Chaos Computer Club - recent events feed

This project transforms a classic rotary phone into a mobile device. Previous talks have analyzed various aspects of analogue phone technology, such as rotary pulse detection or ringing voltage generation. Now this project helps you get rid of the cable: it equips the classic German FeTAp 611 with battery power and a flyback SMPS based ringing voltage generator - but still maintains the classical look and feel. The talk demonstrates the journey of bridging analog and digital worlds, explaining how careful design connects a vintage phone to today’s mobile environment - in a way that will make your grandparents happy. There are people who throw away old telephones - and then there are those who find them in the garbage and think, „How can a microcontroller actually read the digits from a rotary dial?“ This talk follows the journey of transforming a classic German FeTAp 611 rotary phone into a mobile device while keeping its vintage charm. Building on earlier retrofits, this project aims to combine the following design goals into a mobile version of the Fernsprechtischapparat: - Grandparents-compatible – The phone shall be easy to use by non-technical people, showing the same look and feel as the original phones, including details such as a dial tone. - easy phone switching – Switching between FeTAp and regular cellphone shall not require unscrewing the phone to switch SIM cards. - standard components – PCB/PCBA suppliers shall be capable of manufacturing boards at a reasonable price. - device-agnostic circuit design – Adapting to different phones (e.g. W48, FeTAp 791, FeTAp 611) shall minimize the need for changes in the schematic. This includes a ringing voltage generator that shall be powerful enough to drive an old W48 phone. This talk will walk you through certain aspects of the German analog telephony standard 1TR110-1, and the challenges faced when implementing those on a battery-powered device with little space. It explains - the state machine implemented on an STM32 microcontroller, - how to connect old carbon microphones to modern audio electronics, - designing (and avoiding mistakes in) a flyback based SMPS to generate 32V - 75V ringing voltage, - how to generate 25 Hz AC using an H-bridge, - and how to layout the PCB such that the ancient second handset connector can now be used for USB-C charging. In the course of the development, I discovered that the project is not only a good way to get a glimpse into various aspects of ancient and modern types of electronics - but also into people’s reactions when such a phone suddenly starts ringing on a flea market… :-) Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 about this event: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/event/detail/fetap-611-unplugged-taking-a-rotary-dial-phone-to-the-mobile-age

Despite how it's often portrayed in blogs, scientific articles, or corporate test planning, fuzz testing isn't a magic bug printer; just saying "we fuzz our code" says nothing about how _effectively_ it was tested. Yet, how fuzzers and programs interact is deeply mythologised and poorly misunderstood, even by seasoned professionals. This talk analyses a number of recent works and case studies that reveal the relationship between fuzzers, their inputs, and programs to explain _how_ fuzzers work. Fuzz testing (or, "fuzzing") is a testing technique that passes randomly-generated inputs to a subject under test (SUT). This term was first coined in 1988 by Miller to describe sending random byte sequences to Unix utilities (1), but was arguably preceded in 1971 by Breuer for fault detection in sequential circuits (2) and in 1972 by Purdom for parser testing by generating sentences from grammars (3). Curiously, they all exhibit different approaches for generating inputs based on knowledge about the SUT, though none of them use feedback from the SUT to make decisions about new inputs. Fuzzing wasn't yet popular, but industry was catching on. Between the late 90s and 2013, we see a number of strategies appear in industry (4). Some had success with constraint solvers, where they would observe runtime behavior or have knowledge about a target's structure to produce higher quality inputs. Others operated in a different way, by taking an existing input and tweaking it slightly ("mutating") to address the low-likelihood of random generation to produce structured inputs. None was as successful, or as popular, as American Fuzzy Lop, or "AFL", released in 2013. This combined coverage observations for inputs (Ormandy, 2007) with concepts from evolutionary novelty search (5) into a tool which could, from very few initial inputs, _evolve_ over multiple mutations to find new, untested code. Despite its power, this advancement made it far more difficult to understand how fuzzers even worked. Now all you had to do was point this tool at a program and it would start testing, and the coverage would go up; users were now only responsible for writing "harnesses", code which processed fuzzer-produced inputs and sent them to the SUT. Though there have been a few real advances to fuzzing since (or, at least, strategies which combined previous methods more effectively), fuzzing research has mostly deadended, with new methods squeezing only minor improvements out of older ones. This, and inadequate harness writing, comes from this opaqueness in how fuzzers internally operate: without understanding what these tools do from first principles, there's no clear "right" and "wrong" way to do things because there is no mental model to test them against. This talk doesn't talk about new bugs, new fuzzers, or new harness generation tools. The purpose of this talk is to uncover mechanisms of fuzzer input production in the context of different classes of SUT and harnesses thereon, highlighting recent papers which have clarified our understanding of how fuzzers and SUTs interact. By the end, you will have a better understanding of _why_ modern fuzzers work, _what_ their limitations are, and _how_ you can write better fuzzers and harnesses yourself. (1): https://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~bart/fuzz/CS736-Projects-f1988.pdf (2): https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/1671733 (3): https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF01932308 (4): https://afl-1.readthedocs.io/en/latest/about_afl.html (5): https://www.academia.edu/download/25396037/0262287196chap43.pdf Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 about this event: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/event/detail/demystifying-fuzzer-behaviour

