China Global

The Biden administration maintains that China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and the power to do so. One part of China’s economic statecraft toolkit involves state-directed investments through high profile projects in the Belt and Road Initiative which are funded by loans through Chinese development banks. But the role and impact of Chinese companies that provide equity funding for FDI often receive less attention. Does Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) have illiberal effects on recipient countries. And is this goal part of China’s economic statecraft and foreign policy strategy.To address these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Jan Knoerich. He is the author on a chapter of Chinese FDI on the recent Oxford publication “Rising Power, Limited Influence”, a collection of essays on the effects of Chinese investment in Europe. Dr. Knoerich is a senior lecturer on the Chinese economy for the Lau China Institute at King’s College in London. He is an expert on the Chinese economy, FDI, and international investment law and policy. Timestamps[01:38] Evolution of Chinese Foreign Investment Strategies[04:48] Chinese Firms Undertaking Foreign Direct Investment[09:16] Impacts of Chinese FDI: Five Dimensions [18:17] Reasons Why Chinese Firms are Viewed with Suspicion[21:06] Impacts of Chinese FDI Projects in Europe[24:59] Evidence of Chinese FDI Exerting Political Influence

When Hong Kong was handed over to China by the United Kingdom 1997, the city was given a mini-Constitution called the “Basic Law.” Article 23 of the Basic Law states that Hong Kong shall enact laws of its own to prohibit various national security offenses. The law did not pass, however, and was scrapped after mass protests in 2003. And in 2020, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a separate national security law on Hong Kong, citing the city’s delay in acting on Article 23. This year on March 19th, Article 23 was passed unanimously by the city’s parliament and it came into effect just days later. The law covers five types of crime: treason, insurrection and incitement to mutiny, theft of state secrets, and espionage, sabotage, and external interference. Critics say that Article 23 could lead to even further erosions of civil liberties in Hong Kong.To discuss Article 23 and its implications, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eric Yan-ho Lai. Dr. Lai is a Research Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, an Associate Fellow at the Hong Kong Studies Hub of the University of Surrey, and a member of the Asian Civil Society Research Network. Timestamps[01:47] Understanding PRC Definitions Used in Article 23[03:37] Why was Article 23 passed now?[05:23] Compressed Timeline for Unanimous Approval[09:05] Shift in Risk Assessment for Multinational Corporations[12:03] Precedents for Targeting Diaspora Communities[14:17] Reactions to Article 23 from the International Community[15:54] What are some concrete actions that could be taken to signal concern?[17:55] Do the PRC and Hong Kong care about international perceptions?[19:36] Implementation of Article 23 Moving Forward[21:28] Passage of Additional Security Legislature[22:57] Forecast for the Future of Hong Kong

In the past decade, policy toward China has hardened on both sides of the Atlantic. Governments and publics across Europe and in the United States view Xi Jinping as implementing more repressive policies domestically and more aggressive policies abroad. The US and most capitals in Europe see Beijing as seeking to revise the international order in ways that would be disadvantageous to democracies. They agree on the need for de-risking and to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, despite the alignment in transatlantic assessments, cooperation on China remains limited. A new paper by experts from Chatham House and RUSI, leading think tanks in the United Kingdom, analyzes why transatlantic mechanisms have made slow progress, focusing on three domains: economics; security; and the multilateral system and global norms. The paper also offers ways to strengthen cooperation going forward. The title of the report is “Transatlantic China Policy: In Search of an Endgame?” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by one of its authors, Ben Bland who is the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics, and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition. Timestamps[01:46] Why did you pursue this research on transatlantic mechanism?[03:24] Importance of Agreeing on an Endgame[06:30] Consensus and Divergence between the US and Europe[10:10] De-risking: One Word, Many Meanings [15:00] Transatlantic Discussions on European and Indo-Pacific Security[18:40] Can a regional division of labor strategy work?[22:13] China, the Multilateral System, and Global Norms[27:00] Tensions Between EU Multilateralism and Transatlantic Consensus[31:10] What are the next steps for Chatham House?

On a previous episode of the China Global Podcast, we discussed Beijing’s position on the conflict in Gaza during the early days following Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023. Today, we discuss one of the conflict’s spillover effects– the attacks on cargo and trade ships transiting the Red Sea by the Houthis, an Iranian-backed Shia group governing parts of Yemen. While the Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran was as the beginning of a “wave of reconciliation” in the region by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, the resurgence of violence since October 7th has proven that prediction to be overly optimistic. At face value, disruptions of global trade may seem to run counter to Chinese interests, but Beijing’s hesitance to become more deeply involved in the crisis may tell us something about China’s calculations in this crisis. It may also show the limits of Chinese influence in the region. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ahmed Aboudouh. Ahmed is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, and heads the China Studies research unit at the Emirates Policy Center. His research focuses on China’s rising influence in the Middle East and North Africa region, Gulf geopolitics, and the effects of China-US competition worldwide. Timestamps[01:36] China’s Statement on Palestine at the International Court of Justice[08:20] Why is China indirectly supporting Hamas despite its relations with Israel?[12:11] Effectiveness of China’s Narrative Critical of America and the West[16:54] Israel, Palestine, and China’s Diplomatic Calculus[20:12] China’s Hesitance to Counter the Houthis in the Red Sea[25:15] Does China have leverage over Iran, and if so, will they use it?[29:59] Circumstances for Deeper Chinese Involvement

