Tshuvos and Poskim-Beyond simple Ahavah- Hachzakas HaGer- Helping Converts Integrate Into the Community-with Rabbi Michael J. Broyde

מה אבותיכם לא נכנסו לברית אלא במילה וטבילה והרצאת דם, אף הם לא יכנסו לברית אלא במילה וטבילה והרצאת דמים' 

(בבלי כריתות ט ע'א).

As we began the Shloshes Yimei Hagvalah

in preparation for Matan Torah

and reliving the events that transformed our people

and created a unique identity for us in perpetuity 

The Issur Ben Tzvi Hersh

Tshuvos and Poskim Shiur

Of the Yeshiva of Newark@IDT

offered a special halachic discussion on Geirus

that was presented by one of the leading Jewish scholars of our day

Rabbi Micheal J.Broyde

 professor of law at Emory University School of Law

 senior fellow and projects director

 at the Center for the Study of Law and Religion

 The Concise Code of Jewish Law for Converts

(Second Edition forthcoming, 2021, Urim)

Michael J. Broyde

מצות אהבת הגרים :שנצטוינו לאהוב הגרים, כלומר שנזהר שלא לצער אותם בשום דבר, אבל נעשה להם טובה ונגמול אותם

חסד כפי הראוי והיכולת. והגרים הם כל מי שנתחבר אלינו משאר האומות שהניח דתו ונכנס בדתנו, ועליהם נאמר ] דברים י ', י 'ט[

ואהבתם את הגר כי גרים הייתם. – ספר החינוך מצוה תלא

We are commanded to love the convert: In particular, we are directed not to cause converts to suffer in

any way, but rather to do them good and charitably as they deserve and as we can. The converts are all

those who have joined us from other nations and abandoned their religion and joined ours. About this

group, the Torah [Devarim 10:19] says, “Love the stranger [convert] since you were strangers.” – Sefer

HaChinuch Mitzva 431

The mitzva of loving the convert is fundamental to this work. Most sources that discuss this mitzva indicate that

it adds to the force of the obligation to love any Jew – to love the convert specifically. The question for a practical

halachic work, however, is: “How should one love the convert in particular?” Should one love the convert as in

the Midrashic parable of the stag joining the flock of sheep, recognizing that the convert is always an outsider

and will never exactly fit in? Or should one love the convert as a long-lost member of a family, who needs to be

reunited with the community as if the convert were always a family member, lest, out of loneliness, they return

to their original community?

This work adopts both of these alternatives as inherent to the complexity of the mitzva of loving the convert – to

love the convert because a convert is different and to love the convert by helping them fit in and not be different.

The first way of loving calls for heightening the pace and the degree of integration of the convert within the

Jewish community, so that they are no longer perceived as a convert. This complements one of the basic purposes

of the mitzva to love the convert: to make sure that the convert remains part of the Jewish community and does

not feel out of place or like a stranger. This is the basic message of Rambam’s famous letter to Rabbi Ovadia (the

Convert) directing him to pray in a similar manner as all other Jews. Thus, in all situations in which there is a

dispute about the mandates of Jewish law, this work follows this halachic factor in preferring to adopt the

normative Jewish law view which brings the convert to further integration into the Jewish people. The view that

highlights the convert’s status as an outsider is generally disfavored, while that which encourages integration is

generally favored. As Rabbi Moshe Feinstein (cited below in the introduction) taught: The mitzva to love the

convert obligates us to resolve disputed Jewish laws (where a convert is involved) in a way that further helps the

convert find their place within the community.

However, in certain situations, the convert’s status as a stranger within our community creates an affirmative need

of assistance navigating law, custom, and nuance. Ignoring that fact in the name of purely formalist equal status

– pretending that the convert is not a convert – is not truly loving. For example, Shulchan Aruch (OC 529:2)

records that when the Jewish festivals (chagim) arrive, there is a particular duty to reach out to invite the convert

into one’s home for festival meals. When all others are celebrating with family, one must manifest the love of the

convert in particular by acknowledging that they need special attention. To ignore a person’s status as a convert

when everybody else is family-focused does not manifest love and integration of the convert as an insider; it

simply causes the convert to focus on his family-less status. This work recognizes this reality and takes into

account that the duty to love the convert sometimes requires highlighting the fact that this person is a convert.