Like 39C3, the last CCC camp (2023) and congress (38C3) have seen volunteer-driven deployments of legacy ISDN and POTS networks using a mixture of actual legacy telephon tech and custom open source software. This talk explains how this is achieved, and why this work plays an important role in preserving parts of our digital communications heritage. Just like at this very event (39C3), the last few years a small group of volunteers has delpoyed and operated legacy telephony networks for ISDN (digital) and POTS (analog) services at CCC-camp2023 and 38C3. Anyone on-site can obtain subscriber lines (POTS, ISDN BRI or PRI service) and use them for a variety of services, including telephony, fax machines, modem dial-up into BBSs as well as dial-up internet access and video telephony. These temporary event networks are not using soft-PBX or VoIP, but are built using actual de-commissioned hardware from telecom operators, including a Siemens EWSD digital telephone exchange, Nokia EKSOS V5 access multiplexers, a SDH ring for transporting E1 carriers and much more. While some may enjoy this for the mere hack value, others enjoy it to re-live the digital communication sear of their childhood or youth. Howevre, there is a more serious aspect to this: The preservation and restoration of early digital communications infrastructure from the 1970s to 1990s, as well as how to operate such equipment. As part of this effort, we have already been able to help communications museums to fill gaps in their collections. The talk will cover * the equipment used, * the network hierarchy we build, * the services operated * the lessons learnt * newly-written open source software for interfacing retro telcommunications gear Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 about this event: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/event/detail/isdn-pots-telephony-at-congress-and-camp

Das Klima-Update vom FragDenStaat Climate Helpdesk. Chatgpt hat (bald) mehr Nutzer*innen als Wikipedia, OpenAI will in Zukunft den Energieverbrauch von Indien haben und das notfalls auch mit fossilen Energien. Der Energiehunger der künstlichen Intelligenz und der globale Ressourcenhunger für Chips und Elektroautos scheint den Rest Hoffnung einer klimagerechten Welt aufzufressen. Auch in Deutschland finden wir uns in den Wasserkämpfen wieder, während global längst Bewegungen gegen wasserhungrige Konzerne und Rechenzentren zusammenfließen. Auf der ganzen Welt, von Lateinamerika bis Portugal und Serbien wehren sich Menschen gegen den Abbau des weißen Goldes Lithium, das für Elektroautos und Chips benötigt wird. Zusammen mit Wäldern brennen auch die Kommentarspalten und die staatlichen Repressionen gegen Klimaaktivismus nehmen zu. Ich möchte einen Überblick geben zum Zustand unserer Erde und der Klimabewegung und was Hacker*innen für die Rettung des Planeten können und welche Tech-Milliardäre wir dafür bekämpfen müssen. Ich bin Joschi (they/them) vom FragDenStaat Climate Helpdesk. Ich bringe 10 Jahre Erfahrung in der Klimabewegung und Expertise für verschiedene Themen rund um Nachhaltigkeit und Digitalisierung mit. Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 about this event: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/event/detail/brennende-walder-und-kommentarspalten-klimaupdate-mit-bits-baume-und-dem-fragdenstaat-climate-helpdesk

