse everything — I guess it’s the equivalent of losing faith in your religion.Is this a post-ChatGPT, November 2022 phenomenon?Well, I’ve lost hope since then. The analogy is we’re on a plane, we don’t know how to land, but hopefully we’ll be able to fly for quite a bit longer before we have to. Now I think we’ve got to land soon and there doesn’t seem to be an easy way of doing it. So yeah, the faster AI has gone — and certainly ChatGPT has been an amazing advance — the less time I think we have and the less time I think we can get it right. What really scared me, though, was the Chinese LLMs. I think you really need coordination among all the players and it’s going to be so much harder to coordinate now that we absolutely need China to be involved, in my opinion, to have any hope of surviving for the next decade.When I speak to people from Silicon Valley, there may be some difference about timelines, but there seems to be little doubt that — whether it’s the end of the 2020s or the end of the 2030s — there will be a technology worthy of being called artificial general intelligence or superintelligence.Certainly, I feel like when I talk to economists, whether it’s on Wall Street or in Washington, think tanks, they tend to speak about AI as a general purpose technology like the computer, the internet, electricity, in short, something we’ve seen before and there’s, and as far as something beyond that, certainly the skepticism is far higher. What are your fellow economists who aren’t in California missing?I think you’re properly characterizing it, I’m definitely an outlier. Most technologies have gone fairly well and we adapt, and economists believe in the difference between the seen and the unseen. It’s really easy to see how technologies, for example, can destroy jobs — harder to see new jobs that get created, but new jobs keep getting created. I’m of the belief that this is different. The best way to predict the future is to go by trends, and I fully admit, if you go by trends, you shouldn’t be an AI doomer — but not all trends apply.I think that’s why economists were much better at modeling the past and modeling old technologies. They’re naturally thinking this is going to be similar, but I don’t think that it is, and I think the key difference is that we’re not going to be in control. We’re creating something smarter than us. So it’s not like having a better rifle and saying it’ll be like old rifles — it’s like, “Hey, let’s have mercenaries run our entire army.” That creates a whole new set of risks that having better rifles does not.I’m certainly not a computer scientist, I would never call myself a technologist, so I’m very cautious about making any kind of predictions about what this technology can be, where it can go. Why do you seem fairly certain that we’re going to get at a point where we will have a technology beyond our control? Set aside whether it will mean a bad thing happens, why are you confident that the technology itself will be worthy of being called general intelligence or superintelligence?Looking at the trends, Scott Aronson, who is one of the top computer scientists in the world just on Twitter a few days ago, was mentioning how G

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,For most of history, stagnation — not growth — was the rule. To explain why prosperity so often stalls, economist Carl Benedikt Frey offers a sweeping tour through a millennium of innovation and upheaval, showing how societies either harness — or are undone by — waves of technological change. His message is sobering: an AI revolution is no guarantee of a new age of progress.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Frey about why societies midjudge their trajectory and what it takes to reignite lasting growth.Frey is a professor of AI and Work at the Oxford Internet Institute and a fellow of Mansfield College, University of Oxford. He is the director of the Future of Work Programme and Oxford Martin Citi Fellow at the Oxford Martin School.He is the author of several books, including the brand new one, How Progress Ends: Technology, Innovation, and the Fate of Nations.In This Episode* The end of progress? (1:28)* A history of Chinese innovation (8:26)* Global competitive intensity (11:41)* Competitive problems in the US (15:50)* Lagging European progress (22:19)* AI & labor (25:46)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. The end of progress? (1:28). . . once you exploit a technology, the processes that aid that run into diminishing returns, you have a lot of incumbents, you have some vested interests around established technologies, and you need something new to revive growth.Pethokoukis: Since 2020, we’ve seen the emergence of generative AI, mRNA vaccines, reusable rockets that have returned America to space, we’re seeing this ongoing nuclear renaissance including advanced technologies, maybe even fusion, geothermal, the expansion of solar — there seems to be a lot cooking. Is worrying about the end of progress a bit too preemptive?Frey: Well in a way, it’s always a bit too preemptive to worry about the future: You don’t know what’s going to come. But let me put it this way: If you had told me back in 1995 — and if I was a little bit older then — that computers and the internet would lead to a decade streak of productivity growth and then peter out, I would probably have thought you nuts because it’s hard to think about anything that is more consequential. Computers have essentially given people the world’s store of knowledge basically in their pockets. The internet has enabled us to connect inventors and scientists around the world. There are few tools that aided the research process more. There should hardly be any technology that has done more to boost scientific discovery, and yet we don’t see it.We don’t see it in the aggregate productivity statistics, so that petered out after a decade. Research productivity is in decline. Measures of breakthrough innovation is in decline. So it’s always good to