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Show Notes
Dr. Michael Huemer joins me to discuss moral realism vs. antirealism, ethical intuitionism, phenomenal conservatism, moral disagreement, and much else in moral philosophy.
Ethical Intuitionism
Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy
William Lane Craig vs. Erik Wielenberg
Linktree
/ The Five Metaethical Positions /
Noncognitivism/expressivism: Moral statements are neither true nor false. Evaluative predicates do not even
purportedly refer to any sort of property, nor do evaluative statements assert propositions.
Error theory/nihilism: Moral statements (that imply that something has an evaluative property) are all false.
Subjectivism: Some moral statements are true, but not objectively. For a thing to be good is for some individual or group to (be disposed to) take some attitude towards it.
Moral Naturalism: There are objective moral properties, but they are reducible. Evaluative truths are reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, moral statements can be justified empirically.
Moral Non-Naturalism/Intuitionism: There are objective moral properties, and they are irreducible. Evaluative truths are not reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, at least some moral truths are known intuitively.
/ Timestamps /
00:00 Introduction
01:05 Objective vs. Subjective
06:45 Five Metaethical Views
36:45 Fictionalism
50:40 Phenomenal Conservatism, Scientism, Skepticism
1:15:00 Moral Disagreement
1:25:00 Theism and Moral Realism
1:41:00 Companions in Innocence
1:46:30 Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
2:00:00 Huemer’s soul is not in Colorado nor is it in Michigan
Ethical Intuitionism
Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy
William Lane Craig vs. Erik Wielenberg
Linktree
/ The Five Metaethical Positions /
Noncognitivism/expressivism: Moral statements are neither true nor false. Evaluative predicates do not even
purportedly refer to any sort of property, nor do evaluative statements assert propositions.
Error theory/nihilism: Moral statements (that imply that something has an evaluative property) are all false.
Subjectivism: Some moral statements are true, but not objectively. For a thing to be good is for some individual or group to (be disposed to) take some attitude towards it.
Moral Naturalism: There are objective moral properties, but they are reducible. Evaluative truths are reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, moral statements can be justified empirically.
Moral Non-Naturalism/Intuitionism: There are objective moral properties, and they are irreducible. Evaluative truths are not reducible to descriptive truths. Additionally, at least some moral truths are known intuitively.
/ Timestamps /
00:00 Introduction
01:05 Objective vs. Subjective
06:45 Five Metaethical Views
36:45 Fictionalism
50:40 Phenomenal Conservatism, Scientism, Skepticism
1:15:00 Moral Disagreement
1:25:00 Theism and Moral Realism
1:41:00 Companions in Innocence
1:46:30 Evolutionary Debunking Arguments
2:00:00 Huemer’s soul is not in Colorado nor is it in Michigan