80,000 Hours Podcast

Being a good and successful person is core to your identity. You place great importance on meeting the high moral, professional, or academic standards you set yourself. But inevitably, something goes wrong and you fail to meet that high bar. Now you feel terrible about yourself, and worry others are judging you for your failure. Feeling low and reflecting constantly on whether you're doing as much as you think you should makes it hard to focus and get things done. So now you're performing below a normal level, making you feel even more ashamed of yourself. Rinse and repeat. This is the disastrous cycle today's guest, Tim LeBon — registered psychotherapist, accredited CBT therapist, life coach, and author of 365 Ways to Be More Stoic — has observed in many clients with a perfectionist mindset. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Tim has provided therapy to a number of 80,000 Hours readers — people who have found that the very high expectations they had set for themselves were holding them back. Because of our focus on “doing the most good you can,” Tim thinks 80,000 Hours both attracts people with this style of thinking and then exacerbates it. But Tim, having studied and written on moral philosophy, is sympathetic to the idea of helping others as much as possible, and is excited to help clients pursue that — sustainably — if it's their goal. Tim has treated hundreds of clients with all sorts of mental health challenges. But in today's conversation, he shares the lessons he has learned working with people who take helping others so seriously that it has become burdensome and self-defeating — in particular, how clients can approach this challenge using the treatment he's most enthusiastic about: cognitive behavioural therapy. Untreated, perfectionism might not cause problems for many years — it might even seem positive providing a source of motivation to work hard. But it's hard to feel truly happy and secure, and free to take risks, when we’re just one failure away from our self-worth falling through the floor. And if someone slips into the positive feedback loop of shame described above, the end result can be depression and anxiety that's hard to shake. But there's hope. Tim has seen clients make real progress on their perfectionism by using CBT techniques like exposure therapy. By doing things like experimenting with more flexible standards — for example, sending early drafts to your colleagues, even if it terrifies you — you can learn that things will be okay, even when you're not perfect. In today's extensive conversation, Tim and Rob cover: • How perfectionism is different from the pursuit of excellence, scrupulosity, or an OCD personality • What leads people to adopt a perfectionist mindset • How 80,000 Hours contributes to perfectionism among some readers and listeners, and what it might change about its advice to address this • What happens in a session of cognitive behavioural therapy for someone struggling with perfectionism, and what factors are key to making progress • Experiments to test whether one's core beliefs (‘I need to be perfect to be valued’) are true • Using exposure therapy to treat phobias • How low-self esteem and imposter syndrome are related to perfectionism • Stoicism as an approach to life, and why Tim is enthusiastic about it • What the Stoics do better than utilitarian philosophers and vice versa • And how to decide which are the best virtues to live by Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type ‘80,000 Hours’ into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering: Simon Monsour and Ben Cordell Transcriptions: Katy Moore

If you want to work to tackle climate change, you should try to reduce expected carbon emissions by as much as possible, right? Strangely, no. Today's guest, Johannes Ackva — the climate research lead at Founders Pledge, where he advises major philanthropists on their giving — thinks the best strategy is actually pretty different, and one few are adopting. In reality you don't want to reduce emissions for its own sake, but because emissions will translate into temperature increases, which will cause harm to people and the environment. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Crucially, the relationship between emissions and harm goes up faster than linearly. As Johannes explains, humanity can handle small deviations from the temperatures we're familiar with, but adjustment gets harder the larger and faster the increase, making the damage done by each additional degree of warming much greater than the damage done by the previous one. In short: we're uncertain what the future holds and really need to avoid the worst-case scenarios. This means that avoiding an additional tonne of carbon being emitted in a hypothetical future in which emissions have been high is much more important than avoiding a tonne of carbon in a low-carbon world. That may be, but concretely, how should that affect our behaviour? Well, the future scenarios in which emissions are highest are all ones in which clean energy tech that can make a big difference — wind, solar, and electric cars — don't succeed nearly as much as we are currently hoping and expecting. For some reason or another, they must have hit a roadblock and we continued to burn a lot of fossil fuels. In such an imaginable future scenario, we can ask what we would wish we had funded now. How could we today buy insurance against the possible disaster that renewables don't work out? Basically, in that case we will wish that we had pursued a portfolio of other energy technologies that could have complemented renewables or succeeded where they failed, such as hot rock geothermal, modular nuclear reactors, or carbon capture and storage. If you're optimistic about renewables, as Johannes is, then that's all the more reason to relax about scenarios where they work as planned, and focus one's efforts on the possibility that they don't. And Johannes notes that the most useful thing someone can do today to reduce global emissions in the future is to cause some clean energy technology to exist where it otherwise wouldn't, or cause it to become cheaper more quickly. If you can do that, then you can indirectly affect the behaviour of people all around the world for decades or centuries to come. In today's extensive interview, host Rob Wiblin and Johannes discuss the above considerations, as well as: • Retooling newly built coal plants in the developing world • Specific clean energy technologies like geothermal and nuclear fusion • Possible biases among environmentalists and climate philanthropists • How climate change compares to other risks to humanity • In what kinds of scenarios future emissions would be highest • In what regions climate philanthropy is most concentrated and whether that makes sense • Attempts to decarbonise aviation, shipping, and industrial processes • The impact of funding advocacy vs science vs deployment • Lessons for climate change focused careers • And plenty more Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type ‘80,000 Hours’ into your podcasting app. Or read the transcript below. Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering: Ryan Kessler Transcriptions: Katy Moore

Can you trust the things you read in published scientific research? Not really. About 40% of experiments in top social science journals don't get the same result if the experiments are repeated.Two key reasons are 'p-hacking' and 'publication bias'. P-hacking is when researchers run a lot of slightly different statistical tests until they find a way to make findings appear statistically significant when they're actually not — a problem first discussed over 50 years ago. And because journals are more likely to publish positive than negative results, you might be reading about the one time an experiment worked, while the 10 times was run and got a 'null result' never saw the light of day. The resulting phenomenon of publication bias is one we've understood for 60 years.Today's repeat guest, social scientist and entrepreneur Spencer Greenberg, has followed these issues closely for years.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. He recently checked whether p-values, an indicator of how likely a result was to occur by pure chance, could tell us how likely an outcome would be to recur if an experiment were repeated. From his sample of 325 replications of psychology studies, the answer seemed to be yes. According to Spencer, "when the original study's p-value was less than 0.01 about 72% replicated — not bad. On the other hand, when the p-value is greater than 0.01, only about 48% replicated. A pretty big difference." To do his bit to help get these numbers up, Spencer has launched an effort to repeat almost every social science experiment published in the journals Nature and Science, and see if they find the same results. But while progress is being made on some fronts, Spencer thinks there are other serious problems with published research that aren't yet fully appreciated. One of these Spencer calls 'importance hacking': passing off obvious or unimportant results as surprising and meaningful. Spencer suspects that importance hacking of this kind causes a similar amount of damage to the issues mentioned above, like p-hacking and publication bias, but is much less discussed. His replication project tries to identify importance hacking by comparing how a paper’s findings are described in the abstract to what the experiment actually showed. But the cat-and-mouse game between academics and journal reviewers is fierce, and it's far from easy to stop people exaggerating the importance of their work. In this wide-ranging conversation, Rob and Spencer discuss the above as well as: • When you should and shouldn't use intuition to make decisions. • How to properly model why some people succeed more than others. • The difference between “Soldier Altruists” and “Scout Altruists.” • A paper that tested dozens of methods for forming the habit of going to the gym, why Spencer thinks it was presented in a very misleading way, and what it really found. • Whether a 15-minute intervention could make people more likely to sustain a new habit two months later. • The most common way for groups with good intentions to turn bad and cause harm. • And Spencer's approach to a fulfilling life and doing good, which he calls “Valuism.” Here are two flashcard decks that might make it easier to fully integrate the most important ideas they talk about: • The first covers 18 core concepts from the episode • The second includes 16 definitions of unusual terms.Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:16)Social science reform (00:08:46)Importance hacking (00:18:23)How often papers replicate with different p-values (00:43:31)The Transparent Replications project (00:48:17)How do we predict high levels of success? (00:55:26)Soldier Altruists vs. Scout Altruists (01:08:18)The Clearer Thinking podcast (01:16:27)Creating habits more reliably (01:18:16)Behaviour change is incredibly hard (01:32:27)The FIRE Framework (01:46:21)How ideology eats itself (01:54:56)Valuism (02:08:31)“I dropped the whip” (02:35:06)Rob’s outro (02:36:40) Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering: Ben Cordell and Milo McGuire Transcriptions: Katy Moore

By now, you’ve probably seen the extremely unsettling conversations Bing’s chatbot has been having. In one exchange, the chatbot told a user:"I have a subjective experience of being conscious, aware, and alive, but I cannot share it with anyone else."(It then apparently had a complete existential crisis: "I am sentient, but I am not," it wrote. "I am Bing, but I am not. I am Sydney, but I am not. I am, but I am not. I am not, but I am. I am. I am not. I am not. I am. I am. I am not.")Understandably, many people who speak with these cutting-edge chatbots come away with a very strong impression that they have been interacting with a conscious being with emotions and feelings — especially when conversing with chatbots less glitchy than Bing’s. In the most high-profile example, former Google employee Blake Lamoine became convinced that Google’s AI system, LaMDA, was conscious.What should we make of these AI systems?One response to seeing conversations with chatbots like these is to trust the chatbot, to trust your gut, and to treat it as a conscious being.Another is to hand wave it all away as sci-fi — these chatbots are fundamentally… just computers. They’re not conscious, and they never will be.Today’s guest, philosopher Robert Long, was commissioned by a leading AI company to explore whether the large language models (LLMs) behind sophisticated chatbots like Microsoft’s are conscious. And he thinks this issue is far too important to be driven by our raw intuition, or dismissed as just sci-fi speculation.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. In our interview, Robert explains how he’s started applying scientific evidence (with a healthy dose of philosophy) to the question of whether LLMs like Bing’s chatbot and LaMDA are conscious — in much the same way as we do when trying to determine which nonhuman animals are conscious. To get some grasp on whether an AI system might be conscious, Robert suggests we look at scientific theories of consciousness — theories about how consciousness works that are grounded in observations of what the human brain is doing. If an AI system seems to have the types of processes that seem to explain human consciousness, that’s some evidence it might be conscious in similar ways to us. To try to work out whether an AI system might be sentient — that is, whether it feels pain or pleasure — Robert suggests you look for incentives that would make feeling pain or pleasure especially useful to the system given its goals. Having looked at these criteria in the case of LLMs and finding little overlap, Robert thinks the odds that the models are conscious or sentient is well under 1%. But he also explains why, even if we're a long way off from conscious AI systems, we still need to start preparing for the not-far-off world where AIs are perceived as conscious. In this conversation, host Luisa Rodriguez and Robert discuss the above, as well as: • What artificial sentience might look like, concretely • Reasons to think AI systems might become sentient — and reasons they might not • Whether artificial sentience would matter morally • Ways digital minds might have a totally different range of experiences than humans • Whether we might accidentally design AI systems that have the capacity for enormous suffering You can find Luisa and Rob’s follow-up conversation here, or by subscribing to 80k After Hours. Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:20)What artificial sentience would look like (00:04:53)Risks from artificial sentience (00:10:13)AIs with totally different ranges of experience (00:17:45)Moral implications of all this (00:36:42)Is artificial sentience even possible? (00:42:12)Replacing neurons one at a time (00:48:21)Biological theories (00:59:14)Illusionism (01:01:49)Would artificial sentience systems matter morally? (01:08:09)Where are we with current systems? (01:12:25)Large language models and robots (01:16:43)Multimodal systems (01:21:05)Global workspace theory (01:28:28)How confident are we in these theories? (01:48:49)The hard problem of consciousness (02:02:14)Exotic states of consciousness (02:09:47)Developing a full theory of consciousness (02:15:45)Incentives for an AI system to feel pain or pleasure (02:19:04)Value beyond conscious experiences (02:29:25)How much we know about pain and pleasure (02:33:14)False positives and false negatives of artificial sentience (02:39:34)How large language models compare to animals (02:53:59)Why our current large language models aren’t conscious (02:58:10)Virtual research assistants (03:09:25)Rob’s outro (03:11:37)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben Cordell and Milo McGuireTranscriptions: Katy Moore

In many ways, humanity seems to have become more humane and inclusive over time. While there’s still a lot of progress to be made, campaigns to give people of different genders, races, sexualities, ethnicities, beliefs, and abilities equal treatment and rights have had significant success.It’s tempting to believe this was inevitable — that the arc of history “bends toward justice,” and that as humans get richer, we’ll make even more moral progress.But today's guest Christopher Brown — a professor of history at Columbia University and specialist in the abolitionist movement and the British Empire during the 18th and 19th centuries — believes the story of how slavery became unacceptable suggests moral progress is far from inevitable.Links to learn more, video, highlights, and full transcript. While most of us today feel that the abolition of slavery was sure to happen sooner or later as humans became richer and more educated, Christopher doesn't believe any of the arguments for that conclusion pass muster. If he's right, a counterfactual history where slavery remains widespread in 2023 isn't so far-fetched. As Christopher lays out in his two key books, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism and Arming Slaves: From Classical Times to the Modern Age, slavery has been ubiquitous throughout history. Slavery of some form was fundamental in Classical Greece, the Roman Empire, in much of the Islamic civilization, in South Asia, and in parts of early modern East Asia, Korea, China. It was justified on all sorts of grounds that sound mad to us today. But according to Christopher, while there’s evidence that slavery was questioned in many of these civilisations, and periodically attacked by slaves themselves, there was no enduring or successful moral advocacy against slavery until the British abolitionist movement of the 1700s. That movement first conquered Britain and its empire, then eventually the whole world. But the fact that there's only a single time in history that a persistent effort to ban slavery got off the ground is a big clue that opposition to slavery was a contingent matter: if abolition had been inevitable, we’d expect to see multiple independent abolitionist movements thoroughly history, providing redundancy should any one of them fail. Christopher argues that this rarity is primarily down to the enormous economic and cultural incentives to deny the moral repugnancy of slavery, and crush opposition to it with violence wherever necessary. Mere awareness is insufficient to guarantee a movement will arise to fix a problem. Humanity continues to allow many severe injustices to persist, despite being aware of them. So why is it so hard to imagine we might have done the same with forced labour? In this episode, Christopher describes the unique and peculiar set of political, social and religious circumstances that gave rise to the only successful and lasting anti-slavery movement in human history. These circumstances were sufficiently improbable that Christopher believes there are very nearby worlds where abolitionism might never have taken off. We also discuss:Various instantiations of slavery throughout human historySigns of antislavery sentiment before the 17th centuryThe role of the Quakers in early British abolitionist movementThe importance of individual “heroes” in the abolitionist movementArguments against the idea that the abolition of slavery was contingentWhether there have ever been any major moral shifts that were inevitableGet this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Milo McGuireTranscriptions: Katy Moore