be optimistic, I guess, and I agree with you that, when you say AI and when you read about many of the things that are happening now, it’s very, very exciting, but I remain somewhat skeptical that we are actually going to see that leading to a huge revival of economic growth.I would just be surprised if we don’t see any upsurge at all, to be clear, but we do have global productivity stagnation right now. It’s not just Europe, it’s not just Britain. The US is not doing too well either over the past two decades or so. China’s productivity is probably in the negative territory or stagnant, by more optimistic measures, and so we’re having a growth problem.If tech progress were inevitable, why have predictions from the ’90s, and certainly earlier decades like the ’50s and ’60s, about transformative breakthroughs and really fast economic growth by now, consistently failed to materialize? How does your thesis account for why those visions of rapid growth and progress have fallen short?I’m not sure if my thesis explains why those expectations didn’t materialize, but I’m hopeful that I do provide some framework for thinking about why we’ve often seen historically rapid growth spurts followed by stagnation and even decline. The story I’m telling is not rocket science, exactly. It’s basically built on the simple intuitions that once you exploit a technology, the processes that aid that run into diminishing returns, you have a lot of incumbents, you have some vested interests around established technologies, and you need something new to revive growth.So for example, the Soviet Union actually did reasonably well in terms of economic growth. A lot of it, or most of it, was centered on heavy industry, I should say. So people didn’t necessarily see the benefits in their pockets, but the economy grew rapidly for about four decades or so, then growth petered out, and eventually it collapsed. So for exploiting mass-production technologies, the Soviet system worked reasonably well. Soviet bureaucrats could hold factory managers accountable by benchmarking performance across factories.But that became much harder when something new was needed because whe

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,Artificial intelligence may prove to be one of the most transformative technologies in history, but like any tool, its immense power for good comes with a unique array of risks, both large and small.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Miles Brundage about extracting the most out of AI’s potential while mitigating harms. We discuss the evolving expectations for AI development and how to reconcile with the technology’s most daunting challenges.Brundage is an AI policy researcher. He is a non-resident fellow at the Institute for Progress, and formerly held a number of senior roles at OpenAI. He is also the author of his own Substack.In This Episode* Setting expectations (1:18)* Maximizing the benefits (7:21)* Recognizing the risks (13:23)* Pacing true progress (19:04)* Considering national security (21:39)* Grounds for optimism and pessimism (27:15)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Setting expectations (1:18)It seems to me like there are multiple vibe shifts happening at different cadences and in different directions.Pethokoukis: Earlier this year I was moderating a discussion between an economist here at AEI and a CEO of a leading AI company, and when I asked each of them how AI might impact our lives, our economists said, ‘Well, I could imagine, for instance, a doctor’s productivity increasing because AI could accurately and deeply translate and transcribe an appointment with a patient in a way that’s far better than what’s currently available.” So that was his scenario. And then I asked the same question of the AI company CEO, who said, by contrast, “Well, I think within a decade, all human death will be optional thanks to AI-driven medical advances.” On that rather broad spectrum — more efficient doctor appointments and immortality — how do you see the potential of this technology?Brundage: It’s a good question. I don’t think those are necessarily mutually exclusive. I think, in general, AI can both augment productivity and substitute for human labor, and the ratio of those things is kind of hard to predict and might be very policy dependent and social-norm dependent. What I will say is that, in general, it seems to me like the pace of progress is very fast and so both augmentation and substitutions seem to be picking up steam.It’s kind of interesting watching the debate between AI researchers and economists, and I have a colleague who has said that the AI researchers sometimes underestimate the practical challenges in deployment at scale. Conversely, the economists sometimes underestimate just how quickly the technology is advancing. I think there’s maybe some happy middle to be found, or perhaps one of the more extreme perspectives is true. But personally, I am not an economist, I can’t really speak to all of the details of substitution, and augmentation, and all the policy variables here, but what I will say is that at least the technical potential for very significant amounts of augmentation of human labor, as well as substitution for human labor, seem pretty likely on even well less than 10 years — but certainly within 10 years things will change a lot.It seems to me that the vibe has shifted a bit. When I talk to people from the Bay Area and I give them the Washington or Wall Street economist view, to them I sound unbelievably gloomy and cautious. But it seems the vibe has shifted, at least recently, to where a lot of people think that major advancements like superintelligence are further out than they previously thought — like we should be viewing AI as an important technology, but more like what we’ve seen before with the Internet and the PC.It’s hard for me to comment. It seems to me like there are multiple vibe shifts happening at different cadences and in different directions. It seems like several years ago there was more of a consensus that what people today would call AGI was decades away or more, and it does seem like that kind of timeframe has shifted closer to the present. There there’s still debate between the “next few years” crowd versus the “more like 10 years” crowd. But that is a much narrower range than we saw several years ago when there was a wider range of expert opinions. People who used to be seen as on one end of the spectrum, for example, Gary Marcus and François Chollet who were seen as kind of the skeptics of AI progress, even they now are saying, “Oh, it’s like maybe 10 years or so, maybe five years for very high levels of capability.” So I think there’s been some compression in that respect. That’s one thing that’s going on.There’s also a way in which people are starting to think less abstractly and more concretely about the applications of AI and seeing it less as this kind of mysterious thing that might happen suddenly and thinking of it more as incremental, more as something that requires some work to apply in various parts of the economy that there’s some friction associated wit

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,In 1976, America celebrated 200 years of independence, democracy, and progress. Part of that celebration was the release of To Fly!, a short but powerful docudrama on the history of American flight. With To Fly!, Greg MacGillivray and his co-director Jim Freeman created one of the earliest IMAX films, bringing cinematography to new heights.After a decade of war and great social unrest, To Fly! celebrated the American identity and freedom to innovate. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with MacGillivray about filming To Fly! and its enduring message of optimism.MacGillivray has produced and directed films for over 60 years. In that time, his production company has earned two Academy Award nominations, produced five of the Top 10 highest-grossing IMAX films, and has reached over 150 million viewers.In This Episode* The thrill of watching To Fly! (1:38)* An innovative filming process (8:25)* A “you can do it” movie (19:07)* Competing views of technology (25:50)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. The thrill of watching To Fly! (1:38)What Jim and I tried to do is put as many of the involving, experiential tricks into that film as we possibly could. We wrote the film based on all of these moments that we call “IMAX moments.”Pethokoukis: The film To Fly! premiered at the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, at the IMAX Theater, July 1976. Do you happen know if it was it the 4th of July or. . . ?MacGillivray: No, you know, what they did is they had the opening on the 2nd of July so that it wouldn't conflict with the gigantic bicentennial on the 4th, but it was all part of the big celebration in Washington at that moment.I saw the film in the late ’70s at what was then called the Great America Amusement Park in Gurnee, Illinois. I have a very clear memory of this, of going in there, sitting down, wondering why I was sitting and going to watch a movie as opposed to being on a roller coaster or some other ride — I've recently, a couple of times, re-watched the film — and I remember the opening segment with the balloonist, which was shot in a very familiar way. I have a very clear memory because when that screen opened up and that balloon took off, my stomach dropped.It was a film as a thrill ride, and upon rewatching it — I didn't think this as a 10-year-old or 11-year-old — but what it reminded me upon rewatching was of Henry V, Lawrence Olivier, 1944, where the film begins in the Globe Theater and as the film goes on, it opens up and expands into this huge technicolor extravaganza as the English versus the French. It reminds me of that. What was your reaction the first time you saw that movie, that film of yours you made with Jim Freeman, on the big screen where you could really get the full immersive effect?It gave me goosebumps. IMAX, at that time, was kind of unknown. The Smithsonian Air and Space Museum was the fourth IMAX theater built, and very few people had seen that system unless you visited world's fairs around the world. So we knew we had something that people were going to grasp a hold of and love because, like you said, it's a combination of film, and storytelling, and a roller coaster ride. You basically give yourself away to the screen and just go with it.What Jim and I tried to do is put as many of the involving, experiential tricks into that film as we possibly could. We wrote the film based on all of these moments that we call “IMAX moments.” We tried to put as many in there as we could, including the train coming straight at you and bashing right into the camera where the audience thinks it's going to get run over. Those kinds of moments on that gigantic screen with that wonderful 10 times, 35-millimeter clarity really moved the audience and I guess that's why they used it at Great America where you saw it.You mentioned the train and I remember a story from the era of silent film and the first time people saw a train on silent film, they jumped, people jumped because they thought the train was coming at them. Then, of course, we all kind of got used to it, and this just occurred to me, that film may have been the first time in 75 years that an audience had that reaction again, like they did with first with silent film where they thought the train was going to come out of the screen to To Fly! where, once again, your previous experience looking at a visual medium was not going to help you. This was something completely different and your sense perception was totally surprised by it.Yeah, it's true. Obviously we were copying that early train shot that started the cinema way back in probably 1896 or 1898. You ended up with To Fly! . . . we knew we had an opportunity because the Air and Space Museum, we felt, was going to be a huge smash hit. Everyone was interested in space right at that moment. Everyone was interested in flying right at that moment. Basically, as soon as it opened its doors, the Air and Space Museum be

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,Global population growth is slowing, and it’s not showing any signs of recovery. To the environmentalists of the 1970s, this may have seemed like a movement in the right direction. The drawbacks to population decline, however, are severe and numerous, and they’re not all obvious.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with economist and demographer Dean Spears about the depopulation trend that is transcending cultural barriers and ushering in a new global reality. We discuss the costs to the economy and human progress, and the inherent value of more people.Spears is an associate professor of economics at Princeton University where he studies demography and development. He is also the founding executive director of r.i.c.e., a nonprofit research organization seeking to uplift children in rural northern India. He is a co-author with Michael Geruso of After the Spike: Population, Progress, and the Case for People.In This Episode* Where we’re headed (1:32)* Pumping the breaks (5:41)* A pro-parenting culture (12:40)* A place for AI (19:13)* Preaching to the pro-natalist choir (23:40)* Quantity and quality of life (28:48)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Where we’re headed (1:32). . . two thirds of people now live in a country where the birth rate is below the two children per two adults level that would stabilize the population.Pethokoukis: Who are you and your co-author trying to persuade and what are you trying to persuade them of? Are you trying to persuade them that global depopulation is a real thing, that it's a problem? Are you trying to persuade them to have more kids? Are you trying to persuade them to support a certain set of pro-child or pro-natalist policies?Spears: We are trying to persuade quite a lot of people of two important things: One is that global depopulation is the most likely future — and what global depopulation means is that every decade, every generation, the world's population will shrink. That's the path that we're on. We're on that path because birth rates are low and falling almost everywhere. It’s one thing we're trying to persuade people of, that fact, and we're trying to persuade people to engage with a question of whether global depopulation is a future to welcome or whether we should want something else to happen. Should we let depopulation happen by default or could it be better to stabilize the global population at some appropriate level instead?We fundamentally think that this is a question that a much broader section of society, of policy discourse, of academia should be talking about. We shouldn't just be leaving this discussion to the population scientists, demographic experts, not only to the people who already are worried about, or talking about low birth rates, but this is important enough and unprecedented enough that everybody should be engaging in this question. Whatever your ongoing values or commitments, there's a place for you in this conversation.Is it your impression that the general public is aware of this phenomenon? Or are they still stuck in the ’70s thinking that population is running amok and we’ll have 30 billion people on this planet like was the scenario in the famous film, Soylent Green? I feel like the people I know are sort of aware that this is happening. I don't know what your experience is.I think it's changing fast. I think more and more people are aware that birth rates are falling. I don't think that people are broadly aware — because when you hear it in the news, you might hear that birth rates in the United States have fallen low or birth rates in South Korea have fallen low. I think what not everybody knows is that two thirds of people now live in a country where the birth rate is below the two children per two adults level that would stabilize the population.I think people don't know that the world's birth rate has fallen from an average around five in 1950 to about 2.3 today, and that it's still falling and that people just haven't engaged with the thought that there's no special reason to expect it to stop and hold it to. But the same processes that have been bringing birth rates down will continue to bring them down, and people don't know that there's no real automatic stabilizer to expect it to come back up. Of the 26 countries that have had the lifetime birth rate fall below 1.9, none of them have had it go back up to two.That's a lot of facts that are not as widely known as they should be, but then the implication of it, that if the world's birth rate goes below two and stays there, we're going to have depopulation generation after generation. I think for a lot of people, they're still in the mindset that depopulation is almost conceptually impossible, that either we're going to have population growth or something else like zero population growth like people might've talked about in the ’70s. But the idea that a growth rate of zero is just a number and

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,Nuclear fission is a safe, powerful, and reliable means of generating nearly limitless clean energy to power the modern world. A few public safety scares and a lot of bad press over the half-century has greatly delayed our nuclear future. But with climate change and energy-hungry AI making daily headlines, the time — finally — for a nuclear renaissance seems to have arrived.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Dr. Tim Gregory about the safety and efficacy of modern nuclear power, as well as the ambitious energy goals we should set for our society.Gregory is a nuclear scientist at the UK National Nuclear Laboratory. He is also a popular science broadcaster on radio and TV, and an author. His most recent book, Going Nuclear: How Atomic Energy Will Save the World is out now.In This Episode* A false start for a nuclear future (1:29)* Motivators for a revival (7:20)* About nuclear waste . . . (12:41)* Not your mother’s reactors (17:25)* Commercial fusion, coming soon . . . ? (23:06)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. A false start for a nuclear future (1:29)The truth is that radiation, we're living in it all the time, it's completely inescapable because we're all living in a sea of background radiation.Pethokoukis: Why do America, Europe, Japan not today get most of their power from nuclear fission, since that would've been a very reasonable prediction to make in 1965 or 1975, but it has not worked out that way? What's your best take on why it hasn't?Going back to the ’50s and ’60s, it looked like that was the world that we currently live in. It was all to play for, and there were a few reasons why that didn't happen, but the main two were Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. It's a startling statistic that the US built more nuclear reactors in the five years leading up to Three Mile Island than it has built since. And similarly on this side of the Atlantic, Europe built more nuclear reactors in the five years leading up to Chernobyl than it has built since, which is just astounding, especially given that nobody died in Three Mile Island and nobody was even exposed to anything beyond the background radiation as a result of that nuclear accident.Chernobyl, of course, was far more consequential and far more serious than Three Mile Island. 30-odd people died in the immediate aftermath, mostly people who were working at the power station and the first responders, famously the firefighters who were exposed to massive amounts of radiation, and probably a couple of hundred people died in the affected population from thyroid cancer. It was people who were children and adolescents at the time of the accident.So although every death from Chernobyl was a tragedy because it was avoidable, they're not in proportion to the mythic reputation of the night in question. It certainly wasn't reason to effectively end nuclear power expansion in Europe because of course we had to get that power from somewhere, and it mainly came from fossil fuels, which are not just a little bit more deadly than nuclear power, they’re orders of magnitude more deadly than nuclear power. When you add up all of the deaths from nuclear power and compare those deaths to the amount of electricity that we harvest from nuclear power, it's actually as safe as wind and solar, whereas fossil fuels kill hundreds or thousands of times more people per unit of power. To answer your question, it's complicated and there are many answers, but the main two were Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.I wonder how things might have unfolded if those events hadn’t happened or if society had responded proportionally to the actual damage. Three Mile Island and Chernobyl are portrayed in documentaries and on TV as far deadlier than they really were, and they still loom large in the public imagination in a really unhelpful way.You see it online, actually, quite a lot about the predicted death toll from Chernobyl, because, of course, there's no way of saying exactly which cases of cancer were caused by Chernobyl and which ones would've happened anyway. Sometimes you see estimates that are up in the tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of deaths from Chernobyl. They are always based on a flawed scientific hypothesis called the linear no-threshold model that I go into in quite some detail in chapter eight of my book, which is all about the human health effects of exposure to radiation. This model is very contested in the literature. It's one of the most controversial areas of medical science, actually, the effects of radiation on the human body, and all of these massive numbers you see of the death toll from Chernobyl, they're all based on this really kind of clunky, flawed, contentious hypothesis. My reading of the literature is that there's very, very little physical evidence to support this particular hypothesis, but people take it and run. I don’t know if it would be too far to accuse people of

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,The innovation landscape is facing a difficult paradox: Even as R&D investment has increased, productivity per dollar invested is in decline. In his recent co-authored paper, The next innovation revolution—powered by AI, Michael Chui explores AI as a possible solution to this dilemma.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Chui and I explore the vast potential for AI-augmented research and the challenges and opportunities that come with applying it to the real-world.Chui is a senior fellow at QuantumBlack, McKinsey’s AI unit, where he leads McKinsey research in AI, automation, and the future of work.In This Episode* The R&D productivity problem (01:21)* The AI solution (6:13)* The business-adoption bottleneck (11:55)* The man-machine team (18:06)* Are we ready? (19:33)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. The R&D productivity problem (01:21)All the easy stuff, we already figured out. So the low-hanging fruit has been picked, things are getting harder and harder.Pethokoukis: Do we understand what explains this phenomenon where we seem to be doing lots of science, and we're spending lots of money on R&D, but the actual productivity of that R&D is declining? Do we have a good explanation for that?I don't know if we have just one good explanation. The folks that we both know have been both working on what are the causes of this, as well as what are some of the potential solutions, but I think it's a bit of a hidden problem. I don't think everyone understands that there are a set of people who have looked at this — quite notably Nick Bloom at Stanford who published this somewhat famous paper that some people are familiar with. But it is surprising in some sense.At one level, it's amazing what science and engineering has been able to do. We continue to see these incredible advances, whether it's in AI, or biotechnology, or whatever; but also, what Nick and other researchers have discovered is that we are producing less for every dollar we spend in R&D. That's this little bit of a paradox, or this challenge, that we see. What some of the research we've been trying to do is understand, can AI try to contribute to bending those curves?. . . I'm a computer scientist by training. I love this idea of Moore's Law: Every couple of years you can double the number of transistors you can put on a chip, or whatever, for the same amount of money. There's something called “Eroom's Law,” which is Moore spelled backwards, and basically it said: For decades in the pharmaceutical industry, the number of compounds or drugs you would produce for every billion dollars of R&D would get cut in half every nine years. That's obviously moving in the wrong direction. That challenge, I don't think everyone is aware of, but one that we need to address.I suppose, in a way, it does make sense that as we tackle harder problems, and we climb the tree of knowledge, that it's going to take more time, maybe more researchers, the researchers themselves may have to spend more time in school, so it may be a bit of a hidden problem, but it makes some intuitive sense to me.I think there's a way to think about it that way, which is: All the easy stuff, we already figured out. So the low-hanging fruit has been picked, things are getting harder and harder. It's amazing. You could look at some of the early papers in any field and it have a handful of authors, right? The DNA paper, three authors — although it probably should have included Rosalyn Franklin . . . Now you look at a physics paper or a computer science paper — the author list just goes on sometimes for pages. These problems are harder. They require more and more effort, whether it's people's talents, or whether it's computing power, or large-scale experiments, things are getting harder to do. I think there's ways in which that makes sense. Are there other ways in which we could improve processes? Probably, too.We could invest more in research, make it more efficient, and encourage more people to become researchers. To me, what’s more exciting than automating different customer service processes is accelerating scientific discovery. I think that’s what makes AI so compelling.That is exactly right. Now, by the way, I think we need to continue to invest in basic research and in science and engineering, I think that's absolutely important, but —That's worth noting, because I'm not sure everybody thinks that, so I'm glad you highlighted that.I don't think AI means that everything becomes cheaper and we don't need to invest in both human talent as well as in research. That's number one.Number two, as you said, we spend a lot of time, and appropriately so, talking about how AI can improve productivity, make things more efficient, do the things that we do already cheaper and faster. I think that's absolutely true. But we had the opportunity to look over history, and what has actually improved the human condition, what has been one of

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,With tariff and immigration policies uncertain, and the emerging AI revolution continuing to emerge, there’s plenty to speculate about when it comes to the US economy. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I invite Joseph Politano to help us try and make sense of it all.He is the author of the popular Apricitas Economics Substack newsletter. Politano previously worked as an analyst at the Bureau of Labor Statistics.In This Episode* Trade and immigration headwinds (1:03)* Unpredictable trade policy (7:32)* Tariffs as a political tool (12:10)* The goal: higher tariffs (17:53)* An AI tailwind (20:42)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Trade and immigration headwinds (1:03)You're going to have what is probably the largest one-year change in immigration in US history.Pethokoukis: What are the main economic headwinds that you're tracking right now? Or is it just trade, trade, trade?Politano: It’s hard for me to not say it’s trade, trade, trade because that's what my newsletter has been covering since the start of this administration and I think it's where the biggest change in longstanding policy is. If you look back on, say, the last 100 years of economic history in the United States, that's the kind of level you have to go to find a similar period where tariffs and trade restrictions were this high in the United States.At the start of this year, we were at a high compared to the early 2000s, but it was not that large compared to the 1970s, 1960s, the early post-war era. Most of that, especially in Trump's first term, was concentrated in China, and then a couple of specific sectors like steel or cars from Mexico. Now we have one, you had the big jump in the baseline — there's ten percent tariffs on almost all goods that come to the United States, with some very important exceptions, but ten percent for most things that go into the US. Then, on top of that, you have very large tariffs on, say, cars are 25 percent, steel and aluminum right now are 50 percent. China was up to 20 percent then went to the crazy 150 percent tariffs we had for about a month, and now it's back down to only 30 percent. That's still the highest trade war in American history. I think that is a big headwind.The headwind that I don't spend as much time covering, just because it's more consistent policy — even if it is, in my opinion, bad policy — is on the immigration stuff. You're going to have what is probably the largest one-year change in immigration in US history. So we're going to go from about 2.8 million net immigration to a year, to people like Stan Veuger projecting net-zero immigration this year in the United States, which would be not entirely unprecedented — but again, the biggest shift in modern American history. I think those are the two biggest headwinds for the US economy right now.You’re highlighting two big drivers of the US economy: trade and immigration. But analyzing them is tricky because recent examples are limited. To understand the effects of these changes, you often have to look back 50 or 100 years, when the economic landscape was very different. I would think that would make drawing clear conclusions more difficult and pose a real challenge for you as an analyst.Again, I'm going to start with trade because that's where I focused a lot of my energy here, but the key thing I’m trying to communicate to people — when people think of the protectionist era in US history, the number one thing people think about is Smoot-Hawley, which were the very large tariffs right before the Great Depression — in my opinion, obviously did not cause the Great Depression, but were part of the bad policy packages that exacerbated the Great Depression. That is an era in which one, the US is not a big net importer to the same degree; and two, trade was just a much smaller share of the economy, even though goods were a much larger share of the economy.This is pre- the really big post-war globalization and pre- the now technology-era globalization. So if you're doing tariffs in 1930 or prior, you're hitting a more important sector. Manufacturing is a much larger share of the economy, construction is a larger share of the economy, but conversely, you're hitting it less hard. And now you have this change of going from a globalized world in which trade is a much larger share of GDP and hitting that with very large tariffs.The immigration example is hard to find. I think the gap is America has not done . . . let's call it extensive interior enforcement in a long time. There's obviously been changes to immigration policy. Legally the tariffs have gone up. Legally, lot of immigration policy has not changed. We don't pass bills on immigration in the same way. We don't pass bills on tariffs, but we do pass bills on tax policy. So immigration has changed mostly through the enforcement mechanisms, primarily at the border, and then secondarily, but I think this is the bigger ch

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,The 1990s and the dawn of the internet were a pivotal time for America and the wider world. The history of human progress is a series of such pivotal moments. As Peter Leyden points out, it seems we’re facing another defining era as society wrestles with three new key technologies: artificial intelligence, clean energy, and bioengineering.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Leyden about American leadership in emerging technology and the mindset shifts we must undergo to bring about the future we dream of.Leyden is a futurist and technology expert. He is a speaker, author, and founder of Reinvent Futures. Thirty years ago, he worked with the founders of WIRED magazine, and now authors his latest book project via Substack: The Great Progression: 2025 to 2050.In This Episode* Eras of transformation (1:38)* American risk tolerance (11:15)* Facing AI pessimism (15:38)* The bioengineering breakthrough (24:24)* Demographic pressure (28:52)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Eras of transformation (1:38)I think we Americans tend to reset the clock in which we get in these dead ends, we get in these old patterns, these old systems, and the things are all falling apart, it's not working. And then there is a kind of a can-do reinvention phase . . .Pethokoukis: Since World War II, as I see it, we have twice been on the verge of a transformational leap forward, economically and technologically. I would say that was right around 1970 and then right around 2000, and the periods of time after that, I think, certainly relative to the expectations then, was disappointing.It is my hope, and I know it's your hope as well, that we are at another such moment of transformation. One, do you accept my general premise, and two, why are we going to get it right this time?If I'm hearing you right, you're kind of making two junctures there. I do believe we're in the beginning of what would be much more thought of as a transformation. I would say the most direct parallel is closer to what happened coming off of World War II. I also think, if you really go back in American history, it's what came off of Civil War and even came off of the Founding Era. I think there's a lot of parallels there I can go into, I've written about in my Substack and it's part of the next book I'm writing, so there's a bigger way that I think about it. I think both those times that you're referring to, it seems to me we were coming off a boom, or what seemed to be an updraft or your “Up Wing” kind of periods that you think of — and then we didn't.I guess I think of it this way: the ’50s, ’60s, and ’90s were exciting times that made it feel like the best was yet to come — but then that momentum stalled. I’m hopeful we’re entering another such moment now, with so much happening, so much in motion, and I just hope it all comes together.The way I think about it in a bigger lens, I would just push back a little bit, which is, it's true coming off the ’90s — I was at WIRED magazine in the ’90s. I was watching the early ’90s internet and the Digital Revolution and I sketched out at that time, in my first book but also cover stories in WIRED, trying to rough out what would happen by the year 2020. And it is true that coming off the ’90s there was a Dot Com crash, but temporarily, honestly, that with the Web 2.0 and others, a lot of those trends we were talking about in the ’90s actually just kept picking up.So depending how big the lens is, I would argue that, coming off the ’90s, the full digital revolution and the full globalization that we were starting to see in the early to mid-’90s in some respects did come to fruition. It didn't play out the way we all wanted it to happen — spreading wealth all through the society and blah, blah, blah, and many of the things that people complain about and react to now — but I would argue that a lot of what we were saying