On February 1st 2021, the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar military began a coup d’etat against the democratically-elected government, which was led by the National League for Democracy (or NLD) just before elected officials from the November 2020 elections could be sworn in. Since then, Myanmar has been largely controlled by a military junta, who continue to struggle against multiple ethnically-aligned armies dispersed throughout the country. Some countries in the region have refused to recognize the junta, but the People’s Republic of China called the coup simply a “major cabinet reshuffle” and accelerated their military trade with the junta while decrying Western sanctions on the country as escalatory measures, even going so far as to veto a security council resolution condemning the coup alongside Russia. China’s approach to relations with Myanmar since the coup have been evolving swiftly, especially since the recent Operation 1027, a large offensive staged by the ethnic armed forces coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance on October 27th 2023. The losses by the junta during the operation revealed their control of the country to be more tenuous than Beijing might have expected and exemplify the complex factors going into China’s decision-making approach to the conflict. For this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at the United States Institute for Peace. Tower has over 20 years of experience working in conflict and security issues in China and Southeast Asia, including analysis on cross-border investments, conflict dynamics, and organized crime in the region. He worked previously in Beijing and is a former Fulbright research student and Harvard-Yenching fellow. Timestamps[02:07] China’s Interest in the Myanmar Conflict[05:48] China’s Engagement with Parties in Myanmar[12:48] Impact of China’s Brokered Ceasefires [20:30] Credibility of China in Southeast Asia[25:15] Myanmar in the US-China Relationship

Many books about US-China strategic competition have been published in recent years. This episode will focus on Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace, which examines various flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific that could result in military conflict.There are several reasons why this book stands out: First, it includes an examination of debates within China about China’s national interests; Second, it focuses not only on the challenges of major wars, but also on China’s gray-zone strategy of deliberately pursuing its interests in ways that stay below the threshold that would trigger a US military response. And finally, it assesses the applicability of the Thucydides Trap to the US-China relationship. The Thucydides Trap concept was coined by Graham Allison who examined historical cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Allison concluded that in the majority of historical cases the outcome was war.This book is especially interesting because it is written by a European expert who has deep knowledge of Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States: Jean-Pierre Cabestan. He is an emeritus senior researcher at the French Center for Scientific Research in Paris and an emeritus professor political science at the Department of Government and International Studies at Hone Kong Baptist University, and a visiting senior fellow at GMF. Timestamps[02:07] Revisiting the Thucydides Trap [03:53] Why was China fascinated by this concept? [05:26] Reasons for the Risk of War Increasing[06:33] The US-China Cold War and its Characteristics[09:03] China’s Gray-Zone Activities [10:53] Where has China’s gray-zone strategy been the most successful? [12:37] Unifying Taiwan with China through Gray-Zone Activities[14:42] Chinese Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait in the 2020s[16:17] China’s Ambitions in the International Arena[17:40] Future Overseas Operations of the PLA

On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Communist Party of China held the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. This was the sixth such meeting – the first one was held way back in 1971. This Foreign Affairs Work Conference was the third held under Xi Jinping’s leadership, with earlier meetings held in 2014 and 2018.Xi delivered a major speech at the Work Conference, which marks the most comprehensive expression yet of his more activist approach to PRC diplomacy. The speech provides valuable insights into Xi’s assessment of the global balance of power, his vision of the international order, and his views of the role of Chinese diplomacy.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Neil Thomas, a Fellow for Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, where he studies elite politics, political economy, and foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group. Timestamps[01:32] Historical Significance of Foreign Affairs Work Conference[07:09] Xi’s Key Messages from the Conference in December[11:10] Xi’s Concept of the Community of Common Destiny[15:26] Major Country Diplomacy in Chinese Foreign Policy[20:03] China’s Diplomacy Going Forward[23:07] Xi’s Speech to Chinese Ambassadors

On January 13, 2024, voters in Taiwan elected the DPP’s Lai Ching-te the next president of Taiwan. Lai won 40% of the votes–a plurality, but not a majority. In his acceptance speech, Lai pledged to safeguard Taiwan from continuing threats and intimidation from China. He also said that he has an important responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and reiterated a statement that the current president, Tsai Ing-wen, made 8 years ago: that he would act in accordance with the Republic of China constitutional order.Beijing expected that Lai would win and was therefore well prepared. The statement, issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office shortly after the final tally was announced, emphasized that the election result would not change the trend of cross-Strait relations and said that reunification remained inevitable. It also warned against Taiwan independence and foreign interference. This episode focuses on China’s perspectives on the election and its likely reaction going forward. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Rick Waters, who is managing director of Eurasia Group’s China practice. He has served 27 years as a career diplomat, most recently as the inaugural head of the State Department’s Office of China Coordination and Deputy Secretary of State for China and Taiwan. Time Stamps[01:56] Interpreting Beijing’s Statements[03:40] Views of the State Security Ministry[04:38] Poaching Taiwan’s Diplomatic Ally Nauru[06:53] Threat of Tariff Imposition[08:37] Impact of Woodside Summit on Beijing’s Response[10:02] What role do the Chinese want the Americans to play?[11:13] Assessing the Efficacy of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan[13:40] Unofficial American Delegation Visiting Taiwan[15:02] Post-Election Comment from President Biden[16:26] Clarifying the US One-China Policy[19:48] Xi Jinping’s Statements to Biden about Taiwan[23:14] Is reunification a legacy issue for Xi Jinping?[24:49] What are the most important variables moving forward?[27:00] China and Peaceful Unification