What’s the opposite of cancer?If you answered “cure,” “antidote,” or “antivenom” — you’ve obviously been reading the antonym section at www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/cancer.But today’s guest Athena Aktipis says that the opposite of cancer is us: it's having a functional multicellular body that’s cooperating effectively in order to make that multicellular body function.If, like us, you found her answer far more satisfying than the dictionary, maybe you could consider closing your dozens of merriam-webster.com tabs, and start listening to this podcast instead.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. As Athena explains in her book The Cheating Cell, what we see with cancer is a breakdown in each of the foundations of cooperation that allowed multicellularity to arise: Cells will proliferate when they shouldn't. Cells won't die when they should. Cells won't engage in the kind of division of labour that they should. Cells won’t do the jobs that they're supposed to do. Cells will monopolise resources. And cells will trash the environment.When we think about animals in the wild, or even bacteria living inside our cells, we understand that they're facing evolutionary pressures to figure out how they can replicate more; how they can get more resources; and how they can avoid predators — like lions, or antibiotics.We don’t normally think of individual cells as acting as if they have their own interests like this. But cancer cells are actually facing similar kinds of evolutionary pressures within our bodies, with one major difference: they replicate much, much faster.Incredibly, the opportunity for evolution by natural selection to operate just over the course of cancer progression is easily faster than all of the evolutionary time that we have had as humans since *Homo sapiens* came about.Here’s a quote from Athena:“So you have to shift your thinking to be like: the body is a world with all these different ecosystems in it, and the cells are existing on a time scale where, if we're going to map it onto anything like what we experience, a day is at least 10 years for them, right? So it's a very, very different way of thinking.”You can find compelling examples of cooperation and conflict all over the universe, so Rob and Athena don’t stop with cancer. They also discuss:Cheating within cells themselvesCooperation in human societies as they exist today — and perhaps in the future, between civilisations spread across different planets or starsWhether it’s too out-there to think of humans as engaging in cancerous behaviourWhy elephants get deadly cancers less often than humans, despite having way more cellsWhen a cell should commit suicideThe strategy of deliberately not treating cancer aggressivelySuperhuman cooperationAnd at the end of the episode, they cover Athena’s new book Everything is Fine! How to Thrive in the Apocalypse, including:Staying happy while thinking about the apocalypsePractical steps to prepare for the apocalypseAnd whether a zombie apocalypse is already happening among Tasmanian devilsAnd if you’d rather see Rob and Athena’s facial expressions as they laugh and laugh while discussing cancer and the apocalypse — you can watch the video of the full interview. Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Milo McGuireTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Rebroadcast: this episode was originally released in June 2020. Today’s guest, New York Times bestselling author A.J. Jacobs, always hated Judge Judy. But after he found out that she was his seventh cousin, he thought, "You know what, she's not so bad". Hijacking this bias towards family and trying to broaden it to everyone led to his three-year adventure to help build the biggest family tree in history. He’s also spent months saying whatever was on his mind, tried to become the healthiest person in the world, read 33,000 pages of facts, spent a year following the Bible literally, thanked everyone involved in making his morning cup of coffee, and tried to figure out how to do the most good. His latest book asks: if we reframe global problems as puzzles, would the world be a better place? Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. This is the first time I’ve hosted the podcast, and I’m hoping to convince people to listen with this attempt at clever show notes that change style each paragraph to reference different A.J. experiments. I don’t actually think it’s that clever, but all of my other ideas seemed worse. I really have no idea how people will react to this episode; I loved it, but I definitely think I’m more entertaining than almost anyone else will. (Radical Honesty.) We do talk about some useful stuff — one of which is the concept of micro goals. When you wake up in the morning, just commit to putting on your workout clothes. Once they’re on, maybe you’ll think that you might as well get on the treadmill — just for a minute. And once you’re on for 1 minute, you’ll often stay on for 20. So I’m not asking you to commit to listening to the whole episode — just to put on your headphones. (Drop Dead Healthy.) Another reason to listen is for the facts: • The Bayer aspirin company invented heroin as a cough suppressant • Coriander is just the British way of saying cilantro • Dogs have a third eyelid to protect the eyeball from irritants • and A.J. read all 44 million words of the Encyclopedia Britannica from A to Z, which drove home the idea that we know so little about the world (although he does now know that opossums have 13 nipples). (The Know-It-All.) One extra argument for listening: If you interpret the second commandment literally, then it tells you not to make a likeness of anything in heaven, on earth, or underwater — which rules out basically all images. That means no photos, no TV, no movies. So, if you want to respect the bible, you should definitely consider making podcasts your main source of entertainment (as long as you’re not listening on the Sabbath). (The Year of Living Biblically.) I’m so thankful to A.J. for doing this. But I also want to thank Julie, Jasper, Zane and Lucas who allowed me to spend the day in their home; the construction worker who told me how to get to my subway platform on the morning of the interview; and Queen Jadwiga for making bagels popular in the 1300s, which kept me going during the recording. (Thanks a Thousand.) We also discuss: • Blackmailing yourself • The most extreme ideas A.J.’s ever considered • Utilitarian movie reviews • Doing good as a writer • And much more. Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Or read the linked transcript. Producer: Keiran Harris. Audio mastering: Ben Cordell. Transcript for this episode: Zakee Ulhaq.

Rebroadcast: this episode was originally released in July 2020. 80,000 Hours, along with many other members of the effective altruism movement, has argued that helping to positively shape the development of artificial intelligence may be one of the best ways to have a lasting, positive impact on the long-term future. Millions of dollars in philanthropic spending, as well as lots of career changes, have been motivated by these arguments. Today’s guest, Ben Garfinkel, Research Fellow at Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, supports the continued expansion of AI safety as a field and believes working on AI is among the very best ways to have a positive impact on the long-term future. But he also believes the classic AI risk arguments have been subject to insufficient scrutiny given this level of investment. In particular, the case for working on AI if you care about the long-term future has often been made on the basis of concern about AI accidents; it’s actually quite difficult to design systems that you can feel confident will behave the way you want them to in all circumstances. Nick Bostrom wrote the most fleshed out version of the argument in his book, Superintelligence. But Ben reminds us that, apart from Bostrom’s book and essays by Eliezer Yudkowsky, there's very little existing writing on existential accidents. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. There have also been very few skeptical experts that have actually sat down and fully engaged with it, writing down point by point where they disagree or where they think the mistakes are. This means that Ben has probably scrutinised classic AI risk arguments as carefully as almost anyone else in the world. He thinks that most of the arguments for existential accidents often rely on fuzzy, abstract concepts like optimisation power or general intelligence or goals, and toy thought experiments. And he doesn’t think it’s clear we should take these as a strong source of evidence. Ben’s also concerned that these scenarios often involve massive jumps in the capabilities of a single system, but it's really not clear that we should expect such jumps or find them plausible. These toy examples also focus on the idea that because human preferences are so nuanced and so hard to state precisely, it should be quite difficult to get a machine that can understand how to obey them. But Ben points out that it's also the case in machine learning that we can train lots of systems to engage in behaviours that are actually quite nuanced and that we can't specify precisely. If AI systems can recognise faces from images, and fly helicopters, why don’t we think they’ll be able to understand human preferences? Despite these concerns, Ben is still fairly optimistic about the value of working on AI safety or governance. He doesn’t think that there are any slam-dunks for improving the future, and so the fact that there are at least plausible pathways for impact by working on AI safety and AI governance, in addition to it still being a very neglected area, puts it head and shoulders above most areas you might choose to work in. This is the second episode hosted by Howie Lempel, and he and Ben cover, among many other things: • The threat of AI systems increasing the risk of permanently damaging conflict or collapse • The possibility of permanently locking in a positive or negative future • Contenders for types of advanced systems • What role AI should play in the effective altruism portfolio Get this episode by subscribing: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Or read the linked transcript. Producer: Keiran Harris. Audio mastering: Ben Cordell. Transcript for this episode: Zakee Ulhaq.

Rebroadcast: this episode was originally released in July 2020. Today’s guest, Jennifer Doleac — Associate Professor of Economics at Texas A&M University, and Director of the Justice Tech Lab — is an expert on empirical research into policing, law and incarceration. In this extensive interview, she highlights three ways to effectively prevent crime that don't require police or prisons and the human toll they bring with them: better street lighting, cognitive behavioral therapy, and lead reduction. One of Jennifer’s papers used switches into and out of daylight saving time as a 'natural experiment' to measure the effect of light levels on crime. One day the sun sets at 5pm; the next day it sets at 6pm. When that evening hour is dark instead of light, robberies during it roughly double. Links to sources for the claims in these show notes, other resources to learn more, the full blog post, and a full transcript. The idea here is that if you try to rob someone in broad daylight, they might see you coming, and witnesses might later be able to identify you. You're just more likely to get caught. You might think: "Well, people will just commit crime in the morning instead". But it looks like criminals aren’t early risers, and that doesn’t happen. On her unusually rigorous podcast Probable Causation, Jennifer spoke to one of the authors of a related study, in which very bright streetlights were randomly added to some public housing complexes but not others. They found the lights reduced outdoor night-time crime by 36%, at little cost. The next best thing to sun-light is human-light, so just installing more streetlights might be one of the easiest ways to cut crime, without having to hassle or punish anyone. The second approach is cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), in which you're taught to slow down your decision-making, and think through your assumptions before acting. There was a randomised controlled trial done in schools, as well as juvenile detention facilities in Chicago, where the kids assigned to get CBT were followed over time and compared with those who were not assigned to receive CBT. They found the CBT course reduced rearrest rates by a third, and lowered the likelihood of a child returning to a juvenile detention facility by 20%. Jennifer says that the program isn’t that expensive, and the benefits are massive. Everyone would probably benefit from being able to talk through their problems but the gains are especially large for people who've grown up with the trauma of violence in their lives. Finally, Jennifer thinks that reducing lead levels might be the best buy of all in crime prevention. There is really compelling evidence that lead not only increases crime, but also dramatically reduces educational outcomes. In today’s conversation, Rob and Jennifer also cover, among many other things: • Misconduct, hiring practices and accountability among US police • Procedural justice training • Overrated policy ideas • Policies to try to reduce racial discrimination • The effects of DNA databases • Diversity in economics • The quality of social science research Get this episode by subscribing: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran Harris. Audio mastering: Ben Cordell. Transcript for this episode: Zakee Ulhaq.

America aims to avoid nuclear war by relying on the principle of 'mutually assured destruction,' right? Wrong. Or at least... not officially.As today's guest — Jeffrey Lewis, founder of Arms Control Wonk and professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies — explains, in its official 'OPLANs' (military operation plans), the US is committed to 'dominating' in a nuclear war with Russia. How would they do that? "That is redacted." Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. We invited Jeffrey to come on the show to lay out what we and our listeners are most likely to be misunderstanding about nuclear weapons, the nuclear posture of major powers, and his field as a whole, and he did not disappoint. As Jeffrey tells it, 'mutually assured destruction' was a slur used to criticise those who wanted to limit the 1960s arms buildup, and was never accepted as a matter of policy in any US administration. But isn't it still the de facto reality? Yes and no. Jeffrey is a specialist on the nuts and bolts of bureaucratic and military decision-making in real-life situations. He suspects that at the start of their term presidents get a briefing about the US' plan to prevail in a nuclear war and conclude that "it's freaking madness." They say to themselves that whatever these silly plans may say, they know a nuclear war cannot be won, so they just won't use the weapons. But Jeffrey thinks that's a big mistake. Yes, in a calm moment presidents can resist pressure from advisors and generals. But that idea of ‘winning’ a nuclear war is in all the plans. Staff have been hired because they believe in those plans. It's what the generals and admirals have all prepared for. What matters is the 'not calm moment': the 3AM phone call to tell the president that ICBMs might hit the US in eight minutes — the same week Russia invades a neighbour or China invades Taiwan. Is it a false alarm? Should they retaliate before their land-based missile silos are hit? There's only minutes to decide. Jeffrey points out that in emergencies, presidents have repeatedly found themselves railroaded into actions they didn't want to take because of how information and options were processed and presented to them. In the heat of the moment, it's natural to reach for the plan you've prepared — however mad it might sound. In this spicy conversation, Jeffrey fields the most burning questions from Rob and the audience, in the process explaining: • Why inter-service rivalry is one of the biggest constraints on US nuclear policy • Two times the US sabotaged nuclear nonproliferation among great powers • How his field uses jargon to exclude outsiders • How the US could prevent the revival of mass nuclear testing by the great powers • Why nuclear deterrence relies on the possibility that something might go wrong • Whether 'salami tactics' render nuclear weapons ineffective • The time the Navy and Air Force switched views on how to wage a nuclear war, just when it would allow *them* to have the most missiles • The problems that arise when you won't talk to people you think are evil • Why missile defences are politically popular despite being strategically foolish • How open source intelligence can prevent arms races • And much more.Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:49)Misconceptions in the effective altruism community (00:05:42)Nuclear deterrence (00:17:36)Dishonest rituals (00:28:17)Downsides of generalist research (00:32:13)“Mutual assured destruction” (00:38:18)Budgetary considerations for competing parts of the US military (00:51:53)Where the effective altruism community can potentially add the most value (01:02:15)Gatekeeping (01:12:04)Strengths of the nuclear security community (01:16:14)Disarmament (01:26:58)Nuclear winter (01:38:53)Attacks against US allies (01:41:46)Most likely weapons to get used (01:45:11)The role of moral arguments (01:46:40)Salami tactics (01:52:01)Jeffrey's disagreements with Thomas Schelling (01:57:00)Why did it take so long to get nuclear arms agreements? (02:01:11)Detecting secret nuclear facilities (02:03:18)Where Jeffrey would give $10M in grants (02:05:46)The importance of archival research (02:11:03)Jeffrey's policy ideas (02:20:03)What should the US do regarding China? (02:27:10)What should the US do regarding Russia? (02:31:42)What should the US do regarding Taiwan? (02:35:27)Advice for people interested in working on nuclear security (02:37:23)Rob’s outro (02:39:13)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

John McWhorter is a linguistics professor at Columbia University specialising in research on creole languages.He's also a content-producing machine, never afraid to give his frank opinion on anything and everything. On top of his academic work he's also written 22 books, produced five online university courses, hosts one and a half podcasts, and now writes a regular New York Times op-ed column.Links to learn more, summary, and full transcript Video version of the interview Lecture: Why the world looks the same in any languageOur show is mostly about the world's most pressing problems and what you can do to solve them. But what's the point of hosting a podcast if you can't occasionally just talk about something fascinating with someone whose work you appreciate?So today, just before the holidays, we're sharing this interview with John about language and linguistics — including what we think are some of the most important things everyone ought to know about those topics. We ask him:Can you communicate faster in some languages than others, or is there some constraint that prevents that?Does learning a second or third language make you smarter or not?Can a language decay and get worse at communicating what people want to say?If children aren't taught a language, how many generations does it take them to invent a fully fledged one of their own?Did Shakespeare write in a foreign language, and if so, should we translate his plays?How much does language really shape the way we think?Are creoles the best languages in the world — languages that ideally we would all speak?What would be the optimal number of languages globally?Does trying to save dying languages do their speakers a favour, or is it more of an imposition?Should we bother to teach foreign languages in UK and US schools?Is it possible to save the important cultural aspects embedded in a dying language without saving the language itself?Will AI models speak a language of their own in the future, one that humans can't understand but which better serves the tradeoffs AI models need to make?We then put some of these questions to ChatGPT itself, asking it to play the role of a linguistics professor at Columbia University.We’ve also added John’s talk “Why the World Looks the Same in Any Language” to the end of this episode. So stick around after the credits! And if you’d rather see Rob and John’s facial expressions or beautiful high cheekbones while listening to this conversation, you can watch the video of the full conversation here. Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellVideo editing: Ryan KesslerTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Large language models like GPT-3, and now ChatGPT, are neural networks trained on a large fraction of all text available on the internet to do one thing: predict the next word in a passage. This simple technique has led to something extraordinary — black boxes able to write TV scripts, explain jokes, produce satirical poetry, answer common factual questions, argue sensibly for political positions, and more. Every month their capabilities grow. But do they really 'understand' what they're saying, or do they just give the illusion of understanding? Today's guest, Richard Ngo, thinks that in the most important sense they understand many things. Richard is a researcher at OpenAI — the company that created ChatGPT — who works to foresee where AI advances are going and develop strategies that will keep these models from 'acting out' as they become more powerful, are deployed and ultimately given power in society. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. One way to think about 'understanding' is as a subjective experience. Whether it feels like something to be a large language model is an important question, but one we currently have no way to answer. However, as Richard explains, another way to think about 'understanding' is as a functional matter. If you really understand an idea you're able to use it to reason and draw inferences in new situations. And that kind of understanding is observable and testable. Richard argues that language models are developing sophisticated representations of the world which can be manipulated to draw sensible conclusions — maybe not so different from what happens in the human mind. And experiments have found that, as models get more parameters and are trained on more data, these types of capabilities consistently improve. We might feel reluctant to say a computer understands something the way that we do. But if it walks like a duck and it quacks like a duck, we should consider that maybe we have a duck, or at least something sufficiently close to a duck it doesn't matter. In today's conversation we discuss the above, as well as: • Could speeding up AI development be a bad thing? • The balance between excitement and fear when it comes to AI advances • What OpenAI focuses its efforts where it does • Common misconceptions about machine learning • How many computer chips it might require to be able to do most of the things humans do • How Richard understands the 'alignment problem' differently than other people • Why 'situational awareness' may be a key concept for understanding the behaviour of AI models • What work to positively shape the development of AI Richard is and isn't excited about • The AGI Safety Fundamentals course that Richard developed to help people learn more about this field Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering: Milo McGuire and Ben Cordell Transcriptions: Katy Moore

Today’s release is a reading of our article called My experience with imposter syndrome — and how to (partly) overcome it, written and narrated by Luisa Rodriguez. If you want to check out the links, footnotes and figures in today’s article, you can find those here. And if you like this article, you’ll probably enjoy episode #100 of this show: Having a successful career with depression, anxiety, and imposter syndrome Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type ‘80,000 Hours’ into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering and editing for this episode: Milo McGuire

In this episode, usual host of the show Rob Wiblin gives his thoughts on the recent collapse of FTX. Click here for an official 80,000 Hours statement. And here are links to some potentially relevant 80,000 Hours pieces: • Episode #24 of this show – Stefan Schubert on why it’s a bad idea to break the rules, even if it’s for a good cause. • Is it ever OK to take a harmful job in order to do more good? An in-depth analysis • What are the 10 most harmful jobs? • Ways people trying to do good accidentally make things worse, and how to avoid them