This is the two-sided nature of the duty to love the convert: One must both welcome the convert as an outsider,

as well as do one’s best to help them cease being an outsider. This work is aware of both ways of fulfilling the

obligation to love the convert and factors them both into its determinations of normative Jewish law.

Modern Jewish life in America has a number of unique characteristics, almost unprecedented historically. One of

those unique features is the social ease with which one can convert to Judaism. People can and do change religions

without almost any social, economic, or political complications. Indeed, studies show that people in America

change their faiths frequently, and conversion to Judaism is no exception. This is a new historical reality of

American Jewish life, and is still quite different from the reality in other parts of the world.

The present work addresses this new reality by filling a lacuna in the halachic literature both for converts and for

fellow Jews relating to converts. It collects the many different halachic issues that relate to the status of converts

after their conversion. It discusses all the cases in which the halachic rules are different (or even where some

authorities are of the opinion that the halachic rules are different) for a convert than they are for a born-Jew, or

for how a born-Jew is to relate to a convert rather than to a born-Jew. It offers normative rulings that are applicable

today for all of these questions.

Six Undergirding Questions

The halachic issues in which the rules for a convert or for other Jews relating to converts are not the same as for,

or toward, a born-Jew can be divided into six questions:

1. THE CONVERT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FAMILY OF ORIGIN

There are certain mitzvot that are applied in toto differently to a convert, since the family of origin is not Jewish.

For example: How should one respect and honor their Gentile parents? Must a convert mourn for their parents in

the same way that a born-Jew does? Such questions apply no matter how recently a person converted and no

matter how well-integrated they are within the Jewish community. The basic question here is how to approach

the unusual family situation of a convert.

2. THE UNIQUE OBLIGATION TO LOVE A CONVERT

There are mitzvot incumbent on born-Jews in their relationships with converts. The most striking is the special

obligation to love a convert. The duty to love the convert is complex in that love sometimes calls for singling out

a convert for special attention, and not doing so at other times, depending on how the convert will respond to that

unique attention. The core question here is when to identify or single out a convert as such, and when to avoid

doing so.

3. TRANSITION ISSUES IN BEING A JEW WHO HAD BEEN A GENTILE

There are some transitional questions present in conversions, reflecting the fact that a person who was previously

a Gentile becomes, in a single moment, Jewish and obligated in Jewish Law. For example: May a convert eat the

kosher food they cooked the morning before the conversion, or is it prohibited to the convert as a form of bishul

akum (food cooked by a Gentile)? What are the prayer and blessing obligations of someone who converts in the

middle of the time specified for performance of time-bound mitzvot, such as in the middle of the day, in the

middle of sefira, in the middle of Chanuka, and so on? The complicated question here is how to handle the

situation in which a convert joins Judaism in the middle of an ongoing mitzva, or in which they must relate to

their past self. (Fortunately, although these issues are beguiling, they are also transitory.)

4. MARRIAGE LAWS FOR A CONVERT

There are certain people whom a convert may marry that a born-Jew may not marry, and there are certain people

whom a convert may not marry that a born-Jew may marry. For example: a convert may marry a mamzer, and a

female convert may not marry a Kohen. The core question is whom Jews who are converts may marry, since

converts are not Kohanim, Levites, or Israelites.

5. LIMITATIONS ON CONVERTS HOLDING POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY

Many societies exclude those members who were not born into the society from holding some powerful offices.

(One such society is that of the United States.) In parallel: the Torah tells us that a convert may not become a king

of the Jewish nation, and the Talmud rules that a convert may not serve in any position of binding coercive

authority. For example: a convert may not serve on certain kinds of rabbinical courts. See CM 7 and 8. The core

question is one of contemporary Jewish law: what are the modern day offices (or officers, or holders of certain

titles) that fit into this Talmudic rule?