Es ist genau ein Jahr her, dass der Adenauer SRP+ in der Halle des 38C3 stand. Damals war er noch eine Baustelle, aber schon bald machte er sich auf den Weg, um Geschichte zu schreiben. Wir nehmen euch mit auf eine Reise: von Blockade über Protest, von Sommerinterviews bis zu Polizeischikanen lassen wir ein Jahr Adenauer SRP+ Revue passieren. Das könnte lustig werden. Außerdem: alles zum Walter Lübcke-Memorial-Park, den wir gerade direkt vor die CDU-Zentrale gebaut haben. Owei owei: Das wird viel für 40 Minuten. Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 about this event: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/event/detail/zps-ein-jahr-adenauer-srp-und-mehr

The Great Firewall of China (GFW) is one of, if not arguably the most advanced Internet censorship systems in the world. Because repressive governments generally do not simply publish their censorship rules, the task of determining exactly what is and isn’t allowed falls upon the censorship measurement community, who run experiments over censored networks. In this talk, we’ll discuss two ways censorship measurement has evolved from passive experimentation to active attacks against the Great Firewall. While probing the Great Firewall’s DNS injection system in 2021, we noticed something strange: Sometimes the injected responses contained weird garbage. After some investigation, we realized we’d stumbled onto a memory disclosure vulnerability that would give us an unprecedented window into the Great Firewall’s internals: Wallbleed. So we crafted probes that could leak up to 125 bytes per response and repeatedly sent them for two years. Five billion responses later, the picture that emerged was... concerning. Over 2 million HTTP cookies leaked. Nearly 27,000 URL parameters with passwords. SMTP commands exposing email addresses. We found traffic from RFC 1918 private addresses - suggesting we were seeing the Great Firewall’s own internal network. We saw x86_64 stack frames with ASLR-enabled pointers. We even sent our own tagged traffic into China and later recovered those exact bytes in Wallbleed responses, proving definitively that real user traffic was being exposed. In September 2023, the patching began. We watched in real-time as blocks of IP addresses stopped responding to our probes. But naturally the same developers that made this error in the first place made further mistakes. Within hours, we developed “Wallbleed v2” queries that still triggered the leak. The vulnerability persisted for another six months until March 2024. GFW measurement research went back to business as usual until September of this year when an anonymous source released 600GB of leaked source code, packages, and documentation via Enlace Hacktivista. This data came from Geedge Networks - a company closely connected to the GFW and the related MESA lab. Geedge Networks develops censorship software not only for the GFW but also for other repressive countries such as Pakistan, Myanmar, Kazakhstan, and Ethiopia. We will discuss some of our novel findings from the Geedge Networks leak, including new insights about how the leak relates to Wallbleed. Wallbleed and the Geedge Networks leak show that censorship measurement research can be about more than just actively probing censored networks. We hope this talk will be a call to arms for hackers against Internet censorship. More information about Wallbleed can be found at the GFW Report: https://gfw.report/publications/ndss25/en/ Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 about this event: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/event/detail/a-tale-of-two-leaks-how-hackers-breached-the-great

While the extreme right is on the rise in many countries and climate change is unrolling, a promising future seems to be written: According to Elon Musk, Sam Altman, and some other “tech bros” it is to leave the dying planet to go to space. With the help of something called “A(G)I”. But what kind of future is the one that is promised? And what is the connection between power cycles of tech company owners and people who's believes can be called fascist? As we moved power through data in the hands of very view, it is important to examine what ideas these view have in their heads. This talk will explore the roots of today's tech fascism and its love for tech. From the early thoughts and movements in the US and Europe to Futurism and the Holocaust, organised with Hollerith punching cards. It will dive into the its blooming relationship with cybernetics, and take a look in the future the “tech bros” want to lure us in. This talk will address the often overlooked topic of how and when people get comfy with diving into movements of hate and how to stop a white supremacy future where we will be sorted by machines. And, in taking a look on past movements opposing authoritarianism and will examine mindsets and possibilities of resistance as well as the possibility of restarting everything. Because we have a planet and loved ones to lose. Wear your safety cat-ears, buckle up, it will be a wild, but entertaining ride. The idea of the Super-Human is not a new one, neither is the idea of charismatic „good“ leader nor to sort humans into classes, races, abilities. The idea of a view controlling many by force and ideas that justify their rulership and cruelties is an old one, as is the opposing idea of a free society and humans as equals. A central aspect is how people involved see the human nature and according to that what society they want to build. And what role is intended for technology. In the 19th century the beliefs of both the opposing sides dripped into science, as well as individual’s heads, and social movements around the world. While some wanted to form a wold society of equals others wanted to breed a master race that to control everything. The love of industrial leaders for authoritarianism has played an important role since the beginning in funding and providing access to powerful networks. Industrialists like Henry Ford loved and promoted ideas at least close to fascism. German, Italian, and Austrian counterparts funded Hitler and Mussolini. And it is not that they did it because they did not understand the fascist leader’s yearning – it was because they shared and loved their aims and violence. In Futurism, one of the often overlooked roots of fascism, and its Manifesto the enemies and societal goals are proclaimed crystal clear: “We will glorify war — the only true hygiene of the world — militarism, patriotism, the destructive gesture of anarchist, the beautiful Ideas which kill, and the scorn of woman.“ After WWII most of the people believing in dominating others by force and eugenics lived on, they and their cronies had slaughtered millions and destroyed whole social movements were opposing them. These people warning us about authoritarian prophets of doom and concentration camps are still missing. In the post-war time ideas of authoritarianism met a new player: Cybernetics, the believe in a future, where all problems will be solved through technology and we are “All Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace” (Richard Brautigam, 1967). The ideas split, merged, and melted into new beliefs and quasi-religions. Into something that is called “Cyber-Libertarianism” by David Golumbia or “TESCREAL” by Émile P. Torres and Timnit Gebru. This talk will address an aspect that is often missing in analyses: What kind of breeding ground is it where ideas of fascism hatches best? And how can we stop iFascism instead of participating in it? Furthermore, as being sorted by machines is not everyone's secret dream, ways to stop iFascism will be provided. Because we are more, we care for people in need – and we are the chaos! Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 about this event: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/event/detail/all-sorted-by-machines-of-loving-grace-ai-cybernetics-and-fascism-and-how-to-intervene

Typography is the art of arranging type to make written language legible, readable, and appealing when displayed. However, for the neophyte, typography is mostly apprehended as the juxtaposition of characters displayed on the screen while for the expert, typography means typeface, scripts, unicode, glyphs, ascender, descender, tracking, hinting, kerning, shaping, weigth, slant, etc. Typography is actually much more than the mere rendering of glyphs and involves many different concepts. If glyph rendering is an important part of the rendering pipeline, it is nonetheless important to have a basic understanding of typography or there’s a known risk at rendering garbage on screen, as it has been seen many times in games, software and operating systems. Text is everywhere in our modern digital life and yet, no one really pay attention to how it is rendered on a screen. Maybe this is a sign that problem has been solved. But it isn't. A few people are still looking at the best way to display text on any devices & any languages. This talk is based on a lesson I gave at SIGGRAPH a few years ago (https://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/siggraph-2018-digital-typography/110385070) to explain rendering techniques and concepts. Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 about this event: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/event/detail/the-art-of-text-rendering

Power On! Lasst uns gemeinsam an diesem magischen Ort ankommen und alles vorbereiten, um die nächsten vier Tage in einer fröhlich-kreativen, fantastischen Wunderwelt zu verbringen und Kraft zu tanken. Das Opening gibt euch die wichtigsten Infos für den Congress, stimmt euch ein und ... äh ... bis Späti! Licensed to the public under http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 about this event: https://events.ccc.de/congress/2025/hub/event/detail/opening-ceremony

