The Bargaining Strategies of Extremists
There is a political puzzle that has become prominent in the last few decades, especially with the recent turmoil over the Republican led Speaker of the House: how do a small group of extremists manage to get their way despite being a minority of members? In a recent paper, “Organizing at the Extreme: Hardline Strategy and Institutional Design” University of Chicago Political Scientist Ruth Bloch Rubin takes that question head on. Her conclusions could tell us a lot about the bargaining strategies of extremists, when and why they work, and how those strategies may create sticky organization practices and structures.
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Show Notes
There is a political puzzle that has become prominent in the last few decades, especially with the recent turmoil over the Republican led Speaker of the House: how do a small group of extremists manage to get their way despite being a minority of members?
In a recent paper, “Organizing at the Extreme: Hardline Strategy and Institutional Design” University of Chicago Political Scientist Ruth Bloch Rubin takes that question head on. Her conclusions could tell us a lot about the bargaining strategies of extremists, when and why they work, and how those strategies may create sticky organization practices and structures.
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