6. A CONVERT AND PRAYERS THAT SPEAK OF ANCESTRAL JUDAISM

There is an ongoing dispute as to whether and when a convert recites specific parts of the traditional prayers that

reference Jewish ancestors or born Jewishness. For example: Does a convert bless God for having been made a

Jew (shelo asani goy)? The core questions are when and why a convert is called upon to identify themself in

prayer as a descendant of the earliest forefathers of the Jews, or as a descendent of the slaves redeemed from

Egypt, and when and why to identify themself as an outsider by birth.

Four Undergirding Principles Regarding Converts

There are four principles through which these questions are filtered:

1. Love: There is a special obligation to love the convert, and there is a special obligation not to allow a

convert to suffer because they converted. There are many explanations for this mitzva. The two primary

ones are love of the convert and fear that the convert might abandon their Judaism for their original faith.

The following midrash offers a parable to explain the obligation to love the convert as a form of endearment:

A king has many flocks of sheep... and one day a stag appears and joins the sheep. The stag grazes with

the sheep and returns with them at night, as if he were a sheep. When the shepherds tell the king of the

stag... the king takes great pride and interest in it and ensures that the shepherds treat the stag with special

care. The shepherds question the king, asking “you have thousands of animals over which you take no

personal interest... so why do you care so much about this one animal?” The king answers them, “My

sheep have only this flock to join, and cannot leave, but this stag has the whole world to choose from,

yet he chose my flock. He surely deserves my special attention and care.”

The midrash concludes that we, as the Jewish people, should give tremendous credit to the convert who has chosen

to leave their family and their people to join our ranks. This is why the convert deserves special consideration and

care. Other sources further attribute this mitzva to the fear that if converts are not loved, they might abandon

Judaism to return to the community that loves them. Some midrashim thus explain certain rules as grounded in

the concern “lest the convert return to their old faith.” Even these sources, however, still recognize that the

obligation to love the stranger in our midst is part of the legacy of Jewish slavery in Egypt and of our having been

gerim in that setting. Regardless of which concern is more paramount to a given reader of this work, it is clear

that there is a special obligation to act with particular kindness to converts as a way of showing love. For example:

the obligation includes a directive to help a convert celebrate the festivals, when they might feel most alone.

Furthermore: according to many sources, the Biblical repetition of the injunction against oppressing a convert

reinforces the prohibition against oppressing the convert, both in financial matters and in non-financial matters.

Moreover, many halachic authorities are of the view that there is even an obligation to help a convert earn a living

with ease.

2. Arevut: Since a convert is basically viewed as identical to a born-Jew, converts can mutually participate

with fellow Jews in discharging religious obligations for each other even when they have already

fulfilled their own obligation (called in Jewish law the principle of arevut). Although this matter is in

dispute, the general halachic consensus is that a convert can fulfill the obligation of others, even after they

have fulfilled their own. This work accepts that view.

While there are many proofs for this approach, suffice it to say that this is the consensus of halachic authorities.

It is also driven by the categorical insistence of many authorities that a convert may lead a congregation in prayer

(be motzi others as sheliach tzibbur); if a convert were not included in arevut, this rule of allowing a convert to

be a sheliach tzibbur/chazzan would need many caveats and modifications. In addition, this approach is consistent

with Rabbi Feinstein’s obligation that we love the convert by being lenient on matters that could otherwise

stigmatize them.

3. Minhagim: A convert is free to choose which set of Jewish customs (minhagim) the convert wishes to

adopt (Ashkenaz, Sephard, Edot Hamizrach, etc.). A convert is under no obligation to adopt the

customs of their biological homeland (so a Gentile born in Ukraine need not adopt minhag Ashkenaz) as

long as the convert adopts an existent halachic culture.

The same point is true in matters of hashkafa (ideology): A convert may choose any Orthodox ideology,

spanning the breadth of the Orthodox community. Even if a convert’s biological father is Jewish, the convert

still need not adopt his father’s ancestral family practices. Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach does note that a

convert should not adopt a mosaic of unique customs from varied communities. Rather a convert should choose

a community to join, and adopt that community’s practices.

4. “A convert is like a newborn child” ( ger shenitgayer kekatan shenolad ): This principle is a limited

one. It means only that a convert loses (from a Jewish law perspective) their biological and marital

relationships with their prior Gentile family. As a matter of Jewish law, the convert technically has no

mother, father, siblings, or spouse.