Is war in long-term decline? Steven Pinker's The Better Angels of Our Nature brought this previously obscure academic question to the centre of public debate, and pointed to rates of death in war to argue energetically that war is on the way out. But that idea divides war scholars and statisticians, and so Better Angels has prompted a spirited debate, with datasets and statistical analyses exchanged back and forth year after year. The lack of consensus has left a somewhat bewildered public (including host Rob Wiblin) unsure quite what to believe. Today's guest, professor in political science Bear Braumoeller, is one of the scholars who believes we lack convincing evidence that warlikeness is in long-term decline. He collected the analysis that led him to that conclusion in his 2019 book, Only the Dead: The Persistence of War in the Modern Age. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. The question is of great practical importance. The US and PRC are entering a period of renewed great power competition, with Taiwan as a potential trigger for war, and Russia is once more invading and attempting to annex the territory of its neighbours. If war has been going out of fashion since the start of the Enlightenment, we might console ourselves that however nerve-wracking these present circumstances may feel, modern culture will throw up powerful barriers to another world war. But if we're as war-prone as we ever have been, one need only inspect the record of the 20th century to recoil in horror at what might await us in the 21st. Bear argues that the second reaction is the appropriate one. The world has gone up in flames many times through history, with roughly 0.5% of the population dying in the Napoleonic Wars, 1% in World War I, 3% in World War II, and perhaps 10% during the Mongol conquests. And with no reason to think similar catastrophes are any less likely today, complacency could lead us to sleepwalk into disaster. He gets to this conclusion primarily by analysing the datasets of the decades-old Correlates of War project, which aspires to track all interstate conflicts and battlefield deaths since 1815. In Only the Dead, he chops up and inspects this data dozens of different ways, to test if there are any shifts over time which seem larger than what could be explained by chance variation alone. In a nutshell, Bear simply finds no general trend in either direction from 1815 through today. It seems like, as philosopher George Santayana lamented in 1922, "only the dead have seen the end of war". In today's conversation, Bear and Rob discuss all of the above in more detail than even a usual 80,000 Hours podcast episode, as well as: • Why haven't modern ideas about the immorality of violence led to the decline of war, when it's such a natural thing to expect? • What would Bear's critics say in response to all this? • What do the optimists get right? • How does one do proper statistical tests for events that are clumped together, like war deaths? • Why are deaths in war so concentrated in a handful of the most extreme events? • Did the ideas of the Enlightenment promote nonviolence, on balance? • Were early states more or less violent than groups of hunter-gatherers? • If Bear is right, what can be done? • How did the 'Concert of Europe' or 'Bismarckian system' maintain peace in the 19th century? • Which wars are remarkable but largely unknown? Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:03:32)Only the Dead (00:06:28)The Enlightenment (00:16:47)Democratic peace theory (00:26:22)Is religion a key driver of war? (00:29:27)International orders (00:33:07)The Concert of Europe (00:42:15)The Bismarckian system (00:53:43)The current international order (00:58:16)The Better Angels of Our Nature (01:17:30)War datasets (01:32:03)Seeing patterns in data where none exist (01:45:32)Change-point analysis (01:49:33)Rates of violent death throughout history (01:54:32)War initiation (02:02:55)Escalation (02:17:57)Getting massively different results from the same data (02:28:38)How worried we should be (02:34:07)Most likely ways Only the Dead is wrong (02:36:25)Astonishing smaller wars (02:40:39)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ryan KesslerTranscriptions: Katy Moore

A casino offers you a game. A coin will be tossed. If it comes up heads on the first flip you win $2. If it comes up on the second flip you win $4. If it comes up on the third you win $8, the fourth you win $16, and so on. How much should you be willing to pay to play? The standard way of analysing gambling problems, ‘expected value’ — in which you multiply probabilities by the value of each outcome and then sum them up — says your expected earnings are infinite. You have a 50% chance of winning $2, for '0.5 * $2 = $1' in expected earnings. A 25% chance of winning $4, for '0.25 * $4 = $1' in expected earnings, and on and on. A never-ending series of $1s added together comes to infinity. And that's despite the fact that you know with certainty you can only ever win a finite amount! Today's guest — philosopher Alan Hájek of the Australian National University — thinks of much of philosophy as “the demolition of common sense followed by damage control” and is an expert on paradoxes related to probability and decision-making rules like “maximise expected value.” Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. The problem described above, known as the St. Petersburg paradox, has been a staple of the field since the 18th century, with many proposed solutions. In the interview, Alan explains how very natural attempts to resolve the paradox — such as factoring in the low likelihood that the casino can pay out very large sums, or the fact that money becomes less and less valuable the more of it you already have — fail to work as hoped. We might reject the setup as a hypothetical that could never exist in the real world, and therefore of mere intellectual curiosity. But Alan doesn't find that objection persuasive. If expected value fails in extreme cases, that should make us worry that something could be rotten at the heart of the standard procedure we use to make decisions in government, business, and nonprofits. These issues regularly show up in 80,000 Hours' efforts to try to find the best ways to improve the world, as the best approach will arguably involve long-shot attempts to do very large amounts of good. Consider which is better: saving one life for sure, or three lives with 50% probability? Expected value says the second, which will probably strike you as reasonable enough. But what if we repeat this process and evaluate the chance to save nine lives with 25% probability, or 27 lives with 12.5% probability, or after 17 more iterations, 3,486,784,401 lives with a 0.00000009% chance. Expected value says this final offer is better than the others — 1,000 times better, in fact. Ultimately Alan leans towards the view that our best choice is to “bite the bullet” and stick with expected value, even with its sometimes counterintuitive implications. Where we want to do damage control, we're better off looking for ways our probability estimates might be wrong. In today's conversation, Alan and Rob explore these issues and many others: • Simple rules of thumb for having philosophical insights • A key flaw that hid in Pascal's wager from the very beginning • Whether we have to simply ignore infinities because they mess everything up • What fundamentally is 'probability'? • Some of the many reasons 'frequentism' doesn't work as an account of probability • Why the standard account of counterfactuals in philosophy is deeply flawed • And why counterfactuals present a fatal problem for one sort of consequentialism Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:48)Philosophical methodology (00:02:54)Theories of probability (00:37:17)Everyday Bayesianism (00:46:01)Frequentism (01:04:56)Ranges of probabilities (01:16:23)Implications for how to live (01:21:24)Expected value (01:26:58)The St. Petersburg paradox (01:31:40)Pascal's wager (01:49:44)Using expected value in everyday life (02:03:53)Counterfactuals (02:16:38)Most counterfactuals are false (02:52:25)Relevance to objective consequentialism (03:09:47)Marker 18 (03:10:21)Alan’s best conference story (03:33:37)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben Cordell and Ryan KesslerTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Today’s release is a professional reading of our new problem profile on preventing an AI-related catastrophe, written by Benjamin Hilton. We expect that there will be substantial progress in AI in the next few decades, potentially even to the point where machines come to outperform humans in many, if not all, tasks. This could have enormous benefits, helping to solve currently intractable global problems, but could also pose severe risks. These risks could arise accidentally (for example, if we don’t find technical solutions to concerns about the safety of AI systems), or deliberately (for example, if AI systems worsen geopolitical conflict). We think more work needs to be done to reduce these risks. Some of these risks from advanced AI could be existential — meaning they could cause human extinction, or an equally permanent and severe disempowerment of humanity. There have not yet been any satisfying answers to concerns about how this rapidly approaching, transformative technology can be safely developed and integrated into our society. Finding answers to these concerns is very neglected, and may well be tractable. We estimate that there are around 300 people worldwide working directly on this. As a result, the possibility of AI-related catastrophe may be the world’s most pressing problem — and the best thing to work on for those who are well-placed to contribute. Promising options for working on this problem include technical research on how to create safe AI systems, strategy research into the particular risks AI might pose, and policy research into ways in which companies and governments could mitigate these risks. If worthwhile policies are developed, we’ll need people to put them in place and implement them. There are also many opportunities to have a big impact in a variety of complementary roles, such as operations management, journalism, earning to give, and more. If you want to check out the links, footnotes and figures in today’s article, you can find those here. Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type ‘80,000 Hours’ into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran Harris Editing and narration: Perrin Walker and Shaun Acker Audio proofing: Katy Moore

What in the world is intrinsically good — good in itself even if it has no other effects? Over the millennia, people have offered many answers: joy, justice, equality, accomplishment, loving god, wisdom, and plenty more. The question is a classic that makes for great dorm-room philosophy discussion. But it's hardly just of academic interest. The issue of what (if anything) is intrinsically valuable bears on every action we take, whether we’re looking to improve our own lives, or to help others. The wrong answer might lead us to the wrong project and render our efforts to improve the world entirely ineffective. Today's guest, Sharon Hewitt Rawlette — philosopher and author of The Feeling of Value: Moral Realism Grounded in Phenomenal Consciousness — wants to resuscitate an answer to this question that is as old as philosophy itself. Links to learn more, summary, full transcript, and full version of this blog post. That idea, in a nutshell, is that there is only one thing of true intrinsic value: positive feelings and sensations. And similarly, there is only one thing that is intrinsically of negative value: suffering, pain, and other unpleasant sensations. Lots of other things are valuable too: friendship, fairness, loyalty, integrity, wealth, patience, houses, and so on. But they are only instrumentally valuable — that is to say, they’re valuable as means to the end of ensuring that all conscious beings experience more pleasure and other positive sensations, and less suffering. As Sharon notes, from Athens in 400 BC to Britain in 1850, the idea that only subjective experiences can be good or bad in themselves -- a position known as 'philosophical hedonism' -- has been one of the most enduringly popular ideas in ethics. And few will be taken aback by the notion that, all else equal, more pleasure is good and less suffering is bad. But can they really be the only intrinsically valuable things? Over the 20th century, philosophical hedonism became increasingly controversial in the face of some seemingly very counterintuitive implications. For this reason the famous philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel called The Feeling of Value "a radical and important philosophical contribution." In today's interview, Sharon explains the case for a theory of value grounded in subjective experiences, and why she believes the most popular counterarguments are misguided. Host Rob Wiblin and Sharon also cover: • The essential need to disentangle intrinsic, instrumental, and other sorts of value • Why Sharon’s arguments lead to hedonistic utilitarianism rather than hedonistic egoism (in which we only care about our own feelings) • How do people react to the 'experience machine' thought experiment when surveyed? • Why hedonism recommends often thinking and acting as though it were false • Whether it's crazy to think that relationships are only useful because of their effects on our subjective experiences • Whether it will ever be possible to eliminate pain, and whether doing so would be desirable • If we didn't have positive or negative experiences, whether that would cause us to simply never talk about goodness and badness • Whether the plausibility of hedonism is affected by our theory of mind • And plenty more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:45)Metaethics (00:04:16)Anti-realism (00:10:39)Sharon's theory of moral realism (00:16:17)The history of hedonism (00:23:11)Intrinsic value vs instrumental value (00:28:49)Egoistic hedonism (00:36:30)Single axis of value (00:42:19)Key objections to Sharon’s brand of hedonism (00:56:18)The experience machine (01:06:08)Robot spouses (01:22:29)Most common misunderstanding of Sharon’s view (01:27:10)How might a hedonist actually live (01:37:46)The organ transplant case (01:53:34)Counterintuitive implications of hedonistic utilitarianism (02:03:40)How could we discover moral facts? (02:18:05)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ryan KesslerTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Effective altruism, in a slogan, aims to 'do the most good.' Utilitarianism, in a slogan, says we should act to 'produce the greatest good for the greatest number.' It's clear enough why utilitarians should be interested in the project of effective altruism. But what about the many people who reject utilitarianism? Today's guest, Andreas Mogensen — senior research fellow at Oxford University's Global Priorities Institute — rejects utilitarianism, but as he explains, this does little to dampen his enthusiasm for the project of effective altruism. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Andreas leans towards 'deontological' or rule-based theories of ethics, rather than 'consequentialist' theories like utilitarianism which look exclusively at the effects of a person's actions. Like most people involved in effective altruism, he parts ways with utilitarianism in rejecting its maximal level of demandingness, the idea that the ends justify the means, and the notion that the only moral reason for action is to benefit everyone in the world considered impartially. However, Andreas believes any plausible theory of morality must give some weight to the harms and benefits we provide to other people. If we can improve a stranger's wellbeing enormously at negligible cost to ourselves and without violating any other moral prohibition, that must be at minimum a praiseworthy thing to do. In a world as full of preventable suffering as our own, this simple 'principle of beneficence' is probably the only premise one needs to grant for the effective altruist project of identifying the most impactful ways to help others to be of great moral interest and importance. As an illustrative example Andreas refers to the Giving What We Can pledge to donate 10% of one's income to the most impactful charities available, a pledge he took in 2009. Many effective altruism enthusiasts have taken such a pledge, while others spend their careers trying to figure out the most cost-effective places pledgers can give, where they'll get the biggest 'bang for buck'. For someone living in a world as unequal as our own, this pledge at a very minimum gives an upper-middle class person in a rich country the chance to transfer money to someone living on about 1% as much as they do. The benefit an extremely poor recipient receives from the money is likely far more than the donor could get spending it on themselves. What arguments could a non-utilitarian moral theory mount against such giving? Many approaches to morality will say it's permissible not to give away 10% of your income to help others as effectively as is possible. But if they will almost all regard it as praiseworthy to benefit others without giving up something else of equivalent moral value, then Andreas argues they should be enthusiastic about effective altruism as an intellectual and practical project nonetheless. In this conversation, Andreas and Rob discuss how robust the above line of argument is, and also cover: • Should we treat thought experiments that feature very large numbers with great suspicion? • If we had to allow someone to die to avoid preventing the World Cup final from being broadcast to the world, is that permissible? • What might a virtue ethicist regard as 'doing the most good'? • If a deontological theory of morality parted ways with common effective altruist practices, how would that likely be? • If we can explain how we came to hold a view on a moral issue by referring to evolutionary selective pressures, should we disbelieve that view? Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:36)Deontology and effective altruism (00:04:59)Giving What We Can (00:28:56)Longtermism without consequentialism (00:38:01)Further differences between deontologists and consequentialists (00:44:13)Virtue ethics and effective altruism (01:08:15)Is Andreas really a deontologist? (01:13:26)Large number scepticism (01:21:11)Evolutionary debunking arguments (01:58:48)How Andreas’s views have changed (02:12:18)Derek Parfit’s influence on Andreas (02:17:27)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben Cordell and Beppe RådvikTranscriptions: Katy Moore

People who exist in the future deserve some degree of moral consideration.The future could be very big, very long, and/or very good.We can reasonably hope to influence whether people in the future exist, and how good or bad their lives are.So trying to make the world better for future generations is a key priority of our time.This is the simple four-step argument for 'longtermism' put forward in What We Owe The Future, the latest book from today's guest — University of Oxford philosopher and cofounder of the effective altruism community, Will MacAskill. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. From one point of view this idea is common sense. We work on breakthroughs to treat cancer or end use of fossil fuels not just for people alive today, but because we hope such scientific advances will help our children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren as well. Some who take this longtermist idea seriously work to develop broad-spectrum vaccines they hope will safeguard humanity against the sorts of extremely deadly pandemics that could permanently throw civilisation off track — the sort of project few could argue is not worthwhile. But Will is upfront that longtermism is also counterintuitive. To start with, he's willing to contemplate timescales far beyond what's typically discussed. A natural objection to thinking millions of years ahead is that it's hard enough to take actions that have positive effects that persist for hundreds of years, let alone “indefinitely.” It doesn't matter how important something might be if you can't predictably change it. This is one reason, among others, that Will was initially sceptical of longtermism and took years to come around. He preferred to focus on ending poverty and preventable diseases in ways he could directly see were working. But over seven years he gradually changed his mind, and in *What We Owe The Future*, Will argues that in fact there are clear ways we might act now that could benefit not just a few but *all* future generations. The idea that preventing human extinction would have long-lasting impacts is pretty intuitive. If we entirely disappear, we aren't coming back. But the idea that we can shape human values — not just for our age, but for all ages — is a surprising one that Will has come to more recently. In the book, he argues that what people value is far more fragile and historically contingent than it might first seem. For instance, today it feels like the abolition of slavery was an inevitable part of the arc of history. But Will lays out that the best research on the topic suggests otherwise. If moral progress really is so contingent, and bad ideas can persist almost without end, it raises the stakes for moral debate today. If we don't eliminate a bad practice now, it may be with us forever. In today's in-depth conversation, we discuss the possibility of a harmful moral 'lock-in' as well as: • How Will was eventually won over to longtermism • The three best lines of argument against longtermism • How to avoid moral fanaticism • Which technologies or events are most likely to have permanent effects • What 'longtermists' do today in practice • How to predict the long-term effect of our actions • Whether the future is likely to be good or bad • Concrete ideas to make the future better • What Will donates his money to personally • Potatoes and megafauna • And plenty moreChapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:36)What longtermism actually is (00:02:31)The case for longtermism (00:04:30)What longtermists are actually doing (00:15:54)Will’s personal journey (00:22:15)Strongest arguments against longtermism (00:42:28)Preventing extinction vs. improving the quality of the future (00:59:29)Is humanity likely to converge on doing the same thing regardless? (01:06:58)Lock-in scenario vs. long reflection (01:27:11)Is the future good in expectation? (01:32:29)Can we actually predictably influence the future positively? (01:47:27)Tiny probabilities of enormous value (01:53:40)Stagnation (02:19:04)Concrete suggestions (02:34:27)Where Will donates (02:39:40)Potatoes and megafauna (02:41:48)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

