Astral Codex Ten Podcast

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/11/12/book-review-the-body-keeps-the-score/ I. The Body Keeps The Score is a book about post-traumatic stress disorder. The author, Bessel van der Kolk, helped discover the condition and lobby for its inclusion in the DSM, and the brief forays into that history are the best part of the book. Like so many things, PTSD feels self-evident once you know about it. But this took decades of conceptual work by people like van der Kolk, crystallizing some ideas and hacking away at others until they ended up with something legible to the Establishment. Before that there was nothing. It was absolutely shocking how much nothing there was. As soon as the APA officialy recognized PTSD as a diagnosis in 1980, Bessel and his friends applied for a grant from the VA to study it. The grant was rejected on the grounds that (actual quote from the rejection letter) "it has never been shown that PTSD is relevant to the mission of the Veterans Administration". So the first step in raising awareness of PTSD was – amazingly – convincing the US military that some people might get PTSD from combat. After the military relented, the next step was convincing everyone else. PTSD was temporarily pigeonholed as "the thing veterans get when they come back from a war". The next push was convincing people that civilian trauma could have similar effects. It was simple to extend the theory to sudden disasters like fires or violent crimes. But van der Kolk and his colleagues started noticing that a history of child abuse, and especially childhood sexual abuse, correlated with a lot of psychiatric problems later on.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/11/06/building-intuitions-on-non-empirical-arguments-in-science/ Aeon: Post-Empirical Science Is An Oxymoron And It is Dangerous: There is no agreed criterion to distinguish science from pseudoscience, or just plain ordinary bullshit, opening the door to all manner of metaphysics masquerading as science. This is 'post-empirical' science, where truth no longer matters, and it is potentially very dangerous. It's not difficult to find recent examples. On 8 June 2019, the front cover of New Scientist magazine boldly declared that we're 'Inside the Mirrorverse'. Its editors bid us 'Welcome to the parallel reality that's hiding in plain sight'. […] [Some physicists] claim that neutrons [are] flitting between parallel universes. They admit that the chances of proving this are 'low', or even 'zero', but it doesn't really matter. When it comes to grabbing attention, inviting that all-important click, or purchase, speculative metaphysics wins hands down. These theories are based on the notion that our Universe is not unique, that there exists a large number of other universes that somehow sit alongside or parallel to our own. For example, in the so-called Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, there are universes containing our parallel selves, identical to us but for their different experiences of quantum physics. These theories are attractive to some few theoretical physicists and philosophers, but there is absolutely no empirical evidence for them. And, as it seems we can't ever experience these other universes, there will never be any evidence for them. As Broussard explained, these theories are sufficiently slippery to duck any kind of challenge that experimentalists might try to throw at them, and there's always someone happy to keep the idea alive. Is this really science? The answer depends on what you think society needs from science. In our post-truth age of casual lies, fake news and alternative facts, society is under extraordinary pressure from those pushing potentially dangerous antiscientific propaganda – ranging from climate-change denial to the anti-vaxxer movement to homeopathic medicines. I, for one, prefer a science that is rational and based on evidence, a science that is concerned with theories and empirical facts, a science that promotes the search for truth, no matter how transient or contingent. I prefer a science that does not readily admit theories so vague and slippery that empirical tests are either impossible or they mean absolutely nothing at all. As always, a single quote doesn't do the argument justice, so go read the article. But I think this captures the basic argument: multiverse theories are bad, because they're untestable, and untestable science is pseudoscience. Many great people, both philosophers of science and practicing scientists, have already discussed the problems with this point of view. But none of them lay out their argument in quite the way that makes the most sense to me. I want to do that here, without claiming any originality or special expertise in the subject, to see if it helps convince anyone else. II. Consider a classic example: modern paleontology does a good job at predicting dinosaur fossils. But the creationist explanation – Satan buried fake dinosaur fossils to mislead us – also predicts the same fossils (we assume Satan is good at disguising his existence, so that the lack of other strong evidence for Satan doesn't contradict the theory). What principles help us realize that the Satan hypothesis is obviously stupid and the usual paleontological one more plausible? One bad response: paleontology can better predict characteristics of dinosaur fossils, using arguments like "since plesiosaurs are aquatic, they will be found in areas that were underwater during the Mesozoic, but since tyrannosaurs are terrestrial, they will be found in areas that were on land", and this makes it better than the Satan hypothesis, which can only retrodict these characteristics. But this isn't quite true: since Satan is trying to fool us into believing the modern paleontology paradigm, he'll hide the fossils in ways that conform to its predictions, so we will predict plesiosaur fossils will only be found at sea – otherwise the gig would be up! A second bad response: "The hypothesis that all our findings were planted to deceive us bleeds into conspiracy theories and touches on the problem of skepticism. These things are inherently outside the realm of science." But archaeological findings are very often deliberate hoaxes planted to deceive archaeologists, and in practice archaeologists consider and test that hypothesis the same way they consider and test every other hypothesis. Rule this out by fiat and we have to accept Piltdown Man, or at least claim that the people arguing against the veracity of Piltdown Man were doing something other than Science. A third bad response: "Satan is supernatural and science is not allowed to conside

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/11/04/samsara/ I. The man standing outside my front door was carrying a clipboard and wearing a golden robe. "Not interested," I said, preparing to slam the door in his face. "Please," said the acolyte. Before I could say no he'd jammed a wad of $100 bills into my hand. "If this will buy a few moments of your time." It did, if only because I stood too flabbergasted to move. Surely they didn't have enough money to do this for everybody. "There is no everybody," said the acolyte, when I expressed my bewilderment. "You're the last one. The last unenlightened person in the world." And it sort of made sense. Twenty years ago, a group of San Francisco hippie/yuppie/techie seekers had pared down the ancient techniques to their bare essentials, then optimized hard. A combination of drugs, meditation, and ecstatic dance that could catapult you to enlightenment in the space of a weekend retreat, 100% success rate. Their cult/movement/startup, the Order Of The Golden Lotus, spread like wildfire through California – a state where wildfires spread even faster than usual – and then on to the rest of the world. Soon investment bankers and soccer moms were showing up to book clubs talking about how they had grasped the peace beyond understanding and vanquished their ego-self.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2013/09/12/the-life-cycle-of-medical-ideas/ I. About five years ago, an Italian surgeon with the unlikely name of Dr. Zamboni posited the theory that multiple sclerosis was caused by blockages in venous return from the brain causing various complicated downstream effects which eventually led to the immune system attacking myelinated cells. The guy was a good surgeon, nothing about the theory contradicted basic laws of biology, and no one else had any better ideas, so lots of people got excited. As far as I can tell, the medical community responded exactly one hundred percent correctly. They preached caution, urging multiple sclerosis patients not to develop false hope. But at the same time, they quickly launched studies investigating Zamboni's experiments and used newly gathered data to test the theory. All the results that came back made the idea look less and less likely, so that to my understanding by now it is pretty much discredited. Having successfully spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to empirically disconfirm Zamboni's hypothesis, we can now reflect at leisure on the reasons it was kind of dumb and we should have realized it all along.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/10/30/new-atheism-the-godlessness-that-failed/ Thucydides predicted that future generations would underestimate the power of Sparta. It built no great temples, left no magnificent ruins. Absent any tangible signs of the sway it once held, memories of its past importance would sound like ridiculous exaggerations. This is how I feel about New Atheism. If I were to describe the power of New Atheism over online discourse to a teenager, they would never believe me. Why should they? Other intellectual movements have left indelible marks in the culture; the heyday of hippiedom may be long gone, but time travelers visiting 1969 would not be surprised by the extent of Woodstock. But I imagine the same travelers visiting 2005, logging on to the Internet, and holy @#$! that's a lot of atheism-related discourse what is going on here? My first forays onto the Internet were online bulletin boards about computer games. They would have a lot of little forums about various aspects of the games, plus two off-topic forums. One for discussion of atheism vs. religion. And the other for everything else. This was a common structure for websites in those days. You had to do it, or the atheism vs. religion discussions would take over everything. At the time, this seemed perfectly normal. In 2005, a college student made a webpage called The Church Of The Flying Spaghetti Monster. It was a joke based on the idea that there was no more scientific evidence for God or creationism than for belief in a flying spaghetti monster. The monster's website received tens of millions of visitors, 60,000 emails ("about 95 percent" supportive), and was covered in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Daily Telegraph. Six publishing companies entered a bidding war for the rights to the spaghetti monster's "gospel", with the winner, Random House, offering an $80,000 advance. The book was published to massive fanfare, sold over 100,000 copies, and was translated into multiple languages. Putin's thugs broke up a pro-Flying-Spaghetti-Monster demonstration in Russia. At the time, this seemed perfectly normal.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/10/28/financial-incentives-are-weaker-than-social-incentives-but-very-important-anyway/ NYT: Economic Incentives Don't Always Do What We Want Them To (h/t MR). For the first time in history, the title actually understates the article, which argues that incentives can be surprisingly useless: Economists have somehow managed to hide in plain sight an enormously consequential finding from their research: Financial incentives are nowhere near as powerful as they are usually assumed to be. The article starts with some surprising facts. Increased taxes on the rich don't make rich people work much less. Salary caps on athletes don't decrease athletic performance. Increased welfare doesn't make poor people work less. Decreased job opportunities in one area rarely cause people to move elsewhere. Then it presents a neat chart showing that most people believe others would respond to an incentive, but deny responding to that incentive themselves. For example, 60% of people say a Medicaid program with no work requirement would prevent many people from seeking work, but only 10% of people say they themselves would stop seeking work with such a program.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/10/24/highlights-from-the-comments-on-pnse/ (original post) Alex M writes: I think one of the main problems with the current state of rationalism (and many other fake "sciences" such as economics or sociology) is fuzzy thinking and lack of falsifiable empirical testing. So somebody claims to be "enlightened." Does a smart person take that at face value? Of course not. Once you just start believing random shit, you're no better than a superstitious primitive cargo-cult. You have to TEST all claims. For example, I don't just take it at face value that economics is a real science just because a bunch of IYIs tell me so. I analyze economist predictions, see that their track record of successful predictions is atrocious, and then make the totally RATIONAL choice to discard my priors and treats economics as the laughable hocus-pocus that it is – because when you genuinely have an accurate view of reality, it doesn't collapse under scrutiny. We should treat mystical claims exactly the same way. So somebody claims to be enlightened? Fine. How can they substantiate it? Can they do things that unenlightened people can't, like clairvoyance, predicting the future, or sending messages through the collective subconscious in order to significantly impact world events? Do you see what I'm saying? Enlightenment should have some objectively quantifiable impact beyond just having a different internal narrative that is completely subjective and unprovable.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/10/23/indian-economic-reform-much-more-than-you-wanted-to-know/ From a recent Charter Cities Institute report: From India's independence from the British Raj in 1947 to the early 1990s, the country's economic policy was largely socialist. In the 1980s some early steps were taken to open the Indian economy to increased trade, reduce controls over industry, and set a more realistic exchange rate. In 1991, more widespread economic reforms were introduced. These reforms included the end of government monopolies over certain sectors of the economy, reductions in barriers to entry for new firms, increased foreign investment was allowed, and tariffs and other barriers to trade were reduced or eliminated. After liberalization, exports increased substantially, and various service sector industries saw significant growth. India's growth has not just been good for the more educated segment of the population. Datt, Ravallion, and Murgai (2016) argue that India has made substantial progress in reducing the incidence of absolute poverty, and that this trend exists in both urban and rural areas. Historically higher rates of rural poverty have been converging with urban rates of poverty, and the overall poverty rate has been declining at an accelerating rate in the post-1991 reform era. In the 1970s over 60 percent of Indians were living in extreme poverty. As of 2011, only 20 percent of the population lived in extreme poverty. Between 2005 and 2016, an estimated 271 million Indians rose out of multidimensional poverty, which accounts for various health, education, and living standard indicators rather than just income (UNDP and OPHI 2018). Infant mortality has fallen from 161.4 deaths per 1,000 births in 1960 to just 32 deaths per 1,000 births in 2017, and India should soon converge with the world average if the current trend continues. Life expectancy has also improved dramatically, rising from 41 years in 1960 to nearly 69 years today.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/10/21/the-pnse-paper/ I've mentioned this a few times, but it's worth going over in detail. The full title is Clusters Of Individual Experiences Form A Continuum Of Persistent Non-Symbolic Experiences In Adults by Jeffery Martin, with "persistent non-symbolic experience" (PNSE) as a scientific-sounding culturally-neutral code word for "enlightenment". Martin is a Reiki practitioner associated with the "Center for the Study of Non-Symbolic Consciousness", so we're not getting this from the most sober of skeptics, but I still find the project interesting enough to deserve a look. Martin searched various religious and spiritual groups for people who both self-reported enlightenment and were affiliated with "a community that provided validity to their claims". He says he eventually found 1200 such people who were willing to participate in the study, but that "the data reported here comes primarily from the first 50 participants who sat for in-depth interviews…based on the overall research effort these 50 were felt to be a sufficient sample to represent what has been learned from the larger population". Although Martin says he tried to get as much diversity as possible, the group was mostly white male Americans. Martin's research was mostly qualitative, based on in-depth interviews, so we're mostly going with his impressions. But his impression was that most people who self-described as enlightened had similar experiences, which could be be plotted on:

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/10/16/is-enlightenment-compatible-with-sex-scandals/ Last year I reviewed The Mind Illuminated, a meditation guide by Buddhist teacher Upasaka Culadasa. Last month, Culudasa's Buddhist community accused him of cheating on his wife with prostitutes for many years. Culadasa doesn't seem to agree with the exact details of the accusations, but he also doesn't seem to deny that there was something in that general category of thing. What can this teach us about enlightenment? Culadasa has been meditating and studying Buddhism for over forty years and trained under some of the greatest teachers of his generation. I don't know if he's claimed to "be enlightened" in so many words, but he's written books that describe how to reach enlightenment and that assert you can do it in a few years if you follow his advice, which sounds a lot like claiming enlightenment by implication. Other self-proclaimed enlightened Buddhist teachers seem to respect him and treat him as being at around their level. And if Culudasa wasn't enlightened, there's a long list of other Buddhist masters with similar misdeeds. The Atlantic points out that three of the four great founders of American Zen "caused major public sex scandals"; the fourth, Shunryu Suzuki, was spotless, but his successor Richard Baker caused a major public sex scandal. The two most famous US teachers of Tibetan Buddhism, Chongyam Trungpa and Sogyal Rinpoche, both caused major public sex scandals. Trungpa's immediate successor Ösel Tendzin caused a particularly horrifying major public sex scandal, and the current head of Shambhala Buddhism, Sakyong Rinpoche, also caused a major public sex scandal. These teachers were among the most accomplished of our time. Many were officially certified as enlightened by

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/04/28/the-control-group-is-out-of-control/ I. Allan Crossman calls parapsychology the control group for science. That is, in let's say a drug testing experiment, you give some people the drug and they recover. That doesn't tell you much until you give some other people a placebo drug you know doesn't work – but which they themselves believe in – and see how many of them recover. That number tells you how many people will recover whether the drug works or not. Unless people on your real drug do significantly better than people on the placebo drug, you haven't found anything. On the meta-level, you're studying some phenomenon and you get some positive findings. That doesn't tell you much until you take some other researchers who are studying a phenomenon you know doesn't exist – but which they themselves believe in – and see how many of them get positive findings. That number tells you how many studies will discover positive results whether the phenomenon is real or not. Unless studies of the real phenomenon do significantly better than studies of the placebo phenomenon, you haven't found anything. Trying to set up placebo science would be a logistical nightmare. You'd have to find a phenomenon that definitely doesn't exist, somehow convince a whole community of scientists across the world that it does, and fund them to study it for a couple of decades without them figuring it out. Luckily we have a natural experiment in terms of parapsychology – the study of psychic phenomena – which most reasonable people believe don't exist, but which a community of practicing scientists believes in and publishes papers on all the time.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/10/14/book-review-against-the-grain/ Someone on SSC Discord summarized James Scott's Against The Grain as "basically 300 pages of calling wheat a fascist". I have only two qualms with this description. First, the book is more like 250 pages; the rest is just endnotes. Second, "fascist" isn't quite the right aspersion to use here. Against The Grain should be read as a prequel to Scott's most famous work, Seeing Like A State. SLaS argued that much of what we think of as "progress" towards a more orderly world – like Prussian scientific forestry, or planned cities with wide streets – didn't make anyone better off or grow the economy. It was "progress" only from a state's-eye perspective of wanting everything to be legible to top-down control and taxation. He particularly criticizes the High Modernists, Le Corbusier-style architects who replaced flourishing organic cities with grandiose but sterile rectangular grids. Against the Grain extends the analysis from the 19th century all the way back to the dawn of civilization. If, as Samuel Johnson claimed, "The Devil was the first Whig", Against the Grain argues that wheat was the first High Modernist. Sumer just before the dawn of civilization was in many ways an idyllic place. Forget your vision of stark Middle Eastern deserts; in the Paleolithic the area where the first cities would one day arise was a great swamp. Foragers roamed the landscape, eating everything from fishes to gazelles to shellfish to wild plants. There was more than enough for everyone; "as Jack Harlan famously showed, one could gather enough [wild] grain with a flint sickle in three weeks to feed a family for a year". Foragers alternated short periods of frenetic activity (eg catching as many gazelles as possible during their weeklong migration through the area) with longer periods of rest and recreation.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/08/14/beware-isolated-demands-for-rigor/ I. From Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self by John Perry: "There is something about practical things that knocks us off our philosophical high horses. Perhaps Heraclitus really thought he couldn't step in the same river twice. Perhaps he even received tenure for that contribution to philosophy. But suppose some other ancient had claimed to have as much right as Heraclitus did to an ox Heraclitus had bought, on the grounds that since the animal had changed, it wasn't the same one he had bought and so was up for grabs. Heraclitus would have quickly come up with some ersatz, watered-down version of identity of practical value for dealing with property rights, oxen, lyres, vineyards, and the like. And then he might have wondered if that watered-down vulgar sense of identity might be a considerably more valuable concept than a pure and philosophical sort of identity that nothing has. Okay, but I can think of something worse than that. Imagine Heraclitus as a cattle rustler in the Old West. Every time a rancher catches him at his nefarious business, he patiently explains to them that identity doesn't exist, and therefore the same argument against private property as made above. Flummoxed, they're unable to think of a response before he rides off into the sunset. But then when Heraclitus himself needs the concept of stable personal identity for something – maybe he wants to deposit his ill-gotten gains in the bank with certainty that the banker will give it back to him next time he shows up to withdraw it, or maybe he wants to bribe the sheriff to ignore his activities for the next while – all of a sudden Heraclitus is willing to tolerate the watered-down vulgar sense of identity like everyone else. (actually, I can think of something even worse than that, which is a TV western based on this premise, where a roving band of pre-Socratic desperadoes terrorizes Texas. The climax is no doubt when the hero strides onto Main Street, revolver in hand, saying "There's a new sheriff in town." And Parmenides gruffly responds "No, I'm pretty sure that's impossible.") At its best, philosophy is a revolutionary pursuit that dissolves our common-sense intuitions and exposes the possibility of much deeper structures behind them. One can respond by becoming a saint or madman, or by becoming a pragmatist who is willing to continue to participate in human society while also understanding its theoretical limitations. Both are respectable career paths. The problem is when someone chooses to apply philosophical rigor selectively. Heraclitus could drown in his deeper understanding of personal identity and become a holy madman, eschewing material things and taking no care for the morrow because he does not believe there is any consistent self to experience it. Or he could engage with it from afar, becoming a wise scholar who participating in earthly affairs while drawing equanimity from the realization that there is a sense in which all his accomplishments will be impermanent. But if he only applies his new theory when he wants other people's cows, then we have a problem. Philosophical rigor, usually a virtue, has been debased to an isolated demand for rigor in cases where it benefits Heraclitus.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/09/18/too-much-dark-money-in-almonds/ Everyone always talks about how much money there is in politics. This is the wrong framing. The right framing is Ansolabehere et al's: why is there so little money in politics? But Ansolabehere focuses on elections, and the mystery is wider than that. Sure, during the 2018 election, candidates, parties, PACs, and outsiders combined spent about $5 billion – $2.5 billion on Democrats, $2 billion on Republicans, and $0.5 billion on third parties. And although that sounds like a lot of money to you or me, on the national scale, it's puny. The US almond industry earns $12 billion per year. Americans spent about 2.5x as much on almonds as on candidates last year. But also, what about lobbying? Open Secrets reports $3.5 billion in lobbying spending in 2018. Again, sounds like a lot. But when we add $3.5 billion in lobbying to the $5 billion in election spending, we only get $8.5 billion – still less than almonds. What about think tanks? Based on numbers discussed in this post, I estimate that the budget for all US think tanks, liberal and conservative combined, is probably around $500 million per year. Again, an amount of money that I wish I had. But add it to the total, and we're only at $9 billion. Still less than almonds!

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2015/06/06/against-tulip-subsidies/ I. Imagine a little kingdom with a quaint custom: when a man likes a woman, he offers her a tulip; if she accepts, they are married shortly thereafter. A couple who marries sans tulip is considered to be living in sin; no other form of proposal is appropriate or accepted. One day, a Dutch trader comes to the little kingdom. He explains that his homeland also has a quaint custom involving tulips: they speculate on them, bidding the price up to stratospheric levels. Why, in the Netherlands, a tulip can go for ten times more than the average worker earns in a year! The trader is pleased to find a new source of bulbs, and offers the people of the kingdom a few guilders per tulip, which they happily accept. Soon other Dutch traders show up and start a bidding war. The price of tulips goes up, and up, and up; first dozens of guilders, then hundreds. Tulip-growers make a fortune, but everyone else is less pleased. Suitors wishing to give a token of their love find themselves having to invest their entire life savings – with no guarantee that the woman will even say yes! Soon, some of the poorest people are locked out of marriage and family-raising entirely.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/09/16/against-against-pseudoaddiction/ I. "Pseudoaddiction" is one of the standard beats every article on the opioid crisis has to hit. Pharma companies (the story goes) invented a concept called "pseudoaddiction", which looks exactly like addiction, except it means you just need to give the patient more drugs. Bizarrely gullible doctors went along with this and increased prescriptions for their addicted patients. For example, from a letter in the Wall Street Journal: Parroting Big Pharma's excuses about FDA oversight and black-box warnings only discounts how companies like Johnson & Johnson engaged in pervasive misinformation campaigns and even promoted a theory of "pseudoaddiction" to encourage doctors to prescribe even more opioids for patients who displayed signs of addiction. Or from CBS: But amid skyrocketing addiction rates and overdoses related to OxyContin, Panara claimed the company taught a sales tactic she now considers questionable, saying some patients might only appear to be addicted when in fact they're just in pain. In training, she was taught a term for this: "pseudoaddiction." "So the cure for 'pseudoaddiction,' you were trained, is more opioids?" Dokoupil asked. "A higher dose, yes," Panara said.

Thanks to everyone who offered to host a meetup. Full list of cities, times, and places is below. If you're reading this, you're invited. Please don't feel like you "won't be welcome" just because you're new to the blog, demographically different from the average reader, or hate SSC and everything it stands for. You'll be fine! Some suggestions for organizers: 1. Bring a sign that says SSC MEETUP so people can find you 2. Bring nametags and markers 3. Bring a signup sheet where people can write their names and emails if they want to hear about future meetups. 4. If people want to get to know each other better outside the meetup, you might want to mention reciprocity.io, the rationalist friend-finder/dating site. It runs off Facebook, so you have to Facebook friend the other person first. 5. Please record how many people attend; I will ask for these numbers to help with future meetup posts. 6. If you take a picture and send it to me, I'll try to post it here. I'll ask for this later, please don't email these to me until then.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/09/11/lots-of-people-going-around-with-mild-hallucinations-all-the-time/ [Related to: Relaxed Beliefs Under Psychedelics And The Anarchic Brain, HPPD And The Specter Of Permanent Side Effects] I. Hallucinogen persisting perceptual disorder is a condition where people who take psychedelics continue hallucinating indefinitely. Estimates of prevalence range from about 4% of users (Baggott) to "nobody, the condition does not exist" (Krebs and Johansen). To explore this discrepancy, I asked about it on the 2019 SSC survey. The specific question was: Hallucinogen Persisting Perceptual Disorder is a condition marked by visual or other perceptual disturbances typical of psychedelic use that continue for weeks and months after coming off the psychedelic, in some cases permanently. Have you ever had this condition? 2,234 readers admitted to having used psychedelics. Of those, 285 (= 12.8%) stated that they had some hallucinations that persisted afterwards. 219 (9.8%) said they'd had them for a while and then they had gone away. 66 (= 3%) stated that they still had the hallucinations (one limit of the study: I don't know how long it has been since those people took the psychedelics).

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/09/10/ssc-journal-club-relaxed-beliefs-under-psychedelics-and-the-anarchic-brain/ Thanks to Sarah H. and the people at her house for help understanding this paper] The predictive coding theory argues that the brain uses Bayesian calculations to make sense of the noisy and complex world around it. It relies heavily on priors (assumptions about what the world must be like given what it already knows) to construct models of the world, sampling only enough sense-data to double-check its models and update them when they fail. This has been a fruitful way to look at topics from depression to autism to sensory deprivation. Now, in Relaxed Beliefs Under Psychedelics And The Anarchic Brain: Toward A Unified Model Of The Brain Action Of Psychedelics, Karl Friston and Robin Carhart-Harris try to use predictive coding to explain the effects of psychedelic drugs. Then they use their theory to argue that psychedelic therapy may be helpful for "most, if not all" mental illnesses. Priors are unconscious assumptions about reality that the brain uses to construct models. They can range all the way from basic truths like "solid objects don't randomly disappear", to useful rules-of-thumb like "most get-rich-quick schemes are scams", to emotional hangups like "I am a failure", to unfair stereotypes like "Italians are lazy". Without any priors, the world would fail to make sense at all, turning into an endless succession of special cases without any common lessons. But if priors become too strong, a person can become closed-minded and stubborn, refusing to admit evidence that contradicts their views. F&CH argue that psychedelics "relax" priors, giving them less power to shape experience. Part of their argument is neuropharmacologic: most psychedelics are known to work through the 5-HT2A receptor. These receptors are most common in the cortex, the default mode network, and other areas at the "top" of a brain hierarchy going from low-level sensations to high-level cognitions. The 5-HT2A receptors seem to strengthen or activate these high-level areas in some way. So:

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/09/09/partial-retraction-age-and-birth-order-effects/ On Less Wrong, Bucky tries to replicate my results on birth order and age gaps. Backing up: two years ago, I looked at SSC survey data and found that firstborn children were very overrepresented. That result was replicated a few times, both in the SSC sample and in other samples of high-opennness STEM types. Last year, I expanded those results to look at how age gaps affected birth order effects. Curiously, age gaps less than seven years did not seem to attenuate birth order, but age gaps of more than seven years attenuated it almost completely. Bucky analyzed the same data and found that I bungled one and a half of my results. Left graph in each pair is mine, right is Bucky's.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2017/03/16/book-review-seeing-like-a-state/ I. Seeing Like A State is the book G.K. Chesterton would have written if he had gone into economic history instead of literature. Since he didn't, James Scott had to write it a century later. The wait was worth it. Scott starts with the story of "scientific forestry" in 18th century Prussia. Enlightenment rationalists noticed that peasants were just cutting down whatever trees happened to grow in the forests, like a chump. They came up with a better idea: clear all the forests and replace them by planting identical copies of Norway spruce (the highest-lumber-yield-per-unit-time tree) in an evenly-spaced rectangular grid. Then you could just walk in with an axe one day and chop down like a zillion trees an hour and have more timber than you could possibly ever want. This went poorly. The impoverished ecosystem couldn't support the game animals and medicinal herbs that sustained the surrounding peasant villages, and they suffered an economic collapse. The endless rows of identical trees were a perfect breeding ground for plant diseases and forest fires. And the complex ecological processes that sustained the soil stopped working, so after a generation the Norway spruces grew stunted and malnourished. Yet for some reason, everyone involved got promoted, and "scientific forestry" spread across Europe and the world. And this pattern repeats with suspicious regularity across history, not just in biological systems but also in social ones.

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/09/04/list-of-passages-i-highlighted-in-my-copy-of-ages-of-discord/ Turchin has some great stories about unity vs. polarization over time. For example in the 1940s, unity became such a "problem" that concerned citizens demanded more partisanship: Concerned about electoral torpor and meaningless political debate, the American Political Science Association in 1946 appointed a committee to examine the role of parties in the American system. Four years later, the committee published a lengthy (and alarmed) report calling for the return of ideologically distinct and powerful political parties. Parties ought to stand for distinct sets of politics, the political scientists urged. Voters should be presented with clear choices. I have vague memories of similar demands in the early '90s; everyone was complaining that the parties were exactly the same and the "elites" were rigging things to make sure we didn't have any real choices. On the other hand, partisanship during the Civil War was pretty intense: Another indicator of growing intraelite conflict was the increasing incidence of violence and threatened violence in Congress, which reached a peak during the 1850s. The brutal caning that Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina gave to Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts on the Senate floor in 1856 is the best known such episode, but it was not the only one. In 1842, after Representative Thomas Arnold of Tennessee "reprimanded a pro-slavery member of his own party, two Southern Democrats stalked towards him, at least of one of whom was arhmed with a bowie knife…calling Arnold a 'damned coward,' his angry colleagues threatened to cut his throat 'from ear to ear'" (Freeman 2011). According to Senator Hammond, "The only persons who do not have a revolver and a knife are those who have two revolvers" (quoted in Potter 1976:389). During a debate in 1850, Senator Henry Foote of Mississippi pulled a pistol on Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri (Freeman 2011). In another bitter debate, a New York congressman inadvertently dropped a pistol (it fell out of his pocket), and this almost precipitated a general shootout on the floor of Congress (Potter 1976: 389).

Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2019/09/02/book-review-ages-of-discord/ I. I recently reviewed Secular Cycles, which presents a demographic-structural theory of the growth and decline of pre-industrial civilizations. When land is plentiful, population grows and the economy prospers. When land reaches its carrying capacity and income declines to subsistence, the area is at risk of famines, diseases, and wars – which kill enough people that land becomes plentiful again. During good times, elites prosper and act in unity; during bad times, elites turn on each other in an age of backstabbing and civil strife. It seemed pretty reasonable, and authors Peter Turchin and Sergey Nefedov had lots of data to support it. Ages of Discord is Turchin's attempt to apply the same theory to modern America. There are many reasons to think this shouldn't work, and the book does a bad job addressing them. So I want to start by presenting Turchin's data showing such cycles exist, so we can at least see why the hypothesis might be tempting. Once we've seen the data, we can decide how turned off we want to be by the theoretical problems. The first of Turchin's two cyclic patterns is a long cycle of national growth and decline. In Secular Cycles' pre-industrial societies, this pattern lasted about 300 years; in Ages of Discord's picture of the modern US, it lasts about 150:

Last autumn we organized meetups in 85 different cities (and one ship!) around the world. Some of the meetup groups stuck around or reported permanent spikes in membership, which sounds like a success, so let's do it again. For most cities: If you're willing to host a meetup for your city, then decide on a place, date, and time, and post it in the comments here, along with an email address where people can contact you. Then please watch the comments in case I need to ask you any questions. If you're not sure whether your city has enough SSC readers to support a meetup, see the list of people by city at the bottom of this post. There may be more of us than you think – last year we were able to support meetups in such great megalopolises as Norman, Oklahoma and Wellington, New Zealand. But I would prefer people not split things up too much – if you're very close to a bigger city, consider going there instead of hosting your own. If you want a meetup for your city, please err in favor of volunteering to organize – the difficulty level is basically "pick a coffee shop you like, tell me the address, and give me a time"; it would be dumb if nobody got to go to meetups because everyone felt too awkward and low-status to volunteer. For especially promising cities in the US: I am going to try to attend your meetups. My very tentative schedule looks like this:

Ten years ago, everyone was talking about superintelligence, the singularity, the robot apocalypse. What happened? I think the main answer is: the field matured. Why isn't everyone talking about nuclear security, biodefense, or counterterrorism? Because there are already competent institutions working on those problems, and people who are worried about them don't feel the need to take their case directly to the public. The past ten years have seen AI goal alignment reach that level of maturity too. There are all sorts of new research labs, think tanks, and companies working on it – the Center For Human-Compatible AI at UC Berkeley, OpenAI, Ought, the Center For The Governance Of AI at Oxford, the Leverhulme Center For The Future Of Intelligence at Cambridge, etc. Like every field, it could still use more funding and talent. But it's at a point where academic respectability trades off against public awareness at a rate where webzine articles saying CARE ABOUT THIS OR YOU WILL DEFINITELY DIE are less helpful. One unhappy consequence of this happy state of affairs is that it's harder to keep up with the field. In 2014, Nick Bostrom wrote Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies, giving a readable overview of what everyone was thinking up to that point. Since then, things have been less public-facing, less readable, and more likely to be published in dense papers with a lot of mathematical notation. They've also been – no offense to everyone working on this – less revolutionary and less interesting. This is one reason I was glad to come across Reframing Superintelligence: Comprehensive AI Services As General Intelligence by Eric Drexler, a researcher who works alongside Bostrom at Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute. This 200 page report is not quite as readable as Superintelligence; its highly-structured outline form belies the fact that all of its claims start sounding the same after a while. But it's five years more recent, and presents a very different vision of how future AI might look.

I admitted in my last post on Reaction that I devoted insufficient space to the question of why society does seem to be drifting gradually leftward. And I now realize that in order to critique the Reactionary worldview effectively we're going to have to go there. The easiest answer would be "because we retroactively define leftism as the direction that society went". But this is not true. Communism is very leftist, but society eventually decided not to go that way. It seems fair to say that there are certain areas where society did not go to the left, like in the growth of free trade and the gradual lowering of tax rates, but upon realizing this we don't feel the slightest urge to redefine "low tax rates" as leftist. So what is leftism? For that matter, what is rightism? Any theory of these two ideas would have to explain at least the following data points: 1) Why do both ideologies combine seemingly unrelated political ideas? For example, why do people who want laissez-faire free trade empirically also prefer a strong military and oppose gay marriage? Why do people who want to help the environment also support feminism and dislike school vouchers? 2) Why do the two ideologies seem broadly stable across different times and cultures, such that it's relatively easy to point out the Tories as further right than the Whigs, or ancient Athens as further left than ancient Sparta? For that matter, why do they seem to correspond to certain neural patterns in the brain, such that neurologists can determine your political beliefs with 83% accuracy by examining brain structure alone? Link: https://slatestarcodex.com/2013/03/04/a-thrivesurvive-theory-of-the-political-spectrum/

From the New York Times: Are We Living In A Computer Simulation? Let's Not Find Out. It lists the standard reasons for thinking we might be in a simulation, then brings up some proposals for testing the hypothesis (for example, the cosmic background radiation might look different in simulations and real universes). But it suggests that we not do that, because if we learn we're in a simulation, that might ruin the simulation and cause the simulators to destroy the universe. But I think a little more thought suggests we don't have anything to worry about. In order to notice we had discovered our simulated nature, the simulators would have to have a monitor watching us. We should expect this anyway. Although humans may run some simulations without monitoring them carefully, the simulators have no reason to be equally careless; if they can simulate billions of sentient beings, their labor costs are necessarily near zero. Such a monitor would have complete instantaneous knowledge of everything happening in our universe, and since anyone who can simulate a whole planet must have really good data processing capabilities, it would be able to understand and act upon the entire content of its omniscient sensorium. It would see the fall of each sparrow, record the position of ever atom, have the level of situational awareness that gods could only dream of. What I'm saying is, it probably reads the New York Times. That means it knows these experiments are going to happen. If it cares about the results, it can fake them. Assuming for some reason that it messed up designing the cosmic background radiation (why are we assuming this, again?), it can correct that mistake now, or cause the experimental apparatus to report the wrong data, or do one of a million other things that would prevent us from learning we are in a simulation.

Or at least this is the theory proposed in Brain Evolution Through The Lens Of Parasite Manipulation by Marco del Giudice. The paper starts with an overview of parasite manipulation of host behavior. These are the stories you hear about toxoplasma-infected rats seeking out cats instead of running away from them, or zombie ants climbing stalks of grass so predators will eat them. The parasite secretes chemicals that alter host neurochemistry in ways that make the host get eaten, helping the parasite transfer itself to a new organism. Along with rats and ants, there is a dizzying variety of other parasite manipulation cases. They include parasitic wasps who hack spiders into forming protective webs for their pupae, parasitic flies that cause bees to journey far from their hive in order to spread fly larva more widely, and parasitic microorganisms that cause mosquitoes to draw less blood from each victim (since that forces the mosquitoes to feed on more victims, and so spread the parasite more widely). Parasitic nematodes make their ant hosts turn red, which causes (extremely stupid?) birds to mistake them for fruit and eat them. Parasitic worms make crickets seek water; as the cricket drowns, the worms escape into the pond and begin the next stage of their life cycle. Even mere viruses can alter behavior; the most famous example is rabies, which hacks dogs, bats, and other mammals into hyperaggressive moods that usually result in them biting someone and transmitting the rabies virus. Even our friendly gut microbes might be manipulating us. People talk a lot about the "gut-brain axis" and the effect of gut microbes on behavior, as if this is some sort of beautiful symbiotic circle-of-life style thing. But scientists have found that gut microbes trying to colonize fruit flies will hack the flies' food preferences to get a leg up – for example, a carb-metabolizing microbe will secrete hormones that make the fly want to eat more carbs than fat in order to outcompete its fat-metabolizing rivals for gut real estate; there are already papers speculating that the same processes might affect humans. Read Alcock 2014 and you will never look at food cravings the same way again.

Last year, a study came out showing that beef jerky and other cured meats, could trigger mania in bipolar disorder (paper, popular article). It was a pretty big deal, getting coverage in the national press and affecting the advice psychiatrists (including me) gave their patients. The study was pretty simple: psychiatrists at a mental hospital in Baltimore asked new patients if they had ever eaten any of a variety of foods. After getting a few hundred responses, they compared answers to controls and across diagnostic categories. The only hit that came up was that people in the hospital for bipolar mania were more likely to have said they ate dry cured meat like beef jerky (odds ratio 3.49). This survived various statistical comparisons and made some biological sense. The methodology was a little bit weird, because they only asked if they'd ever had the food, not if they'd eaten a lot of it just before becoming sick. If you had beef jerky once when you were fourteen, and ended up in the psych hospital when you were fifty-five, that counted. Either they were hoping that "ever had beef jerky at all" was a good proxy for "eats a lot of beef jerky right now", or that past consumption produced lasting changes in gut bacteria. In any case, they found a strong effect even after adjusting for confounders and doing the necessary Bonferroni corrections, so it's hard to argue with success.

There is a tide in the affairs of men. It cycles with a period of about three hundred years. During its flood, farms and businesses prosper, and great empires enjoy golden ages. During its ebb, war and famine stalk the land, and states collapse into barbarism. Chinese population over time At least this is the thesis of Peter Turchin and Sergey Nefedov, authors of Secular Cycles. They start off Malthusian: due to natural reproduction, population will keep increasing until it reaches the limits of what the land can support. At that point, everyone will be stuck at subsistence level. If any group ever enjoys a standard of living above subsistence level, they will keep reproducing until they are back down at subsistence. Standard Malthusian theory evokes images of a population stable at subsistence level forever. But Turchin and Nefedov argues this isn't how it works. A population at subsistence will always be one meal away from starving. When a famine hits, many of them will starve. When a plague hits, they will already be too sickly to fight it off. When conflict arrives, they will be desperate enough to enlist in the armies of whichever warlord can offer them a warm meal. These are not piecemeal events, picking off just enough of the population to bring it back to subsistence. They are great cataclysms. The Black Plague killed 30% – 60% of Europeans; the Antonine Plague of Rome was almost as deadly. The Thirty Years War killed 25% – 40% of Germans; the Time of Troubles may have killed 50% of medieval Russia. Thus the secular cycle. When population is low, everyone has more than enough land. People grow rich and reproduce. As time goes on, the same amount of farmland gets split among more and more people. Wages are driven down to subsistence. War, Famine, and Pestilence ravage the land, with Death not far behind. The killings continue until population is low again, at which point the cycle starts over. This applies mostly to peasants, who are most at risk of starving. But nobles go through a related process. As a cycle begins, their numbers are low. As time goes on, their population expands, both through natural reproduction and through upward mobility. Eventually, there are more nobles than there are good positions… (this part confused me a little. Shouldn't number of good positions scale with population? IE if one baron rules 1,000 peasants, the number of baronial positions should scale with the size of a society. I think T&N hint at a few answers. First, some positions are absolute rather than relative, eg "King" or "Minister of the Economy". Second, noble numbers may sometimes increase faster than peasant numbers, since nobles have more food and better chances to reproduce. Third, during boom times, the ranks of nobles are swelled through upward mobility. Fourth, conspicuous consumption is a ratchet effect: during boom times, the expectations of nobility should gradually rise. Fifth, sometimes the relevant denominator is not peasants but land: if a noble only has one acre of land, it doesn't matter how many peasants he controls. Sixth, nobles usually survive famines and plagues pretty well, so after those have done their work, there are far fewer peasants but basically the same number of nobles. All of these factors contribute to excess noble population – or as T&N call it, "elite overproduction")

"I don't practice what I preach because I'm not the kind of person I'm preaching to." — J. R. "Bob" Dobbs I. I read Atlas Shrugged probably about a decade ago, and felt turned off by its promotion of selfishness as a moral ideal. I thought that was basically just being a jerk. After all, if there's one thing the world doesn't need (I thought) it's more selfishness. Then I talked to a friend who told me Atlas Shrugged had changed his life. That he'd been raised in a really strict family that had told him that ever enjoying himself was selfish and made him a bad person, that he had to be working at every moment to make his family and other people happy or else let them shame him to pieces. And the revelation that it was sometimes okay to consider your own happiness gave him the strength to stand up to them and turn his life around, while still keeping the basic human instinct of helping others when he wanted to and he felt they deserved it (as, indeed, do Rand characters). II. The religious and the irreligious alike enjoy making fun of Reddit's r/atheism, which combines an extreme strawmanning of religious positions with childish insults and distasteful triumphalism. Recently the moderators themselves have become a bit embarrassed by it and instituted some rules intended to tone things down, leading to some of the most impressive Internet drama I have ever seen. In its midst, some people started talking about what the old strawmanning triumphalist r/atheism meant to them (see for example here).

There's a tradition on Reddit that when somebody repeats some cliche in a tone that makes it sound like she believes she is bringing some brilliant and heretical insight – like "I know I'm going to get downvoted for this, but believe we should have less government waste!" – people respond "SO BRAVE" in the comments. That's what I mean by bravery debates. Discussions over who is bravely holding a nonconformist position in the face of persecution, and who is a coward defending the popular status quo and trying to silence dissenters. These are frickin' toxic. I don't have a great explanation for why. It could be a status thing – saying that you're the original thinker who has cast off the Matrix of omnipresent conformity and your opponent is a sheeple (sherson?) too fearful to realize your insight. Or it could be that, as the saying goes, "everyone is fighting a hard battle", and telling someone else they've got it easy compared to you is just about the most demeaning thing you can do, especially when you're wrong. But the possible explanations aren't the point. The point is that, empirically, starting a bravery debate is the quickest way to make sure that a conversation becomes horrible and infuriating. I'm generalizing from my own experience here, but one of the least pleasant philosophical experiences is thinking you're bravely defending an unpopular but correct position, facing the constant persecution and prejudice from your more numerous and extremely smug opponents day in and day out without being worn-down … only to have one of your opponents offhandedly refer to how brave they are for resisting the monolithic machine that you and the rest of the unfairly-biased-toward-you culture have set up against them. You just want to scream NO YOU'RE WRONG SEFSEFILASDJO:IALJAOI:JA:O>ILFJASL:KFJ

Thanks to everyone who commented on Against Against Billionaire Philanthropy. For whatever reason, the comments there were exceptionally good. In particular, I'm happy that our usually-quiet leftists finally showed up with some strong (and interesting) pushback. I usually highlight good comments with short responses, but it was hard for me to avoid debating some of these. I realize that's complicated, because I can't quote most long comments in their entirety, and I realize I have more of a platform than other commenters who may feel I misrepresented them or who just want to reply to me. I don't have a great solution to this, but if you're annoyed at how I featured/responded to your comment, please tell me, so I can calibrate how serious a problem this is for next time.

I want to signal-boost Tumblr user squareallworthy's analysis of various UBI plans: 1. Jensen et al's plan 2. Healy et al's plan 3. Andrew Yang's plan 4. Torry's plan 5. Sheahen's plan 6. Dolan's plan 7. Stern and Murray's plans 8. Santens' plan 8½. Varoufakis and Reich's plan 9. Yang's plan, redux He finds that most of them fail on basic math – they rely on funding schemes that wouldn't come close to covering costs. The rest are too small to actually lift people out of poverty. None of them are at all credible. These plans fail even though they cheat and give themselves dictatorial power. "End corporate welfare, then redirect the money to UBI!" But if it was that easy to end corporate welfare, wouldn't people have done it already, for non-UBI related reasons? "We'll get a UBI by ending corporate welfare" is an outrageous claim. And even the plans that let themselves make it fail on basic math. This is humbling and depressing. And it concludes the intelligent and useful part of this post that signal-boosts the work of a responsible person. Everything below is epistemic status: wild speculation.

[Conflict of interest notice: I've volunteered for both private and public charities, but more often private. I received a small amount of money for work done for a private charity ten years ago. Some of the private charities have been partially funded by billionaires.] From Vox: The Case Against Billionaire Philanthropy. It joins The Guardian, Truthout, Dissent Magazine, CityLab, and a host of other people and organizations arguing that rich people giving to charity is now a big problem. I'm against this. I understand concern about the growing power of the very rich. But I worry the movement against billionaire charity is on track to damage charity a whole lot more than it damages billionaires. Eleven points: 1. Is criticizing billionaire philanthropy a good way to protest billionaires having too much power in society? Which got more criticism? Mark Zuckerberg giving $100 million to help low-income students? Or Mark Zuckerberg buying a $59 million dollar mansion in Lake Tahoe? Obviously it's the low-income students. I've heard people criticizing Zuckerberg's donation constantly for years, and I didn't even know he had a $59 million Lake Tahoe mansion until I googled "things mark zuckerberg has spent ridiculous amounts of money on" in the process of writing this paragraph. Which got more negative press? Jeff Bezos donating $2 billion for preschools for underprivileged children? Or Jeff Bezos spending $2 billion on whatever is going to come up when I Google "things jeff bezos has spent ridiculous amounts of money on?".

[Trigger warning: Death, pain, suffering, sadness] I. Some people, having completed the traditional forms of empty speculation – "What do you want to be when you grow up?", "If you could bang any celebrity who would it be?" – turn to "What will you say as your last words?" Sounds like a valid question. You can go out with a wisecrack, like Oscar Wilde ("Either this wallpaper goes or I do"). Or with piety and humility, like Jesus ("Into thy hands, o Father, I commend my spirit.") Or burning with defiance, like Karl Marx ("Last words are for fools who haven't said enough.") Well, this is an atheist/skeptic blog, so let me do my job of puncturing all your pleasant dreams. You'll probably never become an astronaut. You're not going to bang Emma Watson. And your last words will probably be something like "mmmrrrgggg graaaaaaaaaaaHAAACK!" I guess I always pictured dying as – unless you got hit by a truck or something – a bittersweet and strangely beautiful process. You'd grow older and weaker and gradually get some disease and feel your time was upon you. You'd be in a nice big bed at home with all your friends and family gathered around. You'd gradually feel the darkness closing in. You'd tell them all how much you loved them, there would be tears, you would say something witty or pious or defiant, and then you would close your eyes and drift away into a dreamless sleep. And I think this happens sometimes. For all I know, maybe it happens quite a lot. If it does, I never see these people. They very wisely stay far away from hospitals and the medical system in general. I see the other kind of people.

I. "Silliest internet atheist argument" is a hotly contested title, but I have a special place in my heart for the people who occasionally try to prove Biblical fallibility by pointing out whales are not a type of fish. (this is going to end up being a metaphor for something, so bear with me) The argument goes like this. Jonah got swallowed by a whale. But the Bible says Jonah got swallowed by a big fish. So the Bible seems to think whales are just big fish. Therefore the Bible is fallible. Therefore, the Bible was not written by God. The first problem here is that "whale" is just our own modern interpretation of the Bible. For all we know, Jonah was swallowed by a really really really big herring. The second problem is that if the ancient Hebrews want to call whales a kind of fish, let them call whales a kind of fish. I'm not making the weak and boring claim that since they'd never discovered genetics they don't know better. I am making the much stronger claim that, even if the ancient Hebrews had taken enough of a break from murdering Philistines and building tabernacles to sequence the genomes of all known species of aquatic animals, there's nothing whatsoever wrong, false, or incorrect with them calling a whale a fish.

[self plagiarism notice: this is mostly copied from last year's contest announcement] 1. Announcing the second annual Adversarial Collaboration Contest An adversarial collaboration is an effort by two people with opposing opinions on a topic to collaborate on a summary of the evidence. Just as we hope that a trial with both prosecutor and defense will give the jury a balanced view of the evidence for and against a suspect, so we hope an adversarial collaboration will give readers a balanced view of evidence for and against some thesis. It's typically done for scientific papers, but I'm excited about the possibility of people applying the concept to to less formal writeups as well. For example, a pro-gun activist might collaborate with an anti-gun activist to write a joint article on the evidence for whether gun control saves lives. We trust each person to make sure the best evidence for their respective side is included. We also trust that they'll fact-check each other and make sure there aren't any errors or falsehoods in the final document. There might be a lot of debating, but it will happen on high-bandwidth informal channels behind the scenes and nobody will feel like they have tailor their debating to sounding good for an audience. Last year, SSC held an adversarial collaboration contest. You can see the entries here:

Ken Kesey, graduating college in Oregon with several wrestling championships and a creative writing degree, made a classic mistake: he moved to the San Francisco Bay Area to find himself. He rented a house in Palo Alto (this was the 1950s, when normal people could have houses in Palo Alto) and settled down to write the Great American Novel. To make ends meet, he got a job as an orderly at the local psych hospital. He also ran across some nice people called "MKULTRA" who offered him extra money to test chemicals for them. As time went by, he found himself more and more disillusioned with the hospital job, finding his employers clueless and abusive. But the MKULTRA job was going great! In particular, one of the chemicals, "LSD", really helped get his creative juices flowing. He leveraged all of this into his Great American Novel, One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest, and became rich and famous overnight. He got his hands on some extra LSD and started distributing it among his social scene – a mix of writers, Stanford graduate students, and aimless upper-class twenty-somethings. They all agreed: something interesting was going on here. Word spread. 1960 San Francisco was already heavily enriched for creative people who would go on to shape intellectual history; Kesey's friend group attracted the creme of this creme. Allan Ginsberg, Hunter S. Thompson, and Wavy Gravy passed through; so did Neil Cassady ("Dean Moriarty") Jack Keroauc's muse from On The Road. Kesey hired a local kid and his garage band to play music at his acid parties; thus began the career of Jerry Garcia and the Grateful Dead. Sometime in the early 1960s, too slow to notice right away, they transitioned from "social circle" to "cult". Kesey bought a compound in the redwood forests of the Santa Cruz Mountains, an hour's drive from SF. Beatniks, proto-hippies, and other seekers – especially really attractive women – found their way there and didn't leave. Kesey and his band, now calling themselves "the Merry Pranksters", accepted all comers. They passed the days making psychedelic art (realistically: spraypainting redwood trees Day-Glo yellow), and the nights taking LSD in massive group therapy sessions that melted away psychic trauma and the chains of society and revealed the true selves buried beneath (realistically: sitting around in a circle while people said how they felt about each other).

The gabapentinoids are a class of drugs vaguely resembling the neurotransmitter GABA. Although they were developed to imitate GABA's action, later research discovered they acted on a different target, the A2D subunit of calcium channels. Two gabapentinoids are approved by the FDA: gabapentin (Neurontin®) and pregabalin (Lyrica®). Gabapentin has been generic since 2004. It's commonly used for seizures, nerve pain, alcoholism, drug addiction, itching, restless legs, sleep disorders, and anxiety. It has an unusually wide dose range: guidelines suggest using anywhere between 100 mg and 3600 mg daily. Most doctors (including me) use it at the low end, where it's pretty subtle (read: doesn't usually work). At the high end, it can cause sedation, confusion, dependence, and addiction. I haven't had much luck finding patients a dose that works well but doesn't have these side effects, which is why I don't use gabapentin much. Pregabalin officially went generic last month, but isn't available yet in generic form, so you'll have to pay Pfizer $500 a month. On the face of things, pregabalin seems like another Big Pharma ploy to extend patents. The gabapentin patent was running out, so Pfizer synthesized a related molecule that did the same thing, hyped it up as the hot new thing, and charged 50x what gabapentin cost. This kind of thing is endemic in health care and should always be the default hypothesis. And a lot of scientists have analyzed pregabalin and said it's definitely just doing the same thing gabapentin is. But some of my anxiety patients swear by pregabalin. They call it a miracle drug. They can't stop talking about how great it is. I can't use it too often, because of the price, but I'm really excited about the upcoming generic version coming out so I can use it more often.

"You say it's important to overcome biases. So isn't it hypocritical that you're not trying to overcome whichever bias prevents you from realizing you're wrong and I'm right?" — everybody Correcting for bias is important. Learning about specific biases, like confirmation bias or hindsight bias, can be helpful. But bias arguments – "People probably only believe X because of their bias, so we should ignore people who say X" tend to be unproductive and even toxic. Why? 1. Everyone Is Biased All The Time You could accuse me of having a conservative bias. After all, I'm a well-off straight white man, a demographic well-known to lean conservative. If a liberal wanted to discount everything I say, or assume any conservative arguments I make come from self-serving motives, they've got all the ammunition they need. Or you could accuse me of having a liberal bias. After all, I'm a college-educated atheist Jewish psychiatrist in the San Francisco Bay Area. All of those demographics are well-known to lean liberal. If a conservative wanted to discount everything I say, or assume any liberal arguments I make come from self-serving motives, they're not short on ammunition either. This is a general phenomenon: for any issue, you can think of biases that could land people on one side or the other. People might be biased toward supporting moon colonization because of decades of sci-fi movies pushing space colonization as the wave of the future, or because Americans remember the moon landing as a great patriotic victory, or because big defense companies like Boeing will lobby for a project that would win them new contracts. Or people might be biased against moon colonization because of hidebound Luddite-ism, or an innate hominid preference for lush green forests and grasslands, or a pessimistic near-termism that rejects with payoffs more than a few years out. I personally might be biased towards moon colonization because I've been infected with the general Silicon Valley technophile mindset; or I personally might be biased against it because I'm a Democrat and Trump's been the loudest modern proponent of more moon missions.

[Related to: The Whole City Is Center] I. I got into an argument recently with somebody who used the word "lie" to refer to a person honestly reporting their unconsciously biased beliefs – her example was a tech entrepreneur so caught up in an atmosphere of hype that he makes absurdly optimistic predictions. I promised a post explaining why I don't like that use of "lie". This is that post. A few months ago, a friend confessed that she had abused her boyfriend. I was shocked, because this friend is one of the kindest and gentlest people I know. I probed for details. She told me that sometimes she needed her boyfriend to do some favor for her, and he wouldn't, so she would cry – not as an attempt to manipulate him, just because she was sad. She counted this as abuse, because her definition of "abuse" is "something that makes your partner feel bad about setting boundaries". And when she cried, that made her boyfriend feel guilty about his boundary that he wasn't going to do the favor. We argued for a while about whether this was a good definition of abuse (it isn't). But I had a bigger objection: this definition was so broad that everyone has committed abuse at some point. My friend could have countered that this was a feature, not a bug. Standards have been (and should be) getting stricter. A thousand years ago, beating your wife wasn't considered abuse as long as you didn't maim her or something. A hundred years ago, you could bully and belittle someone all you wanted, but as long as there was no physical violence it wasn't abuse. As society gets better and better at dealing with these issues, the definition of abuse gets broader. Maybe we should end up with a definition where basically everyone is an abuser.

I. In the old days, you had your Culture, and that was that. Your Culture told you lots of stuff about what you were and weren't allowed to do, and by golly you listened. Your Culture told you to work the job prescribed to you by your caste and gender, to marry who your parents told you to marry or at least someone of the opposite sex, to worship at the proper temples and the proper times, and to talk about proper things as opposed to the blasphemous things said by the tribe over there. Then we got Liberalism, which said all of that was mostly bunk. Like Wicca, its motto is "Do as you will, so long as it harms none". Or in more political terms, "Your right to swing your fist ends where my nose begins" or "If you don't like gay sex, don't have any" or "If you don't like this TV program, don't watch it" or "What happens in the bedroom between consenting adults is none of your business" or "It neither breaks my arm nor picks my pocket". Your job isn't to enforce your conception of virtue upon everyone to build the Virtuous Society, it's to live your own life the way you want to live it and let other people live their own lives the way they want to live them. This is the much-maligned "atomic individualism," or maybe just liberalism boiled down to its pure essence. But atomic individualism wasn't as great a solution as it sounded. Maybe one of the first cracks was tobacco ads. Even though putting up a billboard saying "SMOKE MARLBORO" neither breaks anyone's arm nor picks their pocket, it shifts social expectations in such a way that bad effects occur. It's hard to dismiss that with "Well, it's people's own choice to smoke and they should live their lives the way they want" if studies show that more people will want to live their lives in a way that gives them cancer in the presence of the billboard than otherwise.

Along with more specific questions, I asked people who took the SSC survey to rate their experience with the mental health system on a 1 – 10 scale. About 5,000 people answered. On average, they rated their experience with psychotherapy a 5.7, and their experience with medication also 5.7. This is more optimistic than a lot of the horror stories you hear would suggest. A lot of the horror stories involve inpatient commitment (which did get a dismal 4.4/10 approval rating) so I checked what percent of people engaging with the system ended up inpatient. Of people who had seen either a psychiatrist or therapist, only 7% had ever been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital. Note that this data can't tease out causation, so this doesn't mean 7% of people who saw an outpatient professional were later committed – it might just mean that lots of people got committed to the hospital by police, then saw a professional later. Going into more detail about what people did or didn't like (note truncated y-axis): I asked people what kind of therapy they did. People liked all schools of therapy about the same, except that they liked "eclectic" therapy that wasn't part of any specific school less than any school. Every school including eclectic got higher than 5.7, because people who wouldn't answer this question – who weren't even sure what kind of therapy they were doing – rated it less than any school or than eclectic therapy.

I already started analyzing the SSC survey data on fetishes, but I wanted to move on to look at dominance, submission, sadism, and masochism. Why might this be interesting? For one thing, some people have fetishes for things that seem, well…bad. Getting hurt. Letting other people control and abuse them. As if they have a drive toward weakness and unhappiness. This is kind of reminiscent of the self-sabotage and bad decisions some people make throughout their lives (for example, marrying a spouse who treats them the same way as an abusive parent). Sometimes I conceptualize this as them having a set point of low self-esteem and degradation that they try to enforce, regardless of its cost to their well-being. If this had the same roots as sexual masochism, that would be worth studying. But I didn't find anything interesting like that in the data. BDSM preferences were heavily gendered. Of people who expressed a preference, 71% of cis men preferred the dominant role, compared to only 16% of cis women (18% of trans women; insufficient sample size of trans men). This was such a big difference that gender swamped every other effect, so I limited the analysis to cis men from this point on, since they made up most of the sample. 80% of straight men preferred the dominant role, compared to only 34% of gay men. This was such a big difference that orientation swamped every other effect, so I limited the analysis to straight cis men from this point on. In order of importance, here are some factors that made the men in this sample more likely to be dominant, rather than submissive. All of these are self-rated:

I. I went to Antigua Guatemala in April. Their claim to fame is the world's biggest Easter celebration. I wasn't even there for Easter. I was three weeks early. But already the roads were choked with pre-parties, practice parades, and centurion cosplayers. I couldn't go out and grab dinner at 9 PM because all the streets looked like this Day. Night. The hours of the morning when tourists are trying to sleep and don't want loud Spanish singing outside their hotel windows. It didn't stop. Some people bore the floats on their backs (they weren't motorized, they had to be carried like a sedan chair). Other people crowded into empty lots and backyards, putting finishing touches on art or costumes or paraphernalia. Children and teenagers ran around in Easter purple, jockeying for the best spots on the parade routes. Civic dignitaries stood around, practicing looking important for their turn in the celebrations. I missed the scene in the Bible where a winged mechanical lion drags the body of Christ in an intricate silver juggernaut, but the Guatemalans definitely didn't. This was around the time I was reading about cultural evolution, so I couldn't help rehearsing some familiar conservative arguments. A shared religion binds people together. For a day, everyone is on the same side. That builds social trust and helps turn a city into a community. It was hard to argue with that. I'm no expert in Guatemala. I don't even speak Spanish. But for a little while, everybody, old and young, rich or poor, whatever one Guatemalan political party is and whatever the other Guatemalan political party is, were caught up in the same great wave, swept together by the glory of the Easter narrative. It was the sort of thing, I thought sadly to myself, that would never happen back in America, where we didn't have the same kind of shared religious purpose, where the liberal traditions like the separation of church and state prevented the same kind of all-consuming state-sponsored dedication to a single narrative. Right?

The saying goes: "Never offend people with style when you can offend them with substance". This is the same idea as "weirdness points": you can only bother people a certain amount before they go away. So if you have something important to bother them about, don't also bother them in random ways that don't matter. In writing about science or rationality, you already risk sounding too nerdy or out-of-touch with real life. This doesn't matter much if you're writing about black holes or something. But if you're writing about social signaling, or game theory, or anything else where the failure mode is sounding like an evil robot trying to reduce all of life to numbers, you should avoid anything that makes you sound even more like that evil robot. (yes, people on the subreddit, I'm talking about you) I'm not always great at this, but I'm improving, and here's the lowest-hanging fruit: if there are two terms for the same thing, a science term and an everyday life term, and you're talking about everyday life, use the everyday life term. The rest of this post is just commentary on this basic idea. 1. IQ -> intelligence. Don't use "IQ" unless you're talking about the result of an IQ test, talking about science derived from these results, or estimating IQ at a specific number. Otherwise, say "intelligence" (as a noun) or "smart" as an adjective. Wrong: "John is a very high-IQ person" Right: "John is a very smart person". Wrong: "What can I do if I feel like my low IQ is holding me back?" Right: "What do I do if I feel like my low intelligence is holding me back?" Acceptable: "The average IQ of a Nobel-winning physicist is 155". Acceptable: "Because poor childhood nutrition lowers IQ, we should make sure all children have enough to eat." 2. Humans -> people. This will instantly make you sound 20% less like an evil robot. Use "humans" only when specifically contrasting with another animal: Wrong: "I've been wondering why humans celebrate holidays." Right: "I've been wondering why people celebrate holidays." Acceptable: "Chimpanzees are much stronger than humans." 3. Males -> men, females -> women. You can still use "male" and "female" as adjectives if you really want. Wrong: "Why do so many males like sports?" Right: "Why do so many men like sports?" Acceptable, I guess: "Why do male sports fans drink so much?" Use "males" and "females" as nouns only if you're making a point that applies across animal species, trying overly hard to sound scientifically credible, or arguing some kind of complicated Gender Studies point that uses "man" and "male" differently. Acceptable: "In both rats and humans, males have higher testosterone than females." 4. Rational -> good, best, reasonable, etc. See eg here. Use "rational" when describing adherence to a good cognitive strategy; use "good" etc for things that have good results. Wrong: "What is the most rational diet?" Right: "What is the best diet?" Wrong: "Is it rational to invest in bonds?" Right: "Is it a good idea to invest in bonds?" Acceptable: "Are more rational people more likely to succeed in politics?" (if asking whether people who follow certain cognitive rules like basing their decisions on evidence will succeed more than those who don't. Notice that you cannot sensibly replace this with "good" or "best" – "Are better people more likely to succeed in politics?" is meaningless (unless you switch to the moral value of "better") 5. Optimal -> best. I feel kind of hypocritical for this one because the link above says to replace "rational" with "optimal". But if you really want to go all the way, replace "optimal" with "best", unless you have a specific reason for preferring the longer word. Wrong: "What's the optimal way to learn this material?" Right: "What's the best way to learn this material?" 6. Utility -> happiness, goodness. Use utility only when talking about utilitarian philosophy. Wrong: "Will getting more exercise raise my utility?" Right: "Will getting more exercise make me better off?" Wrong: "What is the highest-utility charity?" Right: "What is the best charity?" or "Which charity helps people the most?" The same applies to "utility function". Wrong: "My utility function contains a term for animal suffering." Right: "I care about animal suffering." 7. Autistic -> nerdy. Use autistic when referring to a psychiatric diagnosis or a complicated package of sensory and cognitive issues. Use "nerdy" when referring to people who are book-smart but lack social graces. Wrong: "Haha, my friends and I are so autistic, we talk about physics all the time." Right: "Haha, my friends and I are so nerdy, we talk about physics all the time." 8. Neoreactionary -> right-wing, far-right, reactionary. Use neoreactionary when talking specifically about the philosophy of Mencius Moldbug, if you think you've looked into it and understand it. If you're just referring to far-right ideas, use far-right.

1. According to the survey, only 13% of SSC commenters identify as rationalists. Almost none of the rationalists I know IRL comment on SSC. Saying "rationalist community" when you mean "SSC comments section" or vice versa will leave everybody pretty confused. 2. Not every blog by a Christian is "a Christian blog", and not every blog by a rationalist is "a rationalist blog". I would hope blogs by Christians don't go around praising Baal, and I try to have some minimum standards too, but I don't want to claim this blog is doing any kind of special "rationality" work beyond showing people interesting problems. 3. Or consider the difference between a church picnic and a monastery. Both have their uses, and the church picnic will hopefully avoid praising Baal, but there's a limit to how Christian!virtuous it can get without any structure or barriers to entry. A monastery can do much better by being more selective and carefully planned. Insofar as SSC makes any pretensions to being "rationalist", it's a rationalist picnic and not a rationalist monastery. 4. Everything above applies to SSC's engagement with effective altruism too, except 100x more. 5. I've been consistently skeptical of claims that rationality has much practical utility if you're already pretty smart and have good intuitions and domain-specific knowledge. There might be exceptions for some domains too new or weird to have evolved good specific knowledge, or where the incentives are so skewed that the specific knowledge will optimize for signaling rather than truly good work (and maybe 99% of value is in domains like this, so maybe I'm not saying much). In any case, if rationality has much practical utility for your everyday life, you won't find that practical utility here.

A few years ago, I wrote the online serial novel Unsong. Someday I want to get it published. But I want to fix it up before I try. I know publishers will have their own editors and their own demands. But I want something I'm happy with before I give it to someone else to tear apart. This post is to solicit feedback on what needs improvement and how it could be improved. I'm going to list some of my thoughts below. All of these are really spoiler-y. If you haven't read Unsong yet, you may not want to read further. If you have read it, I welcome your input. Simple Issues I've Already Kind Of Decided But Would Welcome Feedback On Anyway 1. I equivocate between the terms "Unitarians" and "Singers" pretty frequently, and it takes a bit of a stretch to establish everyone as Unitarians. Plan to excise the Unitarian plotline and just call that whole group of people "Singers" permanently. 2. Probably will delete Chapter 17, "No Earthly Parents I Confess" with the mythological birth of the Comet King, in favor of having the Comet King offhandedly mention his birth in Chapter 29, "Who Respects The Infant's Faith" (which he basically already does). I feel like Chapter 17 is a bit out of character for the rest of the book, and we don't really need to know anything about the Comet King's birth except that he was born of Comet West. I'm kind of sad I have to delete Comet West's speech, Aaron's digression on the word "maiden", and the cosmic significance of Roe v. Wade, but maybe I can shoehorn some of that in elsewhere (any suggestions?) 3. Probably will drop "the Harmonious Jade Dragon Empire" as a random gag when referring to China. More people were confused than amused, and the benefit from gagginess is probably lower than risk of being accused of racism or Orientalism or something. But then do I keep the story in Interlude Chet where someone golem-izes the Terracotta Army, or do I nix that as plot irrelevant?

I. Tyler Cowen writes about cost disease. I'd previously heard the term used to refer only to a specific theory of why costs are increasing, involving labor becoming more efficient in some areas than others. Cowen seems to use it indiscriminately to refer to increasing costs in general – which I guess is fine, goodness knows we need a word for that. Cowen assumes his readers already understand that cost disease exists. I don't know if this is true. My impression is that most people still don't know about cost disease, or don't realize the extent of it. So I thought I would make the case for the cost disease in the sectors Tyler mentions – health care and education – plus a couple more. First let's look at primary education: There was some argument about the style of this graph, but as per Politifact the basic claim is true. Per student spending has increased about 2.5x in the past forty years even after adjusting for inflation. At the same time, test scores have stayed relatively stagnant. You can see the full numbers here, but in short, high school students' reading scores went from 285 in 1971 to 287 today – a difference of 0.7%. There is some heterogenity across races – white students' test scores increased 1.4% and minority students' scores by about 20%. But it is hard to credit school spending for the minority students' improvement, which occurred almost entirely during the period from 1975-1985. School spending has been on exactly the same trajectory before and after that time, and in white and minority areas, suggesting that there was something specific about that decade which improved minority (but not white) scores. Most likely this was the general improvement in minorities' conditions around that time, giving them better nutrition and a more stable family life. It's hard to construct a narrative where it was school spending that did it – and even if it did, note that the majority of the increase in school spending happened from 1985 on, and demonstrably helped neither whites norminorities. I discuss this phenomenon more here and here, but the summary is: no, it's not just because of special ed; no, it's not just a factor of how you measure test scores; no, there's not a "ceiling effect". Costs really did more-or-less double without any concomitant increase in measurable quality. So, imagine you're a poor person. White, minority, whatever. Which would you prefer? Sending your child to a 2016 school? Or sending your child to a 1975 school, and getting a check for $5,000 every year? I'm proposing that choice because as far as I can tell that is the stakes here. 2016 schools have whatever tiny test score advantage they have over 1975 schools, and cost $5000/year more, inflation adjusted. That $5000 comes out of the pocket of somebody – either taxpayers, or other people who could be helped by government programs. Second, college is even worse: Note this is not adjusted for inflation; see link below for adjusted figures Inflation-adjusted cost of a university education was something like $2000/year in 1980. Now it's closer to $20,000/year. No, it's not because of decreased government funding, and there are similar trajectories for public and private schools. I don't know if there's an equivalent of "test scores" measuring how well colleges perform, so just use your best judgment. Do you think that modern colleges provide $18,000/year greater value than colleges did in your parents' day? Would you rather graduate from a modern college, or graduate from a college more like the one your parents went to, plus get a check for $72,000? (or, more realistically, have $72,000 less in student loans to pay off) Was your parents' college even noticeably worse than yours? My parents sometimes talk about their college experience, and it seems to have had all the relevant features of a college experience. Clubs. Classes. Professors. Roommates. I might have gotten something extra for my $72,000, but it's hard to see what it was. Third, health care. The graph is starting to look disappointingly familiar: