The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland. Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert. Welcome back, Dave. We’ve been building up to this specific event for some time now, and so have the Japanese. As you will recall, the last several months on Guadalcanal have seen steadily larger Japanese assaults hit that Marines with intents on grabbing Henderson Field. The Japanese have tried and failed at Tenaru in August, tried and came very close at Edson’s Ridge in September, tried a few smaller attacks here and there the next several weeks, all failures. Now we sit in late October and the Japanese have finally built enough forces on Guadalcanal for their almighty “decisive battle”. All the Japanese thrusts, both ashore and at sea, have led to this operation. This is the all or nothing, the decisive battle that the Japanese have clamored for and the Americans have been preparing for. This is the tipping point for better or worse. Talking Points: Preparations:The Japanese had been steadily sending troops and supplies, more troops than supplies, to Guadalcanal for several weeks in anticipation of this specific offensive. The IJN fully supported the operation in just about any way that they could. On October 14, two battleships, Kongo and Haruna, along with screening vessels shelled Henderson Field in what was easily, the worst bombardment of the entire campaign.For nearly an hour and a half the two battleships fired over 900 rounds of 14 inch ammunition into the Lunga perimeter to knock out both airfields and destroy the Cactus Air Force’s aircraft.The shelling, known as “the Bombardment” by the Marines and soldiers ashore destroyed about half of the Cactus Air Force, and heavily damaged the two airfields, although one was back in operation in a few hours.This bombardment, as well as others in between, were all in conjunction with the large-scale offensive, all with plans to soften the defenses of the Americans. The Japanese had begun steadily moving troops into the attack area for many days, through the jungle (again), with the date of the main assault set for October 22, but would actually take place two days later. To distract the Americans attention from the main location of the attack, the Japanese set up a series of diversionary infantry assaults. The Japanese were under the assumption that only 10,000 Americans were ashore, when in actuality the number was over 23,000. The Americans, aware that a large scale assault was eventually coming, had been preparing their defensive perimeter for weeks.The addition of the Army’s 164th Infantry Regiment gave Vandegrift a total of 13 infantry battalions to defend the perimeter in an almost continuous line. Prelude to the main event: The Japanese had been moving their main assault force through the jungle, along a trail blazed by their engineers, for days…completely undetected by American forces. At dusk on October 23, one of the diversion attacks under COL Nakaguma, alomng with 9 tanks, attacked Marine defenses at the mouth of the Matinikau river. The Japanese tanks advanced near the river under the cover of an artillery barrage, however, the Japanese tanks were either disabled or destroyed by Marine anti-tank weapons on the opposite side of the river. In response to the Japanese assault, and the Japanese artillery, 4 battalions of Marine artillery fired over 6,000 rounds at the Japanese inflicting heavy casualties and essentially stopping the assault at the river. In between the artillery detonations, Marines on the line could audibly hear Japanese screaming and moaning in pain. The artillery, yet again, was devastating.It should be mentioned that while this was happening, Vandegrift was in Noumea at the bidding of newly appointed head banana, Admiral Halsey. We’ll get to Haley’s installation as main man in another episode when we discuss the leadership, both good and bad, of the Guadalcanal campaign with buddy and friend of the show Jon Parshall. The Main Event October 24:At first light on October 24, Marines along the Matinikau caught sight of a long column of Japanese infantry on a ridge to the left rear of the American lines. COL Hanneken’s 2/7 redeployed to the rear and loosely tied in with the Marines of 3/7, albeit with a gap in the line. With the departure of Hanneken’s people, Chesty Puller was forced to stretch his single battalion over a regimental front.Only 700 men guarded an area designed for the protection from over 2,000.Puller, ever vigilant, personally walked the line inspecting each area, and each emplacement ordering improvements or movements as he saw fit in each area. As the Japanese under GEN Maruyama approached the area thought to be the correct position for attack, they began to get bogged down again by the jungle and now, also, heavy rain.The original kick off time for th

On the night of October 11, 1942, the Japanese sent two separate task forces heading in the direction of Guadalcanal. The first task force was yet another troop/resupply convoy, the second task force, separate from the first yet in the same area at the same time, was a bombardment group assigned to shell Henderson field. The Japanese, at this time, rulers of the seas around Guadalcanal, at least at night anyway, did not believe that an American task force would be in the area. Latest intel told them that the Americans were off to the north and not near the beaches. The intelligence was wrong. Set Up:The Japanese have been making steady resupply runs, at night, to their forces on Guadalcanal since Edson’s Ridge. These supply runs are the buildup for the eventual “showdown” that is scheduled to take place in mid to late October, October 20 to be exact.Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, of Savo fame, was in overall command of the operation set for the night of October 11-12.His field commander if you will, is Rear Admiral Aritomo GotoGoto is in command of the bombardment force which consists of:3 CAs and 2 DDs American intel has picked up on the Japanese plans to build forces for an all-out assault on the airfield. Realizing that the Marines would be hard-pressed to hold out against another massive assault, Army General Millard Harmon, CO of US Army in the South Pacific, convinces Admiral Ghormley, whom we shall discuss at a later date, that the Marines need the Army’s help.Ghormley agrees and sends the Army’s 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division to Guadalcanal to reinforce the Gyrenes.The date for the reinforcement is set for October 8 To protect the convoy carrying the soldiers, Ghormley assigns a cruiser/destroyer group under the command of Admiral Norman Scott to protect them.Scott’s forces include:2 CAs, 2 CLs, 5 DDsScott’s orders are to protect the convoy and once the Army is delivered, patrol the waters off Guadalcanal , intercept and then destroy anything that attempts to move inADM Scott knew that his mission carried with it, two tasks aside from the destruction of any Japanese forceDevelop night surface doctrineRevengeAs far as doctrine was concerned, Scott was aware that he and his units, lacked any real experience or training in night actions. Therefore, his plan for action, should it be needed, was simple:Steam in a column with DDs ahead in the van, followed by the cruisersDDs would illuminate targets after radar contact, fire torpedoes and allow the CAs to concentrate on the enemy heavies Scott chose the USS San Francisco (CA-38) as his flagship, when he should have probably chosen either Helena or BoiseHelena and Boise were both equipped with new SG radar units, as opposed to the SC aboard FriscoFaulty intel said that the Japanese had sets that could track American radar and as a result he ordered that the radar on Frisco be turned off (!!)The Fight:On October 9 and 10th Scott was patrolling the area just north of Renell island, out of range of Japanese search planesEach night he entered Savo sound but turned back because of no reported Japanese activityOn the 11th, search planes from Guadalcanal sighted the incoming Japanese troop reinforcement convoy and reported it as 2 CAs and 6DDs.Scott receives this intel and prepares to maneuver his ships into the Savo island area to do battle that night At sundown, Scott orders his ship to GQ, determined to not be surprised by the Japanese like at Savo on August 8 Prior to action, Scott wisely decided to launch most of his scout planes and send them to Guadalcanal.This was a clear lesson learned at Savo as a result of the avgas fires that stared aboard the US cruisers and illuminated them for the Japanese to see What couple of scout planes he still had, he launched around 2200 to scout ahead of his task force. The night was clear and cloudless, but there was no moon to add ambient light to the battlefield, thus making visibility poor.Scott set his formation for battle as follows:DDs Farenholt, Duncan and Laffey leading:CA San Francisco, CL Boise, CA Salt Lake City, and CL Helena followed by:DDs Buchanan and McCalla The Japanese were completely unaware that an American force was closing on them.In actuality Japanese submarine I-26 was on the surface and sighted the force, but did not report it as she chose to dive and make an attack (which she ultimately didn’t do anyway) At 2250 SF’s float plane reported “1 large, 2 small vessels 16 miles from Guadalcanal” Based on this report, Scott executed a turn in order to cross the Japanese’s TExplain crossing the T The Japanese formation was led by CA Aoba, Furataka, and KinugasaDD Fubuki and Hatsuyuki held screen Around 2332 hours, Helena’s radar picked up the Japanese ships, Boise and Salt Lake City also picked up the Japanese on radarScott was confused by the radar reports and initially didn’t trust themThis is huge and will come in to play in November as well. This generation of US CO’s did not have experienc

This week we will be talking about the early actions that occurred along the Matinikau river. Now, as opposed to the land battles we have discussed before, Tenaru and Edson’s Ridge which each only happened one time, the Matinikau actions occurred several times from September through November 1942. Today, we will be focusing on the September and October actions. Following the battle at Edson’s Ridge, what remained of the Japanese force under General Kawaguchi, pulled back through the jungle and attempted to regroup, as well as refit, on the western side of the Matinikau river. Marine general Archer Vandegrift was aware that the Japanese had done this very thing and planned to eliminate whatever was left of the force that had slammed against the ridge on two consecutive nights in September. Vandegrift was determined to mop up what was left of the Japanese so as to deny them the opportunity to consolidate their forces and resume their offensive. Vandegrift chose his freshest troops for this action, the recently arrived 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines under a Lieutenant Colonel whose name was and still is synonymous with the Corps. Lewis B Chesty Puller. Talking Points: The 7th Marines Arrive:On September 18, the Marines on Guadalcanal finally received some much needed reinforcements, to the tune of 4157 men of the 7th Marine RegimentFresh from garrison duty in Samoa, these Marines were both fresh and eager to go.Their arrival allowed Vandegrift to finally establish a full defensive perimeter around the Lunga Point areaLearning from the lessons earlier in the campaign, the 7th Marines were disgorged on the beach early in the morning, and by 1800 that same day the cargo ships, now properly loaded, spit out a further 137 trucks4323 barrels of fuel60% of the tentage and equipment needed by the 7thThe remainder would be unloaded in short order Lewis B “Chesty” Puller 44 years old at this timeJoined the Marines in 1918By 42 he had served 24 years in the CorpsA veteran of Haiti, Nicaragua, better known as the banana wars, Puller had loads of combat experience before he ever got to the CanalDescribed as the prototypical Marine officer, Puller had a chin like “bulldozer blade”, a barrel chest and seemingly always had a pipe stuck in his teeth. Highly decorated for service in Haiti and Nicaragua and grounded in the fundamentals of infantry combat and what it took to both be an infantryman, and how to survive as an infantryman, his men absolutely adored him. Mission:Puller was to advance astride Mount Austen, cross the river and examine the area between Mount Austen and KokumbonaClearly just an exploratory mission 900 men under Puller moved out on September 23On the afternoon of the next day, the lead elements of Puller’s force ran into a Japanese bivouac area on the NW slope of Mount AustenIn the ensuing fight, the Marines drove the Japanese off just before dark, but took significant casualties7 KIA 25 WIA The next day 2/5 was sent to reinforce Puller and allow his wounded to be brought to the rear At the same time, the Japanese had established a defensive area around the position known as “One Log Bridge” along the riverThe Japanese 12th Company, at the bridge, and Puller’s units hit each repeatedly with neither side gaining, or losing, any ground Because of the defense at one log bridge, Puller continued downstream, headed towards the mouth of the river and attempted a crossing.He was met with fierce Japanese defensive fire and mortars that handily checked the Marine advance and forced them to hold on the friendly side of the river Vandegrift sent the 1st Raiders to join Puller and at this point, Edson took commandEdson and Puller devised a plan to have C Company of Puller’s Battalion move up the east side of the river, cross one log bridge and attack Matinikau village from the south2/5 would hold the line near the mouth of the river to deny any attempt by the Japanese to flank Puller’s group Attack:At first light on the 27th, the Raiders moved up to cross the one log bridgeAs they did so, they came under intense fire from well entrenched Japanese on the east bank of the riverThis was completely unexpected as far as the Marines were concernedWell placed Japanese mortar fire began to take effect on the RaidersKenneth Bailey, leading the attack is killed here After Bailey is killed, LCOL Griffith, who had been wounded in the fight, tried to slip 2 companies around the entrenched Japanese in order to flank them, but they too were pinned down by heavy Japanese fire Back at the mouth of the river, the Japanese 9th Company continuously hurled back 2/5’s attacks across the river Pt Cruz: In an attempt to cut the Japanese off, Companies A, B and D of 1/7 landed near Point Cruz and began to push inland.It must be noted that the this action would not have occurred had it been known by Vandegrift that Puller’s and the Raider’s attack had not succeeded as yet.Garbled radio transmissions from Griffith did not make it clear that t

This week we would like to welcome back Dave Holland. Dave is a former United States Marine, owns and runs the facebook and youtube channel called Guadalcanal: Walking a battlefield, a Solomon islands battlefield guide, and most importantly, a Guadalcanal expert. Welcome back, Dave.It’s been over a month since the Marines landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo. August has passed and with it, the lives of over 1,200 allied sailors and airmen at the battles of Savo island and Eastern Solomons, as well as the lives of over 200 US Marines ashore. The Japanese have lost over 1700 men ashore on the aforementioned islands, including nearly 800 at the Tenaru river on August 21 as well as nearly 300 lost at sea. Operation WATCHTOWER was never assumed to be a quick in and out operation, it was never thought of, at least by the United States, as a quick trip. The Americans knew it would be a slugfest, how much of a slugfest was anyone’s guess however. As September dawned and the first week passed, the slugfest ashore abruptly turned into a meatgrinder. A bloody, drawn-out campaign of attrition was something that the Japanese could not withstand. The Japanese were sick of the Marines on Guadalcanal, and wanted them out and wanted them out now. Beginning in the first week of September, over 5,000 Japanese troops under the command of General Kawaguchi landed on Guadalcanal with their sole mission being to “rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield.” The focus of their initial assaults on the Marines would center on an area south of Henderson Field, near three small hills and an, as yet, unnamed ridge. The unnamed ridge would soon receive several names from the Marines who defended it. History would call it, Edson’s Ridge. Talking Points Lead up to the Battle: As early as August 18, Imperial Japanese Army orders stated that the main body of the 35th Infantry Brigade under GEN Kawaguchi prepare to move to Guadalcanal.By late August, Kawaguchi had formed a plan to move his unit to the Canal from Shortland by barges. American day time air power shut that idea down, so as to force the Japanese to move Kawaguchi’s people to the island by means of fast DDs.This was one of the first operations of the infamous Tokyo Express Kawaguchi was completely ignorant as to the number of Marines in and around the defense perimeter. Estimates told him that no more than 2,000 Marines held the lines, albeit with aircraft to help them.This estimate allowed Kawaguchi to believe that he could easily break through Marine lines with his force (sound familiar Ichiki?) By September 7, Kawaguchi had over 5,000 men encamped around Taivu PointThis did not include Colonel Oka’s men, some 1,000 strong, that were separate and slated to hit the SW quadrant of the American lines. Kawaguchi then split his forces further, breaking his units into groups of about 650 men each and put them on 3 separate avenues of advance, through the jungle, to eventually strike the Marine lines all at once. A further avenue of attack was designated to come from the SE, and this would contain the newly christened “Kuma” BTLN, which was consisted of Ichiki’s 2nd echelon. Artillery would theoretically support the assaults, as would naval gunfire in the form of bombardments of Marine positions on September 9 and 10 Kawaguchi picked the night of September 12 as the night of the assaultBy September 8, Kawaguchi had moved his assault units from Taivu to Koli Point and set off on foot through the jungle on September 9. The Tasimboko Raid: Word reached Vandegrift (via native scouts) that fresh Japanese units had landed and that a group of 2-300 were in and around the village of TasimbokoThe commander of the 1st Raider Battalion, Merritt Edson, jumped on the news and hatched a plan to land a portion of his Raider Battalion some 3,000 yards behind Tasimboko and take the Japanese by surprise Merritt A Edson Known as “Red Mike” for his fiery red hairGenerally was a quiet and reserved manSpoke with a low, quiet, raspy voice that was hard to hearFormer aviator, but he was an expert in infantry tacticsLike all good commanders, he possessed an innate ability to instantly recognize good or poor performance in his subordinatesOn September 8, the Raiders landed at Taivu PointImmediately found signs of enemy landings in the form of half-eaten food, abandoned packs, shoes, life preservers and some weapons Edson’s men were met by heavy defensive fire as they moved inland towards Tasimboko Kawaguchi ordered artillery support and detached an infantry company to lend a hand to the defendersThe rest of kawaguchi’s people kept on towards the airfieldP-400’s and SBDs from Henderson Field rendered aerial support as Edson’s men pushed forwardCompany A of the 1st Raiders burst out of the jungle and annihilated what Japanese had not fled the area of TasimbokoThe Marines entered Tasimboko to find it essentially deserted of people but filled with valuable intel

The month of August 1942 has had its ups and downs so far as the campaign for Guadalcanal is concerned. The invasion of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Tanambogo and other outlying islands in the area initially went very well. Marines occupied the islands rather quickly and eliminated Japanese resistance to a man in most places. On August 21, Marines from the 1st Marine Regiment utterly destroyed the first major Japanese counter strike on land at the Tenaru River. On land, the campaign was succeeding. At sea, however, it was not. The debacle at Savo Island, the worst defeat in US Navy history, left a bitter taste in the mouths of every person in and around the seas of Guadalcanal that wore an American or allied uniform. Because of the defeat at Savo, among other reasons, Admiral Fletcher pulled his precious carriers away from the immediate vicinity of Guadalcanal to preserve their ever so valuable flight decks. However, because of the Tenaru battle, Fletcher was compelled to reverse course and send his flattops back to the waters of Guadalcanal to protect and support the Marines against any further Japanese efforts ashore. Unbeknownst to Fletcher, the Japanese had deployed a strong naval force under the command of Chuichi Nagumo, of Midway fame, to support Japanese land efforts and destroy any US ships in the area. Over the next few days, that being August 24, 1942, the US fleet and the Japanese fleet groped for each other, and eventually became entangled in the third carrier battle of 1942, what history would call, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Talking Points: Japanese Intentions:For the most part, Japanese counteroffensives ashore at Guadalcanal, were almost always tag-teamed with a naval supporting operation. This is the first “significant” Japanese effort to eliminate the Marines ashore and the USN offshore by a combined arms operation.The Japanese had sent another troop convoy under Admiral Tanaka towards Guadalcanal with the remainder of Colonel Ichiki’s 2nd echelon. We will hear from them again at Edson’s Ridge…The deployed Japanese fleet would both protect the convoy and destroy any American shipping in the area. Yamamoto knew that US carriers were in the area supporting the Guadalcanal landings, he did not know specifically where they were, but he figured that they had to be in the area. As a result, he deployed the two fleet carriers at his disposal, Pearl Harbor and Coral sea veterans Shokaku and Zuikaku as well as a light carrier Ryujo.Aside from the CVs, which were the long ranged striking arm, the fleet that was deployed consisted of two other task forces.The Advanced Force under Admiral Nobutake Kondo had 5 CAs, 1 CL, 8 DDs and 1 BB.The Vanguard Force under Admiral Hiroaki Abe consisted of 2 BBs, 3 CAs, 1 CL, and 6 DDs.The Japanese actually sent Ryujo ahead of the main striking force as a screen. Yamamoto’s plan called for the destruction of the American CVs that he figured to be in the region thereby allowing the Japanese naval forces the ability to destroy any other US and Allied shipping in the area and isolate and destroy the Marines ashore. Again, like at Midway and Coral Sea, the Japanese divided their forces thereby spreading their AA capabilities, which were not that great anyway, thin. The advantage of spreading their forces, at least here, is that as we shall see, not all of the coveted targets were sighted or attacked by American aircraft. The Japanese forces were laid out as such: Japanese transports were supposed to land reinforcements on August 24 US disposition:To counter any Japanese move in the area, the US had at its disposal, essentially, the same force that it had at the outset of WATCHTOWER, minus the cruisers sunk at Savo of course.Just before the battle, the US had 3 CVs at sea. CV6, CV3, and CV7.On August 23, Fletcher detached USS Wasp, as she was critically low on fuel , and because of this, she missed the battle The US forces were split into two Task Forces, all under Fletcher’s command. TF11 centered around CV3 and included an escort of 2 CAs and 5 DDs. TF16, under the command of Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, centered around CV6 with an escort consisting of 1 CA, 1 CL (AA CL Atlanta), and 6 DDs. A conspicuous presence amongst this TF was the new fast battleship USS North Carolina (BB-55)This was the first time a fast battleship would operate with US CVs in a battle, and as such would also be the first time one of the new fast battleships would unleash their vast array of anti-aircraft weaponry, which would go on to play a vital role in the upcoming battle. August 24 Beginning on August 22, both US and Japanese forces started sending out search aircraft in order to locate one another.USN PBY Catalinas had reported on incoming Japanese warships, and spotted the incoming light carrier Ryujo By morning, Fletcher was getting itchy. He was aware that Japanese forces were in the area, but as yet, had not spotted them himself having relied on PBY contacts. Around 1240, CV6 launched 22

Prewar US Navy and IJN surface doctrineUS Navy surface battle doctrine assumed, and planned for any major surface action against an enemy, specifically the Japanese, would be fought in broad daylight, in perfect weather, near the Philippines and at extreme range of the rifles of the US Navy’s battleship, battle line. While night training did occur for the USN, it was not something that was practiced regularly, nor was it something that was hammered into the sailor’s heads. For example, the USS Vincennes, a heavy cruiser that took an unfortunate part in Savo, last practiced night firing in February 1941. The prewar doctrine was based on arrogance. Arrogance in that it was just presumed that the hapless and half-witted Japanese would openly present their own battle fleet, which was thought to be heavily outnumbered by US battleships, for extreme destruction because…well…that’s what they were supposed to do. The Japanese on the other hand, were extremely well trained in night fighting. Sailors were selected for scouting positions aboard ships because of their night vision abilities.While the Japanese also believed in the decisive battle theory, they differed in that they intended to whittle the US fleet down before the big showdown ever came to fruit.Subs, DDs and CAs were expected to make slashing, surprise night attacks to whittle the US fleet down.Great emphasis was put on torpedoes within the IJN, as opposed to the USN. It was expected that torpedo attacks, at night, would be the major ship killers before the BBs would finish off what was left.The IJN already had great success in nocturnal torpedo attacks before WWII. During the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-06, the IJN employed nighttime torpedo attacks successfully. Advances in weaponry and technologyDue to the emphasis within the IJN on night time torpedo attacks, the development of ship killing torpedoes was of utter importance.The Type 93 Long Lance torpedo was developed in the early 30’sNearly wakelessOxygen fueled1,090 pound warhead with a range of 22,000 yards and a speed of 49 knotsSuperior night optics as well as flash less powder were also a Japanese superiorityThe USN preferred the naval rifle over the torpedo and as such, did not sufficiently develop a torpedo and they placed more emphasis on movement and range placement of ships for gun fire purposes as opposed to torpedo attacks. The Japanese respond to the American landingsThe first major Japanese response to the landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal was launched by Admiral Mikawa at 0830 on August 7. His orders were to assemble his cruiser division (CruDiv 6) and prepare for a night attack on the American fleet now known to be off Guadalcanal.Mikawa’s orders to his force were intercepted by American analysts but the message was not decoded until August 23.By around 1100 hours on August 8, Mikawa’s force had been assembled and was at sea, bound for GuadalcanalHe launched scout planes to determine the Allied strength before he got into the areaOne of Aoba’s scout planes found the US fleet off Gcanal and Tulagi and reported it as:4 CAs, 7 DDs, and 1 phantom BB off Lunga Point2 CAs, 12 DDs and 3 transports off TulagiWith this information Mikawa knew that his enemy was divided in strengthMikawa’s plan was to penetrate the sound south of Savo, torpedo the US ships there and then engage the Tulagi force with gunfire and torpedoes after which he would withdraw northwards Allied preparationAmerican air searches located Mikawa’s force as it was moving southFirst found by B-17s raiding Rabaul and ID’d as 4 CAs and 1 DD heading westSeen again by another B-17 and reported as 6 unidentified ships heading SEUS Sub S-38 reported DDs passing overhead at very high speed and 3 CAs on a course of 140 degreesS-38’s report carried the most weight but was dismissed by Richmond Kelly Turner under the assumption that a large enemy surface force would be seen by search planes first.Search planes (PBYs) did not pick up the forcer on the 8th as they slipped through the aerial net.Fletcher requested another aerial search but McCain and his staff failed to complySighting reports by Lockheed Hudsons of Mikawa’s force, and then plotted by Turner allowed Turner to assume that the Japanese ships spotted (which were erroneously stated as being sea plane tenders) made Turner assume that tenders could not reach the area in time to render any sort of attack. The second sighting report stated that the Japanese ships were making 15 knots and could not arrive in time for a night battle.Turner believed the Japanese were setting up another sea plane base at Rekata Bay, notcoming south at flank speed to kick his ass. British Admiral Crutchley, the senior Allied officer afloat off GCanal, decided to split his forces for defense. He reasoned that there were two areas that enemy ships could slip into the sound without being detected, and by splitting his forces, one was bound to intercept a force moving in a

H-Hour Guadalcanal American intel assumed that the bulk of the Japanese were on Guadalcanal, specifically along Lunga PointEstimated 5,000 men5th Marines secured the beachhead, 1st Marines passed through them and headed for “Grassy Knoll”It was assumed there would be heavy defensive fire on the beachesThe landing on Guadalcanal could not have gone any better, as virtually no opposition was encounteredThe beach head was a jumbled mess of supplies as there were not enough marines nearby, or sailors, to unload the supplies.Marines pressed inland and encountered the jungle for the first time TulagiAbout 2 miles long ½ mile wide. Japanese garrison was the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, about 350 menMarines that assaulted Tulagi, Florida, Gavutu/Tanambogo were:1st Raiders1/22/51st Parachute Btln.The first boots on the ground belonged to 1/2 who landed at Florida island. Initially, resistance was nill until the Raiders hit phase line A where they ran into stiff defenses. Japanese embedded themselves in cavesHarbinger of future defensive efforts throughout the PacificThe night of August 7-8, the Japanese counterattacked on Tulagi, breaking marine lines in one point.By morning, those Japanese had all been killed Good personal stories of the Raiders? Gavutu/TanambogoAssigned to the 1st Parachute Battalion, numbering some 397 menFacing the Paras were over 500 JapaneseHeavy Japanese resistance caused many casualties among the ParasBy nightfall, neither island had been secured and Marine casualties had been very heavyParas requested reinforcements for morning assaultReinforcements sent in, but the landing was a failure because of enemy fireLanded near the causeway insteadLike on Tulagi, the Japanese holed up in caves and had to be blasted outTalk about Angus Goss (An explosion was the sweetest music conceivable)Talk about Harry TorgersonBlew up caves using dynamiteOne blast was so close that it blew the majority of his pants off of his body, exposing most of his ass surrounded by shredded pants.Hence the name “Raggedy Assed Marines”The conversation supposedly went, “Captain you done tore your pants!” “Screw the pants! Get me more dynamite!”Awarded a Silver Star for this actionThe islands were finally captured, most Japanese were killed at the loss of 70 KIA and 87 WIATotal casualties for Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo were 122 KIA for USMC and 863 KIA for the Japanese Air RaidOnce the landings were revealed to be an invasion and not a raid, Yamamoto ordered a “decisive counterattack”While the IJN would respond off Savo within 24 hours, the first “decisive counterattack” came by air53 aircraft were involved in the initial air attackMixture of Betty’s, Zeroes and ValsOnly 12 F4Fs were aloft to intercept the incoming raidersSaburo SakaiAttacked SBDs from CV6Got creased in the head from a rear seat gunner in one of the SBDsThe wound left Sakai blind in his right eye, his left side was paralyzed, and his Zero was shot to piecesSakai losing blood quickly, fought off death by punching himself in his wound to stay conscious, and managed to steer his crippled airplane the 565 miles back to Rabaul The raid achieved nothing in terms of stopping the landing, but it did deprive the Americans of most of their fighter contingent from the CVs, thus compelling Fletcher to pull his CVs back away from Canal as he did not have the fighter capability to withstand another attack by torpedo carrying Betty’s (or so he thought anyway) Pulling his CVs back put them out of reach for proper patrols the next day, which could have spotted Mikawa’s force coming south to destroy the Allied force in what would be Savo Island TenaruBy the time the Tenaru battle unfolded, the Marines had been ashore for 3 weeksNo serious Japanese counterattacks had yet been made against CanalOn August 10, plans had been drawn up to send forces to Guadalcanal to expel the invadersOne of the units selected was the 28th Infantry Regiment, under COL Kiyoano IchikiDue to poor intel, a lack of Allied naval activity or aerial presence on Guadalcanal, the Japanese thought that the majority of Americans had been withdrawn from GuadalcanalWho was Ichiki?Known expert in infantry tacticsCommanded rifle units in ChinaHis actions are said to have started the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, often marked as the beginning of WWIIVery headstrong, was slated to land at MidwayBelieved that the sword and night tactics of traditional Japanese infantry could and would best any defensive positions he may encounter Ichiki Detachment numbered some 900 men The Battle begins2/1 had set up their positions in the days before the attack Myth says that they set up their positions only hours before the attack because of Jacob Vouza’s warningDispel the myth of Vouza here Dug in MG positions manned by H/2/1 and rifle positions manned by G/2/1 stretched from the ocean front down “stream” on the west bank of the river Marines had 1917 water cooled MGs, some 50 caliber weapons, and several 37mm anti

A Rush to Action the beginnings of a “plan”On July 3, just after WATCHTOWER is approved (but not by the Joint Chiefs) King flies to Frisco to brief NimitzRichmond Kelly Turner was told that 3 CVs would support the operation (CV3, CV6 and CV7)The name Guadalcanal had not yet been added to the operation list as a target as of July 3On June 27, to follow King’s initial order to prepare to seize Tulagi, Nimitz ordered Tulagi to be captured and the “seizure of an airfield” adjacent to Tulagi as well…but specified no exact location.On July 5 it was reported that the Japanese had landed airfield construction troops and equipment on Guadalcanal, only then was Guadalcanal added as a target.Also on July 5, the new target received its code name…Cactus Why Guadalcanal and Tulagi?Once the Japanese established a seaplane base at Tulagi in May, that base could disrupt the sealanes between the US, HI, Fiji, Samoa and most importantly, AustraliaIt was feared that the establishment of a larger airfield on neighboring islands (Canal) would further inhibit shipping and cede control of those waterways to the Japanese. Questionable from the start:Admiral Robert L Ghormley had just recently assumed duties as COMSOPAC and as such, WATCHTOWER would fall under his purview.Those under his command would be: 1st Mar Div, 3 CV groups under the command of Vice ADM Frank Jack Fletcher, as well as South Pacific Amphib Forces under Rear Adm Richmond Kelly Turner.All of these forces would be (theoretically) supported by land-based air under RADM McCain, Allied Air Forces SWPAC under MacArthur and GEN KenneyUpon receiving orders to seize “Tulagi and adjacent positions” Ghormley immediately showed what would be his calling card…pessimism. Ghormley immediately concluded that he and his people were nowhere near ready to tackle such an operationIn a way, he was correct. He had exactly 1 Marine on his staff that had any experience in amphibious operations, and he had very, very little.Comms to and from Ghormley’s staff and HQ were hours and sometimes DAYS late in arriving or being sentIntel on the area was virtually NILL.Charts of the GCanal and Tulagi area were woefully outdated.Any actual intel, of which there was essentially none, came from coastwatchers or aerial photosMaps of Guadalcanal were from 1910 charts that were “corrected” by aerial photography Air Power, or lack thereof, was a major concern before the operation even beganThere were no land bases close to the target area from which air support missions could be flown and the aircraft on hand were too old and too few in realityADM McCain’s considerable number of aircraft on hand (282) was deceivingMost of the aircraft were obsolete, and even if they weren’t, such as the case with the F4Fs, P39s and P400s under his command, they did not have the range to support an operation over 590 and 715 miles from the only US bases in the area Espirtu Santo and Efate, respectively that had decently sized airfields. On July 8, Ghormley flew to Melbourne and spoke with MacArthur. The problems outlined by the GEN and the ADM were:Gaining and maintaining air superiority over the islands, the beaches and assault shipsIn a surprising moment of clarity and truthfulness, MacArthur admitted that his air forces probably could not interdict incoming Japanese air raids from RabaulThe protection of the islands and beaches and the like would fall upon Nimitz’s CVsThis could/would be problematic in that the CVs could and would be pulled out due to any threat that may arise, therefore leaving the transport group and the beachhead itself totally without air support The basics of any amphibious operation were already less than stellar before the operation ever launched.The US would have air cover only as long as the CVs were presentAnd that depended on the situation which would be very, very fluid There would be no US land-based air cover until a unit, or units, could be deployed to Guadalcanal, and who knew how long that would take The allied naval force would more than likely have to fight off a Japanese counterattack, probably at night, when the allied forces had little to no night fighting experience The assault troops would have to be properly trained for not only an opposed amphibious landing, but a sustained occupation and defense with the prospect of little to no reinforcement immediately coming Intelligence on enemy troops ashore, their number and strength was severely lacking. Intel on enemy air power as well as naval units was also severely lacking For all intents and purposes, the US and her allies were going into the operation blind and with one, or damn near both, hands tied behind their back. The Old Breed Assault troops would be the 1st Marine DivisionUnder the command of a brand-new MAJ GEN, Alexander Archer Vandegrift.57 Years Old, 34 years a MarineWickedly smart and intuitive, could grasp a situation and its necessities within seconds and make the right callExcellent judge of character and men, mu

Fleet Admiral Ernest King was Commander-in-Chief Fleet, or COMINCH, during most of World War II, and in 1942 assigned to also serve as Chief of Naval Operations or CNO. As CNO he managed the Navy Staff, called OPNAV then (and still is), which allowed him to manage, among other things, all Navy investments in ships and aircraft, as well as all senior Navy officer assignments. A funny aside before we jump in. For some inexplicable reason, prior to King’s appointment, the Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet acronym was CinC-US, pronounced “sink-us.” When King was appointed he thought the sink-us title was stupid, so he changed the acronym to COMINCH for Commander-in-Chief. Although that acronym was better, President Franklin Roosevelt actually tried to talk King out of calling himself a “commander-in-chief,” saying the constitution only provided for one commander-in-chief and that was the president. King said if he was ordered to change the title he would, but Roosevelt was reluctant to make a change like this as we were just entering the war. So the commander-in-chief title stuck for Navy commanders, that is until Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld finally killed it in 2002 during the George W. Bush administration. But getting back to World War II, it was King’s CNO job, not his COMINCH job, that gave him the authority, for example, over Navy administrative matters, such as the assignment of Admirals Spruance and Halsey to command 5th and 3rd Fleets respectively. The CNO job also gave him a seat at the table with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or JCS, along with Generals Marshall, Arnold, and Admiral Stark, as well as the Combined Chiefs of Staff with our British allies. The JCS was the body that approved the initiation of campaigns such as Guadalcanal. But it was the COMINCH job and not the CNO job that allowed King to actually command Navy and Marine forces during campaigns in the Atlantic and Pacific, with Admiral Chester Nimitz as his surrogate as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. King was noteworthy for some personality traits as well. One he was famous for was his legendary temper.General Eisenhower, for example, mostly known as an even-tempered man, once said, “Admiral King is an arbitrary, stubborn type with too much brain and a tendency toward bullying his juniors! But I think he wants to fight, which is vastly encouraging.” But King was also known as someone who was not a fan of Great Britain. Once President Roosevelt adopted a “Europe-First” policy, it was King’s job to divert naval forces preferentially to Eisenhower’s theater of operations. But as King perceived the United Kingdom as dragging its feet in offensive operations in Europe, King took every opportunity to divert naval forces to the Pacific theater. After all, in King’s mind it was Japan that attacked the US, and he realized that the longer we waited to neutralize the Japanese threat in the Pacific, the more entrenched and difficult to defeat they would become. And so, the very first major amphibious landing in World War II was not North Africa as many people think, but Guadalcanal in the Pacific. And that campaign was King’s idea.But King’s intransigence when it came to Europe led to another famous Eisenhower quote, where he says: “One thing that might help win this war is to get someone to shoot King. He's the antithesis of cooperation — a deliberately rude person —which means he's a mental bully.”Even King’s own daughter joined the chorus of opinion about her father. When asked about King’s unpredictable personality, she said, “He is the most even tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage.”But personality foibles aside, in my view King gets a bad rap. He was the main strategist for the Pacific war, and with Nimitz, for the island-hopping campaign that eventually won the war against Japan. In that regard, at least when it comes to the Pacific theater of Operations, as we say in the title of this episode, history has shown that King was right about almost everything. Seth, we don’t want to do a biography here, but maybe a few things about King’s background: As did everyone, went to AnnapolisWas a surface officerInauspicious career early onPart of the Asiatic fleet as a LieutenantReturned to his ship the Cincinnati one day drunk & disorderly, his captain recorded it in his personnel record. The Asiatic fleet commander at one time was Admiral Charles B. McVay, Jr, the father of the man who would become the skipper of USS Indianapolis cruiser during World War II. But King’s behavior problems in the Asiatic are what led to the untrue rumor that King had a vendetta against Admiral McVay, that would cause him decades later to want to court-martial Captain McVay after the Indy was sunk, all despite the fact that when King got in trouble it was actually Admiral Henry Wilson in command of the fleet. He went to submarine school as a captain in a class full of ensigns. Nevertheless, unlike Chester Nimi

Briefly describe the actions of June 6 Discuss the attempted salvage and eventual sinking of Yorktown -How does this sinking lay on the future plans for the war -Discuss why the perception exists that Spruance won the battle when Fletcher was the commander. Let’s talk about Mitscher and his cover up… -Discuss the Army’s claims and propaganda that they won the battle -Discuss King’s reluctance to play the Navy’s story up -Let's talk about the overall implications of the battle: -What does Midway actually allow the US to do now? -What does the loss of the battle mean to the Japanese in terms of plans and future strategy? -What does the defeat do to Yamamoto personally and professionally? -Why is Midway NOT the turning point of the war?

Aboard the Japanese CVsWhat is the morning looking like at this point aboard the CVs?What are the Japanese briefed about?When do they launch?Who is the strike leader?Talk about the flight into Midway…Aboard the American CVsReveille for US aircrews is at 0300, breakfast at 0400, ready rooms shortly after thatTalk about the anticipation in the ready roomsNervous energy Aboard Midway islandSearch planes take off around 0415Americans prepare for the battle they know is coming todayPlanes fueled and armedBert Earnest and his two dollar bill At 0545 a search plane sees the incoming strike and radios “Many Planes Heading Midway” PBY search planes sight Japanese CVs at 0552 Because of incoming aircraft and CV sighting, Midway scrambles damn near everything with wings by 0600 Japanese Midway strikeGive us the run-down of the Japanese attack on the island and the aerial encounters with the American fightersBill Brooks and his Brewster engage Japanese as they come into the island around 0616What are the effects of the Japanese strike on the island?Who decides another strike is needed?Why?When does Nagumo get word of another strike being needed?Take us through his decision making here Aboard the American CVs0645 Pilots Man Your Planes!Dusty KleissDon HoffSpruance on orders from Fletcher decides to launch at 0700CV6 launches and orbits the TF awaiting CV5 and her birdsUS CV strike launch is discombobulated and unorganized (clusterfuck is a good term but we shouldn’t say that)“Proceed on mission assigned” flashed to McCluskyHornet’s strikeStanhope Ring versus John Waldron As the American CVs strike is being launched, the first attackers from Midway see the Japanese CVs…Bert Earnest and Harry Ferrier in 8-T-1 attack HiryuThe B26s attack Akagi at almost the same timeTalk about the near miss by the B26 on Akagi’s bridge0800 VMSB-241 attacks Japanese fleetJapanese CAP proves to be incredibly deadly to these attacks While the Midway based aircraft are attacking the fleet, the Japanese are also attacked by a submarine Talk about the effects that the Nautilus attack on the fleet have as far as timing is concerned, and what do the Japanese do Nautilus’ attack, while not successful, is HUGE when it comes to the events that soon followArashi… Around 0840 the American attacks ceaseTalk about Nagumo’s timetable…What does it look like inside the hangar decks of the Japanese CVs right now?US VT attacks on Kido ButaiVT8 and VT6 shortly afterwards Let’s once and for all dispel the George Gay myth… The Flight to NowhereWhere the hell is HAG?What happens to them?Could they have helped?Tease the cover up by Mitscher for Ring to be discussed at length in the next episode EAG flight and McClusky’s decisionTalk about what is happening in the air right now What is McClusky thinkingWhat is happening to the SBD formation?McClusky’s decision to continue the searchSeeing Arashi…Set up the attack of EAG on Kaga and Akagi from Japanese and US sidesWhat is going on aboard the Japanese CVs right now?PLANES ON THE FLIGHT DECKS MYTH!Flash warning to KagaMcClusky breaks doctrine and attacks Kaga Attack on Kaga and AkagiEarl GallaherDusty KleissDon HoffAboard KagaBriefly discuss attacks on SoryuTalk about the damage done to Kaga, Akagi and SoryuJust how bad is it? Discuss the Hiryu strikes on CV5 Afternoon strike on HiryuLots of AAA this time and CAPDusty KleissDon Hoff Wrap up June 4 and tease the next episodeJapanese lossesUS losses

Talking Points: Sit Rep late May 1942What does the Pacific War look like right now?Any major changes?Doolittle RaidWhat is the reasoning behind the raid?What happens (briefly)What effects does the Doolittle Raid have…On the targets (actual combat results of the raid)On US plans and opsUS CVs high-tail it after launch to get back to PearlOn Japanese plans and ops… Japanese PlansBecause of the Doolittle Raid and the CV raids of Feb and March, what are the Japanese thinking at this time?What is Yamamoto’s conceived plan for the Midway Operation?What is the reasoning behind the plan…the ultimate goalWhy is the plan so complex and so reliant on timingLiterally everything had to go exactly according to plan for the Japanese plan to work as Yamamoto had it in his headDo you think that at this time the Japanese had brushed off the US as a second or even third-rate adversary?Was there a situational arrogance on the part of the Japanese?Why? Why not?Aside from Shokaku and Zuikaku not being able to take part in Midway, did Coral Sea and the efforts of the US CV pilots not kick off a light bulb in the collective Japanese heads in regard to the USN Nav Av prowess and abilities? Code BreakingWe have already done an episode on HYPO, but this period is really where they shine…Intel effects on Coral Sea“AF” and HYPO’s role in figuring out the target is indeed MidwayLet’s talk briefly on the whole AF water condenser myth, the reality, of course, was to convince DC, not the Japanese.King is barely convinced and allows Nimitz to do what he needs/wants to do US Preparations for battleNimitz throws everything but the kitchen sink at MidwayWhat units are on MidwayWhat forces does Nimitz send to Midway?Nimitz pays the atoll a visit before the battleWhile Midway’s defenses are, on paper, strong…are they really?Why not?What are the aces up Nimitz’s sleeve?CV6, CV5, and CV8Talk about the combat experience of Enterprise Air Group, Yorktown Air Group and Hornet Air GroupWho are the CAGs for each AG?McCluskyLeslieRingOne of Nimitz’s Aces, CV5, is damaged…The 72 hour repair myth Japanese Preparations for battleWhat forces do the Japanese plan to send to the fight?Who are the aviators aboard the CVs?Just how good are these people?Japanese attack on the AleutiansThe myth is that this was supposed to be a diversion…Of course it was not…but what exactly was it and why was it executed at this time?What were the goals of the Aleutians Op? US Plans for the Ambush What does the intel from HYPO and Layton tell Nimitz?What does he want to do?Point LuckHow will he and the US CVs go about ambushing Kido Butai?Midway’s role…The US CVs depart Pearl…Before CV6 leaves, Nimitz attends an awards ceremony on May 27 aboard The Big E. He hands out decorations for Pearl Harbor and the carrier raidsIn handing a DFC to VF-6 pilot Roger Mehle, Nimitz tells him “I think you’ll have a chance to win yourself another medal in the next several days.”That very day, May 27, Nimitz executed OpPlan 29-42 which declared a state of “Fleet opposed Invasion”Nimitz’s OpPlan was devastatingly accurateA testament to HYPO and Layton’s diligence Night of June 3 Aboard MidwayLast minute preparationsBill BrooksBert EarnestLeon WilliamsonAboard the US CVsSleepless nightDusty KleissBud MerrillFred BergeronDon Hoff

While the hit and run carrier raids of February and March tested American carrier doctrine to an extent, and the Pearl Harbor raid as well as Indian Ocean raids tested Imperial Navy doctrine also to an extent, this is the very first time that both navies tested each other’s way of doing things, and in the process found things that worked, and things that well…didn’t work. Let’s dig into it…Talking Points:• What sets off the battle of Coral Sea?o Outline Japanese plans for Operation MO Japanese wanted to seize Port Moresby and all of New Guinea. By doing this, it would provide Japan with both a way to isolate Australia as well as New Zealand from allied supply lines, specifically American supply lines. • Why Rabaul (Opeation R) wasn’t good enough This was to be prefaced by the Japanese capture of Tulagi, which is an island we will hear a lot about in the near future. By capturing Tulagi, in the Solomons, the Japanese could patrol the area and the sea lanes to Port Moresby so as to allow their invasion force a free hand. As part of the Port Moresby invasion attempt, the invasion group was to be covered by two separate carrier groups, one which centered around the light carrier Shoho, and another which centered around the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku.o US intel at Station HYPO and fleet radio unit Melbourne, or FRUMEL decrypt Japanese messages to an extent, and in turn believe that the Japanese will strike the area of Port Moresby, or the northern coast of Australia on or about the first week of May. As a result of this intel, Nimitz deploys the only two carrier task forces at his disposal at this time, those centered around USS Lexington, and USS Yorktown, TF 11 and TF 17 respectively, to stand by the area of the Coral Sea with designs to intercept and destroy the incoming Japanese invasion and support fleets.• On May 1 the two US CV TFs unite under the command of ADM Fletchero May 4, Fletcher detaches CV5 to attack recent Japanese positions on Tulagi CV5’s attacks are relatively successful, with damage inflicted on enemy positions and shipping in and around the harbor of Tulagi• US losses are minimal• By May 6, Fletcher is aware that Japanese CVs are in the area, and the Japanese invasion fleet is not far behind. As a result, he detaches ADM Crace’s cruisers WITHOUT air cover to block the invasion force.o This is potentially a critical blunder by Fletcher. Crace’s CAs could have been blown out of the water by Japanese CVs, as it was, they were attacked three times by Japanese aircraft and once by MacArthur’s B17s.  Japanese reports stated that they had sunk a BB, damaged a second BB and a CA. Japanese sent no further attacks towards Crace. His vessels survived due to poor Japanese (and American) accuracy as well as his skillful maneuvering.  The sighting of the supposed BBs by the Japanese informed the invasion fleet to reverse course Still a horrible decision by Fletcher• First day of the carrier battle May 7• Early on the morning of the 7th, Japanese launch searches to find US CVso Japanese scout planes from Shokaku find US ships and radio ADM Tagaki of 1 CV, 1 CA, and 3 DD. What the Japanese actually sight is the detached oiler Neosho and her escort DD Sims. • How did the Japanese pilot screw this up this bad?• Japanese arrive over oiler and DD, realize their mistake and continue their search, they return and attack and sink Sims and force Neosho to be abandonned• At 0815 a CV5 SBD piloted by John Nielsen finds the Japanese screening force under ADM Goto, which includes light carrier Shoho. o An error in Nielsen’s coding made the message read 2 Japanese CVs instead of 1.• Fletcher loses his mind on Nielsen when he lands and clarifies his message Believing this to be the main Japanese CV force, Fletcher launches everything he has. • 93 aircraft are flung at Shohoo 18 F4Fs, 53 SBDs, 22 TBDs from CV2 and CV5• Lexington Air Group, under Bill Ault arrive over Shoho firsto The SBDs attack first, and score at least 2 bomb hits and the TBDs score 5 torpedo hits This is the only real successful TBD attack of WW2• Lex AG executes a hammer and anvil attack and leave Shoho a wreck Talk about Walt Nelson and Ted Wiebe• Yorktown Air Group arrive next and continue to pummel Shoho.o Estimated 11 bombs and 2 more torpedoeso She is barely afloat as US aircraft leave and is gone by 1135• Lexington VB2 CO, Bob Dixon sent a prearranged radio signal back to Fletcher that simply said, “Scratch One Flattop”• Second day of the carrier battle May 8• Both Japanese and US locate each other almost simultaneouslyo US launch first at 0900, Japanese at 0915 Opposing forces actually pass each other on the way to their targets• US attack Japanese firsto The well-coordinated attack of May 7 gives way to the mess of May 8 US aircraft have trouble finding the targets due to squally weather• When they do find them, they can’t coordinate their attacks as the previous day Yorktown aircraft under Bill Burch find and attack S

If Seth and I were to define the two main thrusts of our podcast “The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War,” it would be (1) to correct some of the mythology that has emerged over decades, and (2) to see what lessons might be gleaned that could be important were war to break out in the Pacific again.In my view, our subject for today falls into the second category, because it’s about the impact of strategic alignment and chains of command on operational success.Station Hypo was one of three main stations the Navy used to listen to and break Japanese naval codes. Hypo was the phonetic word for the letter “H,” which stood for Hawaii since Station Hypo was the code breaking office located in the basement of the Hawaii Naval District commander’s building in Pearl Harbor. As an aside, I visited those rooms when I was commodore in Pearl, and they were being used to store furniture for the Pearl Harbor shipyard headquarters building, but we will leave that for another potential future discussion on what’s happened to all these historic sites over the decades.But germane to this conversation, in the early months of the war the Naval District Hawaii commander reported, not to Admiral Nimitz, but to Admiral King directly. That would be corrected in the coming months, but since Station Hypo supported combat operations in the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz certainly thought of it as one of his assets, while Admiral King’s staff in Washington saw it as solely and completely theirs, to include Station Hypo’s brilliant leader, Commander Joe Rochefort.This led to a chain of command problem that would ultimately lead to Rochefort’s dismissal as head of Station Hypo, even after his incredible success leading to our victory at Midway.To help us unpack all of this, to include how Station Hypo fed both King’s and Nimitz’s strategic picture, we are proud to host the chief historian of the Navy and Director of Naval History and Heritage Command, retired Rear Admiral Sam Cox.Admiral Cox, welcome. Station HYPO:What was HYPO?Initially known as Fleet Radio Unit Pacific, or FRUPACHawaii location for the Navy’s cryptanalysts who monitored radio intel of the Japanese.HYPO was one of two major stations for Allied radio intel, the other being in Melbourne, Australia.Under the command of DC, not Nimitz, or Kimmel for that matter.Conspiracy theory that HYPO never had a PURPLE machine, and therefore was unable to read Japanese traffic pre-Pearl Harbor.NOT TRUE. Purple was the diplomatic code, not the Naval code so HYPO had no reason to have the PURPLE machine in the first place. It would not have helped them in any way. HYPO’s mission after Pearl Harbor, was to decipher the Japanese JN-25 code. Prior to Pearl, HYPO was to decipher flag officer’s code and weather codesWashington worked on JN25 initiallyHow much of the code was readable? Prior to Pearl, they had successfully broken a part of the code, only 10% before the attack. Who was HYPO’s CO and what kind of a man was he?Joseph Rochefort was a Naval enlistee, who never graduated high school. He enlisted in 1918, lied about his age and was later commissioned an Ensign in 1919. Spent several years at sea as well as a year in Tokyo as a language officer.He began work in Cryptanalysis in 1926Rochefort was assigned as head of HYPO in March 1941 by Intel officer Laurance Safford.Brilliant man who had a knack for solving crossword puzzles and figuring out different types of word puzzles.WAS NOT an eccentric as has been shown in movies.YES, he wore a smoking jacket while at work, only because it had pockets for his pipe and tobaccoYES, he wore slippers at work because the concrete floors of the “dungeon” hurt his feet while he paced around trying to figure out messages.HYPO was different than most Naval assignments of the era…how so?Many of the staff of codebreakers were handpicked men by RochefortNot much in the way of military disciplineThere was no real system of work, the men were allowed to play their hunches in order to decrypt the information and if that included throwing false messages around to confirm something so be it.There was quite a bit of guesswork involved.Men worked round the clock. Rochefort himself rarely went home, often slept on a cot in his office. Most men worked 12 hour shifts, 7 days a week. How was the JN25 code eventually “broken” what was the process?There were over 50,000 five-digit numeral groups to decipherCodebreakers didn’t necessarily break the code as they actually started to see patterns in the messages and began to plug and play if you will, the different patterns together until something began to take shape.LCDR Thomas Dyer had an uncanny knack for seeing patterns in messages, he said, “if you observe something long enough, you’ll see something peculiar. If you can’t see something peculiar, if ou stare at it long enough, that in itself is peculiar. And then you try to explain the peculiarity.” Traffic analysis Traffic analysis played a large part in the “codebrea

Sit Rep PTO late December 1941-January 1942Japanese are on the offensive everywherePhilippines are already on the way outWake Island, despite a gallant defense by the Marines has been captured and the planned relief had been called off December 22.The fact that Wake Island had been abandoned by Admiral Pye lit a fire under Nimitz to strike back.Morale was extremely low in the fleet due to the fact that Wake had been abandoned. Capt McMorris, Pye’s Chief of staff, said that retreating from Wake would be “unduly cautious” and a retreat would “destroy service and public confidence. It is an opportunity unlikely to come again soon. We are in great need of a victory.”Talk about the effect of Pye’s retreat order on the Carrier ForceAubrey Fitch withdrew to his cabin so he would not hear the mutinous talk on the bridge.Fliers on Saratoga threatened to ignore the order and launch anyway.Intel officer Edwin Layton said, “To lose to an enemy that fought you and you fought well was one thing. But to lose because your own Admiral was a nervous Nellie was another.” January 1942 was probably the worst month of the war in the Pacific as far as public knowledge and morale went. Admiral King wants to strike backIn a cable dated January 2, 1942 King told Nimitz that he was not pleased with the “half-hearted” deployment of the CVs.He desired “Hit and Run” raids in the Marshalls and Gilberts.Talk about surprise raids to hit the outlying Japanese bases.Even though King wants to strike back, Nimitz’s advisers say don’t do it What can Nimitz strike back with?Talk about the carriers and their availabilityCV experience or lack thereof What are the risks of utilizing the CVs at this juncture?Who is expressing doubt?Admiral Bloch 14th Naval District responsible for defending HawaiiWhat were the arguments against a raid or raids?Bloch said that deploying the CVs on raids would leave Hawai’i dangerously exposed to further Jap assaults or invasionIntelligence on the Marshalls and Gilberts was scarceLittle was known about the targetsDidn’t think it was worth the riskWhy take the risk?CVs were all we hadWhy raid in the first place and why the outer ring?Morale boostJapan focused on going south. – this would hit them in their “rear area”“Turning Movement” not the same as flank attackPossibly may divert Japanese attention from Australia and the Coral SeaHitting the outer ring of islands was easier as there would be less of a threat from heavy Jap fleet unitsWould also protect Samoa and Australia by weakening the Jap airfields there The Marshall and Gilbert Islands RaidNimitz confers with Admiral Halsey about the upcoming strike.Halsey is enthusiastic (no surprise here)Says that CVs should strike like General Nathan Bedford Forrest said about cavalry, “get to the other fellow first with everything you have and as fast as you can and dump it on him.”Halsey says he will take Enterprise to the Marshalls himselfWhat strike isn’t with risk?Halsey says it’s important for the Navy’s self-respectNimitz pulls the triggerCryptanalysts state to Nimitz that radio traffic indicated a large Japanese fleet movement south, thereby putting the proposed targets out of range of major enemy fleet unitsSet for Feb 1Will comprise Task Force 8 built around Halsey and CV6 and TF 17 under Fletcher and CV5. TF8 will strike the Marshalls in the am and if possible strike again that afternoon with targets on Kwajalein, Wotje and Taroa (Moelap)TF17 will strike the Gilberts area with targets on Mili, Makin and Jaluit Task Force 8Due to radio intercepts, Nimitz ordered Halsey to strike deep into the Marshalls at Kwajalein and hit the targets as much and as often as practical.Halsey told his pilots on CV6 that they would stay all day and “raise a little hell in the Marshalls”. Pilots were elatedFirst combat for Halsey & SpruanceWeather was clear, moon was high, no wind, no rain…perfect for flyingAircrews awakened at 0300Takeoff at 0445CV6 launches 37 SBDs and 9 TBDs armed with bombsVS6 to attack airfieldVB6 to freelance and attack targets of opportunityAs VS6 approached Roi island, Japs scramble fighters, Type 96 Claudes and AAA starts sprouting up as the SBDs go into their glide bombing runsVS6 CO Halstead Hopping’s SBD is jumped by Claudes and is hit by AAA. He drives directly into the drink.Emergence of Earl Gallaher and Dusty Kleiss. Wade McCluskey & Dick BestJohn Snowden gets an aerial kill on the Claude that shot down HoppingVS6 makes secondary runs on targets on the island with good successVB6They were held up and told to attack any shipping in the areaAttacked several ships, mostly cargo ships and hit several of them, including a minelayer.Second attack of VS6They gain altitude and circle to come around on the shipping initially hit by VB6Instead of glide bombing as they did on the airfield, the scouts come in high and dive in 70-degree dives on the shippingDusty drops his 500 pounder on a large vessel thought to be a cruiserDrills the cruiser dead center (the begin

Nimitz Pre WarWho was he and where did he come from?Texas Hill Country, FredericksburgToo poor to go to college, worked his tail off to go to Naval AcademySpent time in Japan before the warNimitz was a submarine officer in his early yearsCommanded a DD in the PhilippinesCommanded a cruiser division and battleship divisionXO of SC, CO ChicagoHighly experienced in the realm of command Nimitz Upon Assignment as CINCPAC56 Years Old currently occupying the office of the Bureau of NavigationWhose decision was it to promote Nimitz to the position?FDRHe had been offered the job before December 41 and turned it down for fear of upsetting senior officers.He was junior to some 50 other AdmiralsHe feared that taking the job and leapfrogging them would have created resentment and made it more difficult to do the job. Nimitz the LeaderWhat kind leadership style did Nimitz utilize?He was a people personNever cussed, raised his voice or dressed men down in publicHe gave his subordinates a lot of autonomy and assumed they knew their jobs until they proved they did notIf that occurred, he spoke in low tones, was blunt but not rude or insultingAlways looked after his men and took care of them Nimitz the ExecutiveJuggled personalities of subordinates and his boss extremely wellDealings with KingDealings with subordinatesTurnerGEN SmithHalseyTowersJO RichardsonMacArthurSpruance and Nimitz relationshipNimitz handled the various personalities in the Pacific in check much as Ike did in the ETO. Was very similar to Ike in terms of Supreme Commander, even though, Nimitz was no Supreme Commander What did Nimitz inherit in December 41 and how did he go about fixing the problems?Inherited a shattered commandDevastated moraleStaff, fleet and populaceFear of a Japanese invasionWhen he landed in Pearl on Xmas Day he asked about the relief of WakeWhen told it fell and was abandoned, he fell silentDidn’t take command immediately. Worked with Admiral Pye to get the lay of the land, latest issues and intel.Took command on December 31, 1941 aboard USS Grayling (SS-209) fittingly Nimitz’s Strategy 1941-42Be cautious, yet forceful and hit them where they least expect itStrike back was essential(Set the stage for next episode about the Hit and Run Raids) Nimitz’s biggest gambleMidwayRecognized the role of intel and believed in it, believed in his people and their skillsNimitz’s LegacyDeveloped and implemented the island hopping strategy that won the war.Inherited a shattered fleet, trusted his subordinates, built his leadership teams and won when it was absolutely necessary.

As you know, the nation is going through a process of reviewing Confederate leaders through a clearer lens, clearing away the mythology around them that emerged to justify their actions after the end of the Civil War. I see this as right and appropriate.But I also think it’s time to contemplate General MacArthur through a clearer lens. And if we do this, we realize:He was an unabashed liar, regularly committing what we would refer at Annapolis as honor violations of the type that would have gotten any other military officer fired.He was a narcissist of the degree to which made George Patton look like a humble man.He was self-delusional about his military prowess, believing that he and he alone had the ability to win this war in a largely naval theater, when in fact his actions likely extended it.He was a known pedophile who at the age of 50 took in a 16-year-old girl as his live-in concubineAs Army Chief of Staff he used Army mounted cavalry and tanks against protesting World War I veterans in an event referred to as the Bonus March demonstrations.In my view, rather than being a military genius, for his part in the execution of questionable campaigns that contributed to the deaths of thousands of Americans, I see him as the worst American general since another General Mac— George McClellan. About the only good thing I can say about him is he performed admirably in World War I when he far less responsibility and in his leadership of occupied Japan.A lot of this is going to sound like 20-20 hindsight, but in the military we have this thing called the After Action Report or AAR that is 100% 20-20 hindsight. The whole purpose of the AAR is to overcome the fog of war and look back on what really happened so that we can learn from it.

Why did the Japanese invade the Philippines in the first place? Why after so much warning, especially after the attack on Pearl Harbor, were the American forces so unprepared to meet a Japanese attack? Why were the aircraft not dispersed?Why was there so little American air defense?Mac’s belief that Japanese suffered a defeat at Pearl? Excuse for not acting more aggressively? -We’ve harangued the Army Air Corps, as they were called then, enough I guess, lets focus on other commands. What about the Navy? Where was the Asiatic Fleet? -What was MacArthur’s plan to meet the invaders? What did he want to do? -Why would that simply not work? -Talk about the US tanks that ran out of gas trying to get to Lingayen? Amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics. -Mac’s change in strategy from War Plan Orange to “defend the beaches, hit ‘em where they ain’t” was ludicrous. -He had nowhere near the resources to do this. Ironically, it was the Japanese that succeeded in “hitting ’em where they ain’t.” -Needs to be said: Gen Short pilloried for loss of Hawaii with no warning. Mac had warning and received Medal of Honor. -Once the Japanese landed on Luzon in their main assault on December 22, they advanced rapidly, running over most resistance they came across. The largest amphibious invasion in history, to that point, was wildly successful. Another large landing occurred and now the Japanese had two armies advancing on Manila. -With such numbers on the American and Filipino side, why did this happen?-Admiral Hart was one of the first leaders to publicly say that the Philippines were indefensible. Why was this a surprisingly common thought?- ADM Hart was Annapolis classmate & friend of Mac’s older brother. Knew Mac well, called him Douglas. Said “Douglas is certain about a lot of stuff that just ain’t so, and is an effective talker, which leads to danger.” Maybe hint at our MacArthur episode?-Let’s talk about the ineffectiveness of the Cavite submarines that were sortied by Hart-Staring defeat in the face, what did Mac Arthur do next?-How did the American forces do in the defense of the Bataan Peninsula?-Despite their very good showing and heavy casualties inflicted on the Japanese, did they actually have any hope of rescue?-March 11, MacArthur leaves. By May, the Philippines are surrendered to the Japanese. Over 90,000 Americans and Filipinos are captured. -How is this news reacted to in the US? -What does this do to American morale, both in the military and at home?https://williamtoti.com

-Historians often cite Japanese expansionism, imperialism, what have you, for their desire to attack Pearl Harbor. Others say it the United States’ embargos that led to the attack. Which was it? And could there have been another alternative to Kido Butai flinging airplanes at the sleeping American Pacific fleet? -There were many warnings about the impending attack before the first aircraft dropped their ordnance. What were some of those warnings? What, if any, actions could of/should have been taken? -After the attack, the US government needed scapegoats. They had to pin the blame on their overall intelligence failure on anybody but themselves, and so they harpooned both Army General Walter Short, and Navy Admiral Husband Kimmel. Who were these guys, what were their respective roles and were they actually to blame for the entire attack? Were they to blame for anything? What should they have done prior to the attack? Were they aware of any real threat? -The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a military feat in its own right. Who was the planner? Why was attacking PH such a risk militarily? -Let’s talk about the opposing forces…Japanese planning, skill and execution versus American response…https://williamtoti.com

This is just the trailer.