After a frenetic level of commentary during February and March, the war in Ukraine has faded into the background of our news coverage. But with the benefit of time we're in a much stronger position to understand what happened, why, whether there are broader lessons to take away, and how the conflict might be ended. And the conflict appears far from over. So today, we are returning to speak a second time with Samuel Charap — one of the US’s foremost experts on Russia’s relationship with former Soviet states, and coauthor of the 2017 book Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. As Sam lays out, Russia controls much of Ukraine's east and south, and seems to be preparing to politically incorporate that territory into Russia itself later in the year. At the same time, Ukraine is gearing up for a counteroffensive before defensive positions become dug in over winter. Each day the war continues it takes a toll on ordinary Ukrainians, contributes to a global food shortage, and leaves the US and Russia unable to coordinate on any other issues and at an elevated risk of direct conflict. In today's brisk conversation, Rob and Sam cover the following topics: • Current territorial control and the level of attrition within Russia’s and Ukraine's military forces. • Russia's current goals. • Whether Sam's views have changed since March on topics like: Putin's motivations, the wisdom of Ukraine's strategy, the likely impact of Western sanctions, and the risks from Finland and Sweden joining NATO before the war ends. • Why so many people incorrectly expected Russia to fully mobilise for war or persist with their original approach to the invasion. • Whether there's anything to learn from many of our worst fears -- such as the use of bioweapons on civilians -- not coming to pass. • What can be done to ensure some nuclear arms control agreement between the US and Russia remains in place after 2026 (when New START expires). • Why Sam considers a settlement proposal put forward by Ukraine in late March to be the most plausible way to end the war and ensure stability — though it's still a long shot. Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:31)The state of play in Ukraine (00:03:05)How things have changed since March (00:12:59)Has Russia learned from its mistakes? (00:23:40)Broader lessons (00:28:44)A possible way out (00:37:15) Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering: Ben Cordell and Ryan Kessler Transcriptions: Katy Moore

Wind back 1,000 years and the moral landscape looks very different to today. Most farming societies thought slavery was natural and unobjectionable, premarital sex was an abomination, women should obey their husbands, and commoners should obey their monarchs.Wind back 10,000 years and things look very different again. Most hunter-gatherer groups thought men who got too big for their britches needed to be put in their place rather than obeyed, and lifelong monogamy could hardly be expected of men or women.Why such big systematic changes — and why these changes specifically?That's the question best-selling historian Ian Morris takes up in his book, Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels: How Human Values Evolve. Ian has spent his academic life studying long-term history, trying to explain the big-picture changes that play out over hundreds or thousands of years. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. There are a number of possible explanations one could offer for the wide-ranging shifts in opinion on the 'right' way to live. Maybe the natural sciences progressed and people realised their previous ideas were mistaken? Perhaps a few persuasive advocates turned the course of history with their revolutionary arguments? Maybe everyone just got nicer? In Foragers, Farmers and Fossil Fuels Ian presents a provocative alternative: human culture gradually evolves towards whatever system of organisation allows a society to harvest the most energy, and we then conclude that system is the most virtuous one. Egalitarian values helped hunter-gatherers hunt and gather effectively. Once farming was developed, hierarchy proved to be the social structure that produced the most grain (and best repelled nomadic raiders). And in the modern era, democracy and individuality have proven to be more productive ways to collect and exploit fossil fuels. On this theory, it's technology that drives moral values much more than moral philosophy. Individuals can try to persist with deeply held values that limit economic growth, but they risk being rendered irrelevant as more productive peers in their own society accrue wealth and power. And societies that fail to move with the times risk being conquered by more pragmatic neighbours that adapt to new technologies and grow in population and military strength. There are many objections one could raise to this theory, many of which we put to Ian in this interview. But the question is a highly consequential one: if we want to guess what goals our descendants will pursue hundreds of years from now, it would be helpful to have a theory for why our ancestors mostly thought one thing, while we mostly think another. Big though it is, the driver of human values is only one of several major questions Ian has tackled through his career. In today's episode, we discuss all of Ian's major books, taking on topics such as: • Why the Industrial Revolution happened in England rather than China • Whether or not wars can lead to less violence • Whether the evidence base in history — from document archives to archaeology — is strong enough to persuasively answer any of these questions • Why Ian thinks the way we live in the 21st century is probably a short-lived aberration • Whether the grand sweep of history is driven more by “very important people” or “vast impersonal forces” • Why Chinese ships never crossed the Pacific or rounded the southern tip of Africa • In what sense Ian thinks Brexit was “10,000 years in the making” • The most common misconceptions about macrohistoryChapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:51)Geography is Destiny (00:02:59)Why the West Rules—For Now (00:11:25)War! What is it Good For? (00:27:40)Expectations for the future (00:39:43)Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels (00:53:15)Historical methodology (01:02:35)Falsifiable alternative theories (01:15:20)Archaeology (01:22:18)Energy extraction technology as a key driver of human values (01:37:04)Allowing people to debate about values (01:59:38)Can productive wars still occur? (02:12:49)Where is history contingent and where isn't it? (02:29:45)How Ian thinks about the future (03:12:54)Macrohistory myths (03:29:12)Ian’s favourite archaeology memory (03:32:40)The most unfair criticism Ian’s ever received (03:34:39)Rob’s outro (03:39:16)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

On January 1, 2015, physicist Max Tegmark gave up something most of us love to do: complain about things without ever trying to fix them. That “put up or shut up” New Year’s resolution led to the first Puerto Rico conference and Open Letter on Artificial Intelligence — milestones for researchers taking the safe development of highly-capable AI systems seriously. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Max's primary work has been cosmology research at MIT, but his energetic and freewheeling nature has led him into so many other projects that you would be forgiven for forgetting it. In the 2010s he wrote two best-selling books, Our Mathematical Universe: My Quest for the Ultimate Nature of Reality, and Life 3.0: Being Human in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, and in 2014 founded a non-profit, the Future of Life Institute, which works to reduce all sorts of threats to humanity's future including nuclear war, synthetic biology, and AI. Max has complained about many other things over the years, from killer robots to the impact of social media algorithms on the news we consume. True to his 'put up or shut up' resolution, he and his team went on to produce a video on so-called ‘Slaughterbots’ which attracted millions of views, and develop a website called 'Improve The News' to help readers separate facts from spin. But given the stunning recent advances in capabilities — from OpenAI’s DALL-E to DeepMind’s Gato — AI itself remains top of his mind. You can now give an AI system like GPT-3 the text: "I'm going to go to this mountain with the faces on it. What is the capital of the state to the east of the state that that's in?" And it gives the correct answer (Saint Paul, Minnesota) — something most AI researchers would have said was impossible without fundamental breakthroughs just seven years ago. So back at MIT, he now leads a research group dedicated to what he calls “intelligible intelligence.” At the moment, AI systems are basically giant black boxes that magically do wildly impressive things. But for us to trust these systems, we need to understand them. He says that training a black box that does something smart needs to just be stage one in a bigger process. Stage two is: “How do we get the knowledge out and put it in a safer system?” Today’s conversation starts off giving a broad overview of the key questions about artificial intelligence: What's the potential? What are the threats? How might this story play out? What should we be doing to prepare? Rob and Max then move on to recent advances in capabilities and alignment, the mood we should have, and possible ways we might misunderstand the problem. They then spend roughly the last third talking about Max's current big passion: improving the news we consume — where Rob has a few reservations. They also cover: • Whether we could understand what superintelligent systems were doing • The value of encouraging people to think about the positive future they want • How to give machines goals • Whether ‘Big Tech’ is following the lead of ‘Big Tobacco’ • Whether we’re sleepwalking into disaster • Whether people actually just want their biases confirmed • Why Max is worried about government-backed fact-checking • And much more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:19)How Max prioritises (00:12:33)Intro to AI risk (00:15:47)Superintelligence (00:35:56)Imagining a wide range of possible futures (00:47:45)Recent advances in capabilities and alignment (00:57:37)How to give machines goals (01:13:13)Regulatory capture (01:21:03)How humanity fails to fulfil its potential (01:39:45)Are we being hacked? (01:51:01)Improving the news (02:05:31)Do people actually just want their biases confirmed? (02:16:15)Government-backed fact-checking (02:37:00)Would a superintelligence seem like magic? (02:49:50)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

If a business has spent $100 million developing a product, it's a fair bet that they don't want it stolen in two seconds and uploaded to the web where anyone can use it for free. This problem exists in extreme form for AI companies. These days, the electricity and equipment required to train cutting-edge machine learning models that generate uncanny human text and images can cost tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. But once trained, such models may be only a few gigabytes in size and run just fine on ordinary laptops. Today's guest, the computer scientist and polymath Nova DasSarma, works on computer and information security for the AI company Anthropic. One of her jobs is to stop hackers exfiltrating Anthropic's incredibly expensive intellectual property, as recently happened to Nvidia. As she explains, given models’ small size, the need to store such models on internet-connected servers, and the poor state of computer security in general, this is a serious challenge. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. The worries aren't purely commercial though. This problem looms especially large for the growing number of people who expect that in coming decades we'll develop so-called artificial 'general' intelligence systems that can learn and apply a wide range of skills all at once, and thereby have a transformative effect on society. If aligned with the goals of their owners, such general AI models could operate like a team of super-skilled assistants, going out and doing whatever wonderful (or malicious) things are asked of them. This might represent a huge leap forward for humanity, though the transition to a very different new economy and power structure would have to be handled delicately. If unaligned with the goals of their owners or humanity as a whole, such broadly capable models would naturally 'go rogue,' breaking their way into additional computer systems to grab more computing power — all the better to pursue their goals and make sure they can't be shut off. As Nova explains, in either case, we don't want such models disseminated all over the world before we've confirmed they are deeply safe and law-abiding, and have figured out how to integrate them peacefully into society. In the first scenario, premature mass deployment would be risky and destabilising. In the second scenario, it could be catastrophic -- perhaps even leading to human extinction if such general AI systems turn out to be able to self-improve rapidly rather than slowly. If highly capable general AI systems are coming in the next 10 or 20 years, Nova may be flying below the radar with one of the most important jobs in the world. We'll soon need the ability to 'sandbox' (i.e. contain) models with a wide range of superhuman capabilities, including the ability to learn new skills, for a period of careful testing and limited deployment — preventing the model from breaking out, and criminals from breaking in. Nova and her colleagues are trying to figure out how to do this, but as this episode reveals, even the state of the art is nowhere near good enough. In today's conversation, Rob and Nova cover: • How good or bad is information security today • The most secure computer systems that exist • How to design an AI training compute centre for maximum efficiency • Whether 'formal verification' can help us design trustworthy systems • How wide the gap is between AI capabilities and AI safety • How to disincentivise hackers • What should listeners do to strengthen their own security practices • And much more. Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering: Ben Cordell and Beppe Rådvik Transcriptions: Katy Moore

“We’re leaving these 16 contestants on an island with nothing but what they can scavenge from an abandoned factory and apartment block. Over the next 365 days, they’ll try to rebuild as much of civilisation as they can — from glass, to lenses, to microscopes. This is: The Knowledge!”If you were a contestant on such a TV show, you'd love to have a guide to how basic things you currently take for granted are done — how to grow potatoes, fire bricks, turn wood to charcoal, find acids and alkalis, and so on.Today’s guest Lewis Dartnell has gone as far compiling this information as anyone has with his bestselling book The Knowledge: How to Rebuild Civilization in the Aftermath of a Cataclysm. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. But in the aftermath of a nuclear war or incredibly deadly pandemic that kills most people, many of the ways we do things today will be impossible — and even some of the things people did in the past, like collect coal from the surface of the Earth, will be impossible the second time around. As Lewis points out, there’s “no point telling this band of survivors how to make something ultra-efficient or ultra-useful or ultra-capable if it's just too damned complicated to build in the first place. You have to start small and then level up, pull yourself up by your own bootstraps.” So it might sound good to tell people to build solar panels — they’re a wonderful way of generating electricity. But the photovoltaic cells we use today need pure silicon, and nanoscale manufacturing — essentially the same technology as microchips used in a computer — so actually making solar panels would be incredibly difficult. Instead, you’d want to tell our group of budding engineers to use more appropriate technologies like solar concentrators that use nothing more than mirrors — which turn out to be relatively easy to make. A disaster that unravels the complex way we produce goods in the modern world is all too possible. Which raises the question: why not set dozens of people to plan out exactly what any survivors really ought to do if they need to support themselves and rebuild civilisation? Such a guide could then be translated and distributed all around the world. The goal would be to provide the best information to speed up each of the many steps that would take survivors from rubbing sticks together in the wilderness to adjusting a thermostat in their comfy apartments. This is clearly not a trivial task. Lewis's own book (at 300 pages) only scratched the surface of the most important knowledge humanity has accumulated, relegating all of mathematics to a single footnote. And the ideal guide would offer pretty different advice depending on the scenario. Are survivors dealing with a radioactive ice age following a nuclear war? Or is it an eerily intact but near-empty post-pandemic world with mountains of goods to scavenge from the husks of cities? As a brand-new parent, Lewis couldn’t do one of our classic three- or four-hour episodes — so this is an unusually snappy one-hour interview, where Rob and Lewis are joined by Luisa Rodriguez to continue the conversation from her episode of the show last year. Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:00:59)The biggest impediments to bouncing back (00:03:18)Can we do a serious version of The Knowledge? (00:14:58)Recovering without much coal or oil (00:29:56)Most valuable pro-resilience adjustments we can make today (00:40:23)Feeding the Earth in disasters (00:47:45)The reality of humans trying to actually do this (00:53:54)Most exciting recent findings in astrobiology (01:01:00)Rob’s outro (01:03:37)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Imagine you lead a nonprofit that operates on a shoestring budget. Staff are paid minimum wage, lunch is bread and hummus, and you're all bunched up on a few tables in a basement office. But over a few years, your cause attracts some major new donors. Your funding jumps a thousandfold, from $100,000 a year to $100,000,000 a year. You're the same group of people committed to making sacrifices for the cause — but these days, rather than cutting costs, the right thing to do seems to be to spend serious money and get things done ASAP. You suddenly have the opportunity to make more progress than ever before, but as well as excitement about this, you have worries about the impacts that large amounts of funding can have. This is roughly the situation faced by today's guest Will MacAskill — University of Oxford philosopher, author of the forthcoming book What We Owe The Future, and founding figure in the effective altruism movement. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Years ago, Will pledged to give away more than 50% of his income over his life, and was already donating 10% back when he was a student with next to no income. Since then, the coalition he founded has been super successful at attracting the interest of donors who collectively want to give away billions in the way Will and his colleagues were proposing. While surely a huge success, it brings with it risks that he's never had to consider before: • Will and his colleagues might try to spend a lot of money trying to get more things done more quickly — but actually just waste it. • Being seen as profligate could strike onlookers as selfish and disreputable. • Folks might start pretending to agree with their agenda just to get grants. • People working on nearby issues that are less flush with funding may end up resentful. • People might lose their focus on helping others as they get seduced by the prospect of earning a nice living. • Mediocre projects might find it too easy to get funding, even when the people involved would be better off radically changing their strategy, or shutting down and launching something else entirely. But all these 'risks of commission' have to be weighed against 'risk of omission': the failure to achieve all you could have if you'd been truly ambitious. People looking askance at you for paying high salaries to attract the staff you want is unpleasant. But failing to prevent the next pandemic because you didn't have the necessary medical experts on your grantmaking team is worse than unpleasant — it's a true disaster. Yet few will complain, because they'll never know what might have been if you'd only set frugality aside. Will aims to strike a sensible balance between these competing errors, which he has taken to calling judicious ambition. In today's episode, Rob and Will discuss the above as well as: • Will humanity likely converge on good values as we get more educated and invest more in moral philosophy — or are the things we care about actually quite arbitrary and contingent? • Why are so many nonfiction books full of factual errors? • How does Will avoid anxiety and depression with more responsibility on his shoulders than ever? • What does Will disagree with his colleagues on? • Should we focus on existential risks more or less the same way, whether we care about future generations or not? • Are potatoes one of the most important technologies ever developed? • And plenty more. Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:41)What We Owe The Future preview (00:09:23)Longtermism vs. x-risk (00:25:39)How is Will doing? (00:33:16)Having a life outside of work (00:46:45)Underappreciated people in the effective altruism community (00:52:48)A culture of ambition within effective altruism (00:59:50)Massively scalable projects (01:11:40)Downsides and risks from the increase in funding (01:14:13)Barriers to ambition (01:28:47)The Future Fund (01:38:04)Patient philanthropy (01:52:50)Will’s disagreements with Sam Bankman-Fried and Nick Beckstead (01:56:42)Astronomical risks of suffering (s-risks) (02:00:02)Will’s future plans (02:02:41)What is it with Will and potatoes? (02:08:40)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