This episode covers the role of US and Chinese domestic politics in the US-China relationship. There are many drivers of US-China strategic competition, and domestic politics is among them, and has become increasingly important, though it has not been well researched and analyzed in recent years. One reason for the lack of analysis on Chinese politics is that since Xi Jinping became China’s top leader in 2012, domestic politics in China has become even more of black box than previously. Bonnie is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who has recently published a pathbreaking study that seeks to update the understanding of political forces in China and the United States that are influencing the bilateral relationship. Medeiros is one of the world’s leading experts on Chinese foreign policy. He is the Penner Family Chair in Asia studies and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The report we will discuss today is titled: "The New Domestic Politics of US-China Relations" and was published by the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis where Evan is a senior fellow for foreign policy. During the Obama administration, Evan was on the NSC staff, first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as special assistant to the president and Senior Director for Asia. Timestamps[02:14] Influence of Domestic Politics in the US and China[03:32] Differences between US and Chinese Domestic Politics[05:19] Weakening of Historical Forces for Stability[08:35] Most Important Driver of Change to America’s China Policy[13:34] Xi Jinping Shaping Domestic Politics in China[19:38] Reversing the Downward Trend in US-China Relations[21:44] Close Connections between Domestic and Foreign Politics[24:49] Biden and Xi as Leaders in the Bilateral Relationship

This podcast episode is a joint and cross-over episode between the CSIS ChinaPower Podcast and the German Marshall Fund’s China Global Podcast. We are joined by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen to discuss their recently released article titled “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence.” The authors underline the article’s key point, that assurances, alongside threats, are an integral part of effective deterrence. They emphasize that in order for deterrence to work, the threat of punishment must be not only credible but also conditional. Finally, the authors outline what actions each of the three actors- the U.S., China, and Taiwan- should take to effectively convey assurances to one another.Ms. Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific program. She is also a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum. She was previously senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS. Ms. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and U.S. policy for more than three decades.Dr. Jessica Chen Weiss is a professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies in the Department of Government at Cornell University. She was previously an assistant professor at Yale University and founded the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford University. Formerly, Dr. Weiss served as senior advisor to the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department on a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars.Dr. Thomas Christensen is a professor of Public and International Affairs and Director of the China and World Program at Columbia University. Prior to this, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus is on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security.

Early next month, the European Union and China are set to hold the 24th bilateral summit. The last EU-China summit was held via video conference in April 2022. It took place against the background of China’s countermeasures to EU sanctions on human rights, Chinese economic coercion and trade measures against the single market, and most importantly, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn the invasion. Earlier this year, the European Council reaffirmed the EU’s multifaceted policy approach towards China, which is based on the judgment that China is simultaneously a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. However, that balancing act is getting more and more difficult.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Gunnar Wiegand, who has recently retired from the post of Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European External Action Service, which he held for 7 ½ years. He is now a visiting professor at the College of Europe and the Paris School of International Affairs, and as of November 1, 2023, he has joined GMF’s Indo-Pacific program as a visiting distinguished fellow. Timestamps[01:39] EU-China Relations on the Eve of the 24th Bilateral Summit[05:13] Impact of the War in Ukraine on EU-China Relations[07:29] How could China alleviate concerns in Europe? [09:33] De-risking in the European Union[15:27] Proportionate and Precise Economic Security[18:27] How similar are EU and US perceptions of China?[22:13] The EU’s Stance on Taiwan[26:19] How can EU contribute to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait?[27:21] Outcomes of the Biden-Xi Summit

On the morning of October 07, 2023, Hamas launched an unprovoked attack from the Gaza Strip, indiscriminately killing more than 1,400 Israeli and foreign nationals. Over 200 civilians, including women and children, were taken to Gaza as hostages. IN response to this attack, as well as subsequent attacks launched from Lebanon and Syria, Israel began an unprecedented bombing campaign of Gaza and targeted Hezbollah and Syrian government military positions. The conflict is unlikely to end soon and may spread.While the conflict itself demands global attention, the focus of this podcast is Chinese foreign and security policy. This discussion focuses on China’s response to the war, China’s relations with Palestine and Israel, and the actions that Beijing might take in the coming weeks and months that could help defuse the conflict or cause it to worsen.To date, China has not condemned Hamas. Instead, it has criticized what it calls Israel’s disproportionate military response and the “collective punishment of the Gazan people.” Moreover, it has trumpeted its position as an unbiased potential mediator and called for a ceasefire and the implementation of a two-state solution.Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tuvia Gering, who, like many Israelis, has been activated to defend his country. Gering is a leading expert on China and its relations with the Middle East. In his civilian capacity, he is a researcher at the Diane & Guilford Glazer Foundation’s Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a nonresident fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Timestamps[02:25] China’s Past Relationships with Israel and Palestine[03:43] Reaction to the Chinese Response [05:06] China’s Interests in Supporting Palestine[09:06] China’s Reaction to the Death of Chinese Citizens[10:55] Benefits of a Wider Conflict for China [15:02] Comparisons to the War in Ukraine[17:54] China as a Mediator for the War[20:55] Antisemitism in Chinese Society[25:35] Outcome of the War for China