Digitale Dienstleistungen und Angebote sind aus dem Alltag nicht mehr wegzudenken. Von reiner Informationsvermittlung bis zur KI-Interaktion: Das Web ist unser ständiger Begleiter. Was aber tun all jene Menschen, die aufgrund von körperlichen oder geistigen Beeinträchtigungen nur bedingt oder im schlimmsten Fall gar nicht am Netz teilhaben können? Die Stiftung «Zugang für Alle» beschäftigt sich seit 25 Jahren mit genau dieser Frage und gilt als Kompetenzzentrum für Fragen rund um Barrierefreiheit und Inklusion im Netz. Dr. Andreas Uebelbacher und Mo Sherif vermitteln uns am Netzpolitischen Abend einen Einblick in das vielfältige Gebiet und die mannigfaltigen digitalen Herausforderungen, welche Menschen mit Beeinträchtigungen täglich meistern. about this event: https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/event/netzpolitischer-abend-zu-barrierefreiheit-das-internet-ist-fuer-alle-da/

Gegenwärtig ist in den USA zu beobachten, wie einst demokratisch kontrollierte Institutionen und Vorgänge an private High-Tech Unternehmen wie Palantir, Anduril oder SpaceX ausgelagert werden. Diese Firmen übernehmen staatliche Aufgaben und übertragen Gesetze und Entscheidungen in Algorithmen, ohne dabei demokratischen Kontrollen zu unterliegen. Eine Entwicklung, die auch in Europa droht. In der Vergangenheit war zu sehen, wie die libertären Tech-Oligarchen des Silicon Valley nach Wegen suchten, sich der staatlich demokratischen Autorität zu entziehen. Doch mit der zweiten Trump Administration ist ein Strategiewechsel zu beobachten, der darauf abzielt, die demokratischen Institutionen zu übernehmen, anstatt selbst parallele Strukturen (wie Crypto-Währungen und Hochsee-Habitate) zu errichten. Gestützt ist diese Strategie auf Technologie, Investitionen von Risikokapital in potenzielle Staatsprojekte sowie die gezielte Platzierung von Personal in wichtigen Positionen. Das Ziel: Die Privatisierung von demokratisch legitimierter staatlicher Souveränität. In den USA ist zu sehen, wie dieser Plan erfolgreich umgesetzt wird und die Tech-Billionäre aus dem Silicon Valley immer mehr Einfluss über zentrale Regierungsstellen erhalten. Der Vortrag will diese Strategie, die konkreten Vorgehensweisen und Auswirkungen und die damit einhergehenden Verflechtungen von privaten Konzernen und demokratischen Institutionen näher beleuchten, um die geplanten und bereits umgesetzten Vorhaben in Europa besser einordnen zu können. In England wurde das Gesundheitssystem (NHS) mit Palantirs Gotham neu implementiert, Italien plant die feste Integration von Starlink in die militärische Kommunikation und in Deutschland (neben der Nutzung von Palantir bei der Polizei) wurde jüngst die strategische Partnerschaft zwischen Palmer Luckeys Rüstungsunternehmen Anduril und Rheinmetall verkündet, in der gemeinsam ein autonomes Drohensystem für die Bundeswehr entwickelt werden soll. Dabei wurden diese Entscheidungen ohne große Öffentlichkeit, ohne transparente Vergabeprozesse oder ernsthafte parlamentarische Debatten getroffen. Was bedeutet es für Demokratien, wenn ihre Institutionen wie die öffentliche Verwaltung, Sozial- und Gesundheitswesen und das Militär von privaten Unternehmen übernommen werden, deren primäres Interesse dem Gewinn ihrer Aktionäre und nicht dem Wohlergehen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger dient? Und wie sind diese Entwicklungen mit den gleichzeitigen europäischen Bemühungen um digitale Souveränität zusammenzubringen? Da Peter Thiel, die sog. PayPal-Mafia und die Ideologie der Tech-Unternehmer des Silicon Valley einen maßgeblichen Einfluss auf die Entwicklungen haben, sei an dieser Stelle auf das vorherige Open Chaos zum Thema Palantir und Dark Enlightenment verwiesen: https://media.ccc.de/v/c4.openchaos.2025.10.palantir-dark-enlightenment-deutsche-polizei Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

OWASP Juice Shop went through some significant renovation and enhancements over the last year in order to keep current with the underlying Node.js and Angular frameworks. MultiJuicer was entirely rewritten in GoLang and is now faster and more reliable than ever before. All Juice Shop side-projects have been migrated to TypeScript and brought to a common stack for testing and code linting. But the team did not only clean up and refactor behind the scenes. There are also lots of exciting new features and enhancements available, such as: Several new hacking challenges, e.g. a YAML memory bomb attack and an API key leakage Enhancing MultiJuicer's team score board to deliver a more holistic CTF experience Reimagining the hint system for all challenges, integrating now even better with CTF servers and making the use of hints more explicit for users Of course the popular Juice Shop Success Pyramid™ will be back with beyond-crazy Docker image download stats and other usage figures! Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Der Kurzvortrag stellt den aktuellen Stand der OWASP Top 10:2025 vor, mit etwas Glück haben wir bis dahin schon mehr... Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Der Cyber Resilience Act, kurz CRA, ist eine neue Verordnung der EU und tritt im Dezember 2027 vollständig in Kraft. Das Kernelement der Verordnung ist die Softwaresicherheit für alle so genannten „Produkte mit digitalen Elementen“, die auf dem EU-Markt kommerziell angeboten werden. Diese umfassen sowohl vernetzte Hardware-Produkte, in denen Firmwares laufen, als auch reine Softwareprodukte. Die Anforderungen an die Software-Hersteller erstrecken sich von grundsätzlichem „Security by Design“ und „Secure by Default“, über Bedrohungsanalysen der Software bis hin zu verpflichtendem Patching und Schwachstellenmanagement. Die Themen klingen irgendwie familiär? Kein Wunder, denn eine ganze Reihe von Projekten aus dem OWASP-Ökosystem sind geradezu prädestiniert zum Einsatz im Kontext des CRAs. Nicht nur, dass mit CycloneDX einer der zwei de-facto SBOM-Standards aus OWASP heraus entstanden ist - auch Frameworks wie OWASP SAMM oder Tools wie Dependency-Track können ganz entscheidende Rollen für die Umsetzung von Supply-Chain-Security und SDLC-Prozessen spielen. In diesem Talk schauen wir uns die Anforderungen der Verordnung genauer an und blicken dann auf Schnittstellen zu OWASP-Projekten. Dies soll am Ende helfen, sowohl für die Seite der Hersteller ein besseres Bild für OWASP zu erzeugen, als auch von OWASP-Seite aus zielgenauer auf CRA-Verpflichtete zugehen zu können. Je mehr Menschen sich in den Themen wiederfinden und Zusammenarbeit entstehen kann, desto besser. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Web application scanners are popular and effective black-box testing tools, automating the detection of vulnerabilities by exploring and interacting with user interfaces. Despite their effectiveness, these scanners struggle with discovering deeper states in modern web applications due to their limited understanding of workflows. This study addresses this limitation by introducing YuraScanner, a task-driven web application scanner that leverages large-language models (LLMs) to autonomously execute tasks and workflows. YuraScanner operates as a goal-based agent, suggesting actions to achieve predefined objectives by processing webpages to extract semantic information. Unlike traditional methods that rely on user-provided traces, YuraScanner uses LLMs to bridge the semantic gap, making it web application-agnostic. Using the XSS engine of Black Widow, YuraScanner tests discovered input points for vulnerabilities, enhancing the scanning process's comprehensiveness and accuracy. We evaluated YuraScanner on 20 diverse web applications, focusing on task extraction, execution accuracy, and vulnerability detection. The results demonstrate YuraScanner's superiority in discovering new attack surfaces and deeper states, significantly improving vulnerability detection. Notably, YuraScanner identified 12 unique zero-day XSS vulnerabilities, compared to three by Black Widow. This study highlights YuraScanner's potential to revolutionize web application scanning with its automated, task-driven approach. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

As a CISO (or any other security expert) in the area of AI, you can find yourself in increasingly challenging and sometimes bizarre AI-related situations not unlike Alice's adventures in Wonderland. Depending on whom you speak to, people either have high (inflated?) expectations about the (magic?) benefits of AI for security efforts, or try to explain why "AI security Armageddon" is looming... and that is just the security part of the story. All other areas in your organization are heavily using or experimenting with AI (e.g., vibe coding, automation, decision making, etc.), challenging (or ignoring) established security practices. This talk tells the story of the daily experience of dealing with AI as a CISO in a cloud-application startup. Which experiments failed or were successful, which advice is helpful, what is difficult to apply in practice, which questions are still open... The motivation for this talk is to start a conversation among security experts on how we can shape a secure AI future and not get pushed into the role of being seen as "hindering" AI progress. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Coding Assistants wie Github Copilot, Cursor oder Claude versprechen einen Effizienzboost für die Softwareentwicklung. Doch welchen Einfluss hat die Nutzung dieser Tools auf die Software Security? Dieser Vortrag analysiert die Vor- und Nachteile von Coding Assistants in Hinblick auf die Sicherheit des entstehenden Codes. Er gibt einen Überblick über die aktuelle Studienlage und die Benchmarks zu den verschiedenen Modellen und diskutiert die Ergebnisse. Neben der Bedeutung von eingebrachten Schwachstellen im Code selbst werden Risiken wie Slopsquatting, Model Poisoning und Rules File Backdoors erläutert. Zuletzt gibt der Vortrag Empfehlungen zu Best Practices für die Nutzung von Coding Assistants: von der richtigen Konfiguration und Nutzung über Richtlinien zum Review und Testen von solchem Code. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Browser extensions are a powerful part of the Web ecosystem as they extend browser functionality and let users personalize their online experience. But with higher privileges than regular web apps, extensions bring unique security and privacy risks. Much like web applications, vulnerabilities often creep in, not just through poor implementation, but also through gaps in developer awareness and ecosystem support. In this talk, we share insights from a recent study in which we interviewed and observed 21 extension developers across the world [1] as they worked on security and privacy-related tasks that we designed based on our prior works and observations [2, 3]. Their live decision-making revealed common misconceptions, unexpected pain points, and ecosystemic obstacles in the extension development lifecycle. Extending beyond our published results, we plan to highlight some of the untold anecdotes, insecure development practices, their threat perception, the design-level challenges, as well as the misconceptions around them. The audience will take away the following items from the presentation/discussion: Common insecure practices in extension development. Why security ≠ privacy ≠ store compliance, as often perceived by extension developers! Hidden design gaps and loopholes in extension architecture that developers can't spot or comprehend. Anecdotes on the course of extension development in the era of LLMs. Developers, regulations (GDPR/CCPA/CRA), and a few “interesting” opinions. And, most importantly, why you should NOT give up on them just yet! :) References: [1] Agarwal, Shubham, et al. “I have no idea how to make it safer”: Studying Security and Privacy Mindsets of Browser Extension Developers. Proceedings of the 34th USENIX Security Symposium 2025. [2] Agarwal, Shubham, Aurore Fass, and Ben Stock. Peeking through the window: Fingerprinting Browser Extensions through Page-Visible Execution Traces and Interactions. Proceedings of the 31st ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2024. [3] Agarwal, Shubham. Helping or hindering? How browser extensions undermine security. Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2022. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

We hacked 7 of the16 publicly-accessible YC X25 AI agents. This allowed us to leak user data, execute code remotely, and take over databases. All within 30 minutes each. In this session, we'll walk through the common mistakes these companies made and how you can mitigate these security concerns before your agents put your business at risk. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Model Context Protocol (MCP) is the latest hot topic in cybersecurity. Business wants it (AI is the new mantra), developers are excited (new toys, new code), and security teams are left to make it safe—often with already packed schedules. Let's treat it like just another Tuesday. Like many shiny new technologies (remember the early days of cloud?), MCP is being built with a “features first, security later” mindset. As a fresh piece of tech, it blends novel vulnerabilities with familiar, well-known ones. If you're an early adopter, it's important to accept that MCP and its current implementations are imperfect—and to be ready for that. In this talk, we'll dive into the real-world challenges companies are facing with MCP and equip you with practical remediations. We'll cover topics such as: An introduction to the MCP protocol and its security considerations, including authentication Emerging vulnerabilities like prompt injections, tool poisoning, rug pull attacks, and cross-server tool shadowing Classic vulnerabilities that may resurface around MCP, based on recent CVEs Remediation strategies and available tooling Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Do you always read the documentation before using a function in your languages' standard library? This talk explores the attack surface of a special feature in PHP which is easy to misuse with unforseen consequences. The `extract` function allows to replace the value of local variables named after the keys in an array. Calling it with user-controlled input allows the attacker to change arbitrary variables in the program. The documentation warns against the dangers of using it with untrusted data, but our large-scale analysis on 28.325 PHP projects from GitHub shows, that this warning is ignored. The talk walks through the process of identifing `extract`-based vulnerabilities and how they might have ended up the way they are by looking at the surrounding code. After introducing different levels of attacker-control guided by concrete exploits, listeners gain an intuition on what to look out for while reviewing code. Attending this talk, the audience will learn: Rich ways users have control over input in PHP. How to exploit insecure calls to `extract` given multiple real-world case-studies from the dataset of open source projects from GitHub. Tips on how to avoid this and similar threats in new and legacy code. Possible changes to PHP itself for risk reduction. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Threat modeling stands at a critical juncture. While essential for creating secure systems, it remains mostly manual, handcrafted, and often too slow for today's development cycles. At the same time, automation and AI offer new levels of speed and scalability— but how much can we rely on them? This talk explores the tension between automation and human expertise in threat modeling. We'll dissect the traditional threat modeling process—scoping, modeling, threat identification, risk analysis, and mitigation—and perform a step-by-step gap analysis to identify what can realistically be automated today, what cannot, and why. We'll dive into: Current tooling: Review the AI threat modeling tools that handle diagram-based automation, template-driven modeling, risk scoring, and pattern matching. Emerging AI use cases: automatically generating threat models from architecture diagrams, user stories, or use case descriptions; providing AI-assisted mitigation suggestions; and conducting NLP-driven threat analysis. Limitations and risks: False confidence, hallucinations, model bias, ethical accountability, and the challenge of modeling new or context-specific threats. We will ground this analysis with examples from organizations and academic research that aim to scale threat modeling without compromising depth or quality, drawing parallels to how other activities, such as SAST and DAST scanning, evolved. Attendees will walk away with a practical roadmap for integrating automation without undermining the human insight threat modeling still requires. This talk isn't a tool pitch. It's a candid, experience-based view of where automation can meaningfully accelerate threat modeling—and where the human must remain firmly in the loop. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

Apple CarPlay is a widely known protocol that connects smartphones to car multimedia systems. Based on AirPlay, CarPlay is installed in millions of cars, as it is supported by hundreds of car models from dozens of different manufacturers across the globe. In our talk, we will share how we managed to exploit all devices running CarPlay using a single vulnerability we discovered in the AirPlay SDK. We'll take you through our entire exploit development process from identifying the vulnerability, to testing it on a custom device emulator, and finally, executing the exploit on actual devices. The session will include a demonstration of our RCE exploit on a well known third-party CarPlay device to show how an attacker can run arbitrary code while in physical proximity to a target car. We will also share how we managed to blindly exploit CarPlay without a debugger, knowing the vulnerable code is present on the system. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

In this presentation, we will highlight how threat modeling, as a proactive measure, can increase security in DevOps projects. We will introduce OWASP Cumulus, a threat modeling card game designed for threat modeling the Ops part of DevOps processes. This game (in combination with similar games like Elevation of Privilege or OWASP Cornucopia) enables DevOps teams to take the security responsibility for their project in a lightweight and engaging way. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de

WebAuthn was supposed to replace swords on the web: uniform, secure, manageable authentication for everyone! One of its unique selling points was supposed to be the impossibility of phishing attacks. When passkeys were introduced, some of WebAuthn's security principles were watered down in order to achieve some usability improvements and thus reach more widespread adoption. This presentation discusses the security of passkeys against phishing attacks. It explains the possibilities for an attacker to gain access to accounts secured with passkeys using spear phishing, and what conditions must be met for this to happen. It also practically demonstrates such an attack and discusses countermeasures. Participants will learn which WebAuthn security principles still apply to passkeys and which do not. They will learn why passkeys are no longer completely phishing-proof and how they can evaluate this consideration for their own use of passkeys. Licensed to the public under https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ about this event: https://c3voc.de