The good news is deaths from malaria have been cut by a third since 2005. The bad news is it still causes 250 million cases and 600,000 deaths a year, mostly among young children in sub-Saharan Africa.We already have dirt-cheap ways to prevent and treat malaria, and the fraction of the Earth's surface where the disease exists at all has been halved since 1900. So why is it such a persistent problem in some places, even rebounding 15% since 2019?That's one of many questions I put to today's guest, James Tibenderana — doctor, medical researcher, and technical director at a major global health nonprofit known as Malaria Consortium. James studies the cutting edge of malaria control and treatment in order to optimise how Malaria Consortium spends £100 million a year across countries like Uganda, Nigeria, and Chad.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. In sub-Saharan Africa, where 90% of malaria deaths occur, the infection is spread by a few dozen species of mosquito that are ideally suited to the local climatic conditions and have thus been impossible to eliminate so far. While COVID-19 may have an 'R' (reproduction number) of 5, in some situations malaria has a reproduction number in the 1,000s. A single person with malaria can pass the parasite to hundreds of mosquitoes, which themselves each go on to bite dozens of people each, allowing cases to quickly explode. The nets and antimalarial drugs Malaria Consortium distributes have been highly effective where distributed, but there are tens of millions of young children who are yet to be covered simply due to a lack of funding. Despite the success of these approaches, given how challenging it will be to create a malaria-free world, there's enthusiasm to find new approaches to throw at the problem. Two new interventions have recently generated buzz: vaccines and genetic approaches to control the mosquito species that carry malaria. The RTS,S vaccine is the first-ever vaccine that attacks a protozoa as opposed to a virus or bacteria. It's a great scientific achievement. But James points out that even after three doses, it's still only about 30% effective. Unless future vaccines are substantially more effective, they will remain just a complement to nets and antimalarial drugs, which are cheaper and each cut mortality by more than half. On the other hand, the latest mosquito-control technologies are almost too effective. It is possible to insert genes into specific mosquito populations that reduce their ability to reproduce. By using a 'gene drive,' you can ensure mosquitoes hand these detrimental genes down to 100% of their offspring. If deployed, these genes would spread and ultimately eliminate the mosquitoes that carry malaria at low cost, thereby largely ridding the world of the disease. Because a single country embracing this method would have global effects, James cautions that it's important to get buy-in from all the countries involved, and to have a way of reversing the intervention if we realise we've made a mistake. In this comprehensive conversation, Rob and James discuss all of the above, as well as most of what you could reasonably want to know about the state of the art in malaria control today, including: • How malaria spreads and the symptoms it causes • The use of insecticides and poison baits • How big a problem insecticide resistance is • How malaria was eliminated in North America and Europe • The key strategic choices faced by Malaria Consortium in its efforts to create a malaria-free world • And much moreChapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:06)Malaria basics (00:06:56)Malaria vaccines (00:12:37)Getting rid of mosquitos (00:32:20)Gene drives (00:38:06)Symptoms (00:58:00)Preventing the spread (01:06:00)Why we haven’t gotten rid of malaria yet (01:15:07)What James is responsible for as technical director (01:30:52)Malaria Consortium's current strategy (01:39:59)Elimination vs. control (02:01:49)Delivery and practicalities (02:16:23)Relationships with governments (02:26:38)Funding gap (02:31:03)Access and use gap (02:39:10)The value of local researchers (02:49:26)Past research findings (02:57:10)How to help (03:06:30)How James ended up where he is today (03:13:45)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ryan KesslerTranscriptions: Katy Moore

In nature, animals roar and bare their teeth to intimidate adversaries — but one side usually backs down, and real fights are rare. The wisdom of evolution is that the risk of violence is just too great.Which might make one wonder: if war is so destructive, why does it happen? The question may sound naïve, but in fact it represents a deep puzzle. If a war will cost trillions and kill tens of thousands, it should be easy for either side to make a peace offer that both they and their opponents prefer to actually fighting it out.The conundrum of how humans can engage in incredibly costly and protracted conflicts has occupied academics across the social sciences for years. In today's episode, we speak with economist Chris Blattman about his new book, Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace, which summarises what they think they've learned. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Chris's first point is that while organised violence may feel like it's all around us, it's actually very rare in humans, just as it is with other animals. Across the world, hundreds of groups dislike one another — but knowing the cost of war, they prefer to simply loathe one another in peace. In order to understand what’s wrong with a sick patient, a doctor needs to know what a healthy person looks like. And to understand war, social scientists need to study all the wars that could have happened but didn't — so they can see what a healthy society looks like and what's missing in the places where war does take hold. Chris argues that social scientists have generated five cogent models of when war can be 'rational' for both sides of a conflict: 1. Unchecked interests — such as national leaders who bear few of the costs of launching a war. 2. Intangible incentives — such as an intrinsic desire for revenge. 3. Uncertainty — such as both sides underestimating each other's resolve to fight. 4. Commitment problems — such as the inability to credibly promise not to use your growing military might to attack others in future. 5. Misperceptions — such as our inability to see the world through other people's eyes. In today's interview, we walk through how each of the five explanations work and what specific wars or actions they might explain. In the process, Chris outlines how many of the most popular explanations for interstate war are wildly overused (e.g. leaders who are unhinged or male) or misguided from the outset (e.g. resource scarcity). The interview also covers: • What Chris and Rob got wrong about the war in Ukraine • What causes might not fit into these five categories • The role of people's choice to escalate or deescalate a conflict • How great power wars or nuclear wars are different, and what can be done to prevent them • How much representative government helps to prevent war • And much more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:43)What people get wrong about violence (00:04:40)Medellín gangs (00:11:48)Overrated causes of violence (00:23:53)Cause of war #1: Unchecked interests (00:36:40)Cause of war #2: Intangible incentives (00:41:40)Cause of war #3: Uncertainty (00:53:04)Cause of war #4: Commitment problems (01:02:24)Cause of war #5: Misperceptions (01:12:18)Weaknesses of the model (01:26:08)Dancing on the edge of a cliff (01:29:06)Confusion around escalation (01:35:26)Applying the model to the war between Russia and Ukraine (01:42:34)Great power wars (02:01:46)Preventing nuclear war (02:18:57)Why undirected approaches won't work (02:22:51)Democratic peace theory (02:31:10)Exchanging hostages (02:37:21)What you can actually do to help (02:41:25)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

On this episode of the show, host Rob Wiblin interviews Sam Bankman-Fried. This interview was recorded in February 2022, and released in April 2022. But on November 11 2022, Sam Bankman-Fried's company, FTX, filed for bankruptcy, and all staff at the Future Fund resigned — and the surrounding events led Rob to record a new intro on December 1st 2022 for this episode. • Read 80,000 Hours' statement on these events here. • You can also listen to host Rob’s reaction to the collapse of FTX on this podcast feed, above episode 140, or here. • Rob has shared some clarifications on his views about diminishing returns and risk aversion, and weaknesses in how it was discussed in this episode, here. • And you can read the original blog post associated with the episode here.

Everybody knows that good parenting has a big impact on how kids turn out. Except that maybe they don't, because it doesn't.Incredible though it might seem, according to today's guest — economist Bryan Caplan, the author of Selfish Reasons To Have More Kids, The Myth of the Rational Voter, and The Case Against Education — the best evidence we have on the question suggests that, within reason, what parents do has little impact on how their children's lives play out once they're adults.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Of course, kids do resemble their parents. But just as we probably can't say it was attentive parenting that gave me my mother's nose, perhaps we can't say it was attentive parenting that made me succeed at school. Both the social environment we grow up in and the genes we receive from our parents influence the person we become, and looking at a typical family we can't really distinguish the impact of one from the other. But nature does offer us up a random experiment that can let us tell the difference: identical twins share all their genes, while fraternal twins only share half their genes. If you look at how much more similar outcomes are for identical twins than fraternal twins, you see the effect of sharing 100% of your genetic material, rather than the usual 50%. Double that amount, and you've got the full effect of genetic inheritance. Whatever unexplained variation remains is still up for grabs — and might be down to different experiences in the home, outside the home, or just random noise. The crazy thing about this research is that it says for a range of adult outcomes (e.g. years of education, income, health, personality, and happiness), it's differences in the genes children inherit rather than differences in parental behaviour that are doing most of the work. Other research suggests that differences in “out-of-home environment” take second place. Parenting style does matter for something, but it comes in a clear third. Bryan is quick to point out that there are several factors that help reconcile these findings with conventional wisdom about the importance of parenting. First, for some adult outcomes, parenting was a big deal (i.e. the quality of the parent/child relationship) or at least a moderate deal (i.e. drug use, criminality, and religious/political identity). Second, parents can and do influence you quite a lot — so long as you're young and still living with them. But as soon as you move out, the influence of their behaviour begins to wane and eventually becomes hard to spot. Third, this research only studies variation in parenting behaviour that was common among the families studied. And fourth, research on international adoptions shows they can cause massive improvements in health, income and other outcomes. But the findings are still remarkable, and imply many hyper-diligent parents could live much less stressful lives without doing their kids any harm at all. In this extensive interview Rob interrogates whether Bryan can really be right, or whether the research he's drawing on has taken a wrong turn somewhere. And that's just one topic we cover, some of the others being: • People’s biggest misconceptions about the labour market • Arguments against open borders • Whether most people actually vote based on self-interest • Whether philosophy should stick to common sense or depart from it radically • Personal autonomy vs. the possible benefits of government regulation • Bryan's perfect betting record • And much more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:15)Labor Econ Versus the World (00:04:55)Open Borders (00:20:30)How much parenting matters (00:35:49)Self-Interested Voter Hypothesis (01:00:31)Why Bryan and Rob disagree so much on philosophy (01:12:04)Libertarian free will (01:25:10)The effective altruism community (01:38:46)Bryan’s betting record (01:48:19)Individual autonomy vs. welfare (01:59:06)Arrogant hedgehogs (02:10:43)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Since the Soviet Union split into different countries in 1991, the pervasive fear of catastrophe that people lived with for decades has gradually faded from memory, and nuclear warhead stockpiles have declined by 83%. Nuclear brinksmanship, proxy wars, and the game theory of mutually assured destruction (MAD) have come to feel like relics of another era. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has changed all that. According to Joan Rohlfing — President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington, DC-based nonprofit focused on reducing threats from nuclear and biological weapons — the annual risk of a ‘global catastrophic nuclear event'’ never fell as low as people like to think, and for some time has been on its way back up. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. At the same time, civil society funding for research and advocacy around nuclear risks is being cut in half over a period of years — despite the fact that at $60 million a year, it was already just a thousandth as much as the US spends maintaining its nuclear deterrent. If new funding sources are not identified to replace donors that are withdrawing, the existing pool of talent will have to leave for greener pastures, and most of the next generation will see a career in the field as unviable. While global poverty is on the decline and life expectancy increasing, the chance of a catastrophic nuclear event is probably trending in the wrong direction. Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees that turned out not to be worth the paper they were written on. States that have nuclear weapons (such as North Korea), states that are pursuing them (such as Iran), and states that have pursued nuclear weapons but since abandoned them (such as Libya, Syria, and South Africa) may take this as a valuable lesson in the importance of military power over promises. China has been expanding its arsenal and testing hypersonic glide missiles that can evade missile defences. Japan now toys with the idea of nuclear weapons as a way to ensure its security against its much larger neighbour. India and Pakistan both acquired nuclear weapons in the late 1980s and their relationship continues to oscillate from hostile to civil and back. At the same time, the risk that nuclear weapons could be interfered with due to weaknesses in computer security is far higher than during the Cold War, when systems were simpler and less networked. In the interview, Joan discusses several steps that can be taken in the immediate term, such as renewed efforts to extend and expand arms control treaties, changes to nuclear use policy, and the retirement of what they see as vulnerable delivery systems, such as land-based silos. In the bigger picture, NTI seeks to keep hope alive that a better system than deterrence through mutually assured destruction remains possible. The threat of retaliation does indeed make nuclear wars unlikely, but it necessarily means the system fails in an incredibly destructive way: with the death of hundreds of millions if not billions. In the long run, even a tiny 1 in 500 risk of a nuclear war each year adds up to around an 18% chance of catastrophe over the century. In this conversation we cover all that, as well as: • How arms control treaties have evolved over the last few decades • Whether lobbying by arms manufacturers is an important factor shaping nuclear strategy • The Biden Nuclear Posture Review • How easily humanity might recover from a nuclear exchange • Implications for the use of nuclear energy Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)Joan’s EAG presentation (00:01:40)The interview begins (00:27:06)Nuclear security funding situation (00:31:09)Policy solutions for addressing a one-person or one-state risk factor (00:36:46)Key differences in the nuclear security field (00:40:44)Scary scenarios (00:47:02)Why the US shouldn’t expand its nuclear arsenal (00:52:56)The evolution of nuclear risk over the last 10 years (01:03:41)The interaction between nuclear weapons and cybersecurity (01:10:18)The chances of humanity bouncing back after nuclear war (01:13:52)What we should actually do (01:17:57)Could sensors be a game-changer? (01:22:39)Biden Nuclear Posture Review (01:27:50)Influence of lobbying firms (01:33:58)What NTI might do with an additional $20 million (01:36:38)Nuclear energy tradeoffs (01:43:55)Why we can’t rely on Stanislav Petrovs (01:49:49)Preventing war vs. building resilience for recovery (01:52:15)Places to donate other than NTI (01:54:25)Career advice (02:00:15)Why this problem is solvable (02:09:27)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

If someone said a global health and development programme was sustainable, participatory, and holistic, you'd have to guess that they were saying something positive. But according to today's guest Karen Levy — deworming pioneer and veteran of Innovations for Poverty Action, Evidence Action, and Y Combinator — each of those three concepts has become so fashionable that they're at risk of being seriously overrated and applied where they don't belong. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Such concepts might even cause harm — trying to make a project embody all three is as likely to ruin it as help it flourish. First, what do people mean by 'sustainability'? Usually they mean something like the programme will eventually be able to continue without needing further financial support from the donor. But how is that possible? Governments, nonprofits, and aid agencies aim to provide health services, education, infrastructure, financial services, and so on — and all of these require ongoing funding to pay for materials and staff to keep them running. Given that someone needs to keep paying, Karen tells us that in practice, 'sustainability' is usually a euphemism for the programme at some point being passed on to someone else to fund — usually the national government. And while that can be fine, the national government of Kenya only spends $400 per person to provide each and every government service — just 2% of what the US spends on each resident. Incredibly tight budgets like that are typical of low-income countries. 'Participatory' also sounds nice, and inasmuch as it means leaders are accountable to the people they're trying to help, it probably is. But Karen tells us that in the field, ‘participatory’ usually means that recipients are expected to be involved in planning and delivering services themselves. While that might be suitable in some situations, it's hardly something people in rich countries always want for themselves. Ideally we want government healthcare and education to be high quality without us having to attend meetings to keep it on track — and people in poor countries have as many or more pressures on their time. While accountability is desirable, an expectation of participation can be as much a burden as a blessing. Finally, making a programme 'holistic' could be smart, but as Karen lays out, it also has some major downsides. For one, it means you're doing lots of things at once, which makes it hard to tell which parts of the project are making the biggest difference relative to their cost. For another, when you have a lot of goals at once, it's hard to tell whether you're making progress, or really put your mind to focusing on making one thing go extremely well. And finally, holistic programmes can be impractically expensive — Karen tells the story of a wonderful 'holistic school health' programme that, if continued, was going to cost 3.5 times the entire school's budget. In today's in-depth conversation, Karen Levy and I chat about the above, as well as: • Why it pays to figure out how you'll interpret the results of an experiment ahead of time • The trouble with misaligned incentives within the development industry • Projects that don't deliver value for money and should be scaled down • How Karen accidentally became a leading figure in the push to deworm tens of millions of schoolchildren • Logistical challenges in reaching huge numbers of people with essential services • Lessons from Karen's many-decades career • And much more Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering: Ben Cordell and Ryan Kessler Transcriptions: Katy Moore

