Moral Hazard and Socialism in Collective Security Agreements
Collective security agreements allow many countries's politicians to shift the cost of national defense to taxpayers outside their own countries. Moral hazard, belligerence, and over-reliance on military solutions often ensue, writes Patrick Barron. This audio Mises Daily is narrated by Robert Hale.
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Show Notes
Collective security agreements allow many countries's politicians to shift the cost of national defense to taxpayers outside their own countries. Moral hazard, belligerence, and over-reliance on military solutions often ensue, writes Patrick Barron.
This audio Mises Daily is narrated by Robert Hale.