This principle explains why a convert’s halachic relationship with their family is sometimes different than that of

a born-Jew with theirs. However, this principle has very limited application: an adult convert is not “born again”

at conversion. The convert does not have to wait thirteen years to become a bar-mitzva, or twelve years to become

a bat-mitzva. The convert has to repay any money that they owed at the time of conversion, and continues to own

any property that they owned prior to their conversion. In short: the convert is not a newborn child for most

matters of Jewish law. Furthermore, as this work will show many times and in many places, a convert is not

prohibited from having a relationship with their prior family, although Jewish law is concerned with that prior

relationship being used to entice the convert to revert to their prior religion. These principles form the basis of

many of the rules and decisions found throughout this work, and are not necessarily repeated every time that they

are applicable.

Two Key Factors in Deciding Normative Jewish Law (Halacha)

Most of the topics discussed in this work are drawn from disputes by post-medieval rabbinic sages

(Achronim), by medieval sages (Rishonim), and even by sages in the Talmud itself. Thus, in order to reach

practical conclusions, we have utilized two key factors to guide us.

FIRST KEY FACTOR:

This book’s conclusions are reached through conventional analyses widely used for many halachic disputes,

the details of which are beyond the scope of this introduction. The two of these guidelines relevant to this

work are: Ashkenazi norm is generally followed when matters are disputed between Ashkenazim and

Sephardim (although we also note Sephardic practice), and when the Aruch Hashulchan or Mishnah Berurah

resolves a dispute, this work is inclined to follow their resolution over that of other poskim in that era.

SECOND KEY FACTOR:

We have always granted great weight to the obligation to love the convert. As Rabbi Moshe Feinstein states,

this mitzva affects how one resolves halachic questions that affect a convert. He notes simply:

אבל למעשה יש לידע, שהמצווה של ואהבתם את הגר )דברים עקב י' י'ט( מחייבת אותנו לקרבם ולהקל בכל עניינים אלו. ולפיכך

אחר ישוב גדול נראה, שאין להחשיב משרות אלו בתקופתנו כענין של מעשה שררה, דעיקר תפקיד של ישיבה הוא ללמד לתלמידים

כשהם רוצים. ומה שיש כח להמנהלים והראשי הישיבה על התלמידים לסלקם או שלא לקבל אותם לכתחילה וכדומה, אין זה אלא

כמו שררה של בעה'ב על פועליו, שאין זה מעין מינוי לשררה כלל. ולפי זה משרות אלו אינם אלא כמילוי תפקיד וכעניין של

עסק. ואין לדמות זה למש'כ באג'מ יו'ד חלק ב' סימן מ'ד בענין מינוי אשה להשגיח להכשרים, דהוי מינוי של שררה.

But, as a matter of normative practice, one should know that that mitzva to love the convert (Deut. 10:19)

obligates us to bring them closer and to be lenient on all these matters. Therefore, after considerable

contemplation it seems that these positions of authority are in our times examples of positions of mere

acts of authority (serarah), since the purpose of a yeshiva is to teach students who are interested in

studying. The fact that the authority of the principals or heads of the Yeshiva over the students includes

the authority to expel them or deny them admission and the like, is similar to the authority of any owner

over his workers and this has no connection to an appointment of formal serarah at all. Therefore, these

jobs are only like a profession, or a business deal. They should not be compared to what I have written in

Igrot Moshe YD 2:42 about the appointment of a woman as a kashrut supervisor, which is a position of

serarah.

It is important not to under-read this teshuva. What drives Rabbi Feinstein to the conclusion that being a rosh

yeshiva is a mere position of employment with no more authority than the owner of any business (a far from

obvious conclusion) is the duty to love the convert, since it directs us to be open and welcoming to converts,

which cannot be done by excluding the convert. That is exactly why Rabbi Feinstein opens with the duty to bring

the convert closer and connects that thought to his permissive ruling.

Rabbi Feinstein avers that when there is more than one reasonable approach to a halachic topic that impacts a

convert, one should adopt the view (of both the facts and the halacha) that shows love for the convert and brings

them closer and further integrates the