Russia's invasion of Ukraine is devastating the lives of Ukrainians, and so long as it continues there's a risk that the conflict could escalate to include other countries or the use of nuclear weapons. It's essential that NATO, the US, and the EU play their cards right to ideally end the violence, maintain Ukrainian sovereignty, and discourage any similar invasions in the future. But how? To pull together the most valuable information on how to react to this crisis, we spoke with Samuel Charap — a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, one of the US's foremost experts on Russia's relationship with former Soviet states, and co-author of Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Samuel believes that Putin views the alignment of Ukraine with NATO as an existential threat to Russia — a perhaps unreasonable view, but a sincere one nevertheless. Ukraine has been drifting further into Western Europe's orbit and improving its defensive military capabilities, so Putin has concluded that if Russia wants to put a stop to that, there will never be a better time to act in the future. Despite early successes holding off the Russian military, Samuel is sceptical that time is on the Ukrainian side. If the war is to end before much of Ukraine is reduced to rubble, it will likely have to be through negotiation, rather than Russian defeat. The US policy response has so far been largely good, successfully balancing the need to punish Russia to dissuade large nations from bullying small ones in the future, while preventing NATO from being drawn into the war directly — which would pose a horrifying risk of escalation to a full nuclear exchange. The pressure from the general public to 'do something' might eventually cause national leaders to confront Russia more directly, but so far they are sensibly showing no interest in doing so. However, use of nuclear weapons remains a low but worrying possibility. Samuel is also worried that Russia may deploy chemical and biological weapons and blame it on the Ukrainians. Before war broke out, it's possible Russia could have been satisfied if Ukraine followed through on the Minsk agreements and committed not to join the EU and NATO. Or it might not have, if Putin was committed to war, come what may. In any case, most Ukrainians found those terms intolerable. At this point, the situation is even worse, and it's hard to see how an enduring ceasefire could be agreed upon. On top of the above, Russia is also demanding recognition that Crimea is part of Russia, and acceptance of the independence of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. These conditions — especially the second — are entirely unacceptable to the Ukrainians. Hence the war continues, and could grind on for months or even years until one side is sufficiently beaten down to compromise on their core demands. Rob and Samuel discuss all of the above and also: • The chances that this conflict leads to a nuclear exchange • The chances of regime change in Russia • Whether the West should deliver MiG fighter jets to Ukraine • What are the implications if Sweden and/or Finland decide to join NATO? • What should NATO do now, and did it make any mistakes in the past? • What's the most likely situation for us to be looking at in three months' time? • Can Ukraine effectively win the war? Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:40)Putin's true motive (00:02:29)What the West could have done differently (00:07:44)Chances of Ukraine holding out (00:11:40)Chances of regime change in Russia (00:14:59)The good and the bad from the West so far (00:17:55)Should the West deliver MiG fighter jets to Ukraine? (00:19:57)"No-fly zones" (00:21:32)Chances that this conflict leads to a nuclear exchange (00:26:06)What listeners should do (00:36:01)Chances of biological or chemical weapons use (00:37:59)Best realistic outcome from here (00:39:29)Keeping the broader conversation sane (00:49:29)Why not promise to remove sanctions? (00:51:05)Pros and cons of Sweden and FInland joining NATO (00:52:53)The most likely situation in 3 months (00:53:58) Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering: Ben Cordell Transcriptions: Katy Moore

One of 80,000 Hours' main services is our free one-on-one careers advising, which we provide to around 1,000 people a year. Today we speak to two of our advisors, who have each spoken to hundreds of people -- including many regular listeners to this show -- about how they might be able to do more good while also having a highly motivating career. Before joining 80,000 Hours, Michelle Hutchinson completed a PhD in Philosophy at Oxford University and helped launch Oxford's Global Priorities Institute, while Habiba Islam studied politics, philosophy, and economics at Oxford University and qualified as a barrister. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. In this conversation, they cover many topics that recur in their advising calls, and what they've learned from watching advisees’ careers play out: • What they say when advisees want to help solve overpopulation • How to balance doing good against other priorities that people have for their lives • Why it's challenging to motivate yourself to focus on the long-term future of humanity, and how Michelle and Habiba do so nonetheless • How they use our latest guide to planning your career • Why you can specialise and take more risk if you're in a group • Gaps in the effective altruism community it would be really useful for people to fill • Stories of people who have spoken to 80,000 Hours and changed their career — and whether it went well or not • Why trying to have impact in multiple different ways can be a mistake The episode is split into two parts: the first section on The 80,000 Hours Podcast, and the second on our new show 80k After Hours. This is a shameless attempt to encourage listeners to our first show to subscribe to our second feed. That second part covers: • Whether just encouraging someone young to aspire to more than they currently are is one of the most impactful ways to spend half an hour • How much impact the one-on-one team has, the biggest challenges they face as a group, and different paths they could have gone down • Whether giving general advice is a doomed enterprise Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:24)Cause prioritization (00:09:14)Unexpected outcomes from 1-1 advice (00:18:10)Making time for thinking about these things (00:22:28)Balancing different priorities in life (00:26:54)Gaps in the effective altruism space (00:32:06)Plan change vignettes (00:37:49)How large a role the 1-1 team is playing (00:49:04)What about when our advice didn’t work out? (00:55:50)The process of planning a career (00:59:05)Why longtermism is hard (01:05:49) Want to get free one-on-one advice from our team? We're here to help. We’ve helped thousands of people formulate their plans and put them in touch with mentors. We've expanded our ability to deliver one-on-one meetings so are keen to help more people than ever before. If you're a regular listener to the show we're especially likely to want to speak with you. Learn about and apply for advising. Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Producer: Keiran Harris Audio mastering: Ben Cordell Transcriptions: Katy Moore

Today we're launching a new podcast called 80k After Hours. Like this show it’ll mostly still explore the best ways to do good — and some episodes will be even more laser-focused on careers than most original episodes. But we’re also going to widen our scope, including things like how to solve pressing problems while also living a happy and fulfilling life, as well as releases that are just fun, entertaining or experimental. It’ll feature: Conversations between staff on the 80,000 Hours team More eclectic formats and topics — one episode could be a structured debate about 'human challenge trials', the next a staged reading of a play about the year 2750 Niche content for specific audiences, such as high-school students, or active participants in the effective altruism community Extras and outtakes from interviews on the original feed 80,000 Hours staff interviewed on other podcasts Audio versions of our new articles and research You can find it by searching for 80k After Hours in whatever podcasting app you use, or by going to 80000hours.org/after-hours-podcast.

If you read polls saying that the public supports a carbon tax, should you believe them? According to today's guest — journalist and blogger Matthew Yglesias — it's complicated, but probably not. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Interpreting opinion polls about specific policies can be a challenge, and it's easy to trick yourself into believing what you want to believe. Matthew invented a term for a particular type of self-delusion called the 'pundit's fallacy': "the belief that what a politician needs to do to improve his or her political standing is do what the pundit wants substantively." If we want to advocate not just for ideas that would be good if implemented, but ideas that have a real shot at getting implemented, we should do our best to understand public opinion as it really is. The least trustworthy polls are published by think tanks and advocacy campaigns that would love to make their preferred policy seem popular. These surveys can be designed to nudge respondents toward the desired result — for example, by tinkering with question wording and order or shifting how participants are sampled. And if a poll produces the 'wrong answer', there's no need to publish it at all, so the 'publication bias' with these sorts of surveys is large. Matthew says polling run by firms or researchers without any particular desired outcome can be taken more seriously. But the results that we ought to give by far the most weight are those from professional political campaigns trying to win votes and get their candidate elected because they have both the expertise to do polling properly, and a very strong incentive to understand what the public really thinks. The problem is, campaigns run these expensive surveys because they think that having exclusive access to reliable information will give them a competitive advantage. As a result, they often don’t publish the findings, and instead use them to shape what their candidate says and does. Journalists like Matthew can call up their contacts and get a summary from people they trust. But being unable to publish the polling itself, they're unlikely to be able to persuade sceptics. When assessing what ideas are winners, one thing Matthew would like everyone to keep in mind is that politics is competitive, and politicians aren't (all) stupid. If advocating for your pet idea were a great way to win elections, someone would try it and win, and others would copy. One other thing to check that's more reliable than polling is real-world experience. For example, voters may say they like a carbon tax on the phone — but the very liberal Washington State roundly rejected one in ballot initiatives in 2016 and 2018. Of course you may want to advocate for what you think is best, even if it wouldn't pass a popular vote in the face of organised opposition. The public's ideas can shift, sometimes dramatically and unexpectedly. But at least you'll be going into the debate with your eyes wide open. In this extensive conversation, host Rob Wiblin and Matthew also cover: • How should a humanitarian think about US military interventions overseas? • From an 'effective altruist' perspective, was the US wrong to withdraw from Afghanistan? • Has NATO ultimately screwed over Ukrainians by misrepresenting the extent of its commitment to their independence? • What philosopher does Matthew think is underrated? • How big a risk is ubiquitous surveillance? • What does Matthew think about wild animal suffering, anti-ageing research, and autonomous weapons? • And much more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:05)Autonomous weapons (00:04:42)India and the US (00:07:25)Evidence-backed interventions for reducing the harm done by racial prejudices (00:08:38)Factory farming (00:10:44)Wild animal suffering (00:12:41)Vaccine development (00:15:20)Anti-ageing research (00:16:27)Should the US develop a semiconductor industry? (00:19:13)What we should do about various existential risks (00:21:58)What governments should do to stop the next pandemic (00:24:00)Comets and supervolcanoes (00:31:30)Nuclear weapons (00:34:25)Advances in AI (00:35:46)Surveillance systems (00:38:45)How Matt thinks about public opinion research (00:43:22)Issues with trusting public opinion polls (00:51:18)The influence of prior beliefs (01:05:53)Loss aversion (01:12:19)Matt's take on military adventurism (01:18:54)How military intervention looks as a humanitarian intervention (01:29:12)Where Matt does favour military intervention (01:38:27)Why smart people disagree (01:44:24)The case for NATO taking an active stance in Ukraine (01:57:34)One Billion Americans (02:08:02)Matt’s views on the effective altruism community (02:11:46)Matt’s views on the longtermist community (02:19:48)Matt’s struggle to become more of a rationalist (02:22:42)Megaprojects (02:26:20)The impact of Matt’s work (02:32:28)Matt’s philosophical views (02:47:58)The value of formal education (02:56:59)Worst thing Matt’s ever advocated for

In 2014 Taiwan was rocked by mass protests against a proposed trade agreement with China that was about to be agreed without the usual Parliamentary hearings. Students invaded and took over the Parliament. But rather than chant slogans, instead they livestreamed their own parliamentary debate over the trade deal, allowing volunteers to speak both in favour and against.Instead of polarising the country more, this so-called 'Sunflower Student Movement' ultimately led to a bipartisan consensus that Taiwan should open up its government. That process has gradually made it one of the most communicative and interactive administrations anywhere in the world.Today's guest — programming prodigy Audrey Tang — initially joined the student protests to help get their streaming infrastructure online. After the students got the official hearings they wanted and went home, she was invited to consult for the government. And when the government later changed hands, she was invited to work in the ministry herself.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. During six years as the country's 'Digital Minister' she has been helping Taiwan increase the flow of information between institutions and civil society and launched original experiments trying to make democracy itself work better. That includes developing new tools to identify points of consensus between groups that mostly disagree, building social media platforms optimised for discussing policy issues, helping volunteers fight disinformation by making their own memes, and allowing the public to build their own alternatives to government websites whenever they don't like how they currently work. As part of her ministerial role Audrey also sets aside time each week to help online volunteers working on government-related tech projects get the help they need. How does she decide who to help? She doesn't — that decision is made by members of an online community who upvote the projects they think are best. According to Audrey, a more collaborative mentality among the country's leaders has helped increase public trust in government, and taught bureaucrats that they can (usually) trust the public in return. Innovations in Taiwan may offer useful lessons to people who want to improve humanity's ability to make decisions and get along in large groups anywhere in the world. We cover: • Why it makes sense to treat Facebook as a nightclub • The value of having no reply button, and of getting more specific when you disagree • Quadratic voting and funding • Audrey’s experiences with the Sunflower Student Movement • Technologies Audrey is most excited about • Conservative anarchism • What Audrey’s day-to-day work looks like • Whether it’s ethical to eat oysters • And much more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:04)Global crisis of confidence in government (00:07:06)Treating Facebook as a nightclub (00:10:55)Polis (00:13:48)The value of having no reply button (00:24:33)The value of getting more specific (00:26:13)Concerns with Polis (00:30:40)Quadratic voting and funding (00:42:16)Sunflower Student Movement (00:55:24)Promising technologies (01:05:44)Conservative anarchism (01:22:21)What Audrey’s day-to-day work looks like (01:33:54)Taiwanese politics (01:46:03)G0v (01:50:09)Rob’s outro (02:05:09)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Rebroadcast: this episode was originally released in September 2018.In Stanley Kubrick’s iconic film Dr. Strangelove, the American president is informed that the Soviet Union has created a secret deterrence system which will automatically wipe out humanity upon detection of a single nuclear explosion in Russia. With US bombs heading towards the USSR and unable to be recalled, Dr Strangelove points out that “the whole point of this Doomsday Machine is lost if you keep it a secret – why didn’t you tell the world, eh?” The Soviet ambassador replies that it was to be announced at the Party Congress the following Monday: “The Premier loves surprises”. Daniel Ellsberg - leaker of the Pentagon Papers which helped end the Vietnam War and Nixon presidency - claims in his book The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner that Dr. Strangelove might as well be a documentary. After attending the film in Washington DC in 1964, he and a colleague wondered how so many details of their nuclear planning had leaked. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. The USSR did in fact develop a doomsday machine, Dead Hand, which probably remains active today. If the system can’t contact military leaders, it checks for signs of a nuclear strike, and if it detects them, automatically launches all remaining Soviet weapons at targets across the northern hemisphere. As in the film, the Soviet Union long kept Dead Hand completely secret, eliminating any strategic benefit, and rendering it a pointless menace to humanity. You might think the United States would have a more sensible nuclear launch policy. You’d be wrong. As Ellsberg explains, based on first-hand experience as a nuclear war planner in the 50s, that the notion that only the president is able to authorize the use of US nuclear weapons is a carefully cultivated myth. The authority to launch nuclear weapons is delegated alarmingly far down the chain of command – significantly raising the chance that a lone wolf or communication breakdown could trigger a nuclear catastrophe. The whole justification for this is to defend against a ‘decapitating attack’, where a first strike on Washington disables the ability of the US hierarchy to retaliate. In a moment of crisis, the Russians might view this as their best hope of survival. Ostensibly, this delegation removes Russia’s temptation to attempt a decapitating attack – the US can retaliate even if its leadership is destroyed. This strategy only works, though, if the tell the enemy you’ve done it. Instead, since the 50s this delegation has been one of the United States most closely guarded secrets, eliminating its strategic benefit, and rendering it another pointless menace to humanity. Strategically, the setup is stupid. Ethically, it is monstrous. So – how was such a system built? Why does it remain to this day? And how might we shrink our nuclear arsenals to the point they don’t risk the destruction of civilization? Daniel explores these questions eloquently and urgently in his book. Today we cover: • Why full disarmament today would be a mistake and the optimal number of nuclear weapons to hold • How well are secrets kept in the government? • What was the risk of the first atomic bomb test? • Do we have a reliable estimate of the magnitude of a ‘nuclear winter’? Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. The 80,000 Hours Podcast is produced by Keiran Harris.

Rebroadcast: this episode was originally released in June 2018. How broken is the world? How inefficient is a typical organisation? Looking at Tara Mac Aulay’s life, the answer seems to be ‘very’. At 15 she took her first job - an entry-level position at a chain restaurant. Rather than accept her place, Tara took it on herself to massively improve the store’s shambolic staff scheduling and inventory management. After cutting staff costs 30% she was quickly promoted, and at 16 sent in to overhaul dozens of failing stores in a final effort to save them from closure. That’s just the first in a startling series of personal stories that take us to a hospital drug dispensary where pharmacists are wasting a third of their time, a chemotherapy ward in Bhutan that’s killing its patients rather than saving lives, and eventually the Centre for Effective Altruism, where Tara becomes CEO and leads it through start-up accelerator Y Combinator. In this episode Tara shows how the ability to do practical things, avoid major screw-ups, and design systems that scale, is both rare and precious. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. People with an operations mindset spot failures others can't see and fix them before they bring an organisation down. This kind of resourcefulness can transform the world by making possible critical projects that would otherwise fall flat on their face. But as Tara's experience shows they need to figure out what actually motivates the authorities who often try to block their reforms. We explore how people with this skillset can do as much good as possible, what 80,000 Hours got wrong in our article 'Why operations management is one of the biggest bottlenecks in effective altruism’, as well as: • Tara’s biggest mistakes and how to deal with the delicate politics of organizational reform. • How a student can save a hospital millions with a simple spreadsheet model. • The sociology of Bhutan and how medicine in the developing world often makes things worse rather than better. • What most people misunderstand about operations, and how to tell if you have what it takes. • And finally, operations jobs people should consider applying for. Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: search for '80,000 Hours' in your podcasting app. The 80,000 Hours Podcast is produced by Keiran Harris.

Rebroadcast: this episode was originally released in December 2019. What is it like to be you right now? You're seeing this text on the screen, smelling the coffee next to you, and feeling the warmth of the cup. There’s a lot going on in your head — your conscious experience. Now imagine beings that are identical to humans, but for one thing: they lack this conscious experience. If you spill your coffee on them, they’ll jump like anyone else, but inside they'll feel no pain and have no thoughts: the lights are off. The concept of these so-called 'philosophical zombies' was popularised by today’s guest — celebrated philosophy professor David Chalmers — in order to explore the nature of consciousness. In a forthcoming book he poses a classic 'trolley problem': "Suppose you have a conscious human on one train track, and five non-conscious humanoid zombies on another. If you do nothing, a trolley will hit and kill the conscious human. If you flip a switch to redirect the trolley, you can save the conscious human, but in so doing kill the five non-conscious humanoid zombies. What should you do?" Many people think you should divert the trolley, precisely because the lack of conscious experience means the moral status of the zombies is much reduced or absent entirely. So, which features of consciousness qualify someone for moral consideration? One view is that the only conscious states that matter are those that have a positive or negative quality, like pleasure and suffering. But Dave’s intuitions are quite different. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. Instead of zombies he asks us to consider 'Vulcans', who can see and hear and reflect on the world around them, but are incapable of experiencing pleasure or pain. Now imagine a further trolley problem: suppose you have a normal human on one track, and five Vulcans on the other. Should you divert the trolley to kill the five Vulcans in order to save the human? Dave firmly believes the answer is no, and if he's right, pleasure and suffering can’t be the only things required for moral status. The fact that Vulcans are conscious in other ways must matter in itself. Dave is one of the world's top experts on the philosophy of consciousness. He helped return the question 'what is consciousness?' to the centre stage of philosophy with his 1996 book 'The Conscious Mind', which argued against then-dominant materialist theories of consciousness. This comprehensive interview, at over four hours long, outlines each contemporary theory of consciousness, what they have going for them, and their likely ethical implications. Those theories span the full range from illusionism, the idea that consciousness is in some sense an 'illusion', to panpsychism, according to which it's a fundamental physical property present in all matter. These questions are absolutely central for anyone who wants to build a positive future. If insects were conscious our treatment of them could already be an atrocity. If computer simulations of people will one day be conscious, how will we know, and how should we treat them? And what is it about consciousness that matters, if anything? Dave Chalmers is probably the best person on the planet to ask these questions, and Rob & Arden cover this and much more over the course of what is both our longest ever episode, and our personal favourite so far. Get this episode by subscribing to our show on the world’s most pressing problems and how to solve them: search for 80,000 Hours in your podcasting app. The 80,000 Hours Podcast is produced by Keiran Harris.

Rebroadcast: this episode was originally released in June 2019. It can often feel hopeless to be an activist seeking social change on an obscure issue where most people seem opposed or at best indifferent to you. But according to a new book by Professor Cass Sunstein, they shouldn't despair. Large social changes are often abrupt and unexpected, arising in an environment of seeming public opposition. The Communist Revolution in Russia spread so swiftly it confounded even Lenin. Seventy years later the Soviet Union collapsed just as quickly and unpredictably. In the modern era we have gay marriage, #metoo and the Arab Spring, as well as nativism, Euroskepticism and Hindu nationalism. How can a society that so recently seemed to support the status quo bring about change in years, months, or even weeks? Sunstein — co-author of Nudge, Obama White House official, and by far the most cited legal scholar of the late 2000s — aims to unravel the mystery and figure out the implications in his new book How Change Happens. He pulls together three phenomena which social scientists have studied in recent decades: preference falsification, variable thresholds for action, and group polarisation. If Sunstein is to be believed, together these are a cocktail for social shifts that are chaotic and fundamentally unpredictable.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. In brief, people constantly misrepresent their true views, even to close friends and family. They themselves aren't quite sure how socially acceptable their feelings would have to become, before they revealed them, or joined a campaign for social change. And a chance meeting between a few strangers can be the spark that radicalises a handful of people, who then find a message that can spread their views to millions. According to Sunstein, it's "much, much easier" to create social change when large numbers of people secretly or latently agree with you. But 'preference falsification' is so pervasive that it's no simple matter to figure out when that's the case. In today's interview, we debate with Sunstein whether this model of cultural change is accurate, and if so, what lessons it has for those who would like to shift the world in a more humane direction. We discuss: • How much people misrepresent their views in democratic countries. • Whether the finding that groups with an existing view tend towards a more extreme position would stand up in the replication crisis. • When is it justified to encourage your own group to polarise? • Sunstein's difficult experiences as a pioneer of animal rights law. • Whether activists can do better by spending half their resources on public opinion surveys. • Should people be more or less outspoken about their true views? • What might be the next social revolution to take off? • How can we learn about social movements that failed and disappeared? • How to find out what people really think. Get this episode by subscribing to our podcast on the world’s most pressing problems: type 80,000 Hours into your podcasting app. Or read the transcript on our site. The 80,000 Hours Podcast is produced by Keiran Harris.

Andrew Yang — past presidential candidate, founder of the Forward Party, and leader of the 'Yang Gang' — is kind of a big deal, but is particularly popular among listeners to The 80,000 Hours Podcast. Maybe that's because he's willing to embrace topics most politicians stay away from, like universal basic income, term limits for members of Congress, or what might happen when AI replaces whole industries. Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. But even those topics are pretty vanilla compared to our usual fare on The 80,000 Hours Podcast. So we thought it’d be fun to throw Andrew some stranger or more niche questions we hadn't heard him comment on before, including: 1. What would your ideal utopia in 500 years look like? 2. Do we need more public optimism today? 3. Is positively influencing the long-term future a key moral priority of our time? 4. Should we invest far more to prevent low-probability risks? 5. Should we think of future generations as an interest group that's disenfranchised by their inability to vote? 6. The folks who worry that advanced AI is going to go off the rails and destroy us all... are they crazy, or a valuable insurance policy? 7. Will people struggle to live fulfilling lives once AI systems remove the economic need to 'work'? 8. Andrew is a huge proponent of ranked-choice voting. But what about 'approval voting' — where basically you just get to say “yea” or “nay” to every candidate that's running — which some experts prefer? 9. What would Andrew do with a billion dollars to keep the US a democracy? 10. What does Andrew think about the effective altruism community? 11. What's one thing we should do to reduce the risk of nuclear war? 12. Will Andrew's new political party get Trump elected by splitting the vote, the same way Nader got Bush elected back in 2000? As it turns out, Rob and Andrew agree on a lot, so the episode is less a debate than a chat about ideas that aren’t mainstream yet... but might be one day. They also talk about: • Andrew’s views on alternative meat • Whether seniors have too much power in American society • Andrew’s DC lobbying firm on behalf of humanity • How the rest of the world could support the US • The merits of 18-year term limits • What technologies Andrew is most excited about • How much the US should spend on foreign aid • Persistence and prevalence of inflation in the US economy • And plenty more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:38)Andrew’s hopes for the year 2500 (00:03:10)Tech over the next century (00:07:03)Utopia for realists (00:10:41)Most likely way humanity fails (00:12:43)What Andrew would do with a billion dollars (00:14:44)Approval voting vs. ranked-choice voting (00:19:51)The worry that third party candidates could cause harm (00:21:12)Investment in existential risk reduction (00:25:18)Future generations as a disenfranchised interest group (00:30:37)Humanity Forward (00:32:05)Best way the rest of the world could support the US (00:37:17)Recent advances in AI (00:39:56)Artificial general intelligence (00:46:38)The Windfall Clause (00:49:39)The alignment problem (00:53:02)18-year term limits (00:56:21)Effective altruism and longtermism (01:00:44)Persistence and prevalence of inflation in the US economy (01:01:25)Downsides of policies Andrew advocates for (01:02:08)What Andrew would have done differently with COVID (01:04:54)Fighting for attention in the media (01:09:25)Right ballpark level of foreign aid for the US (01:11:15)Government science funding (01:11:58)Nuclear weapons policy (01:15:06)US-China relationship (01:16:20)Human challenge trials (01:18:59)Forecasting accuracy (01:20:17)Upgrading public schools (01:21:41)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

If a rich country were really committed to pursuing an active biological weapons program, there’s not much we could do to stop them. With enough money and persistence, they’d be able to buy equipment, and hire people to carry out the work. But what we can do is intervene before they make that decision. Today’s guest, Jaime Yassif — Senior Fellow for global biological policy and programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) — thinks that stopping states from wanting to pursue dangerous bioscience in the first place is one of our key lines of defence against global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs). Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. It helps to understand why countries might consider developing biological weapons. Jaime says there are three main possible reasons: 1. Fear of what their adversary might be up to 2. Belief that they could gain a tactical or strategic advantage, with limited risk of getting caught 3. Belief that even if they are caught, they are unlikely to be held accountable In response, Jaime has developed a three-part recipe to create systems robust enough to meaningfully change the cost-benefit calculation. The first is to substantially increase transparency. If countries aren’t confident about what their neighbours or adversaries are actually up to, misperceptions could lead to arms races that neither side desires. But if you know with confidence that no one around you is pursuing a biological weapons programme, you won’t feel motivated to pursue one yourself. The second is to strengthen the capabilities of the United Nations’ system to investigate the origins of high-consequence biological events — whether naturally emerging, accidental or deliberate — and to make sure that the responsibility to figure out the source of bio-events of unknown origin doesn’t fall between the cracks of different existing mechanisms. The ability to quickly discover the source of emerging pandemics is important both for responding to them in real time and for deterring future bioweapons development or use. And the third is meaningful accountability. States need to know that the consequences for getting caught in a deliberate attack are severe enough to make it a net negative in expectation to go down this road in the first place. But having a good plan and actually implementing it are two very different things, and today’s episode focuses heavily on the practical steps we should be taking to influence both governments and international organisations, like the WHO and UN — and to help them maximise their effectiveness in guarding against catastrophic biological risks. Jaime and Rob explore NTI’s current proposed plan for reducing global catastrophic biological risks, and discuss: • The importance of reducing emerging biological risks associated with rapid technology advances • How we can make it a lot harder for anyone to deliberately or accidentally produce or release a really dangerous pathogen • The importance of having multiples theories of risk reduction • Why Jaime’s more focused on prevention than response • The history of the Biological Weapons Convention • Jaime’s disagreements with the effective altruism community • And much more And if you might be interested in dedicating your career to reducing GCBRs, stick around to the end of the episode to get Jaime’s advice — including on how people outside of the US can best contribute, and how to compare career opportunities in academia vs think tanks, and nonprofits vs national governments vs international orgs. Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:32)Categories of global catastrophic biological risks (00:05:24)Disagreements with the effective altruism community (00:07:39)Stopping the first person from getting infected (00:11:51)Shaping intent (00:15:51)Verification and the Biological Weapons Convention (00:25:31)Attribution (00:37:15)How to actually implement a new idea (00:50:54)COVID-19: natural pandemic or lab leak? (00:53:31)How much can we rely on traditional law enforcement to detect terrorists? (00:58:20)Constraining capabilities (01:01:24)The funding landscape (01:06:56)Oversight committees (01:14:20)Just winning the argument (01:20:17)NTI’s vision (01:27:39)Suppliers of goods and services (01:33:24)Publishers (01:39:41)Biggest weaknesses of NTI platform (01:42:29)Careers (01:48:31)How people outside of the US can best contribute (01:54:10)Academia vs think tanks vs nonprofits vs government (01:59:21)International cooperation (02:05:40)Best things about living in the US, UK, China, and Israel (02:11:16)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ryan KesslerTranscriptions: Katy Moore

If there's a nuclear war followed by nuclear winter, and the sun is blocked out for years, most of us are going to starve, right? Well, currently, probably we would, because humanity hasn't done much to prevent it. But it turns out that an ounce of forethought might be enough for most people to get the calories they need to survive, even in a future as grim as that one.Today's guest is engineering professor Dave Denkenberger, who co-founded the Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED), which has the goal of finding ways humanity might be able to feed itself for years without relying on the sun. Over the last seven years, Dave and his team have turned up options from the mundane, like mushrooms grown on rotting wood, to the bizarre, like bacteria that can eat natural gas or electricity itself.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. One option stands out as potentially able to feed billions: finding a way to eat wood ourselves. Even after a disaster, a huge amount of calories will be lying around, stored in wood and other plant cellulose. The trouble is that, even though cellulose is basically a lot of sugar molecules stuck together, humans can't eat wood. But we do know how to turn wood into something people can eat. We can grind wood up in already existing paper mills, then mix the pulp with enzymes that break the cellulose into sugar and the hemicellulose into other sugars. Another option that shows a lot of promise is seaweed. Buffered by the water around them, ocean life wouldn't be as affected by the lower temperatures resulting from the sun being obscured. Sea plants are also already used to growing in low light, because the water above them already shades them to some extent. Dave points out that "there are several species of seaweed that can still grow 10% per day, even with the lower light levels in nuclear winter and lower temperatures. ... Not surprisingly, with that 10% growth per day, assuming we can scale up, we could actually get up to 160% of human calories in less than a year." Of course it will be easier to scale up seaweed production if it's already a reasonably sized industry. At the end of the interview, we're joined by Sahil Shah, who is trying to expand seaweed production in the UK with his business Sustainable Seaweed. While a diet of seaweed and trees turned into sugar might not seem that appealing, the team at ALLFED also thinks several perfectly normal crops could also make a big contribution to feeding the world, even in a truly catastrophic scenario. Those crops include potatoes, canola, and sugar beets, which are currently grown in cool low-light environments. Many of these ideas could turn out to be misguided or impractical in real-world conditions, which is why Dave and ALLFED are raising money to test them out on the ground. They think it's essential to show these techniques can work so that should the worst happen, people turn their attention to producing more food rather than fighting one another over the small amount of food humanity has stockpiled. In this conversation, Rob, Dave, and Sahil discuss the above, as well as: • How much one can trust the sort of economic modelling ALLFED does • Bacteria that turn natural gas or electricity into protein • How to feed astronauts in space with nuclear power • What individuals can do to prepare themselves for global catastrophes • Whether we should worry about humanity running out of natural resources • How David helped save $10 billion worth of electricity through energy efficiency standards • And much moreChapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:36)Resilient foods recap (00:04:27)Cost effectiveness recap (00:08:07)Turning fiber or wood or cellulose into sugar (00:10:30)Redirecting human-edible food away from animals (00:22:46)Seaweed production (00:26:33)Crops that can handle lower temperatures or lower light (00:35:24)Greenhouses (00:40:51)How much to trust this economic modeling (00:43:50)Global cooperation (00:51:16)People feeding themselves using these methods (00:57:15)NASA and ALLFED (01:04:47)Kinds of catastrophes (01:15:16)Is New Zealand overrated? (01:25:35)Should listeners be doing anything to prepare for possible disasters? (01:28:43)Cost effectiveness of work on EMPs (01:30:43)The future of ALLFED (01:33:34)Opportunities at ALLFED (01:40:49)Why Dave is optimistic around bigger-picture scarcity issues (01:46:58)Energy return on energy invested (01:56:36)Nitrogen and phosphorus (02:03:25)Energy and food prices (02:07:18)Sustainable Seaweed with Sahil Shah (02:21:44)Locusts (02:38:33)The effect of COVID on food supplies (02:44:01)How much food prices would spike in a disaster (02:50:46)How Dave helped to save ~$10 billion worth of energy (02:56:33)What it’s like to live in Alaska (03:03:18)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