in those ’90s, and had begun in the ’90s with the ’90s boom, continued after a temporary pause, for sure.The Dot Com boom was just frothy investment. It crashed, but the companies that come out of that crash are literally trillion-dollar companies dominating the global economy now here on the west coast. That was some of the things we could see happening from the mid-’90s. The world did get connected through the internet, and globalization did, from a lens that's beyond America, we took 800 million peasants living on two bucks a day in China and brought them into the global economy. There's all kinds of positive things of what happened in the last 25 years, depending on how big your lens is.I would say that we've been through a largely successful — clearly some issues, “Oh my gosh, we didn't anticipate social media and that stuff,” but in general, the world that we were actually starting to envision in the ’90s came about, at some level — with some flaws, and some issues, and we could have done better, but I'm saying now I t

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,Once-science-fiction advancements like AI, gene editing, and advanced biotechnology have finally arrived, and they’re here to stay. These technologies have seemingly set us on a course towards a brand new future for humanity, one we can hardly even picture today. But progress doesn’t happen overnight, and it isn’t the result of any one breakthrough.As Jamie Metzl explains in his new book, Superconvergence: How the Genetics, Biotech, and AI Revolutions will Transform our Lives, Work, and World, tech innovations work alongside and because of one another, bringing about the future right under our noses.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Metzl about how humans have been radically reshaping the world around them since their very beginning, and what the latest and most disruptive technologies mean for the not-too-distant future.Metzl is a senior fellow of the Atlantic Council and a faculty member of NextMed Health. He has previously held a series of positions in the US government, and was appointed to the World Health Organization’s advisory committee on human genome editing in 2019. He is the author of several books, including two sci-fi thrillers and his international bestseller, Hacking Darwin.In This Episode* Unstoppable and unpredictable (1:54)* Normalizing the extraordinary (9:46)* Engineering intelligence (13:53)* Distrust of disruption (19:44)* Risk tolerance (24:08)* What is a “newnimal”? (13:11)* Inspired by curiosity (33:42)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Unstoppable and unpredictable (1:54)The name of the game for all of this . . . is to ask “What are the things that we can do to increase the odds of a more positive story and decrease the odds of a more negative story?”Pethokoukis: Are you telling a story of unstoppable technological momentum or are you telling a story kind of like A Christmas Carol, of a future that could be if we do X, Y, and Z, but no guarantees?Metzl: The future of technological progress is like the past: It is unstoppable, but that doesn't mean it's predetermined. The path that we have gone over the last 12,000 years, from the domestication of crops to building our civilizations, languages, industrialization — it's a bad metaphor now, but — this train is accelerating. It's moving faster and faster, so that's not up for grabs. It is not up for grabs whether we are going to have the capacities to engineer novel intelligence and re-engineer life — we are doing both of those things now in the early days.What is up for grabs is how these revolutions will play out, and there are better and worse scenarios that we can imagine. The name of the game for all of this, the reason why I do the work that I do, why I write the books that I write, is to ask “What are the things that we can do to increase the odds of a more positive story and decrease the odds of a more negative story?”Progress has been sort of unstoppable for all that time, though, of course, fits and starts and periods of stagnation —— But when you look back at those fits and starts — the size of the Black Plague or World War II, or wiping out Berlin, and Dresden, and Tokyo, and Hiroshima, and Nagasaki — in spite of all of those things, it's one-directional. Our technologies have gotten more powerful. We've developed more capacities, greater ability to manipulate the world around us, so there will be fits and starts but, as I said, this train is moving. That's why these conversations are so important, because there's so much that we can, and I believe must, do now.There’s a widely held opinion that progress over the past 50 years has been slower than people might have expected in the late 1960s, but we seem to have some technologies now for which the momentum seems pretty unstoppable.Of course, a lot of people thought, after ChatGPT came out, that superintelligence would happen within six months. That didn’t happen. After CRISPR arrived, I’m sure there were lots of people who expected miracle cures right away.What makes you think that these technologies will look a lot different, and our world will look a lot different than they do right now by decade’s end?They certainly will look a lot different, but there's also a lot of hype around these technologies. You use the word “superintelligence,” which is probably a good word. I don't like the words “artificial intelligence,” and I have a six-letter framing for what I believe about AGI — artificial general intelligence — and that is: AGI is BS. We have no idea what human intelligence is, if we define our own intelligence so narrowly that it's just this very narrow form of thinking and then we say, “Wow, we have these machines that are mining the entirety of digitized human cultural history, and wow, they're so brilliant, they can write poems — poems in languages that our ancestors have invented based on the work of humans.” So we humans need to be very careful not to belittle ourselves.But