On August 1, 2017, China official opened its first overseas military base in the East African nation of Djibouti. The base, constructed to provide logistical support to the Chinese navy’s counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, marked a major step toward Xi Jinping’s goal of constructing a world class military by the middle of the century.The US Defense Department has just released its annual China Military Power Report, and that says that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) probably has also considered adding military logistics facilities in 19 countries around the world (in addition to Djibouti): Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. To expand its global footprint, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will need to cultivate good relations with potential host countries. China’s military diplomacy is likely aimed at achieving that objective among others.Today’s discussion focuses on the key features and goals of China’s military diplomacy and its quest for additional military installations – or what the Chinese call “strategic strongpoints.” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Kristin Gunness, a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. She previously served as the Director of the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group at the Pentagon, advising the Chief of Naval Operations on security and foreign policy trends in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Chinese naval and gray zone warfare capabilities. Earlier this year, Kristin testified on China’s overseas military diplomacy and its implications for American interests at a hearing convened by the US Economic and Security Review Commission. Timestamps[02:20] Introduction to Military Diplomacy[04:36] Three Objectives of Chinese Military Diplomacy[06:15] China’s Regions of Interest[08:48] Gauging the Success of China’s Military[11:46] Beijing’s Broader Geo-Political Strategy[13:47] Challenges Posed to US Interests[15:53] Military Installations Versus Commercial Ports[17:20] Potential Chinese Presence in Cambodia [19:27] Potential Chinese Presence in Equatorial Guinea [21:41] Beijing’s Assessment of their Military Diplomacy[23:33] Recommendations for a US Response

On this episode of the China Global podcast, the relationship between the Philippines and China, and some of the flashpoints therein (especially in the maritime realm), will be discussed. Since taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has pursued a strategy of “being a friend to all and an enemy to none.” He has tried to maintain close economic ties with China, signing 14 cooperation agreements when he visited Beijing last January, including an updated Belt and Road Initiative memorandum. He secured over $22 billion in investment and trade deals. But the maritime disputes between the Philippines and China are becoming more contentious, and Manila is pushing back against Chinese pressure in new ways. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Richard Heydarian to analyze the bilateral relationship and especially the maritime flashpoints. Heydarian is a columnist at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a Senior Lecturer at the University of the Philippines, and a policy adviser. His most recent book is The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Global Struggle for Mastery. Timestamps[01:36] Changes in Sino-Phillipine Relations[09:05] Tensions Between the Chinese Coast Guard and Philippine Ships[14:23] Pushing Back Against China[20:55] China, the Philippines, and the Warship[25:05] Future Relations with China[29:30] The Philippines and a Taiwan Strait Conflict

In late August, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources released its new “standard map,” which includes not only Taiwan, but also parts of the maritime zones of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It also includes land that China disputes with India—and even some Russian territory. To publicize the map and China’s claims, Beijing launched a “national map awareness publicity week,” as it has for map releases in recent years. China’s map release is an annual event, which can happen at any time. So why now? And what does the map tell us about Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping? To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Collin Koh who is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia. Timestamps[01:29] How does this map differ from previous ones?[04:44] Interagency Coordination on Release[05:51] Reaction of the Chinese Foreign Ministry [08:12] Significance of the Timing of the Release[11:32] Protests Against the Map’s Release[15:09] Portrayal of the South China Sea[19:35] Ambiguity of Beijing’s Claims [23:44] Territorial Claims Along the Sino-Russian Border[26:58] Lasting Impact of the Map

In 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRIC” to describe the fast-growing economies that he predicted would collectively dominate the global economy by 2050. The BRIC countries he was referring to were Brazil, Russia, India, and China. After a series of high-level meetings that included officials from the four countries, the BRIC grouping was founded in 2009. The following year, South Africa joined, and the name became “BRICS”. Last month, the fifteenth BRICS summit was held in Johannesburg. In addition to the leaders of the five core countries, representatives from more than 60 countries attended, and six were officially invited to join the club: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.How does the BRICS serve China’s foreign policy objectives? And is this expansion a major win for Xi Jinping? Is BRICS likely to become a global grouping of authoritarian countries that poses a challenge to the G-7 group of democracies – and is that what Beijing wants? To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Colleen Cottle, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she spent over a dozen years at the Central Intelligence Agency where she worked on East and South Asia. Timestamps[01:45] What has BRICS achieved? [05:33] China Driving the BRICS Agenda[08:35] Where does BRICS fit into China’s foreign policy agenda? [10:53] Why has BRICS refrained from endorsing BRI?[12:53] Outcomes of Johannesburg Summit[15:18] Criteria for Expanding BRICS Membership[18:19] Potential for BRICS Disrupting the International Order[23:52] China as a Developing Country[26:56] Will we see any breakthroughs with BRICS?

Earlier this summer, there was an unexpected shakeup in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. Commander Li Yuchao was removed along with his deputy Liu Guangbin and a former deputy Zhang Zhenzhong. All three men are reportedly under investigation for disciplinary violations by the Central Military Commission’s anti-corruption unit. Xi Jinping appointed Wang Houbin, former deputy commander of the navy, as head of the Rocket Force, and Xu Xiesheng, from the air force as political commissar. The PLA’s Rocket Force, established on January 1, 2016, is the successor to the Second Artillery Corps. It has responsibility for China’s growing arsenal of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional. What is the significance of this reshuffle in the PLA’s most sensitive branch? What implications do the appointments of new commanders from other parts of the military have for PLA readiness and preparations for a Taiwan invasion scenario? To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Phillip Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunder’s most recent publication is a study he conducted with David Logan on the drivers of China’s nuclear force development. The views he expresses today are his own and do not represent the National Defense University or the US Department of Defense.Timestamps[01:58] Unpacking the Shakeup [04:19] Launch-on-Warning Posture[05:34] Rooting out Corruption[09:00] Concerns of Loyalty [10:40] Inexperienced Leadership[14:58] Naval Leadership of Rocket Force[17:32] Viability of Invading Taiwan[19:06] System for Military Governance[21:38] Nuclear Force Development[29:00] US-China Nuclear Dialogue

Technology is the focus of the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is at the core. China views AI as a means to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and its allies. It intends to use AI to build a world-class military. Beijing also views AI as an enabler of surveillance and repression that can help to bolster its illiberal model of governance. China’s national AI strategy calls for a vast expansion of AI in manufacturing, governance, and national defense, with China becoming a global leader in the field by 2030 through multiple AI technology innovations and personnel training centers. To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gregory Allen, director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, and developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics. Timestamps[01 :37] Centrality of AI in US-China Competition[04 :21] China’s Strengths and Weaknesses[06 :20] Progress in the Field of AI[09 :54] Reducing the Risk of Military AI Accidents[13 :37] Discussing AI with the Chinese Government[16 :11] Biden Administration’s Export Controls on AI[21 :31] Reducing Dependency on the West[24 :15] Collaborating on AI Regulation[27 :25] Who will spearhead the next Technological Revolution?

Critical minerals are non-fuel minerals or mineral materials essential to the economic or national security of the U.S. They have no viable substitutes yet face a high risk of supply chain disruption. Critical minerals are used for many different purposes, including the production of advanced electronics, weapons systems, manufacturing equipment, and cutting-edge medical devices. They are indispensable for the transition to low-carbon energy sources. Last year, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, with the aid of the U.S. Geological Survey, published a list of 50 critical minerals. China dominates global critical mineral supply chains, accounting for approximately 60% of world-wide production and 85% of processing capacity. However, the U.S. and several European countries are taking steps to build out their own ability to mine, process, and manufacture critical minerals. To discuss the implications of China’s role in critical mineral supply chains and the responses of the U.S. and its partners, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Abigail Wulf, vice president and director of the Ambassador Alfred Hoffman Jr. Center for Critical Minerals Strategy at Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE), a non-profit advancing transformative transportation technology to enhance energy security. Time Stamps[01:51] Vulnerabilities and Risks of Overdependence [07:07] Development of a Domestic Mining Industry [12:42] Environmental Hazards of Processing Raw Minerals [18:30] Impact of Export Controls on Gallium and Germanium[22:53] Diversifying Sources of Rare Earth Imports[26:38] The Critical Raw Materials Act[29:58] The Mineral Security Partnership

SummaryA new Foreign Relations Law took effect in China on July 1, 2023 that formalizes Chinese Communist Party leadership in all foreign policy matters. It puts China’s security and development interests and global rise at the center of its engagement with the world. The new law has been widely interpreted as providing a legal basis for Beijing’s struggle against what it says is a strategy of containment by the United States and its allies, and against foreign interference and sanctions, as well as what is calls America’s “long-arm jurisdiction.” To discuss the Foreign Relations Law, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Moritz Rudolf, a Research Scholar in Law and Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, where he focuses on the implications of China’s rise for the international legal order. Timestamps[01:15] Impetus for the Foreign Relations Law[02:47] Centralized and Unified Leadership of Foreign Relations[04:27] China and Reforming the International Order[09:20] How might China use the foreign relations law?[11:03] Insurance Against International Courts[12:31] Targeting a Domestic Audience[15:10] Expected Policy Changes in China[17:30] Applicability of the Law in Cross-Strait Relations[21:57] Forecasting Chinese Use of Lawfare

Relations between the United States and China have slid to their lowest point since the 1970s. After President Biden and Xi Jinping met in November 2022, they instructed their senior officials to initiate a process to stabilize the relationship. Before much headway could be made, however, China sent a surveillance balloon to the west coast of the United States that ended up loitering over sensitive military sites and then flew across the entire country before being shot down by the US. Secretary of State Blinken postponed his planned visit to China. Acrimony and distrust spiked. Several months later, the US and China decided to try again. Blinken visited Beijing from June 18-19, and had meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang. What is the trajectory of the bilateral relationship after the visit? Is it possible to stabilize ties and resume dialogue mechanisms and some forms of cooperation, or is further deterioration of relations more likely? To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies. During the Obama administration, Evan served for six years on the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. Timestamps[01:45] US-China Relations at this Juncture[05:10] Deterioration of US-China Relations[08:30] Analysis of Secretary Blinken’s Visit[10:40] Principles Guiding US-China Relations[13:16] Is agreement on principles a precondition for progress?[13:48] Is the US-China relationship dominated by competition?[16:45] Top-Down Pressure to Deny Competition[18:30] Displacing the United States[19:50] Where Blinken’s Visit Fell Short[22:48] Putting a Floor Under the Relationship[24:46] Interpreting Evolving Sino-Russian Relations[28:15] China’s Initial Reaction to the War in Ukraine[29:24] Forecast for US-China Relations [31:57] Incentives for Stability

On June 3, 2023, there was a near-collision between a US and a PRC destroyer in the Taiwan Strait. According to a statement issued by US Indo-Pacific Command, a US Navy destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, and a Canadian warship were conducting a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit through waters where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply. The Luyang III, a People’s Liberation Army destroyer, overtook the Chung-Hoon on her port side and crossed her bow at 150 yards. The US warship maintained course and slowed to 10 knots to avoid a collision. US Indo-Pacific Command stated that the actions of the Chinese destroyer violated the maritime Rules of the Road of safe passage in international waters.How dangerous was this incident? Why do US warships sail in these waters, and do they do so in accordance with international law? And what steps should be taken to ensure that accidents do not take place between US and Chinese naval vessels?To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Peter Dutton, professor of international law in the Stockton Center for International Law at the US Naval War College and an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. His research focuses on international law of the sea, Chinese views of sovereignty and international law, and China’s maritime expansion. Timestamps[01:50] Freedom of the High Seas [03:21] Joint Freedom of Navigation Operations[03:52] Statement by the US Indo-Pacific Command[04:46] Statement by Defense Minister Li Shangfu[06:49] History of Dangerous Maneuvering by the Chinese[07:41] Trigger for the Recent Dangerous Maneuver[09:13] Chinese Adherence to International Law[10:19] Signaling Intentions in a Safe and Legal Manner[12:03] Aftermath of a Hypothetical Collision at Sea[14:44] Is the US Goading China into Conflict?[17:38] Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters[19:24] Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea[20:27] The US and the Convention on the Law of the Sea[21:51] Interactions with Chinese Experts and Professionals

[01:50] Switzerland’s Policy toward China Today[03:48] Changes in Swiss-Chinese Relations[06:03] Switzerland’s 2021 China Strategy[08:17] Areas of Economic Cooperation[11:05] Switzerland’s Relationship with Taiwan[14:45] Switzerland’s One China Policy[17:32] Contending with Human Rights Issues[18:55] Huawei’s Presence in Switzerland[20:56] China’s Influence in Switzerland[23:42] Forecast of Swiss-Chinese Relations

Timestamps[01:30] Sinocentric Order in the Digital Sphere[06:51] China’s Digital Silk Road [09:35] Global Rise of Chinese Digital Platforms[11:57] The Strength of Chinese Digital Platforms[14:04] The Digital Sector and Government Partnership[16:53] Dominance of Western Digital Platforms[19:08] Pros and Cons of Banning TikTok [21:08] Chinese Crackdown of the Digital Sector[23:27] Looking Forward in the Digital Space

Timestamps[02:01] China and International Bailout Activities[04:33] China and the G20 Common Framework[07:34] Debt Service Suspension Initiative[09:42] Definition of a “Haircut” in Finance[10:00] IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings[12:37] Beijing’s Demands for Write-Downs[16:18] Japan, India, and France Establishing a Creditors Committee[18:43] Chinese Participation in the Paris Club[22:08] Role of Geopolitical Competition in Debt Relief

Timestamps[02:14] China’s Implementation of Industrial Policy[05:20] Industrial Policy to Achieve Foreign Policy Objectives[08:02] Influence of Strategic Competition on Industrial Policy[10:42] Efficacy of Chinese Industrial Policies[14:17] Semiconductor Subsidies and Export Controls[19:06] Chinese Countermeasures to Export Controls[22:39] Assessment of U.S. Policy[25:58] Forecast of Competition on Advanced Technologies[29:50] Balance of Centralization and Adaptation

Time Stamps[01:39] Background of The Decoding China Dictionary[04:30] Democracy with Chinese Characteristics[06:34] Differing Interpretations of International Law[08:32] Freedom of Religion Versus Freedom of Religious Belief[10:28] Foreign Aid and China as a Developing Country[12:01] Security in Chinese Parlance[13:55] Transparency and its Uses in China[16:19] Historic Revisionism and Domestic Policy[18:39] Historic Revisionism and Foreign Policy[19:44] Promotion of Chinese Interpretations Internationally[23:52] Importance of Understanding Chinese Terminology

[02:10] Chinese Government Awareness of Illicit Domestic Narcotics[05:30] China’s Scheduling of Fentanyl in 2019[06:40] Difference Between Scheduling and Banning[09:50] Lack of Cooperation Between China and Mexico [14:18] Chinese Counternarcotics Cooperation in Southeast Asia[19:04] Possible Steps for China[22:56] A Looming Fentanyl Crisis in China?[25:43] Multilateral Approach to Counternarcotics

[02:16] The 14 Grievances[05:56] Canberra's New Rhetoric[07:54] Self-Censorship[11:12] Decision Making Tightrope[13:00] Darwin Port Lease[14:00] Foreign Investment Review Board[18:00] AUKUS Announcement in Washington[20:13] Australia and the Quad[23:19] Within the Albanese Government[27:05] Australia on Taiwan[31:21] America's China Policy

[02:28] China’s Objectives & Success in Africa[06:02] China’s Political Model & Engaging Political Elites[12:27] China-Africa Support at the UN[14:47] Declining Chinese Investments[16:04] Public Opinion and US-Chinese Competition[22:19] Debt Strains on Relations[25:45] Chinese Propaganda in Africa

[00:00] Topic and Guest Introduction[02:31] Information Collection Capabilities[07:25] Chinese Motivations[10:40] Reaction to Shot Down Balloon[13:59] Mil-Mil Dialogue[16:59] Leverage Over China[19:15] Guidance from Past Incidents[22:08] Risk Reduction Measures[24:47] Balloon Incident and Xi Jinping[27:32] Wartime Use of Balloons

[01:59] Xi’s Relationship with Kim Jong-un[05:12] 1961 Treaty on Friendship[09:48] Chinese Economic Assistance[12:33] Impact of US-DPRK Negotiations[16:02] Sino-American Divergence on North Korea[21:05] A Seventh Nuclear Test[25:30] South Korean Nuclear Deterrence

[1:42] Xi Jinping’s Public Diplomacy at the G20 Summit[4:30] Qin Gang’s New Approaches [5:50] Internal & External Pressures on China’s Behavior?[9:59] China-Australia Relations[15:32] Allyship & Challenges in Southeast Asia [18:27] US-China Relations[23:48] Indicators of Changes to China's Foreign Policy

[01:34] China’s Interests in the Middle East[03:25] Chinese Engagement During the Past Decade[05:54] Xi’s Trip to Saudi Arabia[08:22] Security and the Sino-Middle Eastern Relationships[11:05] Role of Multilateral Institutions[14:09] Perceptions of Huawei[18:12] Perceptions of Xinjiang[22:39] The Sino-Iranian Relationship[26:24] China’s Role in Conflicts

[1:40] China’s Approach to Energy Security[4:45] Dependence on Russia’s Energy[14:08] Oil Partnerships with the Gulf[16:41] Decarbonization & Energy Security Goals[19:41] China’s Overseas Energy Investments [22:23] US-China Energy & Climate Change Cooperation

[2:20] UN Significance & China’s Objectives[8:25] China’s Veto Power[11:17] UN Security Council Reform[13:53] China’s Funding Contributions[18:13] China’s Leadership in UN Agencies[25:21] Influence on WHO & COVID-19[28:47] China’s Future Role in the UN

[01:26] Criticism of Scholz’s Trip[5:18] Scholz’s Trip Aspirations[8:40] German and European Perceptions of the trip[11:33] Xi Jinping’s Gains & Sino-German Relationship[13:20] Germany’s China Strategy[21:38] Germany’s Changing Taiwan Policy

[1:41] Xi Jinping’s Political Report: Main Themes [3:27] The International Environment and Implications[7:59] Taiwan[13:21] China’s Reform of the Global Governance System[16:23] The PLA and China’s Military Modernization[20:51] US-China Competition: Xi Jinping’s Approach Going Forward[23:48] Personnel Arrangements

[2:01] China’s Objectives in the Global Media Environment[5:22] Evolution of CCP’s Tactics, and Investments[8:22] Levels and Effectiveness of Chinese Media Influence[18:03] Approaches in Less/Non-Free Countries[20:02] Government, Civil Society, & Journalists’ Resilience[26:29] Erosion of Governance

[2:21] Shanghai Five and the SCO [6:22] Takeaways from Xi Jinping’s Visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan[10:16] Russia-China Dynamic in Central Asia[15:07] Public Attitudes Toward China[17:34] Xinjiang and Government Responses[19:08] China’s Approach to Central Asia’s Energy Resources[21:33] Turkey and Expanding SCO Membership

[1:28] China's Dominance in Global Supply Chains[3:50] Role of China's Industrial Policy[9:08] Implications of Variables Affecting Supply Chains[13:37] US Policy Response and the CHIPS Act[20:36] Made in China 2025[24:54] Economic Coercion, Vulnerabilities, and an Effective Response

[1:38] Beijing's Goals and Signals[5:43] People’s Liberation Army and Advanced Planning[7:20] A New Normal?[11:44] Learning from the Recent Drills[13:58] China’s Interpretation of US Response[16:40] Mobilization, Confidence, and Capabilities[26:43] US Congress’ Taiwan Policy Act and China’s Reactions

[1:51] Beijing’s Objectives[5:43] China’s Vision for the International Order[8:49] GSI’s Relation to US-China Competition[10:45] "Meat and Bones" over Time[14:47] “Indivisible Security”[16:37] India and Others' Perspectives on GSI[21:27] Sino-Russian Alignment: Implications for China’s Global Security Governance Ambitions?

Episode Highlights:[1:30] Duterte’s China Policy[4:36] Change under the New Marcos Government?[6:53] Philippines’ Relations with the United States[8:45] Public Opinion in the Philippines toward China[14:10] Joint China-Philippines Energy Exploration Talks[17:15] Railway Projects Loan Agreements with China[19:14] Future Developments

Though China’s overseas development program has a long history, it greatly expanded after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Since then, debates have emerged among policymakers, scholars, and journalists about the objectives and impacts of China’s lending and grant-giving activities. Various charges levied against Beijing include that its development programs seek to prop up corrupt and authoritarian regimes and saddle countries with unsustainable debts. Some observers also claim that Chinese projects are not substantially contributing to economic development in recipient countries. Uncovering the facts is challenging because China’s overseas financing is shrouded in secrecy. Gathering data is possible, but enormously time-consuming. In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Bradley Parks, executive director of AidData, where he leads a team of 35 program evaluators, policy analysts, and media and communication professionals who work with governments and international organizations to improve the ways in which overseas investments are targeted, monitored, and evaluated. Parks collaborated with a large team of experts to evaluate China’s development programs through rigorous evidence and presented the research results in a book titled, “Banking on Beijing: The Aims and Impacts of China’s Overseas Development Program. [2:02]: Methodology and Data Set [7:05]: Differences between China's and OECD Countries' International Development Finance [11:39]: Changes in Chinese Overseas Lending [15:11]: Impact on Recipient Countries' Economic Growth [21:33]: Objectives [29:11]: Reevaluating and Looking Ahead

China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) was launched by President Xi Jinping on September 21, 2021. In a speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, Xi stated that, in the face of the severe shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, the world needed to work together to steer global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth. The GDI was meant to achieve those objectives as well as the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A Group of Friends of the GDI was launched at the UN in January, and more than 55 countries have joined it to date.In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Yu Jie to discuss the GDI, which like most PRC initiatives, began as a bumper sticker and was described using vague and abstract language. Dr. Yu is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House in London.[1:26] Beijing’s Objectives[5:54] GDI's Relation to the BRI[7:34] China's Resources into GDI[10:31] UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development[14:06] Group of Friends of the GDI and Interested Countries[20:04] Origin of the GDI

Lithuania-China relations is an interesting case study for how Beijing deals with small states and how it applies economic pressure on target countries to change policies that it views as damaging to Chinese interests. Tensions in Lithuania-China relations arise from numerous sources, including the decision by Vilnius to withdraw from the 17+1 mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries and its agreement to allow Taiwan to establish a representative office in Vilnius under the name Taiwanese Representative Office. In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ambassador Diana Mickevičienė to discuss the drivers of the Lithuania-China friction as well as the circumstances surrounding her departure from China. Ambassador Mickevičienė currently serves as the Lithuanian ambassador to China, operating in exile from Vilnius.

On May 26, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken delivered a long-awaited speech on the Biden Administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China. Separate from the speech itself, there is a China strategy document that remains classified. Blinken’s speech, which did not contain any surprises, introduced a new catchphrase for the Biden administration’s strategy toward China, the only country “with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” This catchphrase, “invest, align, and compete,” has three key features: invest in American strength at home, align with our network of allies and partners, and rely on these two key assets to compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future. In today’s episode of China Global, Dr. Evan Medeiros joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss the Biden Administration’s strategy toward China. Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies at Georgetown University. He previously served in the Obama administration, where he served on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. [1:45] Objectives of the US-China Strategy under the Biden Administration[5:58] Differences between the Biden and the Trump Approach toward China[9:55] Beijing’s Response to Blinken’s May 26 Address and China’s Perception of the US[13:18] Potential Opportunities for Cooperation between the US and China[17:24] Critiques of the Biden Administration’s US-China Strategy[26:21] China’s Strategy toward the United States

South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol formally began his five-year term on May 10, 2022. His predecessor, former president Moon Jae-in, attempted to strike a balance between ties with China and the United States during his term, but whether he was able to successfully advance South Korean interests is unclear. Concurrently, public attitude in South Korea toward China has continued to harden, as Yoon pledged to prioritize the country’s alliance with the United States. China’s relationship with North Korea also seemed to become more distant due in part to the pandemic, but despite this, Beijing has not criticized North Korea’s missile tests—it has only generally urged all parties to exercise restraint.To discuss China’s policy toward and relations with both North and South Korea, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Seong-hyon Lee, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.Marker NotesChina's Relations with South Korea 1:51.442China's Response to Missile Tests 10:08.780China's Relationship with North Korea 14:02.939Looking Ahead 26:16.467

On April 19, the PRC signed an agreement with the Solomon Islands that has prompted concerns in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia about growing Chinese influence that some worry could lead to a Chinese military presence in the Solomons. The Pacific Islands countries are scattered over a broad expanse of ocean and are widely seen as strategically significant. Yet, the region only receives episodic attention from the United States and other leading countries. Beijing has stepped up its engagement in the region, and there is a pressing need to understand the nature of that engagement and its implications.In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Professor Anne-Marie Brady, professor at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand on China’s interests, activities, and role in the Pacific Islands as well as the recent deal between China and the Solomon Islands. Among other issues, Professor Brady is a specialist in Chinese politics and China-Pacific relations, and her groundbreaking work on Chinese interference in New Zealand and other countries is globally renowned.Marker Notes[1:44] China's Interests and Activities in the Pacific Islands[9:00] Recent Deal between China and the Solomon Islands[13:56] China-Pacific Relations[21:30] Attention from the United States