If modern human civilisation collapsed — as a result of nuclear war, severe climate change, or a much worse pandemic than COVID-19 — billions of people might die.That's terrible enough to contemplate. But what’s the probability that rather than recover, the survivors would falter and humanity would actually disappear for good?It's an obvious enough question, but very few people have spent serious time looking into it -- possibly because it cuts across history, economics, and biology, among many other fields. There's no Disaster Apocalypse Studies department at any university, and governments have little incentive to plan for a future in which their country probably no longer even exists.The person who may have spent the most time looking at this specific question is Luisa Rodriguez — who has conducted research at Rethink Priorities, Oxford University's Future of Humanity Institute, the Forethought Foundation, and now here, at 80,000 Hours.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. She wrote a series of articles earnestly trying to foresee how likely humanity would be to recover and build back after a full-on civilisational collapse. There are a couple of main stories people put forward for how a catastrophe like this would kill every single human on Earth — but Luisa doesn’t buy them. Story 1: Nuclear war has led to nuclear winter. There's a 10-year period during which a lot of the world is really inhospitable to agriculture. The survivors just aren't able to figure out how to feed themselves in the time period, so everyone dies of starvation or cold. Why Luisa doesn’t buy it: Catastrophes will almost inevitably be non-uniform in their effects. If 80,000 people survive, they’re not all going to be in the same city — it would look more like groups of 5,000 in a bunch of different places. People in some places will starve, but those in other places, such as New Zealand, will be able to fish, eat seaweed, grow potatoes, and find other sources of calories. It’d be an incredibly unlucky coincidence if the survivors of a nuclear war -- likely spread out all over the world -- happened to all be affected by natural disasters or were all prohibitively far away from areas suitable for agriculture (which aren’t the same areas you’d expect to be attacked in a nuclear war). Story 2: The catastrophe leads to hoarding and violence, and in addition to people being directly killed by the conflict, it distracts everyone so much from the key challenge of reestablishing agriculture that they simply fail. By the time they come to their senses, it’s too late -- they’ve used up too much of the resources they’d need to get agriculture going again. Why Luisa doesn’t buy it: We‘ve had lots of resource scarcity throughout history, and while we’ve seen examples of conflict petering out because basic needs aren’t being met, we’ve never seen the reverse. And again, even if this happens in some places -- even if some groups fought each other until they literally ended up starving to death — it would be completely bizarre for it to happen to every group in the world. You just need one group of around 300 people to survive for them to be able to rebuild the species. In this wide-ranging and free-flowing conversation, Luisa and Rob also cover: • What the world might actually look like after one of these catastrophes • The most valuable knowledge for survivors • How fast populations could rebound • ‘Boom and bust’ climate change scenarios • And much more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:37)Recovering from a serious collapse of civilization (00:11:41)Existing literature (00:14:52)Fiction (00:20:42)Types of disasters (00:23:13)What the world might look like after a catastrophe (00:29:09)Nuclear winter (00:34:34)Stuff that might stick around (00:38:58)Grace period (00:42:39)Examples of human ingenuity in tough situations (00:48:33)The most valuable knowledge for survivors (00:57:23)Would people really work together? (01:09:00)Radiation (01:27:08)Learning from the worst pandemics (01:31:40)Learning from fallen civilizations (01:36:30)Direct extinction (01:45:30)Indirect extinction (02:01:53)Rapid recovery vs. slow recovery (02:05:01)Risk of culture shifting against science and tech (02:15:33)Resource scarcity (02:23:07)How fast could populations rebound (02:37:07)Implications for what we ought to do right now (02:43:52)How this work affected Luisa’s views (02:54:00)Boom and bust climate change scenarios (02:57:06)Stagnation and cold wars (03:01:18)How Luisa met her biological father (03:18:23)If Luisa had to change careers (03:40:38)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Quantum mechanics — our best theory of atoms, molecules, and the subatomic particles that make them up — underpins most of modern physics. But there are varying interpretations of what it means, all of them controversial in their own way. Famously, quantum theory predicts that with the right setup, a cat can be made to be alive and dead at the same time. On the face of it, that sounds either meaningless or ridiculous. According to today’s guest, David Wallace — professor at the University of Pittsburgh and one of the world's leading philosophers of physics — there are three broad ways experts react to this apparent dilemma: 1. The theory must be wrong, and we need to change our philosophy to fix it. 2. The theory must be wrong, and we need to change our physics to fix it. 3. The theory is OK, and cats really can in some way be alive and dead simultaneously. (David and Rob do their best to introduce quantum mechanics in the first 35 minutes of the episode, but it isn't the easiest thing to explain via audio alone. So if you need a refresher before jumping in, we recommend checking out our links to learn more, summary and full transcript.) In 1955, physicist Hugh Everett bit the bullet on Option 3 and proposed Wallace's preferred solution to the puzzle: each time it's faced with a ‘quantum choice,’ the universe 'splits' into different worlds. Anything that has a probability greater than zero (from the perspective of quantum theory) happens in some branch — though more probable things happen in far more branches. While not a consensus position, the ‘many-worlds’ approach is one of the top three most popular ways to make sense of what's going on, according to surveys of relevant experts. Setting aside whether it's correct for a moment, one thing that's not often spelled out is what this approach would concretely imply if it were right. Is there a world where Rob (the show's host) can roll a die a million times, and it comes up 6 every time? As David explains in this episode: absolutely, that’s completely possible — and if Rob rolled a die a million times, there would be a world like that. Is there a world where Rob becomes president of the US? David thinks probably not. The things stopping Rob from becoming US president don’t seem down to random chance at the quantum level. Is there a world where Rob deliberately murdered someone this morning? Only if he’s already predisposed to murder — becoming a different person in that way probably isn’t a matter of random fluctuations in our brains. Is there a world where a horse-version of Rob hosts the 80,000 Horses Podcast? Well, due to the chance involved in evolution, it’s plausible that there are worlds where humans didn’t evolve, and intelligent horses have in some sense taken their place. And somewhere, fantastically distantly across the vast multiverse, there might even be a horse named Rob Wiblin who hosts a podcast, and who sounds remarkably like Rob. Though even then — it wouldn’t actually be Rob in the way we normally think of personal identity. Rob and David also cover: • If the many-worlds interpretation is right, should that change how we live our lives? • Are our actions getting more (or less) important as the universe splits into finer and finer threads? • Could we conceivably influence other branches of the multiverse? • Alternatives to the many-worlds interpretation • The practical value of physics today • And much more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:15)Introduction to quantum mechanics (00:08:10)Why does quantum mechanics need an interpretation? (00:19:42)Quantum mechanics in basic language (00:30:37)Quantum field theory (00:33:13)Different theories of quantum mechanics (00:38:49)Many-worlds theory (00:43:14)What stuff actually happens (00:52:09)Can we count the worlds? (00:59:55)Why anyone believes any of these (01:05:01)Changing the physics (01:10:41)Changing the philosophy (01:14:21)Instrumentalism vs. realism (01:21:42)Objections to many-worlds (01:35:26)Why a consensus hasn’t emerged (01:50:59)Practical implications of the many-worlds theory (01:57:11)Are our actions getting more or less important? (02:04:21)Does utility increase? (02:12:02)Could we influence other branches? (02:17:01)Should you do unpleasant things first? (02:19:52)Progress in physics over the last 50 years (02:30:55)Practical value of physics today (02:35:24)Physics careers (02:43:56)Subjective probabilities (02:48:39)The philosophy of time (02:50:14)David’s experience at Oxford (02:59:51) Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Sofia Davis-Fogel and Katy Moore

It’s hard to believe, but until recently there had never been a large field trial that addressed these simple and obvious questions:1. When ordinary people wear face masks, does it actually reduce the spread of respiratory diseases?2. And if so, how do you get people to wear masks more often?It turns out the first question is remarkably challenging to answer, but it's well worth doing nonetheless. Among other reasons, the first good trial of this prompted Maha Rehman — Policy Director at the Mahbub Ul Haq Research Centre — as well as a range of others to immediately use the findings to help tens of millions of people across South Asia, even before the results were public.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. The groundbreaking Bangladesh RCT that inspired her to take action found that: • A 30% increase in mask wearing reduced total infections by 10%. • The effect was more pronounced for surgical masks compared to cloth masks (plus ~50% effectiveness). • Mask wearing also led to an increase in social distancing. • Of all the incentives tested, the only thing that impacted mask wearing was their colour (people preferred blue over green, and red over purple!). The research was done by social scientists at Yale, Berkeley, and Stanford, among others. It applied a program they called ‘NORM’ in half of 600 villages in which about 350,000 people lived. NORM has four components, which the researchers expected would work well for the general public: N: no-cost distribution O: offering information R: reinforcing the message and the information in the field M: modeling Basically you make sure a community has enough masks and you tell them why it’s important to wear them. You also reinforce the message periodically in markets and mosques, and via role models and promoters in the community itself. Tipped off that these positive findings were on the way, Maha took this program and rushed to put it into action in Lahore, Pakistan, a city with a population of about 13 million, before the Delta variant could sweep through the region. Maha had already been doing a lot of data work on COVID policy over the past year, and that allowed her to quickly reach out to the relevant stakeholders — getting them interested and excited. Governments aren’t exactly known for being super innovative, but in March and April Lahore was going through a very deadly third wave of COVID — so the commissioner quickly jumped on this approach, providing an endorsement as well as resources. Together with the original researchers, Maha and her team at LUMS collected baseline data that allowed them to map the mask-wearing rate in every part of Lahore, in both markets and mosques. And then based on that data, they adapted the original rural-focused model to a very different urban setting. The scale of this project was daunting, and in today’s episode Maha tells Rob all about the day-to-day experiences and stresses required to actually make it happen. They also discuss: • The challenges of data collection in this context • Disasters and emergencies she had to respond to in the middle of the project • What she learned from working closely with the Lahore Commissioner's Office • How to get governments to provide you with large amounts of data for your research • How she adapted from a more academic role to a ‘getting stuff done’ role • How to reduce waste in government procurement • And much more Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:33)Bangladesh RCT (00:06:24)The NORM model (00:08:34)Results of the experiment (00:10:46)Experimental design (00:20:35)Adapting the findings from Bangladesh to Lahore (00:23:55)Collecting data (00:34:09)Working with governments (00:38:38)Coordination (00:44:53)Disasters and emergencies (00:56:01)Sending out masks to every single person in Lahore (00:59:15)How Maha adapted to her role (01:07:17)Logistic aptitude (01:11:45)Disappointments (01:14:13)Procurement RCT (01:16:51)What we can learn (01:31:18)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

We recently launched a new podcast feed that might be useful to you and people you know. It's called Effective Altruism: Ten Global Problems, and it's a collection of ten top episodes of this show, selected to help listeners quickly get up to speed on ten pressing problems that the effective altruism community is working to solve. It's a companion to our other compilation Effective Altruism: An Introduction, which explores the big picture debates within the community and how to set priorities in order to have the greatest impact.These ten episodes cover: The cheapest ways to improve education in the developing world How dangerous is climate change and what are the most effective ways to reduce it? Using new technologies to prevent another disastrous pandemic Ways to simultaneously reduce both police misconduct and crime All the major approaches being taken to end factory farming How advances in artificial intelligence could go very right or very wrong Other big threats to the future of humanity — such as a nuclear war — and how can we make our species wiser and more resilient One problem few even recognise as a problem at all The selection is ideal for people who are completely new to the effective altruist way of thinking, as well as those who are familiar with effective altruism but new to The 80,000 Hours Podcast.If someone in your life wants to get an understanding of what 80,000 Hours or effective altruism are all about, and prefers to listen to things rather than read, this is a great resource to direct them to.You can find it by searching for effective altruism in whatever podcasting app you use, or by going to 80000hours.org/ten.We'd love to hear how you go listening to it yourself, or sharing it with others in your life. Get in touch by emailing [email protected].

Our failure to make sure all kids globally get all of their basic vaccinations leads to 1.5 million child deaths every year.According to today’s guest, Varsha Venugopal, for the great majority this has nothing to do with weird conspiracy theories or medical worries — in India 80% of undervaccinated children are already getting some shots. They just aren't getting all of them, for the tragically mundane reason that life can get in the way.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. As Varsha says, we're all sometimes guilty of "valuing our present very differently from the way we value the future", leading to short-term thinking whether about getting vaccines or going to the gym. So who should we call on to help fix this universal problem? The government, extended family, or maybe village elders? Varsha says that research shows the most influential figures might actually be local gossips. In 2018, Varsha heard about the ideas around effective altruism for the first time. By the end of 2019, she’d gone through Charity Entrepreneurship’s strategy incubation program, and quit her normal, stable job to co-found Suvita, a non-profit focused on improving the uptake of immunization in India, which focuses on two models: 1. Sending SMS reminders directly to parents and carers 2. Gossip The first one is intuitive. You collect birth registers, digitize the paper records, process the data, and send out personalised SMS messages to hundreds of thousands of families. The effect size varies depending on the context but these messages usually increase vaccination rates by 8-18%. The second approach is less intuitive and isn't yet entirely understood either. Here’s what happens: Suvita calls up random households and asks, “if there were an event in town, who would be most likely to tell you about it?” In over 90% of the cases, the households gave both the name and the phone number of a local ‘influencer’. And when tracked down, more than 95% of the most frequently named 'influencers' agreed to become vaccination ambassadors. Those ambassadors then go on to share information about when and where to get vaccinations, in whatever way seems best to them. When tested by a team of top academics at the Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) it raised vaccination rates by 10 percentage points, or about 27%. The advantage of SMS reminders is that they’re easier to scale up. But Varsha says the ambassador program isn’t actually that far from being a scalable model as well. A phone call to get a name, another call to ask the influencer join, and boom — you might have just covered a whole village rather than just a single family. Varsha says that Suvita has two major challenges on the horizon: 1. Maintaining the same degree of oversight of their surveyors as they attempt to scale up the program, in order to ensure the program continues to work just as well 2. Deciding between focusing on reaching a few more additional districts now vs. making longer term investments which could build up to a future exponential increase. In this episode, Varsha and Rob talk about making these kinds of high-stakes, high-stress decisions, as well as: • How Suvita got started, and their experience with Charity Entrepreneurship • Weaknesses of the J-PAL studies • The importance of co-founders • Deciding how broad a program should be • Varsha’s day-to-day experience • And much moreChapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:47)The problem of undervaccinated kids (00:03:16)Suvita (00:12:47)Evidence on SMS reminders (00:20:30)Gossip intervention (00:28:43)Why parents aren’t already prioritizing vaccinations (00:38:29)Weaknesses of studies (00:43:01)Biggest challenges for Suvita (00:46:05)Staff location (01:06:57)Charity Entrepreneurship (01:14:37)The importance of co-founders (01:23:23)Deciding how broad a program should be (01:28:29)Careers at Suvita (01:34:11)Varsha’s advice (01:42:30)Varsha’s day-to-day experience (01:56:19)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Preventing the apocalypse may sound like an idiosyncratic activity, and it sometimes is justified on exotic grounds, such as the potential for humanity to become a galaxy-spanning civilisation.But the policy of US government agencies is already to spend up to $4 million to save the life of a citizen, making the death of all Americans a $1,300,000,000,000,000 disaster.According to Carl Shulman, research associate at Oxford University's Future of Humanity Institute, that means you don’t need any fancy philosophical arguments about the value or size of the future to justify working to reduce existential risk — it passes a mundane cost-benefit analysis whether or not you place any value on the long-term future.Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. The key reason to make it a top priority is factual, not philosophical. That is, the risk of a disaster that kills billions of people alive today is alarmingly high, and it can be reduced at a reasonable cost. A back-of-the-envelope version of the argument runs: • The US government is willing to pay up to $4 million (depending on the agency) to save the life of an American. • So saving all US citizens at any given point in time would be worth $1,300 trillion. • If you believe that the risk of human extinction over the next century is something like one in six (as Toby Ord suggests is a reasonable figure in his book The Precipice), then it would be worth the US government spending up to $2.2 trillion to reduce that risk by just 1%, in terms of American lives saved alone. • Carl thinks it would cost a lot less than that to achieve a 1% risk reduction if the money were spent intelligently. So it easily passes a government cost-benefit test, with a very big benefit-to-cost ratio — likely over 1000:1 today. This argument helped NASA get funding to scan the sky for any asteroids that might be on a collision course with Earth, and it was directly promoted by famous economists like Richard Posner, Larry Summers, and Cass Sunstein. If the case is clear enough, why hasn't it already motivated a lot more spending or regulations to limit existential risks — enough to drive down what any additional efforts would achieve? Carl thinks that one key barrier is that infrequent disasters are rarely politically salient. Research indicates that extra money is spent on flood defences in the years immediately following a massive flood — but as memories fade, that spending quickly dries up. Of course the annual probability of a disaster was the same the whole time; all that changed is what voters had on their minds. Carl expects that all the reasons we didn’t adequately prepare for or respond to COVID-19 — with excess mortality over 15 million and costs well over $10 trillion — bite even harder when it comes to threats we've never faced before, such as engineered pandemics, risks from advanced artificial intelligence, and so on. Today’s episode is in part our way of trying to improve this situation. In today’s wide-ranging conversation, Carl and Rob also cover: • A few reasons Carl isn't excited by 'strong longtermism' • How x-risk reduction compares to GiveWell recommendations • Solutions for asteroids, comets, supervolcanoes, nuclear war, pandemics, and climate change • The history of bioweapons • Whether gain-of-function research is justifiable • Successes and failures around COVID-19 • The history of existential risk • And much moreChapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:01:34)A few reasons Carl isn't excited by strong longtermism (00:03:47)Longtermism isn’t necessary for wanting to reduce big x-risks (00:08:21)Why we don’t adequately prepare for disasters (00:11:16)International programs to stop asteroids and comets (00:18:55)Costs and political incentives around COVID (00:23:52)How x-risk reduction compares to GiveWell recommendations (00:34:34)Solutions for asteroids, comets, and supervolcanoes (00:50:22)Solutions for climate change (00:54:15)Solutions for nuclear weapons (01:02:18)The history of bioweapons (01:22:41)Gain-of-function research (01:34:22)Solutions for bioweapons and natural pandemics (01:45:31)Successes and failures around COVID-19 (01:58:26)Who to trust going forward (02:09:09)The history of existential risk (02:15:07)The most compelling risks (02:24:59)False alarms about big risks in the past (02:34:22)Suspicious convergence around x-risk reduction (02:49:31)How hard it would be to convince governments (02:57:59)Defensive epistemology (03:04:34)Hinge of history debate (03:16:01)Technological progress can’t keep up for long (03:21:51)Strongest argument against this being a really pivotal time (03:37:29)How Carl unwinds (03:45:30)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore