
Chaos Computer Club - recent events feed
4,903 episodes — Page 58 of 99
Unprivileged Containers, with Transient User Namespaces and ID Mapping, but Without SETUID Binaries (asg2025)
Many traditional container engines make use of the "subuid" concept and the "newuidmap" tool to implement a concept of "unprivileged" user-namespace containers on Linux. This approach has many shortcomings in my PoV, from both a security and scalability standpoint. Recent systemd versions provide a more powerful, more secure, mor scalable alternative, via systemd-nsresourced, systemd-mountfsd and other components. In this talk I want to shed some light on the problems with the "old ways", and in particular focus on what the "new ways" bring to the table, and how to make use of them in container runtimes. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/E7FHPY/
Shipping Flatpak applications with an image based system (asg2025)
Flatpak is the de-facto standard for distributing desktop applications across various Linux based systems. It also offers other advantages such as sandboxing. It is particularly useful for image based systems as it installs the applications into a separate location and doesn't try to modify the system. GNOME OS is GNOME's development, testing and QA operating system. It builds the latest and greatest in-development versions of the GNOME desktop and core applications. It is also Linux based system that tries to fully embrace the systemd ecosystem. The applications are however built into the system. While this might be great for testing the apps as they would be in most distros, we also want to build our Flatpak applications from the same build definitions and our users (or more correctly early adopters) prefer to use Flatpak for various reasons. In this talk we'll explore what other image based distributions do to provide Flatpak applications to their users, what users expect from "Flatpak applications" and the various proposals for implementing that in GNOME OS. We hope to be able to present our end result by the time of the conference. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/98W9EX/
oo7-daemon: One year later – Progress, Challenges, and What’s next (asg2025)
oo7-daemon is the new D-Bus Secret Service provider that aims to fully replace gnome-keyring. In this followup (continuation of my 2024 talk) lightning talk, I will go through the progress made, the challenges faced and the status of systemd credentials integration. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/NFNFJS/
oo7-daemon: One year later – Progress, Challenges, and What’s next (asg2025)
From initramfs-tools to mkosi-initrd (asg2025)
Marco will review the features available in the initramfs-tools ecosystem, the initrd generator used by Debian and Ubuntu, and how they can be implemented (or not) by adopting mkosi-initrd. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/E989ZX/
From initramfs-tools to mkosi-initrd (asg2025)
A new systemd container runtime?! (asg2025)
At Meta, we've been looking to revamp our internal container runtime (Twine). Instead of maintaining all the low level container runtime code ourselves, we'd much prefer having more of this managed by systemd. This talk will go over what we did to make systemd transient units a suitable environment for running system containers (pid namespace support, cgroup namespace support, namespace delegation, ...), and why we went this route instead of reusing systemd-nspawn. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/BBTJSF/
Verification of OS artifacts without stateful keyrings (asg2025)
Many OS artifacts today are still verified using proprietary, stateful keyring formats. With the "File Hierarchy for the Verification of OS Artifacts (VOA)" an attempt is made to rid the ecosystem of this limitation by implementing a generic lookup directory. With extensibility in mind, this unifying hierarchy currently provides integration for OpenPGP, with further integrations in planning. While working on improvements to the [ALPM](https://alpm.archlinux.page) ecosystem, the way packages and other OS artifacts are currently verified on Arch Linux has been evaluated. Noticing the extensive vendor lock-in to GnuPG and with today's widespread availability of [Stateless OpenPGP](https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Stateless_OpenPGP) implementations in mind, a plan was hatched to create a more generic, stateless approach. A specification and implementation for the [UAPI group](https://uapi-group.org/) has been started to create a ["File Hierarchy for the Verification of OS Artifacts (VOA)"](https://github.com/uapi-group/specifications/pull/134). This approach is meant to be technology agnostic and allow further integrations, such as SSH and X.509. Follow along for an overview of what this specification is trying to improve upon and how today's tools could benefit from it in the future. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/7DDSVZ/
isd: interactive systemd (asg2025)
Simplify systemd management with `isd`! `isd` is a TUI offering fuzzy search for units, auto-refreshing previews, smart sudo handling, and a fully customizable interface for power-users and newcomers alike. If you ever became frustrated while typing: - `systemctl start --user unit-A.service` (manually starting a unit) - `systemctl status --user unit-A.service` (seeing that it failed) - `journalctl -xe --user -u unit-A.service` (checking the logs) - `systemctl edit --user unit-A.service` (updating the unit) - (repeat until problem is solved) `isd` could help. In this presentation, we will discuss the features that `isd` currently supports, the features that are planned for the future, and the experience of developing a TUI for `systemd` commands. I hope attendees will find the content engaging and practical. Audience participation is highly encouraged. I am especially eager to hear your thoughts, ideas, and feature requests. If you think a tool like `isd` might be unnecessary or redundant, I'd love to hear your perspective, too! Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/GCV3PM/
Verification of OS artifacts without stateful keyrings (asg2025)
isd: interactive systemd (asg2025)
ParticleOS: Why is Lennart still not dogfooding systemd?! (asg2025)
More than six months have passed since Daan tried to ~~shame~~ gently peer pressure Lennart to actually use the stuff he builds, via a FOSDEM talk: https://fosdem.org/2025/schedule/event/fosdem-2025-4057-particleos-can-we-make-lennart-poettering-run-an-image-based-distribution-/ Did he succeed? Is dogfooding standard practice now in the systemd development process? Or do things like randomly breaking logging in GNOME (*cough*) still happen from time to time? Join us for this talk to find out, and to apply yet more peer pressure. We will also spend some time talking about more boring and mundane topics, such as giving an overview of the current status of ParticleOS, and how we build it as a ready-to-consume and secure-by-default signed and self-enrolling appliance on the SUSE Open Build Service. https://github.com/systemd/particleos https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/system:systemd/particleos-fedora https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/system:systemd/particleos-debian Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/QMYAMS/
ParticleOS: Why is Lennart still not dogfooding systemd?! (asg2025)
A simpler and faster firewall with bpfilter (asg2025)
For many years, firewall solutions on Linux have grown and evolved, without any major change, until eBPF. While eBPF can allow very fast and efficient packet filtering, the learning curve doesn't make it easily accessible to non-developers. bpfilter aims to bridge the gap between existing tools (nftables, iptables) and modern technologies such as eBPF. By translating filtering rules into native code, bpfilter abstracts the complexity behind cutting-edge kernel technologies while maintaining backward compatibility with existing solutions. Let's discuss about bpfilter and see it in action! Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/JEVBTZ/
A simpler and faster firewall with bpfilter (asg2025)
Integrating systemd-sysext images in an update stack (asg2025)
systemd-sysext provides a nice way to enhance a distribution with a read-only root filesystem without the need to reboot. But there is additional tooling necessary to manage the sysext images: * install an image which is compatible with the installed OS version * update installed images to the newest compatible version * rollback images in case of an OS rollback * cleanup unneeded images In this presentation I will talk about which tooling systemd itself provides for this (importctl, updatectl, ...) and what the benefits and disadvantages of this tools are compared with real world use cases. In the end I created an own, generic and distribution independent tool for this using systemd tools in the backend. Using openSUSE MicroOS as example I will demonstrate how we solved the problems with it and how we integrated it in our update stack. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/8AA87L/
Sandboxing services with Landlock (asg2025)
Landlock is an unprivileged kernel feature that enables all Linux users to sandbox their processes. Complementary to seccomp, developers can leverage Landlock to restrict their programs in a fine-grained way. While Landlock can be used by end users through sandboxer tools, there is currently no well-integrated solution to define security policies tailored to system services. Although AppArmor and seccomp security policies can already be tied to a system unit, we aim to provide a more dynamic, standalone, and unprivileged option with Landlock. In this talk, we'll briefly explain what Landlock is and highlight its differences from other Linux security features (e.g., namespaces, seccomp, other LSMs). We'll then focus on the new configuration format we are designing for Landlock security policies, its characteristics, and how it could extend systemd units by taking into account runtime context (e.g., XDG variables). Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/FXWDCF/
Sandboxing services with Landlock (asg2025)
Look ma, no secrets! - bootstrapping cryptographic trust in my homelab using Nix, UKIs, TPMs and SPIFFE (asg2025)
Extending Fedora Atomic Desktops using systemd system extensions (asg2025)
On image based desktops distributions such as Fedora Atomic desktops and Universal Blue, users are expected to run their graphical applications using Flatpaks and their command line ones using containers. But that approach does not work well for some applications that require more privileges, direct access to devices or kernel interfaces. With systemd system extensions (sysexts), it is possible to extend an image based system on demand. Sysexts come with a lot of advantages: they can be created out of arbitrary content (not only packages), are quickly enabled or disabled and can be built and shared independently of the main distribution channels. We will demonstrate how the Atomic Desktops can take benefit of sysexts to provide extensions such as virtual machine management (libvirt), alternative container runtimes (moby-engine or docker), IDE (VS Code) or debugging (gdb). We will also look at important details when building sysexts, the current limits when deploying them (SELinux policy modules, service management, RPM database update), what is currently blocking us from using it for more complex cases (kernel modules) and what we would need to properly manage and update them. Supporting examples for this talk: https://github.com/travier/fedora-sysexts Work in progress sysexts manager that targets managing sysexts on Bootable Container systems: https://github.com/travier/sysexts-manager Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/DCVQLK/
Look ma, no secrets! - bootstrapping cryptographic trust in my homelab using Nix, UKIs, TPMs and SPIFFE (asg2025)
All the big cloud providers provide your machines with a unique cryptographic identity that can be used to talk to their cloud services securely without having to manage or rotate any cryptographic secrets yourself. For example GCP has Service accounts and AWS has IAM roles. This ubiquity of cloud identity and the seamless integration with all the the services of these cloud providers is one of the reasons why they are so successful. SPIFFE (Secure Production Identity Framework For Everyone) tries to unify these concepts of workload identity in a vendor neutral framework. But how do we bootstrap our cryptographic identity securely when we are running things on our own hardware as opposed to on cloud? What is our bottom turtle? In this talk, I will show how I use Nix in combination with the swiss-army knife of tools provided by systemd (ukify, systemd-measure, systemd-repart, systemd-veritysetup-generator) to create reproducible images for which we can predict TPM measurements. Paired with a custom attestation plugin for SPIRE (the reference CA server for SPIFFE) that uses TPM remote attestation I can give each of my servers a unique identity encoded in a TLS certificate if and only if they were booted up with the software that I intended them to boot up with. This then allows me to have workloads talk to each other with mutual TLS without having to manage any keys or certificates myself. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/X3ZSXV/
Extending Fedora Atomic Desktops using systemd system extensions (asg2025)
systemd-confext Two Years On: Versioned Overlays for /etc, Reloaded (asg2025)
Accessing shadow records via varlink (asg2025)
Accessing shadow records via varlink (asg2025)
Provide a varlink service to access /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow so that no setuid and setgid binaries are necessary for this task. There are two independent "problems" which can be solved with the same idea: all files in /usr should be owned by root:root and no setuid binary should be needed. The first one is a requirement of image based updates of /usr to avoid UID/GID drift, the second one is a security feature wished by systemd developers and security teams. Currently most setuid binaries (or setgid binaries owned by group shadow) beside su and sudo only need this to read the shadow entry of the calling user. This task could be delegated to a systemd socket activated service which provides the user shadow entry for the calling user. In this talk I will present the why, the current implementation and feedback from security teams. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/RUTE9Y/
systemd-confext Two Years On: Versioned Overlays for /etc, Reloaded (asg2025)
systemd-confext is a lightweight overlay mechanism for /etc, allowing you to drop in a configuration extension ("confext") bundle and let systemd make it visible to your service as though it was already shipped with the base image. Building on the same extension magic as systemd-sysext, confext also introduces extra features tailored for the /etc use case, such as vpick-ing the newest version and the ability to pick up config revisions with a `systemctl reload`. This talk presents the changes to systemd-confext since [its debut at All Systems Go! 2023](https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2023/talk/XLQNDJ/), the lessons learned along the way to make it work, and how we leverage this capability at Microsoft already to deliver configuration payloads in production. Immutable Linux distributions offer stability and reproducibility, but at the cost of configuration changes needing time to build. A small configuration or system change can then require complete redeployment of the entire OS, adding friction to development work and impacting customers. This is not acceptable for certain Linux environments at Microsoft, where only seconds of planned downtime budget exist every year. systemd-confext is intended to be a signed, `dm-verity`-protected, live configuration update mechanism meant to address this issue. It provides a way to make quick additions in a secure and reliable way with minimum customer impact. Two years later, confext now supports host-level payloads to /etc and also works in the individual namespaces of services and portable units via `ExtensionImages=` and `ExtensionDirectories=` too. One of the recent significant additions is that systemd-confext has been integrated with `systemctl reload`, giving it the ability to pick up new configuration revisions during a reload, not just a restart. Combined with services that implement notify-reload, it is possible to simply drop a new versioned extension into the watched directory to trigger the reload flow and update the service config. We'll review how these features can be used and include a demo of a couple of use cases, including path-activated units to deploy config payloads in production at Microsoft. We'll also briefly discuss the namespace and mounting changes needed in the systemd codebase to make this integration work. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/GSRYLR/
systemd: round table (asg2025)
How I optimized away 94% CPU from zbus (asg2025)
How I optimized away 94% CPU from zbus (asg2025)
Haven’t you ever wanted to find ways to make your Rust code the most optimal in the world? I know how you feel. This is a talk, where I’d tell you how easy it is to profile your Rust software and how most often the solutions are trivial. This is a story of how I used a few readily-available Open Source tools to achieve huge optimizations in [zbus](https://crates.io/crates/zbus), a pure Rust D-Bus library. This was long journey but gains were worth the efforts. I will go through each single bottleneck found, how it was found and why it was a bottleneck and how it was optimized away. While attending this talk will by no means make you an expert in optimizations, it is my hope that by you will be able to relate to some of bottlenecks or solutions I will present (“hey”, I also do that in my code!”) and learn from my experience. Maybe afterwards, you can suggest an even better solution? Moreover, if you don’t already have any experience with profiling and optimizations, this talk should be a good introduction for that. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/TYRJUG/
systemd: round table (asg2025)
Let's have an open discussion with systemd developers who are at ASG and users in the audience. We will open with the developers saying what they plan to work on in the near future, and then allow questions / comments from the audience. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/PXZGEL/
systemd: state of the project (asg2025)
systemd: state of the project (asg2025)
Same as every year, a lot has happened in the systemd project since last year's ASG. We released multiple versions, packed with new components and features. This talk will provide an overview of these changes, commenting on successes and challenges, and a sneak peak at what lies ahead. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/B8RVCJ/
Linux IPC: Lost between Threading and Networking (asg2025)
Communication is paramount in modern application development. This applies equally well to the process of writing applications and to the code itself. The complexity of the tasks ahead of us calls for a distributed and coordinated development effort, and this often manifests in our code: We design distributed, communicating systems to split complexity and responsibility among many people and teams, and at the same time meet the demand for ever faster systems. The last decade showed significantly increased popularity in API design, network protocols, and distributed computations. At the same time some of the most intriguing language research improves how multi-threaded applications synchronize and exchange information without sacrificing safety or performance. Between these two lies an almost forgotten world: Linux Inter-process communication (IPC) has lost ground to thread-communication and networking protocols. Let us look at how other operating systems have evolved their IPC layers, what new systems decide to go with, and why Linux IPC has not seen any major changes since the 90s. And finally, can we lift Linux IPC out of stagnation and catch up with everyone else? Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/8WW7YH/
Linux IPC: Lost between Threading and Networking (asg2025)
BPF Tokens in systemd (asg2025)
Running **BPF** programs today requires *CAP_BPF* capability, which is an all or nothing BPF capability. But BPF nowadays spans a large area, from simple monitoring to potentially invasive fields like network or tracing. BPF Tokens aims to add fine grained BPF capabilities to systemd units and containers, avoiding to give the whole *CAP_BPF* capability or even worse running the service as privileged user. References: https://lwn.net/Articles/947173/ https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/36134 Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/TEH3QN/
Systing: tracing for the lazy (asg2025)
Systing helps you solve problems in minutes rather than days. Out of the box it gives you everything you could possibly need, combined with perfetto’s visualization you will never be confused again. This talk will introduce systing, a tracer that is built on modern BPF tooling, purpose built to debug large applications with complicated interactions. This will be little talk and mostly demo. Two decades of experience debugging kernel problems has been poured into this tool to make it as straightforward as possible. I will walk through the basic usage, and show a case study investigation to give a feel for the various features that set it apart from the lower level tools we all use and love. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/UHSCHF/
Systing: tracing for the lazy (asg2025)
BPF Tokens in systemd (asg2025)
Why you should contribute to systemd! (asg2025)
I'll use these 20 minutes to explain why and why contributing to systemd is a great experience. We'll avoid beating dead horses by not discussing git forges and email, but instead focus on the development experience, from building systemd distribution packages from git main, running integration tests against those distribution packages, debugging failures, writing new tests, and installing the distribution packages on real hardware to debug issues. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/B8LJKD/
Container Networking With Netkit: The BPF Programmable Network Device (asg2025)
Why you should contribute to systemd! (asg2025)
Container Networking With Netkit: The BPF Programmable Network Device (asg2025)
Introduced in kernel v6.7, the Netkit device is an eBPF-programmable network device designed with containers in mind. In this talk, I will go over the the basics of the Netkit device, and discuss the performance gains we have realized and challenges we faced when rolling out Netkit across millions of containers at Meta. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/WAHYE8/
A Security Model for systemd (asg2025)
Linux lacks a coherent security model, and by extension we never defined one for the systemd project either. In this talk I'd like to start changing this, and begin defining some general security design guidelines that we so far mostly followed implicitly, and make them more explicit. After all, systemd to a large degree is involved in security subsystems, from SecureBoot, Measured Boot & TPM, to its service sandboxing, dm-verity/dm-crypt support, its FIDO2/PKCS#11 hookups, its many security boundaries, secure parameterization, Linux Security Module initialization and more. While this distributions & applications consuming systemd might follow different security models I think it's important to talk about a unified vision from the systemd upstream perspective, even if various downstreams then make modifications or only deploy a subset of it. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/de/ about this event: https://cfp.all-systems-go.io/all-systems-go-2025/talk/FE98ZY/
A Security Model for systemd (asg2025)
How to Quellcode (quellcode25)
Kurzer Talk, indem ich kurz vorstelle wie wir die Quellcode organisiert haben. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://pretalx.0x90.space/quellcode-2/talk/QVGLUD/
Siemens Systemtelefon hacken for fun and giggles (quellcode25)
Siemens Systemtelefon hacken for fun and giggles (quellcode25)
Im Hackspace sind Systemtelefone von Siemens aufgetaucht. Wir hatten sehr viel Spass mit ihnen und ich will davon erzählen. Zusammen mit zwei anderen Mitgliedern aus dem Nerdberg haben wir uns das "Unify OpenStage 60" Telefon angeschaut, Root-Zugriff bekommen und schlussendlich ein paar nette Anwendungen darauf zum laufen bekommen. Das ganze war aber eher eine längere Reise - von dieser will ich euch erzählen. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://pretalx.0x90.space/quellcode-2/talk/AVRDJR/
Lightning talks (quellcode25)
Lightning talks (quellcode25)
Lightning talk slot, to present some lightning talks. A slot for short talks about different topics, Can be in English or German. Ein Programm Punkt in dem kurze Vorträge über verschiedene Themen vorgetragen werden können. Die Vorträge können in Deutsch oder Englisch gehalten werden. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://pretalx.0x90.space/quellcode-2/talk/RD9FHU/